Commercial-financial dealings between the USSR and market-type economies with special reference to Soviet banking, maritime and trading operations in the West by Harrison, John Wesley
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
 
 
 
 
Theses Digitisation: 
https://www.gla.ac.uk/myglasgow/research/enlighten/theses/digitisation/ 
This is a digitised version of the original print thesis. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this work are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, 
without prior permission or charge 
 
This work cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, 
title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten: Theses 
https://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
research-enlighten@glasgow.ac.uk 
GOMMERGIAL-FINANCIAL DEALINGS BETWEEN THE USSR AND 
MARKET-TYPE ECONOMIES WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO 
SOVIET BANKING, MARITIME AND TRADING 
OPERATIONS IN THE WEST
by
John Wesley Harrison
A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor 
of Philosophy in the Faculty of Social 
Sciences, University of Glasgow
Institute of Soviet and East 
European Studies, University 
of Glasgow
November 1978
ProQuest Number: 10646985
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a com p le te  manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uesL
ProQuest 10646985
Published by ProQuest LLO (2017). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States C ode
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLO.
ProQuest LLO.
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.Q. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106- 1346
crwCTMï. tSTÆJ.
GLASGOW
UNIVERSITY! 
LIBRARY.
PREFACE
During the last decade there has been a marked expansion of Soviet 
commercial-financial dealings with market-type economies. The differ­
ences between East and West were so striking in the early 1960s that 
few analysts predicted that Soviet trade with the West would reach 
such proportions by the mid-1970s. Since the early 1970s, numerous 
technical co-operation agreements have been signed between the USSR 
and industrialised market-type economies. Prior to 1963, the USSR 
only owned a handful of companies and banks in the West, By the mid- 
1970s, nine Soviet banks and about eighty Soviet trading companies 
were operating in market-type economies. Before the mid-1960s, Sov­
iet merchant vessels were a rarity in the ports of industrialised West­
ern nations. Nowadays Soviet merchant vessels are rather commonplace 
in some major Western ports.
The main purpose of this thesis is to explain how the USSR con­
ducts its commercial-financial business with the West, Most of the
material in the thesis is connected with the contemporary period. How­
ever, this researcher also felt that it was important to trace the 
development of Russian-Soviet foreign economic policy so the reader 
can compare contemporary policies with those of the past. In dealing 
with contemporary Soviet foreign trade operations, this researcher 
decided that special emphasis should be placed on those operations 
which take place in market-type economies. This involved the study 
of a wide range of Soviet organisations which are based in the West,
Such organisations fall within three broad categories* (l) trading
ii
iii
companies, (2) banks, and (3) commercial organisations which have 
been set up on the basis of intergovernmental agreements. Since Sov­
iet maritime operations in the West have increased markedly it was 
necessary to include a chapter on the Soviet merchant fleet. In addi­
tion to the growth of Soviet commercial operations in the West, there 
has also been an increase in the amount of Western participation in 
industrial projects on Soviet soil. In the light of the fact that 
such projects could eventually play an important role in Soviet for­
eign trade, an attempt was made to cover some of the key points con­
nected with the use of foreign capital for the development of Soviet 
industries.
This researcher would have been unable to complete his work on 
the topic under consideration without the assistance of organisations 
and individuals in the United Kingdom, the United States and Western 
EJurope, My greatest debt is owed to my mentors at the University of 
Glasgow, Professor Alec Move and D, J, I. Matko, During the past 
three years both men have provided advice and encouragement for this 
researcher that went well beyond his best expectations. This researcher 
wishes to impart a special word of thanks to his 'self-appointed super­
visors' at the University of Glasgow, Rene Beerman, Roger Clarke and 
W, H. Balekjian, These men were also a constant source of advice and 
encouragement. My language tutors, Tanya Ticktin and N, Yakovleva-Birkett, 
also deserve a special word of thanks for helping me gain a reading 
knowledge of Russian, This researcher is also indebted to the University 
of Glasgow, the U.S. Veterans Administration and Cass and Kathrine 
Harrison for their financial support. Other individuals who helped 
this researcher over the last three years include Leo Dobes, Vladimir 
Kusin, Evan Mawdsley, W. L. Newman, L, Sire, J. G, Zielinski and espe­
cially my colleague Ronnie Kowalski. This researcher also acknowledges
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the assistance provided by government and private organisations which 
have been mentioned in the thesis. All errors, omissions and oversights 
are the responsibility of this researcher.
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SUMMARY
The main purpose of this thesis is to explain how the USSR conducts 
its commercial-financial business with market-type economies. Special 
emphasis was placed on Soviet commercial-financial operations which 
take place in the West, Chapter I is primarily an overview of Soviet 
economic dealings with the West since the October Revolution. A brief 
summation of Russian foreign economic policy is included in CHAPTER I 
to give the reader an opportunity to compare developments in the post­
revolutionary period with developments in the pre-revolutionary period, 
CHAPTER II is concerned with Soviet organisations and personnel 
in the West. Most of the chapter is devoted to the study of Western- 
based joint-stock (trading) companies which are either wholly or par­
tially owned by the USSR, Official Soviet trade representations, joint 
intergovernmental commissions and Soviet foreign trade missions are 
also covered in some detail.
Western participation in USSR-based industrial projects is cov­
ered in CHAPTER III, Three types of industrial projects are discussed* 
compensatory projects, barter projects and non-compensatory projects,
A fair amount of time was spent on compensatory projects as they appear 
to be one solution to the USSR's rising hard currency indebtedness,
CHAPTER IV deals with the financing of Soviet trade with indus­
trialised market-type economies and less-developed (market-type) coun­
tries. A large portion of this chapter is devoted to the operations 
of the Foreign Trade Bank of the USSR, Other topics falling within 
CHAPTER IV include Soviet invisible trade, gold sales and indebtedness«
xiii
XIV
The operations of Soviet foreign-based banks are discussed in 
CHAPTER V, The chapter begins with an historical account of the USSR's 
activities in Eurocurrency markets. After this introduction, the oper­
ations of individual Soviet foreign-based banks are covered in some 
detail. Such operations are not always connected with Soviet foreign 
trade.
CHAPTER VI is concerned with the development and operations of 
the Soviet merchant fleet. Prior to 1965» the Soviet merchant fleet 
was regarded as underdeveloped. At this time Soviet ships are capable 
of competing with the most up-to-date Western merchant vessels, Sov­
iet maritime activities in the West have increased to such an extent 
that Western governments are now considering ways of curbing the oper­
ations of Soviet merchant vessels.
The restraints on Soviet economic operations in the West are 
covered in CHAPTER VII, Generally speaking, Soviet organisations are 
permitted to carry out their operations in the West in a free fashion. 
However, this situation could change if Soviet organisations become 
a real threat to Western entrepreneurs, CHAPTER VII also covers the 
problems which would arise if the USSR decides to join selected West­
ern-dominated international economic organisations. Since currency 
convertibility is a pre-condition for joining some international econ­
omic organisations, the prospects for ruble convertibility were dis­
cussed at the end of this chapter.
The idea of Russian cultural isolation is a myth in the field 
of economics. No other country so peculiarly re-created economic ideas 
and attempted to adjust them immediately to its own conditions,
— J . F, Normano
However different their ideology and internal institutions, STEs 
/™Soviet”type economies^ still trade like capitalists,
— P. J, D. Wiles
It is impossible for us to enter the world market in a strait- 
jacket of our internal customs and traditional planning, production, 
and transportation, relying solely on the laws of the internal market. 
It is necessary to be on the level of the demands of the world market. 
Being on this level will not dejiage our planned economy or our laws 
of socialist production, nor most of all will it destroy our commun­
ist ideology. On the other hand, a principle like that will teach 
us much and make us more powerful in. the competitive struggle with 
capitalism,
— N, Smelyakov
CHAPTER I
AN OVERVIEW OF RUSSIAN-SOVIET FOREIGN ECONOMIC
POLICY
Pre-revolutionary Commercial Operations
The level of Russia's commercial-financial penetration into foreign 
economies was never as impressive as the level of Soviet commercial- 
financial penetration into foreign economic systems. With few except­
ions, Tsarist Russia enjoyed little commercial success outside its 
immediate sphere of influence. To a large extent this shortcoming 
can be attributed to the marked territorial growth of the country which 
took place between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries. This growth
1
2was primarily the result of Russia's successful wars against the Tar­
tars, Poles, Lithuanians, Swedes and Turks, and the eastward colonisa­
tion of Russians who witnessed various types of opposition from the 
Asiatic peoples of Siberia,^ It is thei'efore not surprising that Tsar­
ist Russia failed to extend its commercial operations to all corners 
of the earth while the country's leaders were struggling to maintain 
their authority over a vast number of culturally different peoples 
at various stages of economic development.
These conquests by no means weakened Russia's economic position. 
Indeed, this territorial expansion was responsible for bringing addit­
ional markets and vast stores of natural resources under the control
2
of the Russian state. Furthermore, the territorial gains meant that 
Russia's sphere of influence eventually reached the Pacific, Baltic, 
Caspian and Black Sea coasts, and deep into Eastern Europe, providing 
better access to markets in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East.
As early as the eighteenth century Russia began showing some 
interest in markets far beyond its borderlands. For example, Russia 
sought possession of the Dardanelles which would have given Russian 
traders ready access to the Mediterranean Sea,^ Interest in this re­
gion was based upon a need to establish an outlet for the wheat, coal, 
pig iron and petroleum produced in the southern part of Russia and 
the manufactured goods produced in the Moscow area.
In the early 1700s Russia was successful in extending its in­
fluence into North America, The expedition of the Kamchatka Cossacks 
from 1711-1715» and the commercial expeditions of the merchants Sere- 
bryannikov, Trapeznikov and others between 1730 and 1740, resulted 
in the occupation of the Aleutian and Kurile islands,^ Following the 
occupation of the two islands the Russian merchant and explorer Shel- 
ekhov led a private trade expedition along the coast of Alaska, His
3expeditionary force established a number of settlements and commercial 
outlets in Ale.ska, In 1797t the United American Company (later called 
the Russo-American Trading Company) was set up to exploit Russia's new 
colony. The operations of the United American Company extended Russia's 
influence to many parts of Alaska, In I8l2, the company founded sev­
eral Russian colonies in California,5
From the middle of the nineteenth century to the October Revolu­
tion in 1917, Russia made numerous attempts to penetrate foreign mar­
kets, Turkey was one of the first countries to experience the Russian 
commercial offensive during this period, Turkey's proximity made it 
an ideal market for Russian consumer goods, A number of these products 
were reportedly inexpensive which gave Russian traders an opportunity 
to establish a firm foothold in the market.^  In some areas— primarily 
in Constantinople, along the Black Sea coast of Asia Minor, and along 
the Mediterranean Sea coast— Russian commodities often dominated local 
markets. For example, in Constantinople, Russian textiles, tableware 
and sugar had virtually no competition until the end of the nineteenth 
century.
In the mid-l890s Russia began to lose some of its influence in 
Turkish markets as a result of stiff competition from rapidly expand­
ing German industries. This commercial onslaught was doubly damaging 
for the Russians since Germany entered the region with both its pop­
ular products from light industries and financial resources. Within 
a short period of time Germany acquired a position of leadership in 
the industrial and banking circles of Turkey, Only Russian goods which 
did not compete with the output of German industries (e,g,, flour and 
sugar) maintained their strong position in Constantinople,*^
Russia's commercial penetration into Iran (Persia) was compar­
atively more successful. For some time, however, British-commodities
4and capital (i.e., financial resources) hampered Russian trading oper­
ations in this region. In an attempt to end this competitive struggle, 
Britain and Russia signed an agreement in 1907 which established spheres 
of influence in Iran for both countries, Britain agreed to operate 
within the southern region of the country which contained petroleum 
resources and important sea ports. The northern part of Iran, which
was more developed and had better markets, fell within Russia's sphere 
8
of influence,
Russian commercial influence in Iran was quite impressive. In 
the latter half of the l890s the amount of commodities sold to Iran 
by all West European countries combined was less than Russia's exports 
to Iran,^  Moreover, Russian economic penetration into Iran did not 
merely involve the sale of commodities. During the l890s, Russia es­
tablished the Persian Loan Bank which attracted a fair amount of Rus­
sian capital into the Iranian economy. A sizeable amount of this cap­
ital was utilised for building railways, mining coal and extracting 
petroleum. Between 1900 and 1902, Russia granted Iran two loans total­
ling 32.5 million rubles^^ (approximately E3.6 million or $17.1 mil­
lion at that time),
Russian commercial penetration into the Far East took place be­
fore the seventeenth century. Following the conquest of Siberia, Russia 
established commercial relations with China and Mongolia. The Siber­
ian Railroad facilitated the importation of Mongolian wool and animal 
skins for the Russian textile and leather industries as well as the 
exportation of Russian industrial output to Mongolia, China proved 
to be an excellent market for goods from Moscow's light industries 
in addition to being a major supplier of tea for Russian consumers, 
Manchuria and Korea were also vital sources of raw materials 
as well as important markets for goods produced in Russian industries.
5In addition, both regions represented promising markets for Russian 
capital. The construction of the 375 million-ruble Chinese Eastern 
Railroad in Manchuria during the latter half of the nineteenth century 
and Russian participation in timber and other concessions in the Far 
East were, according to Lyashchenko, 'forms of "capital export" quite 
new (and rather "adventurous" in character) for Russian capitalism*
Russia's Operations in World Financial Markets
Tsarist Russia was never regarded as a major exporter of capital, Rus­
sia's capital exports were usually limited to a few underdeveloped 
countries (e.g., China and Iran), In world markets Russian capital 
played a subordinate role vis-à-vis West European capital. But this 
is not the entire story. As we shall learn, during the two decades 
immediately preceding World War I the Russian government and Russian 
businessmen borrowed large amounts of foreign capital in order to main­
tain their operations. Consequently, the Russian financial system 
became quite dependent on foreign loans. Lyashchenko states*
. . .  in the general world system of finance capital the expansion 
of Russian capital in other countries was not especially noticeable; 
only in the Eastern policy of Russian imperialism was such finan­
cial expansion evident. In its relations with Western capitalist 
systems the Russian financial-capitalist system was itself the 
object of exploitation by Western financial s y s t e m s , ^2
It is interesting to note that Russia's first 'regular state 
loans' were contracted in foreign m a r k e t s , T h e  first foreign loan 
for the Russian government was arranged in Amsterdam in I769. Russia's 
initial creditors were private banking houses in the Netherlands and 
Italy. Prior to I892, the Russian government's foreign indebtedness 
did not exceed 1,5 billion rubles, and the growth of the debt was reg­
ulated rather c l o s e l y , ( F o r  the sake of comparison, Russia's ordin­
ary budgetary revenue in I89O amounted to 943.7 million rubleso^^)
6However, after 1892, Russia's foreign indebtedness increased markedly. 
In fact, it grew to such proportions that just before the outbreak of 
World War I, Russia's foreign debt was the largest in the world. Even 
as early as I906, a German v/riter made the following remark concern­
ing Russia's precarious financial situation: 'Never in the history
of this earth has any nation contracted so huge a foreign indebtedness 
as Russia
Over half of Russia's foreign debt was contracted during the 
two decades immediately preceding World War I, Foreign loans ob­
tained by the Russian government during this twenty-year period were 
primarily used for economic purposes (e.g., the construction of rail­
roads), whereas many of the loans contracted before 1892 were report­
edly used for political reasons. According to Moulton and Pasvolskyi
Before I892, the industrial development of Russia had not begun; 
hence there was little foreign borrowing for development purposes 
in Russia, Most of the existing debt had been incurred for pol­
itical rather than commercial purposes,17
Indeed, the wars which involved Russia from the 1760s to the latter 
half of the nineteenth century— sporadic wars with Turkey, Sweden, 
Poland and Iran; the Napoleonic wars under Alexander I; and the Cri­
mean War— had a devastating impact on the Russian economy. Some of 
the financial consequences of Russia’s foreign policy during the per­
iod under consideration are provided by Olga Crisp*
Ever since Russia had attained the status of a great power in the 
eighteenth century the military requirements for the maintenance 
of that position imposed on the Russian treasury a task of a mag­
nitude disproportionate to the largely natural economy of the coun­
try and the poverty of its people. This imbalance led to chronic 
budgetary deficits, despite increased taxation, and recourse to 
the printing press and foreign l o a n s . 18
In the final analysis Russia's foreign policy not only placed a huge 
financial burden on the country but also perpetuated the backwardness 
of the Russian economic system by demanding the use of potential in­
vestment capital for military and other unproductive purposes,19
7A number of Russia's financial problems stemmed from the country's 
unstable and inconvertible paper currency, (ibe reader should note 
that under the gold standard, currencies were classified as inconvert­
ible if they could not be converted into gold. Although the ruble was 
classified as inconvertible until 1897» it could be exchanged for for­
eign currencies during the period of inconvertibility.) The deprecia- 
ating ruble often discouraged long-term foreign investment in Russia, 
Even short-term foreign credits were apt to be influenced by Russia's 
economic (and political) problems rather than the projected profitabil­
ity of the business arrangement. Perhaps the most serious argument 
against commercial agreements with Russia was based on the assumption 
that the ruble's instability made Russian tariff concessions illusory. 
Furthermore, government financial organs were placed in difficult pos­
itions since foreign loans to Russia often called for payments in gold 
or silver (or metal-based currencies) while state revenue m s  usually 
collected in the form of inconvertible paper currency.
During the l880s and 1890s paper rubles and Russian securities 
came under heavy pressure in foreign markets, A press campaign in 
Germany against Russia's creditworthiness caused a panic amongst Ger­
man holders of Russian bonds. It was fortunate that France was seeking 
to strengthen its economic relations with Russia at that time. As a 
result, French investors were happy to purchase discarded Russian se­
curities from the Berlin bourse. But the paper ruble did not fare so 
well. After serving as a means of promoting commercial operations 
between Germany and Russia for over a decade the paper ruble became 
an object of speculation in the Berlin foreign currency market during 
the early 1890s. It is interesting to note that Germans were not the 
only speculators, Russian banks, trading companies, and even Russia's 
Finance Minister, I, A, Vyshnegradsky, participated in these speculative
8activities.
Vyshnegradsky's successor, S, X. Witte, recognised at least one 
inherent shortcoming of the Russian economy. The economic backwardness 
of the country stemmed, to a large extent, from the fact that Russia’s 
very existence depended upon a successful harvest. Witte decided that 
a policy of rapid industrialisation would correct this lopsided char­
acteristic of the economy. He made no effort to conceal the fact that 
foreign capital would play a vital role in this scheme.
Since foreign capital would act as an important agent of Russian 
economic growth Witte took steps to improve Russia's credit position 
with industrialised countries in the West, In the mid-l890s he made 
speculative ruble transactions, within Russia, illegal, and placed 
Russian money markets under strict control. By waging a campaign of 
counter-speculation against the Berlin money market Witte was successful 
in bringing about a diminution of foreign ruble speculation,^^ At 
that time all leading industrialised nations had adopted the gold stand­
ard and Witte realised Russia would have to follow suit in order to 
strengthen its external financial position. In 1897, the Russian ruble 
became convertible. For a brief period Witte's policies were success­
ful beyond most expectations. Indeed, foreign investment in Russia 
grew so rapidly during the late 1890s that it exceeded the amount of 
foreign investment channelled into the Russian economy during the pre­
ceding two or three decades.
On Russia's ForeiCTi Indebtedness
Before analysing any data on Russia's foreign indebtedness it might 
be worthwhile to study some of the distinctions between the external 
commercial operations of Russia and those of other industriadised nations.
9For the sake of brevity Russia will only be compared with Germany,
At the end of the nineteenth century Germany was an industrialised 
nation which relied on imported foodstuffs and raw materials. Exports 
of manufactured products from German industries paid for a sizeable 
portion of these imports. But it is significant to note that Germany 
had other means of financing its imports— shipping, insurance, banking 
services, and the proceeds from foreign investments,^^ In the decades 
immediately preceding World War I these sources of income not only 
paid for the country's imports but also provide Germany with capital 
which could be invested abroad. On the other hand Russia was consid­
ered a backward industrialised nation which imported some foodstuffs 
and many manufactured commodities, and exported sizeable amounts of 
agricultural products and raw materials. Moreover, Russia, unlike 
Germany, provided very few services for foreigners. As a result, Rus­
sia's visible exports were responsible for covering virtually all for­
eign debts. In other words, such exports were required to pay for 
imported goods (including precious metals) and technical assistance 
(e.g., foreign technicians employed in Russian industries); insurance 
and banking and transport services; expenditures of Russian tourists and 
official representatives abroad; interest on state-contracted loans, mun­
icipal bonds and government-guaranteed railroad bonds held abroad; 
and interest and dividends on private industrial securities (i.e., 
stocks and bonds) held by foreigners,^^'
We should now turn our attention to TABLE 1,1. Except for a 
deficit in 1899» Russia maintained a favourable balance of (visible) 
trade during the period 1894-1913* (The overall deficits recorded 
from 1896-1899 were most likely the result of Witte's policy of im­
porting gold to establish/maintain the convertible ruble.) Some of 
the (visible) trade surpluses achieved between 1894 and I913 were
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TABLE 1.1
RUSSIA’S FOREIGN TRADE, 1894-1916 
(in millions of gold rubles)
Year Trade balance Bullion and 
specie balance
Net trade and
bullion-speoie
balance
Exports Imports Net Exports Imports Net
1894 672 562 110 42 131 -89 21
1895 698 545 153 1 38 -37 116
1896 689 590 99 2 118 -116 -17
1897 727 560 167 13 209 -196 -29
1898 733 617 116 5 132 -127 -11
1899 627 650 -23 51 82 -31 —54
1900 716 626 90 134 34 100 190
1901 762 594 168 72 18 54 222
1902 860 599 261 7 • 14 -7 254
1903 1,001 682 319 5 28 -23 296
1904 1,006 651 355 39 26 13 368
1905 1,077 635 442 47 64 -17 425
1906 1,095 801 294 18 38 -20 274
1907 1,053 847 206 13 11 2 208
1908 998 913 85 19 28 -9 76
1909 1,428 906 522 27 46 -19 503
1910a 1,449 1,084 365
I9II& 1,591 1,162 429
1912a 1,519 1,172 3471913a 1,520 1,374 146
1914a 956 1,098 -142
I915& 402 1,139 -737
1916a 476 1,717 ■-1,241
&Data on bullion and specie movements after 1909 are not given 
in official Russian reports.
Source* Harold G, Moulton and Leo Pasvolsky, Russian Debts and 
Russian Reconstruction (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1924), p. 16."*"
rather large (e.g., 4^1*2 million rubles in 1905? 522 million in 1909; 
and 429 million in 1911). But in spite of Russia's favourable balance 
of (visible) trade Moulton and Pasvolsky have shown that the country's 
foreign indebtedness increased by about 2,5 billion rubles (rou^ly 
£264 million) during the two decades immediately preceding World War 1.^5 
A large portion of this debt stemmed from the fact that Russia's ex-
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port surpluses during the period 1894-1913 were usually inadequate to
cover interest charges on foreign loans and obligations connected with
foreign technical s e r v i c e s . Russia's pre-war financial plight is
summed up by Alexander Baykov *
Of the fifty-three years from 1860-1913, Russia had only twelve
years with a negative balance of trade, and over this period taken 
as a whole, her exports were 6.5 billion (6,593,843,000) rubles
higher than her imports, and all this export surplus was swallow­
ed by the service on loans and payments for other invisible imports, '
In 1914, Russia suffered its first trade deficit since 1899.
This led to a sharp increase in Russian borrowing operations. But the 
worst was yet to come. During the initial stages of World War I Rus­
sia's foreign trade position steadily deteriorated to the point where 
imports were three and one-half times the level of exports at the end 
of 1916. Moreover, war loans totalling 7,681 million rubles (roughly 
E812 million) doubled Russia's foreign indebtedness. In the period 
immediately preceding the October Revolution Russia's foreign debt 
amounted to approximately 13,823 million rubles (roughly £1,461 million). 
TABLE 1.2 gives a breakdown of Russia's pre-revolutionary foreign debt.
It might be interesting to note that Russia's entire annual national 
income for the period 1915/1916 would have been required to cover all 
of the country's outstanding foreign debts just prior to the October 
Revolution,
On Some of the Shortcomings of Russia's Foreign 
Economic Policy
By the latter half of the nineteenth century it was clear that foreign 
trade would play a key role in the development of the Russian economy. 
As a result, Russia's export potential had to be continually upgraded 
in order to meet the rising level of visible and invisible imports.
But despite the demands placed upon it, Russia's export sector failed
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TABLE 1.2
RUSSIA'S PRE-REVOLUTIONARY FOREIGN DEBT 
(in millions of gold rubles)
Pre-war state debt 3,850
Government-guaranteed loans* 87O
Municipal loans 422
Industrial investment 2,000
War loans^ 6,681
Total 13,823
*In most cases, loans obtained by selling bonds of privately 
owned railroads which carried a guarantee of the Imperial government,
^Moulton and Pasvolsky accepted the sum of 7,681 million rubles 
as the nominal value of foreign war loans to Russia, However, when 
making their calculations they reduced this figure by 1,000 million 
rubles in order to allow for the Russian gold shipped abroad during 
the war (640 million rubles to the Allied, nations and 120 million to 
Germany under the treaty of Brest-Litovsk which fell into the hands 
of the Allied nations after the Armistice) plus Russian bank accounts 
and property in creditor nations.
Source: Moulton and Pasvolsky, Russian Debts . , ,, p. 21,
to evolve satisfactorily. To a certain extent this grave shortcoming 
stemmed from the fact that Russians seldom regarded their country's 
foreign trade sector as a significant part of the national economy,
Russia's failure to build a merchant fleet tailored to its import 
and export operations might have been a costly oversight. When Russia 
began to step up its foreign trade in the 1900s such activity was 
highly dependent on maritime transport.But at the turn of the cen­
tury the Russian merchant fleet was a rather insignificant part of 
the country's foreign trade sector,^0 a decade later the Russian mer­
chant fleet was still in an underdeveloped condition and only accounted 
for just over 5 percent of the country's maritime transport.
The years passed, yet Russia, as before, lagged behind other 
countries in the number of ships and the overall tonnage of the 
merchant fleet. In I9IO, the entire Russian merchant fleet con­
sisted of 925 steamships and 2,494 sailing vessels with a com­
bined carrying capacity of 720,437 registered tons. Not more 
than 13 percent of the ships had a displacement of 1,000-4,000
13
tons.
The carrying capacity of the Russian merchant fleet was 23 
times less than the British, 3 times less than the German, and 
just a little over 2 times less than the merchant fleet of such 
a small country as Norway, The old age of Russian ships, their 
slowness and uneconomical engines, made the operational costs of 
the merchant fleet very high; so it is not surprising that in 1910, 
it /"i.e., the Russian merchant fleet__7 only provided 5.3 percent 
of Russia's maritime transport.31
In 1912, over 90 percent of the shipping charges for Russian seaborne
32exports were paid to non-Russian carriers.^ In the final analysis 
Russia not only paid enormous sums for transport services to and from 
its ports but also deprived itself of earnings from the world cargo 
market,
Russia's underdeveloped merchant fleet was not solely responsible 
for the failure of Russia's foreign trade sector to keep in step with 
its foreign counterparts. Other reasons for Russia's weak foreign 
economic policy include the country's feudalistic background, under­
developed banking system and unstable currency. It has also been 
suggested that the Russian government was responsible for subordina­
ting foreign commerce to the country’s fiscal policy at a time when 
the governments of other industrialised nations shied away from the 
rigid control of external trade, 33 But perhaps Russia's foreign econ­
omic operations were hindered most of all by the lack of competitive 
zeal in Russian traders. According to Olga Crisp, 'Russia's trade 
remained essentially ps,ssive, in the sense that the trading initiative 
usually came from foreigners, that Russians rarely ventured to the 
West to seek out trading opportunities’, 34
Crisp's argument is supported by M, Zhirmunski who maintained 
that Russian industries producing commodities for export seldom had 
direct contact with foreign markets as the exportation of Russian goods 
was almost completely managed by foreign firms both in Russia and abroad. 
Since most Russian companies showed little concern for the competitive­
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ness of their output destined for export 2hirmunski concluded that
only 'inferior' Russian commodities were familiar to foreign consumers.
The foreign firms exported goods from Russia in an almost primitive 
form and unsorted. They deliberately created a bad reputation for 
Russian goods, in order to be able to pay abnormally low prices.
After export, these 'inferior' goods were subjected to a certain 
degree of cleaning, sorting and preparation, and were then sold at 
considerably higher prices, but no longer as Russian goods.35
Now a few Russian businessmen ventured into foreign markets.
For example, in I9II, the Anglo-Russian Bank was established in London 
by a group of British and Russian businessmen. However, one report 
claims that the primary objective of the Anglo-Russian Bank was to gain 
control of the Russian Commercial and Industrial Bank in St, Peters­
burg, 3^ From this information one could assume that the Anglo-Russian 
Bank was initially more interested in (domestic) banking operations 
in Russia rather than foreign commerce. During World War I the Moscow 
Narodny Bank set up offices in London and New York to help finance the 
foreign trade of Russian co-operative organisations. In 1917, the 
All-Russian Central Union of Consumers* Societies (Tsentrosoyuz) estab­
lished a London office to promote the foreign trade of its co-operative 
organisations. But as we shall learn a little later, these offices 
did not begin any meaningful commercial/financial operations until 
the early 1920s.
The view is widely held that Russia lacked capital, technology 
and entrepreneurship at a time when rapid industrialisation was taking 
place in other industrialised countries. In the 1890s foreign business­
men equipped with unique skills and ideas were responsible for consider­
ably increasing Russia's industrial capabilities. According to J, P. 
McKay, these businessmen 'helped infuse a missing dynamism and growth 
outlook into Russia*.3^ By the late I89OS a sizeable number of Russ­
ian businessmen were successfully competing with foreign investors.
After 1908, Russian banks played a key role in the country's invest-
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ment process by providing Russian industries with capital from local 
and foreign financial markets. During the same period the more mature 
Russian-owned industries were quite successful in selling their secur­
ities in Western Europe, In brief, the inculcation of foreign business 
techniques was so successful in stimulating Russian ingenuity that 
some foreign entrepreneurs were concerned they would lose control of 
their business operations in Russia,38 Although S, S, Katzenellenbaum 
criticised Russia for lagging 'behind other countries in all that is 
characteristic of economic progress' he acknowledged that a number 
of favourable economic changes had taken place in Russia a few years 
prior to World War 1,39
So, Tsarist Russia might have emerged as a sagacious internation­
al commercial-financial operator after World War I if the Bolsheviks 
had procrastinated. It is a most interesting problem which deserves 
additional research. However, the topic lies beyond the scope of this 
undertalcing. As we learned previously, Russia's export potential fell 
sharply during the war while the country's imports increased signifi­
cantly, This led to a marked increase in Russia's foreign indebted­
ness. By 1916, it was obvious that Russia would have to undergo an 
economic transformation in order to meet the demands of its creditors. 
But the October Revolution in 191? eliminated the possibility of this 
transformation taking place under Russian rule.
In spite of Its commercial-financial woes Russia was regarded as an 
integral part of the world economy during the twenty years immediate­
ly preceding World War I. In I896, Russia occupied sixth place in the
40world in terms of foreign trade turnover. According to estimates,
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exports comprised over 10 percent of Russia's gross national product 
in 1913;^^ a- respectable figure for a country endowed with such a 
diverse natural resource base. These exports (especially grain, tim­
ber, petroleum, manganese, and flax) were vital to a number of coun­
tries including Britain, France and Germany. It is also important to 
remember that Russia was a huge market for the manufactured commodit­
ies of countries in Western Europe and North America, Alexander Ger- 
schenkron provides an insight into the problems connected with Russia's 
departure from world markets.
It is well to recall how great was the damage inflicted upon the 
world and especially the European economy by Russia's withdrawal 
from the world market after the First World War. It was not solely, 
and not even primarily, the disappearance of Russian grain exports. 
Yet their stoppage caused, temporarily, a serious deficiency in 
the supply of cereals and necessitated a considerable readjustment 
of production. Similarly, the discontinuation of exports of Rus­
sian aspen created, for some years, considerable difficulties in 
the English match industry. In some cases the damage proved al­
most irreparable. The hog-raising regions in northwestern Germany 
were largely based on supplies of Russian barley. This was a true 
case of international specialization. When Russian exports ceased, 
other sources had to be used but a really satisfactory substitute 
was never found. More important was the fact that central Europe 
found herself deprived of an important market for her merchandise 
exports, and western Europe lost a large and traditional market 
for her capital exports.42
Early Soviet Foreign Economic Policy
Even when the smoke had cleared from the October Revolution and civil 
war Lenin was confronted with a number of pressing problems. The econ­
omy was in a chaotic condition and the political position of Soviet 
Russia in the international arena was far from desirable. Moreover, 
Soviet Russia's creditworthiness had been all but destroyed following 
the revolutionary government's decision to renounce the debts of Tsarist 
Russia,
While the Bolsheviks were revolting in Russia Lenin had many
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reasons to suspect a similar revolution would take place in Germany,
This was only the beginning. After Germany was tucked away in the 
socialist camp the revolutionary movement was bound to spread like 
wildfire. With socialism prevailing in many parts of the world the 
Soviet state would not be faced with the painful task of establishing 
commercial relations with hostile countries. But of course, the rev­
olution in Germany did not materialise and Soviet Russia was forced 
to go it alone. As a result, Lenin was faced with a dilemma. On the 
one hand it would be dangerous to isolate the Soviet state from the 
rest of the world at the height of economic despair. By forcing the 
citizenry to bear additional hardships Lenin might have brought about 
his own downfall. But how far would the Bolsheviks have to stoop in 
order to trade with market-type economies (MTEs )? (At this point it 
should be mentioned that MTEs represent both industrialised and develop­
ing market-type economies in the West,)
Lenin's desire to trade with MTEs was widely known outside Soviet 
Russia, When asked about the prospects for economic relations with 
America Lenin repliedi 'We are resolutely for an economic understand­
ing with America— with all countries but especially with America', 43 
(it is interesting to note that Lenin's statement was published in 
the Chicago Daily News on 27 October 1919, but was not officially pub­
lished in Russian until 1942,) Now the real problems connects with 
East-West trade during the early stages of Soviet rule were most like­
ly political and not economic. An economic justification for trade 
could be found without too much trouble but how to establish commercial 
relations with MTEs was entirely another matter,
Lenin often used the works of Karl Marx to support his oim in­
clinations, It is not surprising Lenin obtained so much of his rev­
olutionary fervour from the philosopher-economist since Marx left no 
doubt (at least in Lenin's mind) that economics is subordinate to pol-
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itics,^ Indeed, for well over a century Marxist (economic) theory 
has sought to expose the evils of capitalist exploitation. Those who 
follow the writings of Marx per se favour the absolute elimination 
of capitalist society and the subsequent building of a communist (utop­
ian) state.
There is little doubt that Lenin was interested in setting up 
a Marxist-type economy. This was not going to be an easy task as Marx 
himself failed to paint a lucid picture of the socialist economic sys­
tem, 45 Lenin's scheme to establish 'communist production and distrib­
ution' (i.e., the exchange of goods and services on the basis of com­
modity payments as opposed to commodity transfers on the basis of mon­
ey) in Soviet Russia immedie^tely following the revolution might have 
been an attempt to put Marxist theory into practice. However, the 
plan was unsuccessful and Lenin was forced to take a more moderate 
approach to solving the country's economic problems,4^
Lenin undoubtedly experienced problems if he attempted to form­
ulate Soviet foreign economic policy on the basis of Marxist (economic) 
theory. According to Gottfried Haberler, Marx had nothing to say about 
the foreign trade problems of the socialist state.4? However, Lenin 
could have considered using Marx's discussions on the labour theory 
of value for the purpose of establishing prices for Soviet exports 
(i.e., the value of Soviet exports could have been based on the amount 
of labour required to produce these commodities). But such a scheme 
was useless since world market prices are not established according 
to the labour theory of value. Quite simply, in the world market com­
modities are exchanged (and prices are determined) on the basis of 
supply and demand. As commodities become more scarce their prices 
tend to increase. On the other hand, as commodities become more abun­
dant their prices tend to fall. In the world market, prices must sat­
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isfy both buyers and producers/sellers (i.e., under most conditions 
producers/sellers must offer commodities at prices which will cover 
production and marketing costs as well as satisfy the demands of buy­
ers), Moreover, international commercial operations are often conduct­
ed on the basis of the theory of comparative advantage (or theory of 
comparative costs). In a nutshell the theory shows that most countries 
are capable of producing some commodities more efficiently than other 
nations, (For example, Brazil is undoubtedly capable of producing 
bananas more efficiently than Scotland,) In addition, the theory of 
comparative advantage points out that even if a given country cannot 
produce any commodities more efficiently than other nations it can 
still minimise losses by concentrating on those commodities which prom­
ise the highest rate of return. Therefore it stands to reason that 
under most conditions a country will try to export those commodities 
which offer the highest rate of return and import those commodities 
which it cannot produce efficiently. Of course, Marx had little to 
say about the theory of comparative advantage. By supporting the theory 
Marx would have been required to admit that some countries should re­
main exporters of fruits and vegetables while other nations should 
remain exporters of machinery and equipment. In the light of the fact 
that a number of Western analysts have already discussed the incompat­
ibility of Marxist (economic) theory with conditions in world markets 
it is unnecessary for us to devote any more time to the subject.48 
Lenin started writing about the foreign commercial operations 
of MTEs long before the twentieth century. Of course, his writings 
had a familiar Marxist ring* *A foreign market is necessary because 
it is inherent in capitalist production to strive for unlimited expan­
sion ', 49 Indeed, the production capabilities of industrialised market- 
type economies (iMTEs) may have impressed Lenin but it did not obfus­
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cate his perception of the impact of capitalist expansion on the world 
economy,
, , , the law of capitalist production is the constant transfor­
mation of the methods of production and the unrestricted growth 
of the scale of production , . . , the capitalist enterprise in­
evitably outgrows the limits of the community, the local market, 
the region, and then the state. And since the isolation and se­
clusion of the states have been thwarted already by commodity cir­
culation, the natural yearning of every capitalist industry leads 
it to the necessity 'to search for a foreign market'.
This necessity demonstrates the progressive historical work 
of capitalism which destroys the age-old isolation and seclusion 
of economic systems , . , which links all countries of the world 
into a single economic system, 50
Now Lenin might have been wary of capitalist expansion but it 
did not deter him from inviting capitalists to participate in the de­
velopment of the Soviet economy during the New Economic Policy (NEP), 31 
Indeed, Lenin thought the 'mixed company system' (i,e,, companies run by 
capitalists and socialists together)was one of the most effective means 
of improving the operations of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, 52 
It is interesting to note that Lenin even encouraged the Soviet cit­
izenry to adopt those capitalistic techniques which would be benefic­
ial for the country.
Get down to business all of you! You will have capitalists beside 
you, including foreign capitalists, concessionaires and leasehold­
ers; they will squeeze enormous profits out of you; they will grow 
rich alongside you. Let them grow rich; but you will leam from 
them the business of running the economy, and only when you do 
that will you be able to build a communist republic, 53
Economic realities compelled Lenin to state* 'We must trade 
with capitalist countries as long as they exist',34 in order to carry 
out such trade on a meaningful scale he realised that both the level 
and quality of industrial and agricultural output would have to be im­
proved, Lenin was also concerned about the ability of Soviet traders 
to deal sagaciously with foreign businessmen. As we learned previous­
ly, Russia was not recognised as a nation of skillful foreign traders.
Of course, the situation was no different immediately after the October
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Revolution, Lenin know that inept traders would be responsible for 
Soviet setbacks in the sphere of foreign commerce. Nevertheless he 
expected a gradual diminution of such losses as Soviet traders became 
more accustomed to capitalist business techniques, 55
Economic recovery in Soviet Russia depended on the reconstruct­
ion of the country's industrial sector. Lenin thought that foreign 
capital should be employed to develop Soviet Russia's industrial sect­
or, But the country's creditworthiness had been severely damaged by 
the revolutionary government's decision to renounce the public and 
private debts of Tsarist Russia, Lenin hoped his country's creditwor­
thiness could be restored at the International Economic Conference in 
Genoa (April-May 1922), Soviet delegates attending the conference 
stressed the need for peaceful co-existence between nations with dif­
ferent political and economic systems. However, both Western and Sov­
iet delegates were unwilling to bend on the issue of Tsarist Russia's 
debts and the conference ended without a solution to the economic rift 
between the two groups.
We can be sure that Lenin had more than the annulment of debts, 
trade and foreign capital on his mind when he informed the West of 
his desire to attend the Genoa Conference. Now the economic issues 
were important. In fact, Lenin wanted his delegates to be familiar 
with both Soviet economic problems and problems which were plaguing 
the Western world. With regard to the latter, Lenin demanded that 
'All members of the /"Soviet// delegation must be perfectly familiar 
with Keynes' book ("The Economic Consequences of the Peace") and with 
similar bourgeois and bourgeois-pacifist books',^ However, Lenin 
also saw the conference as a means of addressing the entire capitalist 
world. His delegates were instructed to give concise communist views 
on international relations and economics whatever the outcome of the
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conference.37 in addition, the Soviet delegation was responsible for
indoctrinating any capitalist delegates who were sympathetic toward
Soviet proposals.
One of our main, if not principal, political tasks in Genoa is 
to single out this wing of the bourgeois camp from the rest of 
the camp, endeavour to flatter that wing and make it known that 
we consider possible and desirable not only a trade but also a 
political agreement with them (as one of the few chances of cap­
italism's peaceful evolution towards a new order, which we, as 
communists, do not especially believe in, but which we agree and 
consider our duty to help try out as representatives of one power 
in the face of a hostile majority of other powers),5#
Although it would be difficult to argue that Lenin was not a 
revolutionary in the true sense of the word there is enough evidence 
to indicate that he was a practical man when considering the advantages 
of foreign trade. Indeed, there is little doubt that Lenin was willing 
to make concessions in the interest of promoting trade with the West,39 
At one point Lenin demanded that Soviet foreign trade delegates refrain 
from using such jargon as the 'inevitable violent revolution' and the 
'inevitability of new world wars' in their official speeches and state­
ments,^® As we learned before, Lenin even advised Soviet citizens 
to pay close attention to foreign capitalists operating in Soviet Russia 
in order to gain enough expertise to compete successfully with traders 
in the world market. These and related facts make one wonder if Soviet 
foreign economic policy from the raid-1920s onward would have been con­
ducted differently had Lenin lived beyond 1924,
The Early Structure of the Soviet 
Foreign Trade System
On 22 April 1918, the foreign trade sector in Soviet Russia was decreed
a monopoly of the state. Article I of the decree states*
All foreign trade is nationalised. Commercial operations involv­
ing the purchase and sale of all kinds of products (of the extract­
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ing and processing industries, agriculture and others) with for­
eign states and individual trading concerns abroad are to be car­
ried out on behalf of the Russian Republic by specially authorised 
organs. All import and export operations outside /"the control 
of/7 these organs are prohibited,6l
Since the civil war (1918-1921) brought Soviet foreign commerce to 
a standstill one could say that the monopoly of foreign trade was vir­
tually inoperative for a few years. When Soviet Russia began trading 
with Estonia and Britain in 1920, the People's Commissariat of Foreign 
Trade (it might be wise to mention at this point that the People's 
Commissariat of Foreign trade was transformed into the Ministry of 
Foreign Trade in 1946) was directly responsible for authorising the 
export of Soviet goods and the import of foreign commodities according to 
government quota regulations as well as granting permission to carry 
out export operations outside the quota system. Most organisations 
participating in Soviet foreign trade operations were considered organs 
of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade,  ^Until the introduction of NEP 
the monopoly of foreign trade functioned as a state monopoly of for­
eign trade operations, (in other words, the People's Commissariat 
of Foreign Trade, via its oivn organs, conducted Soviet foreign trade,)
The monopoly of foreign trade underwent a fundamental change 
during NEP, Prior to 1922, the Commissariat of Foreign Trade was res­
ponsible for both controlling and conducting Soviet foreign trade. How­
ever, by May 1922, the situation had changed. At that time various 
Soviet trading organisations (e,g,, co-operatives, trusts, and syndi­
cates) were conducting their own trading operations under the control 
of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, (in other words, by the middle 
of 1922, the Commissariat of Foreign Trade was responsible for control­
ling /"as opposed to conducting// Soviet foreign trade operations,)
Up to May 1922, both the People's Commissariat for Trade and its 
local home and foreign organisations were fulfilling both the funct­
ions of regulating as well as those of conducting commercial trans-
24
actions. Since that date the People’s Commissariat for Trade has 
been considerably reorganised, and at present the Commissariat is 
a purely administrative body, which fulfils the function of the 
general direction and regulation of foreign trade on the princip­
les of the State monopoly of foreign trade, 62
As we learned, in pre-revolutionary Russia the exportation of 
commodities was almost completely managed by foreign companies both 
in Russia and abroad. This situation supposedly led to the export 
of so-called 'inferior" Russian commodities as the reputation of Rus­
sian goods in world markets was not the major concern of these compan­
ies, But under Soviet rule conditions changed. After 22 April 1918, 
organisations belonging to the monopoly of foreign trade were solely 
responsible for managing the exportation of Soviet commodities. As 
a result, Soviet traders had to assume responsibility for any "infer­
ior* Soviet goods exported to world markets.
The Establishment of Official Soviet
Soviet Russia’s plans to penetrate foreign markets included the estab­
lishment of official Soviet trade representations abroad. Such trade 
representations were set up on the basis of intergovernmental commer­
cial agreements. It is interesting to note that these commercial agree­
ments were often negotiated under different conditions. For example, 
Germany and Soviet Russia negotiated a trade agreement in May 1921, 
but diplomatic relations between the two countries were not establish­
ed until April 1922,^3 Likewise, a trade agreement was concluded be­
tween Britain and Soviet Russia on l6 March 1921, but the two countries 
did not establish diplomatic relations until 1924,^ A trade agreement 
between Italy and Soviet Russia was negotiated at the same time the 
two countries established diplomatic relations (February 1924),^3 Nor­
way and Soviet Russia established diplomatic relations in January 1924,
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but a trade agreement between the two countries was not negotiated 
until December 1925*
Since members of Soviet trade representations functioned as rep­
resentatives of the monopoly of foreign trade (i.e., the Soviet govern­
ment) Soviet officials argued that such members should enjoy diplomat­
ic immunity. In the light of the fact that there was a profound dis­
tinction between business operations and state politics in MTEs during 
the early 1920s Western businessmen opposed such a scheme on the grounds 
it would give Soviet traders a privileged position in international 
markets. However, the Soviet government persistently demanded that 
foreign governments recognise the monopoly of foreign trade and grant 
diplomatic privileges to representatives of this monopoly, Germany 
was the first country to recognise the monopoly of foreign trade. The 
trade agreement which was negotiated between Germany and Soviet Russia 
in May 1921 contained provisions for the establishment of Soviet and 
German trade representations. Members of both trade representations 
were granted diplomatic immunity.Following this move other coun­
tries started granting diplomatic immunity to members of Soviet trade 
representations. By the mid-1920s Soviet Russia had established trade 
representations in the following countries* Austria, Britain, Canada, 
China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iran (Persia), Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Mexico, Mongolia,
Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Turkey.
Official trade representations played an important role in Soviet 
foreign trade until the early 19308, The operations of the trade rep­
resentations were, in most cases, controlled by the Commissariat of 
Foreign Trade, Members of the Soviet trade representations often rep­
resented individual republics and Soviet economic organisations, Such 
members were empowered to utilise the services of the foreign trade
26
representations to facilitate the import/export operations of their 
republics and organisations. The foreign trade representations funct­
ioned in both a commercial and regulatory capacity. The commercial 
responsibilities were handled by import/export offices within the trade 
representations. These offices were subdivided into units which spec­
ialised in those commodities which were exchanged between Soviet Rus­
sia and the host country. The commercial sections of Soviet foreign 
trade representations also contained specialised offices for transport, 
finance, legal matters, and accounting. Some of the commercial duties 
of official trade representations included the negotiation of trade 
deals between Soviet and foreign organisations and the writing of re­
ports concerning conditions in local markets. The regulatory functions 
included controlling the operations of foreign-based Soviet companies 
and offices (e.g., the issuance of licences for the importation/expor- 
tation of commodities) and supervising the execution of trade agreements 
between Soviet Russia and foreign firms.
The Establishment of Foreign-Based 
Soviet Companies
In the 1920s Soviet Russia expanded its foreign commercial operations 
significantly by establishing numerous foreign-based trading companies. 
Of course, such companies gave Soviet traders better access to foreign 
markets. It would appear as though Soviet officials considered these 
companies as one of the best means of conducting Soviet foreign trade. 
But this might not have been the case. According to A, V, Sngibarov, 
Soviet Russia set up joint-stock companies in Britain and the United 
States during the 1920s because both countries refused to trade with 
its so-called 'state* organisations,^9 (%n other words Britain and the
United States were reluctant to trade directly with economic organisa-
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tions in Soviet Russia.)
As a rule, Soviet officials have always preferred to set up joint- 
stock companies (as opposed to other types of organisations such as 
branches and agencies) in foreign economic systems. There are at least 
two reasons for this preference. Firstly, in most MTEs a foreign-owned 
joint-stock company is classified as a local company with foreign share 
capital while other types of organisations owned by foreign interests 
are classified as foreign institutions. In some cases, companies which 
are classified as foreign institutions are subject to less favourable
70
tax rates than the so-called local companies with foreign capital. 
Secondly, joint-stock companies enjoy limited liability (i.e., no share­
holder of a company is required to pay more than the nominal value 
of his share capital if the company is liquidated for falling to meet 
its financial obligations). Of course, without limited liability the 
shareholders of a company can be forced to meet all of the company's 
outstanding financial obligations,
Soviet Qo-operative Societies
Co-operative societies were set up in Russia long before the October 
Revolution. Most of the large Russian co-operative societies establish­
ed companies/agencies abroad for the purpose of selling and buying on 
behalf of the co-operatives. In I916, a Siberian co-operative establish­
ed one of the first Russian co-operative agencies in London, This 
agency was responsible for selling dairy produce as well as purchas­
ing churning equipment, tea, textiles, agricultural machinery and other 
commodities which were needed by the members of the Siberian co-oper­
ative, 71
The most noteworthy co-operative in the sphere of Soviet foreign
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trade was the All-Russian Union of Consumers' Societies (Tsentrosoyuz),
The co-operative was established in Russia in 1898, During World War I 
the foreign trade operations of Tsentrosoyuz expanded so rapidly that 
it was necessary to set up a London agency of the co-operative in July
1917.
In an attempt to wipe out private trading operations the Soviet 
government abolished the separate existence of co-operative societies 
in January 1920, Following this move all co-operatives were merged 
with Tbentrosoyuz, However, in 1921 (i.e., after the introduction of 
NEP), co-operatives were again permitted to exist independently. From 
1919-1920, 'Ifeentrosoyuz established a number of companies and agencies 
in foreign countries. In 1919 alone, agencies were set up in Berlin, 
Paris, Marseilles (a sub-agency under the direction of the Paris agen­
cy), New York, Shanghai, Kobe and Y o k o h a m a . 72 in addition to its bus­
iness in France, the Paris agency was responsible for commercial oper­
ations in the Belgian market. From December 1919-July 1921, the Ber­
lin agency of Ifeentrosoyuz maintained a. commercial agent in Vienna, In 
1920, the Thentrosoyuz agencies in Berlin, New York, and Paris were 
transformed into joint-stock companies. The Ibentrosoyuz agency in 
London became a joint-stock company in November 1921 (Centrosoyus Ltd.),73
From 1918-1921, the operations of the foreign-based agencies and 
companies owned by Ifeentrosoyuz were hampered by a number of factors. 
Firstly, Soviet Russia was politically isolated from the rest of the 
world. Secondly, the economic blockade of Soviet Russia from 1919 to 
the early 1920s severed many of the agencies' commercial links with 
co-operatives in Soviet Russia, And finally, there were differences 
of opinion between the directors of Tbentrosoyuz who had been appoint­
ed prior to the October Revolution and those who assumed their duties 
at a later date.74 But some of the agencies managed to keep up their
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operations despite these problems. According to N, Barou, after los­
ing their connections with Soviet co-operatives the foreign-based agen­
cies of Tsentrosoyuz started trading on an independent b a s i s , 75 Most 
of this independent trade was conducted with China, Japan and the United 
States.
Soon after being admitted to the International Congress of Co­
operatives in 1921, Soviet co-operative societies started to step up 
their operations in foreign markets. The primary aim of Tsentrosoyuz 
at that time was re-establishing firm control over its foreign-based 
organisations. Toward the end of 1922, ‘Ifeentrosoyuz had regained com­
plete control over these organisations. In that same year a new board 
of directors was appointed for Tsentrosoyuz, Following this move, new 
directors were appointed for the foreign-based organisations owned by 
Tsentrosoyuz,
The All-Russian Union of Agricultural Co-operative Societies 
(Selskosoyuz) and the All-Russian Central Co-operative Union of Flax 
and Hemp Growers became rather important traders in the early 
1920s, In London, Selosoyus Ltd. represented both Selskosoyuz 
and the All-Russian Union of Dairy Produce Co-operative Societies, 
Selosoyus Ltd, was responsible for selling Soviet butter, cheese, eggs, 
fur and horsehair; and purchasing such commodities as agricultural 
machinery and implements. In addition to its company in London, Sels­
kosoyuz had companies/agencies in Berlin, Paris, Riga and New York,
In 1925, eight different Soviet co-operative societies were engaged 
in foreign commerce.
During the period 1922-1928, the foreign trade of Soviet co-oper­
atives grew markedly (see TABLE I.3). When the co-operatives began 
active trading in foreign markets in 1922, their operations differed 
somewhat from those in the pre-war period. Before the war co-opera­
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tives rarely imported large amounts of commodities (agricultural mach­
inery, hinder twine, and herring were exceptions),76 in the post-war 
period Soviet co-operatives be^n importing sizeable amounts of com­
modities, The foreign-based companies/agencies of these co-operatives 
were required to locate hundreds of new commodities in world markets 
as well as make sure such goods would be suitable for use in the Soviet 
economy. The foreign-based companies/agencies were also responsible 
for promoting the sale of Soviet commodities which had all but disappear­
ed from world markets since the October Revolution, Some of these 
goods had been handled almost exclusively by foreign firms (as we learn­
ed previously) which meant the companies/agencies were required to 
locate both old and new customers. In order to improve the competit­
iveness of Soviet exports the companies/agencies were responsible for 
sending periodic reports to Soviet co-operatives citing defects in 
exported commodities and methods of improving future consignments,
TABLE 1.3
DEVELOPMENT OF SOVIET CO-OPERATIVE 
FOREIGN TRADE, 1922-1928 
(in pounds sterling)
Year Exports Imports Turnover
1922 904,229 493,465 1,397,694
1923 3,771,729 592,350 4,364,079
1924 4,643,64-3 1,884,291 6,527,934
1925 8,467,045 5,740,154 14,207,199
1926 7,666,211 3,606,717 11,272,928
1927 9,075,305 5,778,054 14,853,359
1928 11,074,385 7,317,615 18,392,000
Source* N, Barou, Russian Co-operation Abroad (London* P. 8. 
King, 1930), p. 21.
Soviet co-operatives were divided into two groups. The first 
group was required to secure permission from the People’s Commissariat
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of Foreign Trade before negotiating any deals with foreign traders.
Such authorisation could be obtained from the offices of the People's 
Commissariat of Foreign Trade both in Soviet Russia and abroad. The 
second group held a more privileged position. Co-operative societies 
in this group— Ibentrosoyuz,Selskosoyuz, the Ukrainian Co-operative 
Society and the All-Ukrainian Co-operative Wholesale Society (Vukospil- 
ka)— were authorised to carry out their foreign trade operations on 
the same basis as Soviet economic enterprises (see next paragraph) and 
hence able to deal with foreign companies in a more independent fash-
ion.77
Soviet Economic Enterprises
In addition to the co-operative societies, Soviet economic enterprises 
played an important role in Soviet foreign trade. These enterprises 
were authorised to export their manufactured commodities and raw mat­
erials and to import goods which were used in the enterprises' product­
ion processes. They could also import commodities needed by their 
workers. Generally speaking, Soviet economic enterprises could carry 
out their foreign trade operations somewhat independently as long as 
such operations were within the guidelines laid down by the Commissar­
iat of Foreign Trade. The enterprises were not permitted to re-export 
commodities. As a rule,a Soviet economic enterprise was not authorised
78to export goods which it did not produce. Some of the Soviet enter­
prises operating in 1926 included veirious timber trusts, the Oil Syn­
dicate (Neftesindikat), the Textile Syndicate, the Donets Basin Indus­
try Board, the Tea Administration Board, the Leather Syndicate (Kozh- 
sindikat), the Rubber Trust (Rezinotrest), Azneft, Grozneft, the State 
Copper Trade Agency (Gosmedtorg), and GUM (State Universal Stores).79
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In almost all cases Soviet economic enterprises were authorised 
to carry out their trading operations only on the basis of certificates 
and licences issued by the Commissariat of Foreign Trade and official 
Soviet foreign trade representations. Certificates were issued to 
organisations which were authorised to carry out 'direct' (or quasi­
independent) foreign trade operations,^® The certificates normally 
covered a wide range of commodities that organisations were authorised 
to handle under the general foreign trade scheme of the country. Li­
cences were issued for all other types of foreign trading. Organisa­
tions applying for foreign trade licences were required to give pre­
cise information regarding 'the quantity and nature of the merchandise, 
terms of purchase or sale, and price'.®!
Before negotiating with foreign companies Soviet economic enter­
prises were required to inform either the Commissariat of Foreign Trade 
or official Soviet trade representations of proposed deals. If the 
Commissariat of Foreign Trade or trade representations did not object 
to proposed deals within forty-eight hours Soviet economic enterprises 
could start negotiating with their trading partners. When the bargain­
ing process was completed a Soviet economic enterprise was required to 
inform the Commissariat of Foreign Trade or the foreign trad© repre­
sentation (in the country where the deal took place) of the terms of 
the commercial agreement. Both the Commissariat of Foreign Trade and 
official trade representations were empowered to cancel agreements 
made by Soviet economic enterprises. Such cancellations could be made 
on the basis of the 'unsuitability of the proposed transaction to the 
general state economic plan, for political considerations, or as a
82result of the commercial disadvantage of the proposed transaction',
If an agreement was cancelled for being commercially disadvantageous 
the Commissariat of Foreign Trade (or a given trade representation) was
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required to assist the enterprise in negotiating a more favourable 
deal with another firm.
Like Soviet co-operative societies, Soviet economic enterprises 
were authorised to establish foreign-based organisations. Authorisa­
tion for the establishment of these organisations was granted by the 
Commissariat of Foreign Trade, Foreign-based agencies and joint-stock 
companies belonging to Soviet economic enterprises were directly managed 
by the Soviet enterprises and indirectly controlled by the Commissariat 
of Foreign Trade and official Soviet trade representations. Between 
1923 and 1924, the Textile Syndicate established three branches in 
Iran, The syndicate also opened an agency in New York in the early 
1920s,
Soviet economic enterprises, like Soviet co-operatives, operated 
as juridical (or legal) persons. Under such conditions the Soviet 
government was not legally required to meet any of their obligations.®4 
As a rule, the obligations of Soviet economic enterprises were limited 
to the amount of disposable property held by these enterprises.
The external financial operations of Soviet economic enterprises 
were carefully regulated. All financial resources of the enterprises' 
foreign-based organisations were held either by Soviet trade represen­
tations or Soviet foreign-based financial institutions. The enterprises' 
foreign-based organisations were forbidden to negotiate any concession 
agreements with foreign firms and could not attract foreign capital 
into Soviet Russia without special permission from the Head Concession 
Committee of the Council of People's C o m m i s s a r s , ®3
Soviet Bxport/lmport Organisations 
In addition to co-operatives and Soviet economic enterprises a number
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of specialised export/import organisations were established within 
Soviet Russia, These organisations were set up as joint-stock compan­
ies and their shareholders included Soviet governmental organs (e.g., 
the Commissariat of Foreign Trade) and Soviet producers. The export/ 
import organisations were responsible for exporting certain types of 
commodities on behalf of Soviet producers and importing certain types 
of commodities on behalf of Soviet buyers, Soviet export/import organ­
isations were not set up to produce commodities. The following export/ 
import organisations were operating in the late 1920s; Eksport les (tim­
ber and related commodities), Promeksport (industrial goods), Eksport- 
khleb (grain). Metallimport (metals), Elektroiraport (electrical commod­
ities), Khimimport (chemicals), Kozhimport (leather goods), Tekstilim-
port (textiles), and Selkhozimport (agricultural machinery and equip-
. \ 86 ment;.
Joint Chambers of Commerce
In 1929, the USSR participated in four joint chambers of commerce.
These chambers of commerce were located in London, New York, Prague 
and Reval, The joint chambers of commerce operated primarily as in­
formation centres for both Soviet and foreign trading organisations.
Wholly Soviet-Owned Trading 
Companies in Britain
Arcos Ltd. was established in London in 1920, All of the company's 
share capital was owned by Soviet organisations, Arcos Ltd, functioned 
as a universal trading company and hence handled a wide range of com­
modities, It imported (from Soviet Russia) such goods as timber, flax, 
furs, ores, metals, crude drugs and petroleum. Its exports (to Soviet
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Russia) included agricultural machinery, motors, tools, scientific 
apparatuses, drugs and clothing. Arcos Ltd, comprised eight commodity 
offices and three supporting offices. As their operations grew these 
offices were transformed into subsidiary companies. From 192>-1925» 
the shipping office became Arcos Steamship Company Ltd,, the book de­
partment became Kniga Ltd., the finance office was transformed into 
the Arcos Bank Ltd., and the insurance section became the Black Sea 
and Baltic Insurance Company Ltd,
On 23 August 1924, Russian Oil Products Ltd. (ROP) was founded 
in Britain. One-half of ROP's share capital was owned by Arcos Ltd, 
and the other half belonged to Neftesindikat. ROP was authorised to 
sell its own petroleum and petroleum products (i.e., the output of 
Neftesindikat) as well as market the petroleum and petroleum products 
of other producers on a commission ba,sis,^^ TABLE 1.4 shows the wholly 
Soviet-owned joint-stock companies established in Britain from 1919" 
1924, (Soviet banks have been excluded from TABLE 1.4.)
TABLE 1.4
SOVIET JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES ESTABLISHED 
IN BRITAIN, 1919-1924
Name Date of Capital
formation (in pounds sterling)
Gentrosoyus Ltd, 1919 230,000
Arcos Ltd. 1920 1,000,000
Selosoyus Ltd, 1920 30,000
Ukrainian Flaxgrowers Go. Ltd, 1920 10,000
Kniga Ltd. 1923 2,000
Arcos Steamship Go, Ltd, 1923 1,000
Anglo-Russian Dobroflot Ltd. 1923 30,000
Russian Oil Products Ltd. 1924 100,000
Source: Soviet Union Review, Vol. VI, No, 4 (24 January 1925)i
p. 74.
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Other Wholly Soviet-Owned Joint- 
Stock Companies in the West
During the early 1920s a sizeable amount of American-Soviet trade was 
handled by Arcos-Araerica Inc, (formerly a branch of Arcos Ltd.) and 
the Products Exchange Company (Prodexo), In May 1924, the Amtorg Trad­
ing Company was established in New York as a result of a merger between 
Arcos-America and Prodexo, In addition to its role as a general 
export-import company, Amtorg functioned as an unofficial trade rep­
resentation (an official Soviet trade representation was not permitted 
in the United States until diplomatic relations were established be­
tween the two countries in the mid-1930s). In 1925» Amtorg established 
a branch office in Buenos Aires, In October 1927, this branch was 
transformed into the South American Trading Company (Yuzhamtorg), In
1931» Yuzhamtorg ceased its operations in Argentina and was re-incor-
89
porated in Uruguay,
Mixed Joint-Stock Companies
Soviet Russia also participated in a number of mixed (i.e., Soviet- 
foreign) joint-stock companies in the West, One of the first Soviet- 
foreign companies was established in Berlin on 16 November 1922, under
90the name Rusgertorg. Half of Rusgertorg's share capital was held 
by Soviet interests and the other half by a German company. Rusger­
torg's operations included the export of metal goods (to Soviet Russia) 
and the import of raw materials (from Soviet Russia),
Soviet Russia participated in quite a few mixed companies in 
Britain, In October 1923» & Soviet timber trust— Dvinoles— and a group 
of foreign businessmen established a company in London under the name 
Dvinoles Export, The company was responsible for financing and selling
3?
the timber products of D v i n o l e s . T h e  remaining Soviet-foreign com­
panies which were established in Britain are included in TABLE 1.5#
TABLE 1.5
SOVIET-FOREIGN JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES 
ESTABLISHED Di BRITAIN IN 1923
Name Soviet capital 
(in pounds sterling 
unless 8ta,ted other­
wise)
Foreign capital 
(in pounds sterling 
unless stated other­
wise)
Total
Russian Wood Agency 70,000 30,000 100,000
Russhollandles 76,000 74,000 150,000
Russangloles 76,000 74,000 150,000
Russnorvegoles 160,000 140,000 300,000
Dvinoles Export 51,000 49,000 100,000
Russian Bristles Co, 2,000 1,000 3,000
Russo-British Grain
Export Go, 50,000 50,000 100,000
Russo-Norwegian
Navigation Go. 5,000 5,000 10,000
Norwego-Russian
Navigation Co, 600 kroner 900 kr. 1,500 kr
Source* Russian Information and Review. Vol. VI, No. 4, (24 Jan­
uary 1925), p. W * ’
A few Soviet-foreign companies were set up in less-developed coun­
tries (e.g., Iran and Turkey), Although these mixed companies were 
seemingly set up to conduct Soviet foreign trade operations Glen Smith 
suggests they might also have been established for political purposes. 
Smith states* 'The pattern of the creation of such companies in Iran, 
Turkey, Bukhara, and Mongolia clearly indicates that these mixed com­
panies were used as a means for gaining economic control over these 
92countries',
On Some of the Activities of Soviet 
Foreign Traders
To a certain extent Smith's argument is supported by Violet Gonolly
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who maintained that 'From the earliest days of the Revolution it was 
clear that the East would be a predominating factor in Bolshevik policy 
and politico-economic doctrine',93 In an attempt to strengthen its 
economic relations with the Middle East the USSR began exporting 'cheap' 
commodities into this region. However, such a policy wreaked havoc 
on infant industries in Turkey and Iran and induced local manufactur­
ers to seek government protection against some Soviet commodities.9^
In 1931» Iran established a monopoly of foreign trade. According to 
an Iranian press report one of the main reasons for this move was the 
ruthless competition of Soviet organisations trading under diplomatic 
immunity.'Cheap' Soviet matches were allegedly responsible for 
the collapse of the Iranian match factory in Tabriz, As soon as local
competition had been eliminated the price of the matches was increas­
ed
ed, Soviet traders also employed tactics widely used in the West 
in order to achieve the highest profit margins, Gonolly has mentioned 
that Soviet trading companies in the northern part of Iran sometimes 
held their goods until supplies were diminishing and prices rising. 
After local merchants had placed orders for additional supplies Sov­
iet traders would sell their hoarded commodities. Such a scheme often 
resulted in high profits for Soviet trading companies while local com­
petitors were faced with the prospect of falling demand for their fut- 
97ure supplies.'^
Ever since Soviet traders started operating in world markets 
Western governments were not convinced that these traders would con­
fine their activities to commercial business. This suspicion was well 
founded. The political activities of Soviet trade officials were re­
sponsible for the German police raid on Soviet commercial organisations 
in 1923» the British raid on Arcos Ltd. in 1927» and the expulsion 
of Soviet trade officials from Vienna (1927) and Argentina (l93i)*
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According to Smith, the political activities of the Yuzhamtorg company 
(which were just as important as its commercial operations) led Uruguay 
to sever diplomatic relations with the USSR in 1935*98
The British government's reaction to Soviet political activities 
in and around London led to a number of changes in the USSR's commer­
cial operations in Britain. In May 1927, the trade agreement between 
Britain and the USSR was cancelled and the Soviet trade representation 
returned to the USSR, At about the same time a number of Soviet trad­
ing organisations operating in Britain were liquidated. In addition, 
a number of Soviet orders for British commodities were transferred 
to other countries. These facts might well lead one to conclude that 
Anglo-Soviet trade fell sharply during the late 1920s. However, des­
pite the strained political relations between Britain and the USSR 
it is interesting to note that Anglo-Soviet trade (turnover) only de­
clined from £37,057,000 in 1926, to £30,572,000 in 1928, But of course 
this is only one side of the story. It is also important for us to 
be aware of the fact that Soviet exports to Britain actually increased 
from £23,617,000 in 1926, to £24,198,000 in 1928, while Soviet imports 
from Britain dropped sharply from £13,440,000 in 1926, to £6,374,000 
in 1928.9^ Indeed, it does appear as though the USSR retaliated against 
the British government* s action by cutting purchases from British ex­
porters.
Soviet Banks Operating in the S-phere of Foreign 
Trade During the 1920s
During NEP a number of Soviet banks were involved in foreign trade 
operations. The State Bank (Gosbank) was established in October 1921, 
Within a short period of time Gosbank was supposed to acquire a monop­
oly over credit operations in Soviet Russia, However, such control
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was not given to the bank until after the credit reform of 1930, In 
the sphere of foreign-trade financing, Gosbank assumed an important 
role from the very outset. A foreign department was added to Gosbank 
in the early 1920s to handle the increasing level of trade financing 
business. In 1924, Gosbank financed about 50 percent of Soviet exports
and participated in the financing of approximately 55 percent of Sov-
, . , . 1 0 0
let imports.
The All-Ukrainian Co-operative Bank (Ukrainbank) was established
before the October Revolution but its activities were quite limited
until 1922. Although Ukrainbank was set up to handle the financial
transactions of co-operative societies it was also authorised to deal
with Soviet economic enterprises, foreign firms and individual trad- 
1 01ers. According to its statutes Ukrainbank could open branch offices
both in Soviet Russia and abroad.
On 4 December 1922, the All-Russian Co-operative Bank (Vsekobank)
was established. The bank's primary function was financing the foreign
and domestic operations of Soviet co-operatives. According to Barou,
Vsekobank carried out most of its foreign banking business through
Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd, (London) and the Co-operative Transit Bank 
1 OPin Riga, Vsekobank held a major portion of the share capital of 
both banks for some time.
The Foreign Trade Bank of the USSR (Vneshtorgbank) was establish­
ed in March 1924. The primary objective of the bank was to promote 
Soviet foreign trade by assisting internal organisations involved in 
export/import operations. Smith points out that Vneshtorgbank was 
not initially intended to have a monopoly over all foreign-trade fi-
103
nancing in the USSR. According to a treatise published in 1935» 
Vneshtorgbank was 'simply an agent carrying out instructions' , and 
'may best be re^rded as the executive side of the Gosbank's foreign
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department*. Indeed, until the early 1960s Gosbank handled most 
of the USSR's foreign financial business.
By the mid-1920s Vneshtorgbank was quite active in financing 
Soviet petroleum and flax exports. Moreover, Vneshtorgbank financed 
the imports of the Soviet Medical Supply Agency and played a leading 
role in financing Soviet wool imports. In addition to its trade finan­
cing operations Vneshtorgbank bought and sold foreign currencies and 
precious metals. Like other banks in the USSR, Vneshtorgbank was author­
ised to handle the financial transactions of both state-owned and pri­
vate organisations.
During NEP Vneshtorgbank became an active participant in world 
financial markets. In the latter part of 1924, Vneshtorgbank’s direct­
or travelled to the United States to establish closer relations with 
American banks. At about the same time an American bank granted a 
Soviet trading organisation a $1 million credit which was guaranteed 
by Vneshtorgbank,Soviet interest in the American money market 
led to rumours that Vneshtorgbank would open a branch in New York dur­
ing the mid-1920s.
Between 1 April 1924 and 1 October 1924, Vneshtorgbank’s total 
assets doubled (i.e., from 29.9 million rubles to 60 million). Before 
the end of 1924, Vneshtorgbank had established a branch office in Baku 
and was planning to open another branch office in Constantinople, The 
marked expansion of Vneshtorgbank’s operations prompted some Soviet 
authorities to assert that the bank would soon control the financing 
of the country's foreign trade* 'With its developing network of bran­
ches Vneshtorgbank should, in a short time, supported as it is by the 
various organs of the Commissariat for Foreign Trade, achieve its ob­
ject of becoming the main instrument of finance for the whole of the 
Foreign Trade of the USSR',
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The Soviet Industrial Bank (Prombank) was chiefly concerned with 
the redistribution of funds within the country’s industrial sector.
Its credit-granting mechanism relied heavily on the deposits of Soviet 
trusts and syndicates. In 1925, representatives of Prombank travelled 
to Western Europe for the purpose of establishing correspondent rela­
tions with banks in Britain, France and Germany, During the same year 
Prombank (with the assistance of Vneshtorgbank) was planning to set 
up a Soviet bank in P a r i s .1^7
The Far Eastern Bank (Dalbank) was established in April 1922 
by the government of the Par Eastern Republic, The primary functions 
of Dalbank were to assist the development of agriculture, industry 
and trade in Siberiaj finance Soviet export and import operations in 
the Far East; and finance the Soviet gold i n d u s t r y D a l b a n k  was 
especially active in China and maintained branches in Harbin and Shan­
ghai.
Soviet Foreign-Based Banks
The first Soviet foreign-based bank— Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd.— was 
established in London in 1919, (Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd. should not 
be confused with the Moscow Narodny Bank which existed in Soviet Rus­
sia / ”Moscow_J7 during the 1920s.) Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd, was reg­
istered as a joint-stock company and a major portion of its share cap­
ital was held by Vsekobank and the larger Soviet co-operative s o c i e t i e s . ^^9 
At the outset Moscow Narodny's primary function was financing the for­
eign trade of co-operatives. The marked expansion of co-operative 
trade in the mid-1920s brought Moscow Narodny Bank into contact with 
a number of banks in Britain, Western Europe, the United States, Canada, 
and the Baltic states, Moscow Narodny Bank's total assets increased
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from £2,391,629 on 31 December 1924, to £5,429,509 on 31 December 1925.
In September 1925, Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd, opened a branch office 
in Paris, In addition to its business with French banks the Paris 
branch had dealings with banks in Belgium and Switzerland, Moscow . 
Narodny also established agencies in Berlin and New York, In 1928, 
the Berlin agency became a branch of Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd,^^^
The Co-operative Transit Bank Ltd, was set up in Riga in 1923.
The Soviet authorities had originally planned to open a branch of Mos­
cow Narodny Bank Ltd, or Vsekobank in Riga but found that it was dif-
111ficult to establish branch offices of foreign banks under Latvian law.
As a result the Co-operative Transit Bank was set up as a joint-stock 
company. The shareholders of the bank were Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd., 
Vsekobank, Ifeentrosoyuz, Selskosoyuz and other co-operative societies.
The Co-operative Transit Bank vfas ideally located as a high proportion 
of Soviet exports and imports passed through the Baltic states.
As we learned previously, Arcos Bank Ltd, was an outgrowth of 
the Soviet trading company Arcos Ltd, The bank was set up in London 
in 1923. The functions of Arcos Bank Ltd, included the financing of 
Soviet exports and imports, the buying and selling of foreign curren­
cies, and the issuance of chervonets travellers cheques to foreigners 
going to Soviet R u s s i a , I n  1926, Arcos Bank Ltd, was transformed 
into the Bank for Russian Trade Ltd, For about seven years Moscow 
Narodny Bank Ltd, and the Bank for Russian Trade handled a large por­
tion of the financial resources of Soviet foreign-based organisations. 
Following the increase of specialised Soviet foreign trade organisa­
tions in 1930 (which will be covered at a later point), and the credit 
reform of the same year, the Bank for Russian Trade lost much of its 
importance. In 1932, the Bank for Russian Trade was liquidated and its 
share capital was transferred to Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd,
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Two other Soviet foreign-lmsed financial institutions— Banque
Commerciale pour 1' Europe du Herd and the Russian-Iranian Banking
Office of the Russian Asiatic Company— were operating in the 1920s,
Banque Commerciale v/as established in Paris in 1921, by White Russian 
114emigres. The bank's operations were rather unsuccessful at the
outset which put the shareholders in a mood to sell. At about the
same time the USSR was in a mood to buy and ironically became the own-
11 '3
er of Banque Commerciale in 1925. The Russian-Iranian Banking Office 
of the Russian Asiatic Company was set up in Teheran in 1923, to fi­
nance trade between Iran and Soviet Russia, In 1932, the Russian-Iran- 
ian Banking Office was transformed into the Bank Russo-Iran
On Soviet Co-operative Trade and Plans 
for an International Co-operative Bank
Soviet co-operatives became quite active in Britain, Western Europe, 
Scandinavia and North America during the mid-1920s. Of course, the 
USSR was not the only country experiencing high growth rates in its 
co-operative trade. Indeed, Western co-operatives were developing 
alongside of their Soviet counterparts. This situation raised Soviet 
hopes that the international co-operative movement would become an 
integral part of the world market and hence provide the USSR with a 
potent vehicle for realising its foreign economic objectives.
Now there were a few obstacles hindering the development of the 
international co-operative movement. In the first place the interna­
tional co-operative banking system was underdeveloped and lacked a 
unified (centralised) sense of direction. Secondly, a significant 
portion of international co-operative trade was financed by banks out­
side of the co-operative movement. In the early 1930s a director 
of Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd, pointed out these deficiencies and pro-
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posed a scheme to strengthen international co-operative banking through
the establishment of an international co-operative bank.
The lack of a central operating institution is greatly hindering 
the development of relations between the co-operative banks. Great 
perseverance and initiative are demanded in all countries in order 
to develop a self-contained international co-operative banking 
system throughout the world— a system which shall be independent 
of the strong and convenient machinery of the capitalist banks.
Only by establishing an International Co-operative Bank, even 
on a small scale, will it be possible to develop to the full ex­
tent mutual relations between the various co-operative banks and 
prepare the way for the development of a really strong Internation­
al Co-operative Bank.117
According to Barou, the 'foremost aim of the supporters of the
organisation of an International Co-operative Bank . , . /"was_J7 to
strengthen the National Co-operative Banks and to establish firm and
close business relations between them and the Co-operative Wholesale 
lid
Societies', It was decided that the bank should be set up in Lon­
don. Such a location was important for at least three reasons. First­
ly, London was a major banking centre. Secondly, the bank's capital 
would be in sterling and its operations carried out on a sterling basis, 
(By stressing the fact that the international co-operative bank would 
carry out its financing operations through the London sterling market 
proponents of the bank were hoping to dispel the argument that the 
bank should not be established because of the instability of European 
currencies.) And finally, any apprehensions in London could be mit­
igated by citing the success of Moscow Narodny Banlc both in the London 
banking community and abroad. However, plans for the international 
co-operative bank were scrapped when the Soviet co-operative movement 
lost much of its significance in the early 1930s,
Early Develoument of the Soviet Merchant Fleet 
Soviet Russia was keenly aware of its weakness in maritime transport
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when trading operations were stepped up in the 1920s, Indeed, in 1923» 
at least 90 percent of Soviet exports and imports were transported 
in s h i p s , ^^9 since Soviet Russia was not recognised as a reputable 
trading partner when it first ventured into Western markets the Com­
missariat of Foreign Trade found that its payments for chartering for-
1?0eign merchant vessels were sometimes 50 percent above standard rates.
In 1925, chartering rates for the USSR were significantly reduced but
the Soviet authorities had already decided that it was imperative to
develop their merchant fleet so that it would meet the needs of the
foreign trade sector,
. , , it is necessary , , , to build new ships which would be in 
all respects modern ships suitable to the various trades. This 
is by far the best method of keeping freights at a normal level, 
and to retain inside the country an important item in the foreign 
trade budget. The USSR aims at bringing its goods to foreign mar­
kets and selling them there independently and without intermediar­
ies.1^1
Throughout the 1930s the USSR strove to build up its merchant 
fleet. Some of the ships added to the Soviet merchant fleet during 
those years were purchased abroad. By 1935» the USSR was able to trans­
port most of its imports in Soviet ships. However, the USSR still had 
to rely on foreign ships to transport 70-75 percent of its exports 
since the tonnage requirements for the transport of bulky Soviet raw 
materials (e.g., petroleum, timber, ores and grain) greatly exceeded 
the capabilities of the Soviet fleet, (Remember, most of the USSR's 
,imports by value__7 comprised machinery and equipment while exports 
were primarily raw materials and half-finished products,) In 1938» 
the size of the Soviet merchant fleet amounted to 1.2 million gross 
registered tons (the figure in 1914 was 1 million tons),^^^
On Soviet Currency and Pricing Policy 
The Bolshevik leaders, like their Russian counterparts, were forced
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to print rubles in order to cover budgetary deficits. Needless to say, 
this policy resulted in the marked depreciation of the (paper) ruble.12] 
However, at the time of the revolution Soviet leaders were not concern­
ed about establishing a stable currency. Indeed, ardent Bolsheviks 
believed that the depreciating ruble would eventually bring about the 
abolition of money in the Soviet (communist) state. This notion was 
derived from Marxist (economic) theory which favours the substitution 
of a labour unit of value for money. For two and one-half months the 
Commissariat of Finance attempted to formulate a workable labour unit 
of v a l u e , 124 Such a scheme was never put into practice and the Bol­
shevik leaders went back to the drawing board.
In an attempt to curb inflation (as well as improve the country's 
foreign trade financing mechanism) the Soviet government, on 11 October 
1922, gave the State Bank the right to issue bank notes in a new mon­
etary unit called the chervonets. One chervonets was equal to ten 
(pre-war) gold rubles. The chervonets bank notes were issued in denom­
inations of 1, 2, 3» 5» 10, 25, and 50 chervontsy. Although chervontsy 
were inconvertible (into gold) Soviet authorities announced that they 
would eventually become convertible. It was stipulated that 25 per­
cent of the chervonets notes should be covered by precious metals or 
stable foreign currencies and the remaining 75 percent by bills of 
exchange, short-term securities, and 'easily realisable commodities',^25 
According to one Soviet source the value of the chervonets was main­
tained 'in the same way as any other currency’, i.e., 'through the 
trade requirements for money, Z ”and_7 through the positive balance 
of the USSR in its transactions with other countries',^26 rate
of exchange for the chervonets remained fairly stable throughout the 
period when chervontsy were bought and sold in world financial markets.
The issuance of chervontsy did not solve all Soviet financial
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problems. The rapidly depreciating paper rubles (sovznaki) still re­
mained in circulation when chervontsy were first issued. However, 
in February 1924, the issuance of sovznaki was stopped and the Soviet 
Treasury was given the right to issue treasury notes backed by (but 
not convertible into) gold, Sovznaki could be exchanged for these 
treasury notes at a fixed rate. In addition, the new treasury notes 
could be exchanged for chervontsy at the rate of ten (gold) rubles 
(i.e., a ten-ruble treasury note) for one chervonets,^^7 ^s in the 
case of chervontsy, the rate of exchange for Soviet treasury notes 
remained relatively stable in world markets.
On 1 August 1926, the exportation of all forms of Soviet money 
(treasury notes, bank notes, metal coins, and drafts and money orders 
made out in rubles) was prohibited. At the same time the importation 
of all forms of Soviet money into the USSR (unless such money was ex­
ported before 1 August 1926) was prohibited. However, the importation 
of foreign currency into the USSR was still p e r m i t t e d , ^28 After July 
1926, the exchange rate for Soviet currency (hereafter the terms 'rub­
les' and 'the ruble' will be used in place of Soviet currency) was 
arbitrarily determined by Gosbank,
It is important to remember that up until August 1926, the ex­
change rate for the ruble was largely determined on the basis of the 
volume of rubles in world financial markets and the demand for such 
rubles. Moreover, the ruble exchange rate was more or less in line 
with purchasing-power p a r i t y , ^29 Under such conditions the external 
and internal values of the ruble were closely related. But the arbit­
rarily determined exchange rates altered this situation. According 
to Huntington and Lawton, 'The official exchange rates quoted by the 
Gosbank, . . ,, became completely unreal, and soon bore no relation­
ship to purchasing power p a r i t y ' , I n  other words by isolating the
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ruble from world financial markets Soviet leaders succeeded in crea­
ting a price system which operates on far different principles than 
its counterparts in MTEs,
After the ruble was isolated from world financial markets there 
was little reason for the USSR to achieve a favourable balance of trade 
in order to maintain the official exchange rate of the ruble, (indeed, 
the official exchange rate merely functioned as a means of estimating 
the ruble value of exports and imports.) In addition, it was no long­
er necessary for most Soviet exporters to conduct profitable operations. 
As we shall learn, Soviet leaders were willing to export commodities 
at almost any price in order to obtain enough foreign currency to pay 
for imports.
Westerners have often been quite critical of Soviet export policy. 
Much of this criticism has stemmed from the fact that Soviet exports, 
in most cases, are priced much differently than exports from MTEs. Gen­
erally speaking, Western traders must conduct profitable export opera­
tions while Soviet traders are not necessarily forced to operate on 
the same basis, A commodity which costs the USSR 100 rubles to pro­
duce can be exported for, say, 50"^ubies worth of foreign currency.
In order to balance the account the Soviet government simply transfers 
fifty rubles from the state budget to the seller. It has often been 
pointed out that when ruble (wholesale) prices for Soviet commodities 
are converted into foreign currency on the basis of official rates of 
exchange they do not necessarily resemble world market prices for the 
same commodities (or substitutes). So what happens when Soviet prices 
are not in line with world market prices? According to Goldman, Soviet 
officials have resigned themselves to the fact that 'there are two sep­
arate markets and two separate currencies*,^3i The USSR must import 
Western commodities (at world market prices in most cases) which are 
called for in the Five-Year Plan, This, of course, means that the
50
USSR is required to sell commodities in world markets. If it is nec­
essary to sell goods at a loss in order to obtain the means to pay 
for imports the Soviet government will usually not hesitate to do so.
For the most part Soviet exporters have attempted to sell their com­
modities at world market prices but if such goods have not sold under 
these conditions the prices have been reduced in order to attract buy­
ers, Goldman states:
When Russians want dollars, , , ,, they are usually willing to 
sell whatever they can for as low a price as it takes to find a 
customer. If necessary, that may be below the world price and 
even the domestic Russian ruble price at the stated / official^/ 
rate of exchange. But that does not matter. While they would 
like to charge high prices, all that seems to matter to them is 
that they earn as much foreign currency as possible, 132
On numerous occasions the USSR has been accused of carrying out 
dumping o p e r a t i o n s , ^33 However, during the 1920s and 1930s Western 
nations were clearly involved in the same type of activity. According 
to Gerschenkron, the USSR was especially susceptible to dumping char­
ges despite the fact that some Soviet dumping could be justified.
There is little doubt that the price level in Russia, if computed 
by the official rate of exchange, was much higher than the price 
level abroad. This was particularly true in the early 'thirties. 
In other words the official rate of exchange was over-valued. As 
long as this is the case then, any and every transaction between 
Russia and foreign countries may on a superficial examination be 
considered as dumping. Let us assume that the rate of exchange 
between the ruble and the dollar , , . is 5 rubles for $1,00, A 
bushel of wheat costs, , , $1,00 in the United States, and 50
rubles in Russia, According to the rate of exchange the price 
of wheat in Russia should be $10,00, or ten times as much as in 
the United States, If the foreign trade monopoly buys in the dom­
estic market 1000 bushels of wheat for 50,000 rubles and sells 
them in the United States, , . for $1000 it seemingly has been 
engaged in a dumping operation. For the official equivalent of 
the $1000 is just 5000 rubles which means a loss of 45,000 rubles 
for the monopoly. But if the monopoly uses the $1000 received 
for the purchase of a piece of machinery, to produce domestically 
it would have had to shift from the production of wheat to the 
production of machinery more labor and capital than was needed 
to produce the 1000 bushels of wheat, the situation is different. 
If prices express correctly the cost relationships the monopoly 
would be able to sell foreign machinery at home for more than 
50,000, say for 55,000 rubles.
If the transaction's two phases are considered together, as
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they properly should be, then it did not involve any differential 
cost calculus, nor any price discrimination against the domestic 
consumer; nor, finally was there any financial loss involved. 
Quite on the contrary, the monopoly ended its operation with a 
gain of 5000 rubles. This gain is nothing else but the gain bas­
ic to all international exchanges of goods. What on the face of 
it looked like a case of dumping reveals itself on a closer scru­
tiny as a normal application of the principles of international 
specialization,134
On the Effectiveness of Soviet Foreign 
Trade Before World War II
It is generally accepted that by the late 1920s criteria for deter­
mining the effectiveness of Soviet foreign trade were not widely used. 
For example, the USSR did not necessarily concentrate on those commod­
ities which were more profitable to produce for export (i,e,, little 
emphasis was placed on the production of goods which would result in 
more foreign currency per ruble invested), Soviet exports were often 
considered as those commodities which were not absolutely vital for 
the Soviet e c o n o m y , ^35 \i/hen Soviet production had satisfied domestic 
needs any surplus could be exported to pay for vital imports called 
for in the Five-Year Plan,
Structural Changes in the Soviet Foreign 
Trade Sector During the 1930s
Following the introduction of the First Five-Year Plan in the late 
I92O8 the Soviet foreign trade sector underwent a complete transfor­
mation, The so-called independent trading which took place during 
NEP was abolished. By the early 1930s specialised export/import organ­
isations (commonly referred to as foreign trade organisations) were 
responsible for handling virtually all Soviet exports and imports, 
Zhirmunski provides an explanation for the changes in the USSR's
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foreign trade sector*
Tlrie general accentuation of competition in the world markets, and, 
in particular, the intensification of the struggle of the capital­
ist world against Soviet exports, demanded in this new stage that 
the monopoly of foreign trade should be organisationally so con­
structed as to increase its capacity for manoeuvring in foreign 
markets in the conditions of the world economic crisis.136
Soviet foreign trade organisations (FTOs ) operated as juridical 
persons. They were authorised to conclude all types of contracts with 
foreign companies and individuals both within the USSR and abroad. In 
addition, FTOs were permitted to set up organisations (e.g., joint-stock 
companies) abroad and to assign officials to these organisations.
As a result of the policy changes in the early 1930s FTOs were 
required to carry out virtually all of their operations through Soviet 
foreign trade representations. This led to the establishment of depart­
ments within the trade representations which were responsible for deal­
ing with certain types of commodities. The emphasis placed on Soviet 
trade representations led to the gradual elimination of Soviet foreign- 
based trading companies and offices. Some of the trading companies 
which continued to operate throughout the 1930s were Arcos Ltd,, Rus­
sian Oil Products Ltd,, the Arcos Steamship Company, the Black Sea 
and Baltic Insurance Company, and the Amtorg Corporation.
In 1935» Soviet foreign trade policy was altered once again. In­
stead of carrying out their operations through the foreign trade rep­
resentations Soviet FTOs were required to conclude a majority of their 
contracts in the USSR, In cases where it was necessary to conclude 
trade deals abroad FTOs could employ the services of Soviet trade rep­
resentations and Soviet foreign-based companies. The impact of the 
policy changes which took place in the 1930s is summed up by Gerschen­
kron i 'If throughout the period of the NEP the government often merely 
regulated foreign trade, and did so infrequently in a rather loose and 
liberal fashion, throughout the 'thirties it was the government that
53
conducted foreign t r a d e * . ^^8
The policy of concluding foreign trade contracts in the USSR 
was especially advantageous for FTOs involved in the exportation of 
commodities. VJhen marketing operations were carried out abroad the 
USSR was required to maintain large stocks of goods in foreign coun­
tries, This method of trading not only involved high transport costs 
but also the costs connected with the storage of Soviet exports abroad. 
Many of these services required foreign currency payments. Such pay­
ments sometimes reduced the USSR's profit margin,
Soviet Foreign Economic Policy Under Stalin
To Stalin the successful proletarian revolution in Russia marked the
beginning of a worldwide struggle against capitalism.
After the land of the Soviets appeared in the world, after the 
old Russia was transformed into the Soviet Union, an all-embrac­
ing world capitalism ceased to exist. The world split into two 
camps* the camp of imperialism and the camp for the struggle 
against imperialism.139
The economic and political problems which plagued MTEs after World 
War I heightened the possibility of a successful worldwide communist 
revolution. However, by the mid-1920s the economic crisis was about 
over and the political situation had stabilised. As a result Stalin 
was forced to concede in 1925» that the struggle would be a long one,^^^ 
But this struggle by no means prevented him from negotiating commer­
cial deals with his adversaries. Indeed, in 1925» Stalin also announ­
ced that* 'this year is the first year since the establishment of the 
period of ''co-existence" with capitalist states when we are entering
into rich and broad commercial relations with the capitalist world 
l4lon a wide scale'.
TABLE 1.6 provides an account of Soviet foreign trade from
TABLE 1.6
VALUE AND VOLUME OF SOVIET 
FOREIGN TRADE, 1913-1940 
(in millions of 196I rubles)
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Year
current
prices
1913
prices
lndex&
1929
prices
index^
Compos­
ite in­
dex
Imports
current
prices
1913
prices
index®
1929
prices
index*!
Compos­
ite in­
dex
1913 1,192 100.0 100.0 1,078 100.0 100,0
1917 82 6,9 6.9 1,901 176.3 176.3
1918 6 0.5 0.5 83 7 .7 7.7
1919 0 0.0 0,0 3 0.2 0.2
1920 1 0.1 0.1 23 2.1 2.1
1921 16 1.3 1.3 165 15.3 15.3
1922 64 5 .4 5 .4 212 19.6 19.6
1923 171 14.3 14.3 112 10.4 10.4
1924 264 22,2 22.2 204 18.9 18.9
1925 477 25.1 25.1 648 37.8 37.8
1926 569 32.2 32,2 540 33.8 33.8
1927 585 34.7 34.7 594 38.9 38.9
1928 630 37.7 37.7 747 49.4 49.4
1929 724 44.4 100,0 44.4 691 48.3 100.0 48.3
1930 813 56.6 135.7 57,0 830 65.7 141.3 72.1
1931 636 54.3 146.1 61,4 867 85.3 161.5 82.4
1932 451 52.2 127.8 53.7 552 71.2 115.8 59.1
1933 389 48.8 118.5 49.8 273 37.9 62.5 31.9
1934 328 42.9 102.9 43.2 182 26.3 47.1 24.0
1935 288 90,5 38.0 189 51.5 26.3
1936 243 68.2 28,6 242 59.4 30.3
1937 295 71.5 30,0 229 5'+.5 27.8
1938 230 62.4 26.2 245 63.4 32.3^
1939 104 10.69 167 20.4?
1940 240 21.8© 245 27.7?
®The value of exports in a given year as a percentage of the
(weighted) value of exports in I913*
^he value of exports in a given year as a percentage of the
(weighted) value of exports in 1929,
°The value of imports in a given year as a percentage of the
(weighted) value of imports in I9I3.
^The value of imports in a given year as a percentage of the
(weighted) value of imports in 1929.
®Calculated on the basis of the I96O exports index,
^Calculated on the basis of the I96O imports index.
Source* Michael Kaser, 'A Volume Index of Soviet Foreign Trade', 
Soviet Studies, Vol. XX, No, 4 (April I969), p. 524,
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1913-1940. It is immediately obvious that the value of Soviet foreign 
trade from 1917 to the mid-1930s failed to reach the level achieved 
in 1913. In 1930, the value of Soviet exports only reached 56.6 per­
cent and imports 65.7 percent of the corresponding figures in 1913. 
During the late 1920s and early 1930s (i.e., during the First Five-Year 
Plan) Soviet foreign trade grew significantly. It is well worth not­
ing that the volume (as opposed to the value) of trade might have been 
considerably greater than the figures suggest as world market prices 
declined sharply during the Great Depression, Indeed, from 1929-1932, 
world trade declined 25.5 percent in volume and 60,9 percent in value, 
The marked expansion in Soviet foreign trade from 1929-1931 
was clearly the result of a scheme to speed up Soviet industrialisa­
tion, This policy stemmed from the Stalinist belief that Soviet in-
143dustrial expansion was a 'question of life or death*. Franklyn 
Holzman contends that the USSR would probably have been willing to 
import additional commodities on the basis of long term credits/loans 
at low interest rates if the political situation had been different 
and Soviet exports could have been increased commensurately with im­
ports.
By the early 1938s the Soviet economy was developing rapidly. 
Since most of the pressing needs for machinery and equipment had been 
satisfied the Soviet government most likely decided that the costs 
(in terms of exports) of importing commodities which were not urgent­
ly needed had risen too high.^^^ Moreover, the international terms 
of trade turned against the USSR in the early 1938s,Furthermore, 
by the end of 1931» the USSR*s foreign indebtedness had become such
a burden that the authorities decided to reduce this debt as soon as 
l4?
possible. In the light of these facts both the decline in Soviet 
foreign trade after 1932, and the Soviet trade surpluses (see TABLE 1,6)
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from 1933-1937» are quite understandable.
Early Qoncem Over Soviet Indebtedness
Long before the early 1930s Stalin was aware of the dangers of Sov­
iet foreign indebtedness. The directive from the Thirteenth Party 
Congress in 1924, advising Soviet organisations to achieve a favour­
able balance of trade at all costs obviously reflected Stalin's con­
cern, At the Fourteenth Party Congress Stalin stated that a favour­
able balance of trade 1 * is absolutely necessary for a country like ours 
where there is little capital, where the import of capital from abroad 
does not take place, or takes place only to a minimal degree, and where 
the equilibrium of the balance of payments must be maintained by the 
balance of trade so that our chervonets remains stable and in order 
, , , to preserve the possibility of further development of our indus­
try and agriculture'.^^® But as we learned, when rubles could no 
longer be legally exported there was little reason for the USSR to 
achieve a favourable payments position for the sake of maintaining 
the stability of its currency.
The successful implementation of the First Five-Year Plan was 
so important that Stalin was willing to make concessions in order to 
secure credits for the importation of industrial c ommodities.Never­
theless, Western creditors still remained skeptical of the USSR's credit- 
worthiness.Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s Soviet de­
mand for Western commercial credit was high and the discounting 
facilities for bills of exchange and promissory notes guaranteed by 
the Soviet government were quite limited. As a result commercial credit 
for the USSR was extremely costly,
Wîien Soviet foreign indebtedness had risen to 1.4 billion rubles
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(about $722 million) in 1931» the country's borrowing operations abroad 
were sharply reduced. By the end of 1933» Soviet foreign credit ob­
ligations amounted to just over 45O million rubles (about $232 million). 
The payments on this sum could have been partially covered by the sale 
of the USSR's annual gold output which totalled approximately 100 million 
rubles (about $52 m i l l i o n ) . B y  the mid-1930s Soviet foreign indebt­
edness had fallen to a rather safe level. On 1 November 1935» Soviet 
foreign indebtedness stood at $115 million, and by 1 July 1936, had 
dwindled to $75 million. According to the People's Commissar for For­
eign Trade, A. P. Rosengoltz, Soviet foreign indebtedness was no longer 
a topic of concernI 'With such figures there is no occasion to speak 
of reducing foreign indebtedness, and whether it will or will not be 
further reduced is of no essential importance',^ -55
The marked decline in Soviet foreign indebtedness failed to bring 
about any appreciable change in Soviet international trade policy.
Even now that there has been a radical improvement in our exchange 
position we must continue the same rigid policy which we formerly 
pursued, for two reasons; first, because we must accumulate ex­
change reserves; and second, because the experience of past years 
has shown that a rigid policy with regard to imports is the best 
instrument for bringing out the internal resources of our indus­
try, the best instrument for developing our industry and attain­
ing independence of the outside world,156
However, the decrease in Soviet foreign indebtedness enabled the USSR 
to demand more favourable terms for credit. As soon as the USSR began 
to achieve favourable balances of trade it initiated a policy of reduc­
ing the cost of foreign credit. At six-month intervals Soviet FTOs 
were instructed not to accept foreign credit above a fixed rate. In 
the early 1930s this interest ceiling fell from 8 percent to 6|- per­
cent, In 1935» the maximum rate of interest on credit which was accept­
able to Soviet authorities was 6 percent. One year later the USSR not 
only fixed the maximum rate of interest below 6 percent but also de­
manded that foreign credit be extended for more than five years in most
58
c a s e s , A t  the same time the USSR no longer found it necessary to 
issue government-guaranteed bonds abroad for the purpose of raising
foreign capital,^58
It is significant to note that the USSR never failed to meet its 
foreign obligations. To Stalin, the USSR's creditworthiness was vital 
and he relied heavily upon the country's natural resources to meet the 
demands of Western creditors. This policy eventually put the USSR in 
good stead with a few key lending nations. In 1935, the USSR received 
a 'cash credit' of 200 million marks from a consortium of German banks 
to finance imports of German industrial commodities. The credit was 
granted for five years and the rate of interest was placed at 2 per­
cent above the discount rate of the Relchsbank, This was the first 
time the USSR received a foreign 'cash credit' (as opposed to commercial 
credits granted by Western exporters). Since the USSR was in a pos­
ition to pay cash for its Imports, German manufacturers were more will­
ing to quote cheaper prices for their co m m o d i t i e s ,^59
Western Reaction to Soviet Foreign Trade Policy
The foreign trade policy adopted by the USSR in the 1930s might have 
solved some of the Soviet Union's problems but it had an adverse im­
pact on a few countries in the West, In spite of its efforts to scale 
down imports, the USSR found that it was necessary to keep importing 
commodities (especially machinery and equipment) from a small number 
of industrialised market-type economies (e,g,, the United States and 
Germany), When the USSR urgently needed such imports it was not in 
a good position to demand balanced trade with supplier nations. Of 
course, in order to cover its deficits with selected industrialised 
market-type economies (iMTBs) the USSR was required to achieve hard
59
(or convertible) currency trade surpluses with other countries in the 
West.
In the early 1930s British authorities were complaining about 
the country's trade deficit with the USSR, Now one might think that 
Britain could have provided the USSR with enough services (e.g., ship­
ping, banking, and insurance) to balance the trade account between the 
two countries. But according to one source this was not possible*
The Soviet Government does not permit private travelling , , ,
Tlie Soviet Government has repudiated Russia's debts to this coun­
try /SritainJ/ and has paid no interest on them for the last fif­
teen years. And arising out of this there are few financial ser­
vices which this country could render to the Soviet Government 
and charge for them. It is thus clear that the surpluses obtain­
ed by Soviet Russia in this country were of necessity paid in gold 
or gold credits, , , ,I60
Gold payments to the USSR for the cancellation of trade deficits 
were disturbing to both British traders and the government for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, such payments reduced the country's monetary 
reserves. Secondly, these payments were used primarily to cancel Sov­
iet deficits with non-British t r a d e r s . A  special committee was 
set up in Britain to study the problems in Anglo-Soviet trade. The 
committee concluded that*
Great Britain cannot any longer tolerate the present unequal trade, 
especially when it is only too evident that the money obtained by 
Russia for her imports into England is used almost entirely for 
the purpose of purchasing machinery and tools from England's com­
petitors, We require an arrangement with Russia to trade on a 
reciprocal basis, our trade with Russia being regulated to an am­
ount approximately equal to the amount Russia buys from us, plus 
the value of our invisible exports to R u s s i a ,162
The Soviet Union and World Trade
The Soviet share of world trade during the 1920s and 1930s is given 
in TABLE 1,7. As far as world exports are concerned the largest annual 
Soviet share (recorded in the years 1931-1933) only amounted to 52
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percent of Russia's share in I9I3. The share of Soviet imports in 
world trade came a little closer to the pre-revolutionary figure* In 
1931, the share of Soviet imports amounted to 75 percent of the Russian 
portion recorded in 1913. In comparison with other industrialised 
countries the USSR's export operations were quite unimpressive. In 
1937, Soviet exports were approximately ten times smaller than Amer­
ican exports, eight times smaller than British exports, and six times 
smaller than German e x p o r t s ,^^3
TABLE 1,7
THE SOVIET SHARE OF WORLD EXPORTS 
AND IMPORTS, 1913-1936 
(in millions of U.S. gold dollars)
Exports 1913 
world
1925 ,1929 1232 mi m 2 1233 1934 mi 1236
total 18,356 30,708 33,040 26,492 18,908 12,902 11,694 11,364 11,554 12,492
USSR
exports 775 
USSR
326 482 533 417 290 261 216 189 160
share % 4.2
Imports
world
1.1 1.5 2*0 2*2 2.2 2,2 1.9 1.6 1.3
total 19,509 32,164 35,601 29,083 20,818 13,996 12,485 12,011 12,227 13,051
USSR
imports 700 
USSR
424 453 545 569 360 182 120 124 159
share % 3.6 1.3 1.3 1.9 2.7 2.6 1.5 1.0 1,0 1.2
Source* D, D, Mishustin, ed,, Vneshnyaya torgovlya Sovetskoeo 
Soyuza (Moscow* Mezhdunarodnaya kniga, 1938), p. IO5.
For some time Western analysts argued that the USSR adopted an 
autarkic policy solely for the purpose of eventually alienating itself 
from the Western world* 'The policy of autarky stems from the prior 
objective of securing and maintaining military and economic indepen­
dence from the capitalist world'*1^^ Of course, the writings of Soviet 
economists only helped to confirm the suspicions of Western critics.
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Moreover, the country's history of commercial relations with the West 
was enough to make even the most ardent proponents of East-West trade 
a little skeptical,166 Now it should be remembered that the increase 
in Soviet foreign trade which began in the late 1920s resulted in some 
rather encouraging developments. Indeed, between the late 1920s and 
early 1930s hundreds of Soviet technicians travelled abroad in order 
to learn Western industrial techniques, and Western technicians were 
operating equipment (which had been imported from the West) and train­
ing personnel in the USSR, But this form of co-operation was short­
lived, By the mid-1930s the level of interaction between Soviet and 
Western industrial personnel had fallen sharply. In addition, virtually 
every sector of the Soviet economy had achieved a significant level of 
independence from external markets.
As we have learned, the scope of Soviet foreign trade was rather 
limited by the mid-1930s. On the other hand the Western approach to 
external trade at that time was hardly a worthy example to follow. In 
fact, the discriminatory trade measures which were used against the 
USSR— embargoes, currency restrictions (i,e,, unfavourable terms for
16*7
credits), high tariffs, and anti-Soviet campaigns — at a time when
the Soviet Union was attempting to step up its trade operations only 
exacerbated the situation. Now the Soviet Union was not the only vic­
tim of discriminatory trading practices. During the Great Depression 
all countries traded within a jungle of protective legislation. More­
over, the USSR was hardly an innocent victim of the cutthroat compet­
ition which took place during this period. According to Stalin, the 
Soviet petroleum industry and other organisations producing commodities 
for export were capable of carrying out successful operations despite 
stiff foreign competition,
, , , certain petroleum firms of capitalist countries are trying
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to strangle the Soviet petroleum industry so the Soviet petroleum
industry has to defend itself in order to exist and develop fur­
ther.
How does the Soviet petroleum industry defend itself? It de­
fends itself . . ., above all, by lowering the price of petroleum, 
by selling cheap petroleum in the market, cheaper than the petrol­
eum of capitalist firms, . , , the Soviet petroleum industry is 
not a capitalist industry and, therefore, does not need huge pro­
fits, . , . And precisely because the Soviet petroleum industry 
does not need huge profits it can sell its products cheaper than 
capitalist firms,
It might be interesting to note that during the late 1920s and 
early 1930s world petroleum production increased markedly while de­
mand remained stagnant. Western petroleum companies blamed falling 
prices (and profits) on the Soviet export offensive which was aimed 
at selling the largest possible volume of petroleum at any price that 
buyers were willing to p a y , ^^2 attempt to curb Soviet exports
and halt the sharp decline in world petroleum prices, international
oil companies literally offered to buy the Soviets out in the early 
1930s, At a world petroleum conference held in New York between May 
and June 1932» British and American oil companies offered to accept 
all Soviet petroleum exports for ten years at the 1931-level of about 
5,2 million metric tons,^^^ According to the terms of the proposal 
the USSR would have been required to sell its distributing facilities 
in foreign countries. Needless to say, the USSR did not accept the 
proposal,
Soviet Foreign Aid
The increasing economic and technological capabilities of the USSR 
led to the introduction of Soviet foreign aid programmes. Prior to 
World War II such aid was limited to neighbouring countries. In 1927» 
the USSR provided Afghanistan with a radio station and cotton mill 
under the Soviet foreign aid p r o g r a m m e , A  few years later the USSR
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constructed a textile mill in Turkey, All of the equipment for this 
mill was produced in the USSR and Soviet technicians were responsible 
for installing the machinery and organising production.^73 In 1933» 
the IBSR was asked to construct and equip rice-polishing mills, cotton 
mills and wool-washing plants in Iran, Two years later the USSR agreed 
to design and construct a second textile mill in Turkey. Once again 
all equipment was provided by the USSR and Soviet technicians were res­
ponsible for installing it,^"^^
On Soviet Autarky
It is generally assumed that Stalinist-type planners seek absolute 
control over the economic variables which are responsible for achiev­
ing the objectives of the central economic plan. If this is true, Sov­
iet planners in the 1930s most likely had a general feeling of ant­
ipathy toward foreign trade since such control over the economic var­
iables in this sector of the economy would be partially eroded by the 
uncertainties of the world market. But planner sovereignty and all 
the other ideological factors which have been mentioned heretofore 
fail to explain satisfactorily the USSR's decision to adopt an autar­
kic policy. For this reason very few Western analysts continue to 
rely solely on the ideological issues when dealing with the problem 
of Soviet autarky. Indeed, Adam Zwass may maintain (as many critics 
do) that the formation of the Stalinist-type economy was, to a large 
extent, ideologically motivated, but he wisely modified his criticism 
by adding that during the 1930s the 'economically shattered Western 
nations' were in no position to offer an attractive alternative. 
Gerschenkron reached the same conclusion way back in 1945* 'Even if 
one deplores this development /~i.e,» economic development on the basis
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of autarky_7f a- good case can be made for the view that the economic 
world of the unhappy 'thirties being what it was, autarkic policies 
were inevitable from the point of view of the self-preservation of the 
country and no responsible Russian government would have pursued essen­
tially different policies'. ^ ^6
The extensive capabilities of the Soviet economy gave the coun­
try's leaders one of the best reasons for adopting an autarkic policy. 
This assumption is supported by Herbert Levine who points out that 
the USSR's large and diverse resource base might have been responsi­
ble for the country*slow level of foreign trade during the period of 
rapid industrialisation. Of course, this situation was not just 
a peculiarity of the USSR, In the United States, for example, the 
ratio of exports to national income decreased from 7*5 percent in 1913» 
to 4 percent in 1958» despite attempts by the government to stimulate 
trade during this period,^^8
In a belated response to the findings of Western analysts, a 
Soviet writer has confirmed that the USSR's resource base proved to 
be a significant reason for Soviet autarky. According to N. Shmelev, 
the industrialisation of the USSR was brought about mainly by 'domes­
tic productive, financial and scientific-technical potential*,^^2 
By the late 1930s the Soviet economy was developing on the basis of 
indigenous resources and deliveries of foreign equipment were, for 
the most part, u n n e c e s s a r y . ^^O Shmelev defends the USSR's autarkic 
policy in spite of the fact that it led to the establishment of some 
inferior industries.
The policy of maximum self-sufficiency in the development of key 
branches of industry was the only correct policy in this histor­
ical period /"i.e., the 1930s^, . , . with its natural and human
resources and its high scientific potential the Soviet Union had 
the necessary actual conditions for creating a complete industrial­
ised nation, including all basic branches of industry, although 
some of them were undoubtedly less effective than analogous bran­
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ches in other countries. The very problem of the Soviet economy 
effectively participating in the worldwide division of labour and 
organising economically advantageous and truly equal relations 
with other countries could not have been resolved without the coun­
try attaining technical-economic independence beforehand . , , Nat­
urally, the wide expansion of the industrialisation process and the 
utilisation of productive resources to the utmost in order to sat­
isfy the country's current and future needs initially restricted 
the export potential of the Soviet Union. This, in turn, limited 
its import potential, 181
Soviet Foreign Economic Policy 
During the 19^0s and 1950s
The demands placed on the Soviet economy during World War II were great 
enough to warrant a change in Soviet policy. After becoming the re­
cipient of massive infusions of wartime commodities under the Lend- 
Lease agreement the Soviet economy was no longer developing along aut­
arkic lines. Moreover, in the light of the USSR's decreased export 
potential and its dependence on imports, planned surpluses were not 
a primary objective of Soviet foreign trade policy throughout most of 
the war (see TABLE 1,8),
TABLE 1,8
FOREIGN TRADE OF THE USSR, 1941-1945 
(in millions of I96I rubles)
Year Exports Imports Balance
1941 178.5 277.7 - 99.2
1942 65.7 181,8 -116,1
1943 66,8 173.1 -106.3
1944 114,9 198.8 - 83.9
1945 301.8 259.7 42.1
Total -36374
Sourcei Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR statisticheskii sbornik 1918- 
1966 (Moscow* Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 1967).
There were a number of reasons to indicate the USSR would become
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an integral part of the world economy after the war. Firstly, the 
USSR and its allies, despite their ideological differences, had join­
ed together in the fight against world fascism. Secondly, the Soviet 
economy could no longer he considered autarkic. Thirdly, at the U.N. 
Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods in 1944, the USSR 
participated in discussions (with over forty other nations) on the 
establishment of the International Monetary Fund and the Internation­
al Bank for Reconstruction and Development. And finally, and perhaps 
most important, the vast economic capabilities of the USSR were great­
ly needed during the period of reconstruction.
By 1946, the USSR had become the key participant in the world 
socialist movement and was no longer considered a meaningful part of 
the Western economic system. Although Soviet commercial operations 
with other socialist countries lie outside the confines of this under­
taking it is important to remember that present-day members of the 
East European socialist community were regarded as MTEs both before 
and immediately after the war. Therefore, we should briefly cover 
the steps taken by the USSR which helped to transform these former 
MTEs into centrally planned economies (CPEs),
Soviet Economic Operations in Eastern Europe
Soviet relations with the economies of Eastern Europe involved much 
more than the exchange of commodities, and reparations from the 
USSR's former enemies (Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania). Margaret Dewar 
states*
Soviet economic policy toward these states was contradictory. Par­
ticularly in the immediate post-war period, the USSR sought to ex­
tract from Eastern Europe as much capital equipment and goods as 
possible. At the same time, Russia, in her own interest, was great­
ly concerned in helping these countries to rehabilitate their econ-
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omy and to mould it according to the Soviet pattern,^82 
There were at least three forms of Soviet economic penetration into 
Eastern Europe during the immediate post-war period. Firstly, the 
Soviet Union gained control over German and Italian assets in Eastern 
Europe,1^3 A significant portion of’this property (i.e,, machinery 
and equipment) was subsequently transferred to the USSR, Secondly,
Soviet foreign trade representations and missions (i.e,, groups of 
Soviet officials sent to foreign countries on a temporary basis) in 
Eastern Europe were used as a means of strengthening the USSR's econ­
omic influence in this region. And finally, through the establishment 
of Soviet-East European joint-stock companies (and wholly Soviet-owned 
companies) the USSR played a key role in various sectors of the East 
European economies.
The USSR's intention to establish a foothold in East European 
economic systems via joint-stock companies was especially evident in 
Hungary, When the five-year economic co-operation agreement between 
the USSR and Hungary was being negotiated in August 1945» it reported­
ly contained provisions for the establishment of Hungarian-Soviet com­
panies which would be concerned with petroleum exploration, refining 
and marketing; coal mining; electrical power plants; agriculture; mach­
inery and equipment; and air, sea and land t r a n s p o r t . T h e  proposed 
agreement was strongly opposed by the Hungarian business community. The 
British and American governments also protested against the agreement,^^ -5 
But on 21 December 1945» the Hungarian Supreme National Council fin­
ally ratified a 'modified' agreement which contained provisions for 
Soviet participation in the Hungarian economy. Until the mid-1950s 
the USSR participated in over ten joint-stock companies in Hungary 
including the bank which was set up to facilitate trade between the 
two countries.
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Mixed joint-stock companies were also established in Rumania, 
Bulgaria, and East Germany. Between 1945 and 1946, five Rumanian-Sov­
iet companies were set up* Sovromtransport, the Soviet-Rumanian Civil 
Aviation Company (Tars), the Soviet-Rumanian Lumber Company (Sovrom- 
lemn), Sovrombank, and S o v r o m p e t r o l , I n  1948, the USSR's influence 
in the Rumanian banking community was strengthened when all of the 
important banks in Rumania were merged with Sovrombank, Between 1948 
and 1949» six additional Rumanian-Soviet companies were established* 
SovTomtractor, Sovromchemicals, Sovromgas, Sovrommetal, Sovromcoal, 
and Sovromconstruction.lG? in Bulgaria the USSR participated in com­
panies which were concerned with mining, shipbuilding, construction 
material, and civil aviation. Only one East German-Soviet joint-stock 
company was set up in the immediate post-war period. However, the 
establishment of such companies at that time was quite unnecessary 
as the USSR had already seized a large segment of East Germany's in­
dustrial sector. It is interesting to note that the Foreign Trade 
Bank of the USSR (Vneshtorgbank) exercised control over the bank which 
was later transformed into the national bank of the German Democratic
R e p u b l i c . I G G
Soviet participation in joint-stock companies in Eastern Europe 
differed little from country to country. In most cases the USSR held 
50 percent of each company's share capital. The USSR's contributions 
to these companies often came from reparations or confiscated German/ 
Italian property. The boards of directors of Bast European-Soviet 
companies were usually balanced (i.e., each board had an equal number 
of Soviet and local directors). The management staff of such compan­
ies included both Soviet and local personnel. In the USSR the Main 
Administration for Soviet Property Abroad was responsible for guiding 
the operations of the joint companies,
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By the mid-1950s, the USSR had relinquished its assets in the 
East European countries. There were a number of obvious reasons for 
this move. At that time the pains of war had abated and the omnipres­
ence of the USSR in East European economic systems was no longer nec­
essary, Moreover, mixed joint-stock companies in Eastern Europe were 
often given preferential t r e a t m e n t ,^20 This was bound to create prob­
lems as conditions stabilised in Eastern Europe, In all likelihood 
the USSR did not regard the loss of the companies as an economic set­
back. If we take a close look at the reasons behind the USSR's desire 
to establish the aforementioned companies it is immediately apparent 
(in the light of the present-day situation) that such a policy was 
successful beyond most expectations.
The participation of the Soviet Union in joint-stock companies,
, , ,, represents in itself a new and profitable form of co-oper­
ation for the countries of the people's democracies. Production 
of the joint-stock companies is used for the needs of the inter­
nal market and the exports of the people's republics. At the same 
time these countries receive necessary industrial equipment and 
means of transport from the USSR, The joint companies serve as 
an example for other enterprises in the countries of the people's 
democracies in the pursuit of socialist organisation of labour, 
the rational use of equipment, and the introduction of new product­
ion methods. 191
Soviet Joint-Stock Companies in the West 
Immediately After World War II
During World War II the activities of Soviet joint-stock companies 
in the United States and Britain were reduced considerably. Through­
out this period the official Soviet trade representation in Britain 
and the Buying Commission of the USSR in the United States played a 
key role in the external commercial operations of the Soviet U n i o n , ^22 
In 1946, the United States requested the liquidation of the USSR's 
Buying Commission, Within a short period of time the responsibilities 
of the Buying Commission were shifted to the Amtorg Corporation,
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With only a few exceptions, the Soviet joint-stock companies 
which existed in the United States and Britain in 1940 resumed active 
commercial operations in the post-war period. The Amtorg Corporation, 
which was virtually inactive during the war, became a fundamental par­
ticipant in American-Soviet trade. In Britain the Moscow Narodny Bank, 
the Black Sea and Baltic Insurance Company and the Anglo-Soviet Ship­
ping Company continued to function throughout World War II and the 
cold war, and, like Amtorg, still operate today, Russian Oil Products 
was one of the few exceptions. It was liquidated in 1948,
Soviet International Financial Relations 
from the Mid-1940s to the Early 1950^
The rift which developed between the USSR and IMTEs at the end of 1945 
sharply reduced the flow of credits from the West to the Soviet Union, 
From 1946-1953» only one IMTE— Sweden— granted the USSR new credits.^^3 
(The USSR received a few credits from IMTEs in the immediate post-war 
period on the basis of agreements negotiated during the war,) Now 
one might think that the USSR could have obtained hard currency loans 
quite easily from its banks in the U.K. and France. However, such 
banks only had limited access to world financial markets until the 
late 1950s,
It is interesting to note that the USSR was transformed into 
a major creditor nation a few years after the war. According to A, M, 
Smirnov, 'The change in the USSR's role in international credit rela­
tions after the war was brought about first of all by the formation 
of the world socialist system as a result of the departure of the Chin­
ese People's Republic and other peoples' democracies in Europe and 
Asia from the capitalist s y s t e m ' . ^^4 indeed, by the early 1950s the 
USSR had granted a significant amount of credit to Albania, Bulgaria,
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China, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland and Rumania, Then 
in the latter part of the 1950® the USSR extended crW.its to a few 
less-developed (market-type) countries (IjDCs ), Most of these credits 
to LDGs were earmarked for purchases of Soviet machinery, equipment, 
and technical services, (For the purpose of this undertaking LDGs 
only refer to countries in the West.)
Soviet Trade with the West 
Since the Mid-1950s
At this point it is only necessary for us to take a brief look at some 
of the most important developments in the Soviet foreign trade sector 
which have taken place over the last two decad.es. More detailed an­
alyses will be provided in following chapters. One of the most note­
worthy developments in Soviet foreign economic policy is the growing 
emphasis on the expansion of the export sector coupled with the pro­
duction of more competitive commodities for export,^25 This desire to 
increase exports went pari passu with the USSR's endeavours to obtain 
more Western technology (on credit) for the purpose of promoting Soviet 
economic growth. Another important development is the widespread use 
of calculations for determining the effectiveness of Soviet export- 
import operations. Yet another significant development is the marked in­
crease in both the size and number of Soviet trading companies and banks 
in MTEs. Before I96O, only a few of these organisations existed. At 
this time Soviet foreign-based trading companies and banks are operating 
in almost all of the major world markets. The Soviet merchant fleet 
has grown significantly since 1965, a-nd now actively operates in most 
Western shipping markets. And finally, Soviet officials have been 
promoting East-West technical co-operation by negotiating numerous 
agreements with foreign governments and private companies.
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Recent Developments in Soviet 
Export Strategy
Throughout the I96OS various changes took place within the Ministry 
of Foreign Trade (remember that the Commissariat of Foreign Trade was 
transformed into the Ministry of Foreign trade in 1946) which were aimed 
at increasing the exportation of Soviet manufactured commodities to 
MTEs, In 1962, there were only two main export administrations--one 
for raw materials and the other for machinery and equipment. However, 
by 1969, the main export administration for machinery and equipment 
had been split into four main export administrations* (l) industrial 
equipment, (2) transportation equipment, (3) road-building and agri­
cultural machinery, and (4) consumer g o o d s , ^^6
During the 1960s a number of FTOs were either established or 
reorganised in order to increase the level of specialisation in the 
export sector and boost sales of Soviet manufactured products in the 
West, In 1964, the FTC Vneshtorgreklama was established to handle 
the advertising requirements of exporting FTOs, One year later the 
FTO Zapchast'eksport was set up to handle the export of spare parts.
This was an important development as Soviet manufactured products were 
often shunned by Western consumers because spare parts for these com­
modities were difficult (and sometimes virtually impossible) to obtain. 
In 1966, Mashinoeksport was reorganised into three FTOs— Mashinoeksport, 
Tekhmasheksport, and Energomasheksport, This move was part of a scheme 
to limit the operations of individual FTOs to more specific commodity 
groups, Soviet interest in penetrating markets for technologically 
advanced commodities became quite obvious in the early 1970s, For 
example, the FTO Elektronorgtekhnika was established in 1971 to sell 
Soviet computers in world markets.
In 1973» N. N. Smelyakov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of
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the USSR, stressed the importance of producing Soviet commodities which 
are capable of competing with goods in world markets * * if a machine
is not suitable for export, if it is not purchased in the world market, 
it is not, as a rule, needed in our national e c o n o m y * , ^^7 Although 
Smelyakov maintained that the competitiveness of Soviet commodities 
in world markets depends to a large degree on the quality of such goods, 
he also pointed out the fact that Soviet commodities of the highest 
quality (especially products from the machine-building industry) often 
create little or no interest amongst Western buyers. When the output 
of Soviet manufacturing industries began to satisfy domestic (Soviet) 
needs exporters and producers in the USSR should have started paying 
closer attention to the demands of buyers in world markets. However, 
the USSR had little experience in meeting the demands of the world 
market for manufactured commodities, (Most of the USSR's exports to 
the West are raw materials and half-finished products,) As a result 
Soviet exporters of machinery and equipment thought that their goods 
could be marketed in much the same fashion as raw materials. Needless 
to say this policy was not too successful. In the words of Smelyakov, 
'We /"i.e,, Soviet sellers^/ put ourselves in a difficult position 
by starting to sell machinery and equipment by applying the same meth­
ods used to sell, say, timber*,^^8 Smelyakov's call for greater Sov­
iet awareness of demands in world markets is supported by at least 
two other analysts in the USSR, While agreeing that the competitive­
ness of Soviet exports depends a great deal on the quality of such 
products, P. Zav'yalov and I. Kratov also maintain that the competi­
tiveness of Soviet commodities depends on whether or not these goods 
meet current and future demands of the world market,^29
Although it would not be right to say that Soviet manufactured 
products are now capturing Western markets there is enough evidence
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to indicate that within a reasonable amount of time such commodities 
might establish a firm foothold in the West. At the present time Sov­
iet automobiles, cameras and watches appear to be selling quite well.
In the U.K., Sekonda watches now hold second place in terms of sales.200 
(Approximately one out of every eleven watches sold in the U.K. is a 
Sekonda.) Soviet refrigerators, colour televisions, camping equipment 
and pianos are now being exported to the West.201 addition, Soviet 
heavy machinery and equipment seem to be generating some interest. Dur­
ing the mid-1970s the USSR won contracts to supply Canada with two 
444-megawatt turbines, four 178-megawatt turbines, and two 110-mega­
watt turbines,202
Since the mid-1970s a number of Western organisations have been 
helping Soviet traders improve their management and marketing techniques. 
In the early part of 1974, the Chase World Information Corporation, 
a subsidiary of the Chase Manhattan Bank, signed an agreement with 
Gosbank for the exchange of information which would promote Soviet 
trade with the W e s t ,203 The USSR agreed to supply Chase World Infor­
mation with data on Soviet markets and Chase agreed to assist Soviet 
exporters in their attempts to penetrate Western markets. During 1974, 
one of the largest accounting firms in the United States, Arthur Ander­
sen and Company, started negotiating with Soviet authorities on the 
establishment of an Arthur Andersen office in M o s c o w , 204 idea
for such an office stemmed from an agreement on auditing, international 
taxation and management services signed by the USSR and the Arthur 
Andersen company in 1973* At the present time the Arthur Andersen 
office in Moscow is responsible for teaching Western management and 
marketing techniques to Soviet foreign trade personnel. In 1975» an 
American public relations firm, Black-Russell-Morris, conducted a sem­
inar in Moscow on methods of advertising and marketing industrial equip-
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ment in the United States. The seminar vas conducted on the basis 
of a contract signed by Black-Russell-Morris and Vneshtorgreklama. In 
the latter part of 1976, another Moscow seminar was conducted by Black- 
Russell-Morris for 100 representatives of Soviet FTOs.2^5
On Determining the Effectiveness 
of Soviet Foreign Trade
We learned previously that during the 1930s officials in the Soviet 
foreign trade sector seemed to pay little attention to the effective­
ness of the country's export-import operations. Imports were looked 
upon as a vital means of achieving rapid industrial growth in the USSR 
while exports merely functioned as a means of paying for such necessary 
imports. However, by the late 1950s this attitude started to change. 
At the present time Soviet planners in the export sector seem to be 
interested in finding out which domestically produced commodities will 
earn the largest amount of foreign exchange per ruble spent. On the 
other hand Soviet planners in the import sector appear to be interested 
in determining which imports will save the largest amount of domestic 
(Soviet) resources per unit of foreign exchange spent. Of course, 
this does not mean that economic rationality is now used to guide Sov­
iet foreign trade operations. Indeed, calculating the effectiveness 
of foreign trade and actually using the result to shape export/import 
operations are two different things, A number of formulae are current­
ly being used in the USSR to calculate the effectiveness of foreign 
t r a d e . A n  example of a simple formula for calculating the effect­
iveness of export,operations is as follows:
Pde
Eex. = —
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where
Eex, represents the effectiveness of a given export;
Pde represents the domestic price (or cost) of the export;
V represents the domestic value of imported goods embod­
ied in the export (i.e., the ruble value of commodities 
needed to pay for Imports which will be used to pro­
duce the export);
Pfe represents the selling price of the export, in foreign 
exchange ;
G represents the cost of the import content of the export,
in foreign exchange.
Let's assume that for commodity 'W: Pde “ 100 rubles, V = I5 rubles,
Pfe “ $175.00, and G = $25.00, Under such conditions Eex, “ 0.6, which 
means that one-ruble's worth of commodity 'W  earns 1,66 units of for­
eign exchange. For the sake of comparison let's assume that Eex, « 0.5 
in the case of commodity 'X', This would mean that one-ruble's worth 
of commodity 'X* earns 2.0 units of foreign exchange. If no other 
factors have to be taken into consideration it would be more advantag­
eous for the USSR to export commodity 'X',
An example of a simple formula for calculating the effectiveness 
of import operations is as follows*
Eim, -
Pfi 
where
Eim, represents the effectiveness of a given import;
Pdi represents the domestic price (or cost) of the import­
ed commodity (i.e., the cost of producing the commod­
ity in the USSR);
Pfi represents the foreign price of the import.
Let's assume that for commodity 'Y'* Pdi - 120 rubles, and Pfi - $80,00;
and for commodity 'Z'* Pdi = I60 rubles, and Pfi = $90.00, Under
these conditions Eim. ™ 1.5 for commodity 'Y', and 1.8 for commodity 'Z',
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If no other factors have to be taken into consideration it would be 
more advantageous for the USSR to import commodity 'Z' as this import 
saves the country more rubles per unit of foreign exchange spent, (For 
more discussions on the effectiveness of imports see pp. 199'"204.)
On the Current Soviet Attitude Toward 
the Theory of Comparative Advantage
For over a half century Soviet officials have openly rejected the theory
of comparative advantage. According to V. Buglai, 'Soviet economic
science has described this theory as an ideological justification of the
dependent and subordinate status of some countries vis-à-vis other coun-
207tries in the international market'. In spite of this attitude, Adam 
Zwass has pointed out that some Soviet economists have acknowledged the 
usefulness of the 'rational core' of the theory of comparative advan­
tage. But this is no indication that Soviet foreign trade will even­
tually be conducted on the basis of this theory. Indeed, as long as ser­
ious differences exist between East and West, Soviet leaders (as well as 
their Western counterparts) will most likely discourage any foreign trade 
policy which would lead to severe economic problems in the event of a 
complete breakdown of relations between the two camps. Much more could 
be said about the theory of comparative advantage but such discussions 
lie outside the confines of this undertaking. Therefore, it is only nec­
essary to mention that official Soviet reports indicate that Soviet gains 
from foreign trade will be realised from the international division of 
labour (and not from comparative advantage), L, I, Brezhnev statesi
One of the peculiarities of our time is the growing use of the inter­
national division of labour for the development of every country 
irrespective of its wealth and economic level. We, like other coun­
tries, are striving to use the advantages which are provided to us 
by foreign economic relations for the mobilisation of additional pos­
sibilities for the successful solution of economic problems and, by 
gaining time, to increase the effectiveness of production and the 
acceleration of progress of science and technology.209
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Soviet Trading Companies 
and Banks in the West
One of the most striking developments in Soviet foreign economic pol­
icy is the marked increase in Soviet trading companies and banks in 
MTEs, According to the CIA, there were twenty-eight Soviet companies 
(including banks) operating in the West in 1970. At the end of 1976, 
over eighty such companies were in operation. 210 ^e leaimed previous­
ly from A. V, Engibarov that some Soviet companies were set up in 
the West because selected IMTEs were unwilling to conduct commercial 
operations with organisations in Soviet Russia, But the situation 
changed after World War II, According to Engibarov, the establish­
ment of post-war Soviet foreign-based trading companies was necessary 
in order to bring about more favourable conditions for the sale of 
Soviet commodities in highly competitive m a r k e t s , A  sizeable num­
ber of Soviet foreign-based companies are concerned with the market­
ing and servicing of machinery and equipment while a slightly smaller 
group promotes Soviet maritime operations (shipping and fishing) in 
the West. Some Soviet foreign-based companies were set up to operate 
within a certain market while others were established in major trade 
centres for the purpose of conducting business with firms throughout 
the world.
It is interesting to note that before the early 1970s Soviet 
foreign-based companies, as a rule, were set up to market Soviet goods 
and services. However, over the past few years a number of mixed com­
panies have been established in the West for the purpose of marketing 
commodities from both Soviet and foreign sources, Soviet foreign trade 
personnel have found that they can gain valuable technical information 
and marketing skill via mixed companies in IMTEs,
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It should also be mentioned that the USSR could start purchasing 
share capital of wholly Western-owned companies on a fairly large scale. 
This might not be far off since one GMEA member (Hungary) has already 
set up a company in Luxemburg— Globinvest— to raise funds for the pur­
chase of share capital in (small and medium-sized) Western c o m p a n i e s , ^^2 
Even if the USSR purchases share capital in companies which do not 
function as marketing outlets for Soviet commodities the Soviet Union 
would still benefit from annual dividend payments and better access 
to Western technology.
On Ruble Exchange Rates and Soviet Prices
Since 1961, the official value of the ruble has appreciated vis-à-vis 
the dollar I in June I96I, 1 ruble « $1.11; and in June 1978, 1 ruble *• 
$1,43. Is it possible that the ruble has become more than just an 
accounting unit over the last two decades and is now a worthy measure 
of value? According to Alec Nove, 'The evidence suggests that the 
official rate /"of the ruble// is not far off purchasing-power parity, 
in terms at least of wholesale prices'.213 There is little doubt that 
prices in the USSR have Increased much slower than in the West. Of 
course, a number of commodities in the USSR are still grossly expen­
sive when their ruble values are converted into foreign currency at 
the official rate (in other words purchasing-power parity and the rate 
of exchange are out of line). On the other hand some Soviet commodi­
ties appear relatively inexpensive. Such conditions, of course, are 
not just found in the USSR. As Nove rightly points out, 'Purchasing- 
power parities and exchange rates are seldom in line for any group of 
countries. East or West'.214
At this point one might wonder if prices for Soviet exports are
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starting to move in line with official exchange rates. Obviously one 
could find examples of Soviet commodities being sold in the West for 
prices in line with official ruble rates. For example, if a tourist 
in the USSR during June 1978 looked far and near for a specific type 
of vodka which he paid $7.15 per bottle for in New York he might have 
found the same vodka in Moscow (in a store which accepts only Soviet 
currency) selling for 5 rubles (remember, in June 1978, 1 ruble = $1,43), 
On the other hand Goldman has pointed out that the USSR was selling 
automobiles in the West for roughly $2,400 while the same cars were 
being sold in the USSR for the equivalent of $7,300.^^^ In addition, 
we should keep in mind the fact that a number of Soviet manufactured 
goods which are exported to the West are seldom available to a wide 
range of Soviet consumers at any ruble price. Indeed, in some respects 
Soviet export policy has changed very little since the 1930s, But 
it would hardly be fair to criticise Soviet traders for selling goods 
in the West at prices below those charged in the USSR without mention­
ing the fact that Western governments also provide subsidies to enable 
their traders to offer goods at competitive prices. In 1974, the EEC 
paid out almost £50 million in subsidies to bridge the gap between 
higher EEC prices for beef and lower prices prevailing in world mar­
kets, It might be interesting to note that most of this beef was sold 
to the USSR.216
Economic Co-operation Between the USSR and 
Foreign Governments and Private Companies
Since the early 1970s numerous agreements have been negotiated on 
economic, scientific and technical co-operation between the USSR and 
Western nations. Initial agreements on economic, scientific and tech» 
nical co-operation are usually negotiated by top-level governmental
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organs on both sides. These agreements cover broad fields such as 
environmental protection, flight safety, engineering technology, stand­
ardisation and quality control, geology, architecture, forestry, mach­
ine building, and space research. Mixed intergovernmental commissions 
for economic, scientific and technical co-operation are normally estab­
lished as a result of initial agreements. The aforementioned commiss­
ions are responsible for setting up mixed working groups (or special­
ised commissions) which concentrate on specific fields (e.g., the tim­
ber industry, the steel industry, and the aircraft industry),
 ^ Following the negotiation of initial agreements on economic co­
operation Soviet FTOs and other organisations involved in foreign trade 
start negotiating more specific agreements with foreign governmental 
organisations and private companies. In many cases these agreements 
have led to the signing of contracts for the exchange of commodities 
between a Western company and an FTO. However, agreements between 
Soviet organisations and Western companies now involve much more than 
the exchange of goods between signatories. Indeed, one of the most 
noteworthy developments during the past few years is the growing 
interest amongst Soviet organisations and Western companies to enter 
into joint production schemes for the purpose of penetrating markets 
in third countries. For example, in 1976, the Soviet FTO Energomash­
eksport participated jointly with West European firms in bidding for a 
contract to supply equipment to a power station in Brazil,21? In April 
1977, the Austrian firm Elin-Union was negotiating with the Soviet 
FTO Mashinoeksport on the joint sale of mine lifts to third countries,218 
Approximately one year later the Deputy Chairman of the USSR's State 
Committee for Science and Technology, Dzhermen Gvishiani, mentioned 
that British and Soviet industries could participate in a number of 
co-production schemes. The joint production of automobiles which could
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be marketed in third countries was one of the schemes suggested by
Gvishiani.219
In June 1978, officials from the Soviet Ministry of the Elect­
ronics Industry and members of the British company Plessey were dis­
cussing a scheme for the joint production of a music centre consisting 
of a record player, a tuner, a casette tape recorder, an amplifier, 
and speakers. During the first stage of the deal Plessey would be 
responsible for supplying the record players. However, during the 
second stage Plessey would only supply parts for the record players.
Then at the final stage Soviet manufacturers would produce virtually 
all parts for the record player and the music centre. If the deal 
goes through the USSR could export these music centres to Britain and 
third countries,
Another interesting development is the marked growth of Western 
participation in production facilities in the USSR, In I966, the Ital­
ian automobile manufacturer Fiat agreed to help construct a plant in 
the USSR for the production of (Fiat-designed) automobiles. By the 
mid-1970s the automobile plant had not only significantly increased 
the number of automobiles in the USSR but also provided the Soviet 
Union with thousands of (Western-designed) cars which could be market­
ed abroad. One type of automobile produced in the aforementioned plant—  
the Lada— is generating quite a lot of interest in the West,
It is also important to mention that since the late 1960s Soviet 
officials have been encouraging Western investment (without equity 
ownership) in compensatory projects in the USSR, Such projects call 
for medium- and long-term Western credits for the purchase of machin­
ery, equipment, and technical services. The imported Western goods/ 
services are used to boost Soviet production of a wide range of com­
modities (e.g., natural ^s, timber, coal, and chemicals), Soviet
83
officials have placed a great deal of emphasis on compensatory projects 
as Western suppliers of machinery, equipment, and technical services 
are usually required to purchase part of the output of these projects 
which is equal to or greater than the value of Western project-related 
goods/services exported to the USSR,
The Impact of Soviet Exports 
on the West
Some rather encouraging economic developments have taken place between 
the USSR and MTEs over the past decade. For some time the Western 
world regarded the USSR as a backward exporter of raw materials. How­
ever, following the energy crises of the early and mid-1970s Soviet 
exports of petroleum, natural gas and electricity were looked upon 
as an important means of solving the world's energy problems* In addit­
ion, Soviet technology is now starting to play a greater role in the 
country's foreign trade. For example, in 1976, a U.S. drug firm ob­
tained a licence from the USSR for the production of an anti-cancer 
d r u g .221 Other examples include the sale of a Soviet licence to the 
United States for the production of aluminium, the sale of a Soviet 
licence to Japan for the production of a cooling system for blast fur­
naces, and even the sale of a Soviet licence to France for the product- 
222ion of champagne.
Economic co-operation between the USSR and the West can result 
in the most efficient use of the world's resources. In the field of 
research and development much could be gained by co-ordinating the 
activities of Soviet and Western technicians. It is widely known that 
the Soviet merchant fleet has reduced shipping costs for Western ex­
porters and importers. Although a sizeable portion of these savings 
might stem from the Soviet fleet's rate-cutting policy (as opposed to
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the efficiency of the fleet) it should be mentioned that the USSR has 
shown that it can reduce shipping costs for Westerners via other schemes. 
For example, on 26 November 1976, the USSR and Venezuela signed a pet­
roleum-exchange agreement whereby Venezuela can arrange for its cus­
tomers to receive petroleum from the USSR if this proves to be cheaper 
than shipping them Venezuelan petroleum. On the other hand the USSR 
can arrange for its customers to receive Venezuelan petroleum if this 
scheme is cheaper than shipping them Soviet p e t r o l e u m . 2 ^ 3
We should now turn our attention to APPENDIX A (pp. 410-416),
After studying Soviet foreign trade operations under the six commodity 
classifications— food, beverages and tobacco; raw materials (excluding 
fuels, oils and fats); mineral fuels and related materials; chemicals; 
machinery and transport equipment; and other manufactured commodities—  
it is immediately obvious that only in a few instances are MTEs (or 
groups of MTEs) in APPENDIX A even moderately dependent on Soviet ex­
ports. (The reader’s attention should be drawn to the fact that in 
1975» the USSR accounted for 20,4 percent of the EFTA's imports of 
mineral fuels and related materials.) In almost all cases Soviet ex­
ports to MTEs (or groups of MTEs) in APPENDIX A amounted to well under 
5 percent of total exports to these countries under each commodity 
classification. Moreover, American exports to MTEs (or groups of MTEs) 
in APPENDIX A far exceed Soviet exports in most oases.
According to a recent report Soviet petroleum will account for 
roughly 10 percent of Western Europe's petroleum imports by the late 
1 9 7 0 s . 224 This might indicate that at some point the USSR would be 
in a position to apply a fair amount of pressure on countries in West­
ern Europe in the event of an international crisis. However, it is 
interesting to note that the aforementioned report also claims that 
Soviet petroleum exports to Western Europe will fall sharply in the
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1980s, By 1990» Soviet petroleum is expected to account for only 4 per­
cent of Western Europe's petroleum imports.^25
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Everything that an American corporation does or is alleged to 
do, whether in the Caribbean or in France, can be done by a Soviet 
corporation. Nay more so, for the Soviet corporation is directly un­
der command of the Soviet government and so can be co-ordinated with 
other such corporations and with Soviet foreign trade.
— P. J. D. Wiles
CHAPTER II 
SOVIET COMMERCIAL ORGANISATIONS AND 
PERSONNEL IN MARKET-TYPE ECONOMIES
Or^ns Responsible for Promoting and Guid­
ing the Operations of the USSR’s Foreign- 
Based Business Community
Since their inception Soviet foreign trade organisations (as well as 
other USSR-based organisations involved in foreign trade) have been 
legally entitled to set up foreign-based companies/offices, However, 
under the monopoly of foreign trade these trading organisations are 
required to secure permission from the Soviet government before estab­
lishing companies/offices abroad. The Ministry of Foreign Trade of 
the USSR is usually responsible for dealing with requests to set up 
Soviet foreign-based commercial organisations. According to J, R. 
Beerman, top-level Party officials are normally consulted on matters 
concerning the establishment of Soviet companies in market-type econ­
omies (MTEs).^
In the immediate post-war years adverse political conditions 
hindered the development of the USSR's business community in the West. 
Only a small number of Soviet foreign-based trading companies (SFTCs)
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were established in the West during the 1950s and early 1960s. By 
the mid-1960s a lot of the hostility toward Soviet economic expansion 
in world markets had disappeared. The operations of existing SFTCs 
stai’ted to increase significantly at that time reflecting the marked 
growth of Soviet trade with MTEs, However, it was soon recognised 
that the handful of Soviet companies in the West was not able to sat­
isfy the requirements of the country's foreign trade sector. There­
fore, by the late 1960s the USSR had started a campaign to penetrate 
numerous world markets via the establishment of joint-stock companies. 
To a significant degree the marked increase in the number of 
SFTCs which took place after 1970 can be attributed to Brezhnev's de­
cision to promote greater co-operation between the USSR and MTEs. In 
order to carry out his scheme Brezhnev made frequent trips to the West 
and negotiated numerous economic/political agreements. Soviet minis­
ters later followed in Brezhnev's footsteps and negotiated more spe­
cific agreements with foreign governmental agencies and private cor­
porations, These agreements gave rise to numerous contracts between 
USSR-based foreign trade organisations (FTOs) and Western firms. The 
intergovernmental agreements also stimulated FTOs to increase their 
presence in MTEs,
Despite the fact that some Politburo-level agreements with for­
eign nations provide the legal basis for the establishment of Soviet 
commercial organisations abroad it would be unreasonable to assume 
that Party leaders are responsible for determining the specific level 
of Soviet economic activity in foreign markets. After broad policy 
guidelines have been laid down by the Party, government organs are 
responsible for putting them into practice. Now that top-level gov­
ernmental officials are convinced the Party favours a significant in­
crease in the number of Soviet commercial organisations abroad we can
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assume that FTOs will he encouraged by various Soviet ministries to 
gain an even stronger foothold in MTEs.
Some General Comments on the Establishment and 
Operations of Soviet Foreign-Based Companies
SFTCs are established under local laws and the employees of such com­
panies operate according to local business norms. In a legal sense 
SFTCs are considered Western companies with Soviet capital. As we 
learned in CHAPTER I, SFTCs are usually set up as joint-stock compan­
ies, The share capital of SFTCs is normally obtained from the earn­
ings of their shareholders, SFTCs can be wholly owned by the USSR 
or owned by Soviet and foreign interests (i.e., mixed companies).
There are two principal groups of Soviet shareholders of SFTCs, 
The most common group comprises FTOs and other economic organisations 
in the USSR. The second group includes SFTCs which own share capital 
in other Soviet companies in the West, SFTCs can be minority share­
holders of other SFTCs (in this case an SFTG would own less than ^0 
percent of another company's share capital) or parent companies (in 
this case an SFTC would own over 50 percent of another company's share 
capital), A high proportion of SFTCs established after 1970 have other 
SFTCs as shareholders. The advantage of such a policy is obvious* 
instead of SFTCs being entirely owned by Moscow-based interests (which 
might irk a few Western critics) they are partially (or even wholly) 
owned by the Soviet business community in the West, Now one might 
think that capital in the hands of Soviets— either in the East or the 
West— would have the same implications. However, it is well worth 
mentioning that SFTCs established by Soviet interests in the West are 
apt to create less adverse attention than SFTCs set up directly from 
Moscow and hence could become an important means of strengthening the
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USSR's role in world markets.
The boards of directors of SFTCs are normally dominated by Soviet 
citizens. As a result the USSR is theoretically responsible for form­
ulating the broad objectives of SFTCs, Members of the boards of direct­
ors of Soviet foreign-based parent companies often serve as directors 
of their subsidiaries. In some cases Soviet shareholders appoint lo­
cal nationals to function as heads of their companies in the West, This 
is done in a few instances to comply with local business norms. Such 
appointments are also made for the purpose of utilising local manager­
ial expertise.
As a rule local nationals are responsible for the day-to-day 
operations of SFTCs and hence fill most of the managerial positions.
On occasion, managerial policies conflict with the objectives of Sov­
iet directors. However, unless the disagreements involve rigid instruct­
ions from Moscow, Soviet directors are apt to be persuaded to accept 
the recommendations of their non-Soviet managers.
Almost all Soviet international businessmen have been educated 
in institutions (both Soviet and foreign) offering courses on inter­
national commerce, economics and finance. In most cases these business­
men are able to conduct their operations in the language of the host 
country. Soviet businessmen often spend a few years working abroad 
before they are promoted to the boards of directors of the larger SFTGs, 
Some of the large SFTGs in Western Europe and the U.K. function 
as training centres for Soviet businessmen. Of course, not all Soviet 
international businessmen are initially assigned to companies in indus­
trialised market-type economies (iMTEs), A number of them receive a 
practical introduction to the market mechanism by serving in less-devel­
oped (market-type) economies (LDGs ), Some Soviet businessmen serve 
in various countries belonging to the Council for Mutual Economic Assis-
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tance (CMEA) before being assigned to positions in the West.
The average Soviet international businessman is assigned to an 
SFTG for two or three years. However, a few Soviet executives have 
served individual SFTGs for less than two years while others remained 
with individual SFTGs for a number of terms, Soviet citizens who are 
not assigned to top-level positions in SFTGs often serve for less than 
two years, SFTGs sometimes employ students from various GMEA members, 
Soviet citizens who are permanently assigned to SFTGs are often author­
ised to bring their families into the host countries,
V/hen a Soviet director completes his first term with an SFTG he 
often applies for an additional term with the same company. If his 
request is denied the Soviet director is either reassigned to another 
(related) SFTG or sent back to the USSR, Soviet directors who have 
served in IMTEs are sometimes reassigned to LDGs or various GMEA mem­
bers, A few former directors of SFTGs are given top-level positions 
in FTOs or ministries when they return to the USSR. Others simply 
return to the USSR and 'retire' from active commercial life,
Soviet international businessmen achieve varying degrees of suc­
cess, A few of them are recognised as highly skilful operators in for­
eign markets. However, others get a less than average rating from their 
Western counterparts. In almost all cases the failure of Soviet bus­
inessmen in the West is not linked to ignorance of the market system. 
Indeed, Soviet international businessmen appear to be adequately briefed 
on conditions in MTEs before being assigned to positions in SFTGs,
It is interesting to note that SFTCs themselves might be respon­
sible for producing and fostering international businessmen who lack 
some of the qualities which are demanded of their Western counterparts. 
Executives of Western multinational corporations seldom co-ordinate 
their operations with the national economic objectives of either home
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or host countries. Decisions are made on the basis of global economic 
considerations and the decision-making process takes place within the 
corporation. Indeed, national economic objectives are subordinate 
to the aims of entrepreneurs. But up till now Soviet (foreign and 
domestic) economic objectives have tended to determine the direction 
and level of the commercial operations of SFTGs, In markets where 
extensive commercial possibilities exist, SFTGs have been given little 
leeway to seek their own destinies. However, recent developments in­
dicate that this situation might be changing. Nevertheless we should 
keep in mind that until the umbilical cord between Moscow and SFTGs 
is severed Soviet foreign businessmen will be required to follow a 
course which differs fundamentally from the course pursued by most 
of their Western counterparts.
As a rule SFTGs conduct formal annual general meetings. Share­
holders of SFTGs normally send representatives to such meetings. The 
annual general meetings enable shareholders to study the success in­
dicators (e.g., sales, profits, terms of contracts, etc,) of their 
companies as well as make recommendations on how the companies can 
improve their performance during the next year. The chairmen of the 
boards of directors are usually appointed at the annual general meet­
ings, Announcements concerning the retirement of members of the boards 
of directors and the appointment of new directors to the boards are 
also made at the meetings,
SFTGs seldom pay dividends to their shareholders. The net pro­
fit of an SFTG is usually transferred to the company's reserve fund 
or used to increase the company's paid-up share capital. Profits of 
SFTGs can also be placed in bank accounts or used to purchase gilt- 
edged securities, bills of exchange, etc.
There are a number of ways the USSR can promote the development
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of SFTGs. As we just learned, shareholders of SFTGs often opt to plough
back their profits. In addition, the USSR can subsidise SFTGs via
direct cash payments or, more commonly, it can sell its exports to
SFTGs at relatively low prices or buy its imports from such companies
at relatively high prices. Moreover, the USSR can grant SFTCs monop-
2
oly and monopsony rights, and cover licensing and technical assis­
tance fees charged to SFTGs,
SFTGs often obtain supplies and services from other Soviet organ­
isations in the West. For example, the Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company 
in London orders petroleum products from Soviet distributors in the 
U.K. and employs the services of Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd, In regions 
where Soviet goods and services are not readily available SFTGs obtain 
their supplies and services from local sellers,
SFTGs perform a number of functions, Soviet foreign-based ship­
ping and insurance companies provide services for both GMEA and Western 
clients. The majority of SFTGs represent one or more FTOs and are 
responsible for selling Soviet-made products abroad as well as purchas­
ing commodities in foreign markets on behalf of their shareholders.
One such company is Sobren Ghemiehandel GmbH (FRG) which is responsible 
for handling Soviet chemical exports to Germany and buying German chem­
icals on behalf of the FTO Soyuzkhimeksport, Some SFTGs are involved 
in selling commodities which are manufactured on the basis of Soviet 
and foreign technology. For example, the French-Soviet company Slava SA 
opened a plant in 1976 to assemble watches made with Soviet movements 
and French casings. The USSR is also setting up companies in IMTEs 
(e.g., Promolease in Paris) which are responsible for leasing Western 
machinery and equipment to GMEA organisations as well as leasing GMEA- 
made machinery and equipment to Western companies.
Some of the larger SFTGs are divided into at least four special-
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ised departments! administrative, commercial, financial, and techni- 
calr The administrative department is generally responsible for co­
ordinating the activities of individual departments within the company. 
The commercial department is responsible for obtaining commodities 
directly from Soviet FTOs (e.g., automobiles from Avtoeksport, boat 
and ship engines from Sudoimport, tractors and road-building equipment 
from Traktoroeksport, and tyres from Radnoimport), The commercial 
department is also responsible for selling Soviet exports to local 
buyers and purchasing commodities in Western markets for FTOs. The 
financial department is responsible for arranging (or providing) bank­
ing services for buyers. The technical department performs a number 
of tasks including the servicing of Soviet exports and advertising.
Some SFTGs are set up to conduct their operations within a giv­
en country. On the other hand a growing number of SFTGs are set up 
in major world markets in order to facilitate Soviet trade with the 
host country and third countries. According to V. M. Ivanov, 'Soviet 
foreign trade organisations widely use the London market with its ex­
tensive international ties for trade with third countries',^ (Ivanov 
was probably referring to both SFTGs and USSR-based FTOs.) In 1975» 
Soviet trade turnover with third countries via companies (both British- 
owned and Soviet-oimed) in the U.K. exceeded L400 million.3
A few of the larger SFTGs have recently established representa­
tive offices in Moscow. The advantage of such offices is not overly 
apparent in the light of the closely knit Soviet foreign trade network. 
In all likelihood SFTCs are merely following a policy set by a few 
Western firms in an attempt to generate additional business by adver­
tising and providing on-the-spot services for their customers in Mos­
cow.
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Wholly Soviet-Owned Gomnanies in 
World Markets^
SFTGs in this section are completely owned by the USSR, In most cases 
these companies were initially set up by Soviet shareholders. A few 
wholly Soviet-owned trading companies in MTEs initially operated as 
mixed companies or wholly Western-owned firms, SFTGs which are not 
included in this section can be found in APPENDIX B (pp. 417-421),
At the end of 1977 there were four wholly Soviet-owned compan­
ies operating in the United States— Amtorg Trading Corporation, Sov- 
fracht (usa) Inc,, Morflot American Shipping Inc,, and Belarus Mach­
inery of USA Inc, The Amtorg Corporation was established in New York 
in 1924, and is the oldest Soviet trading company in America, From 
1947 to 1972, Amtorg was the only Soviet commercial organisation based in 
the U.S. (with the exception of the commercial counsellor's office in 
the Soviet Embassy), Since its inception Amtorg has functioned as 
an intermediary between American firms and Soviet FTOs, Although some 
members of Amtorg*s staff have the authority to negotiate and sign 
contracts, they seldom carry out such activities. On occasion Amtorg 
provides assistance and logistical support for Soviet trade missions 
visiting the United States, During the last few years Amtorg has start­
ed to concentrate more of its efforts on increasing the level of Soviet 
exports to the United States. In line with this aim, Amtorg establish­
ed an 'export and information department' which has offices in a sep­
arate building in New York City, Amtorg now has more direct access 
to Soviet FTOs through its representative office in Moscow named Mos- 
amtorg. According to some sources Amtorg has been somewhat 'ineffect­
ive' in providing useful information and assistance to the American 
business community.? In 1976, Amtorg employed approximately forty 
Soviet and American citizens.
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Sovfracht (USA) Inc, was established in New York in 1976, and 
is principally owned by the USSR-based chartering organisation Sov- 
frakht (see p. 362), During its early stages Sovfracht (USA) opera­
ted in the United States' freight market as a charterer and broker 
for American, Soviet and third-country dry-cargo ships to transport 
American grain to the USSR, At this time Sovfracht (USA) also charters 
Soviet and foreign tankers. In 1976, three Soviet citizens were em­
ployed in Sovfracht (USA),
Morflot American Shipping Inc. (Moram) was established in Clark, 
New Jersey in 1976, and is owned by the Soviet maritime organisation 
Sovinflot (see p. 362). In addition to its head office, Moram has 
branch offices in Dallas, Houston, and New Orleans. Moram’s president 
is an American citizen who formerly served as a senior executive in 
two American shipping companies. He is reportedly earning 5 percent 
more at Moram than he was at his previous position. In addition to 
the president, Moram employs six directors and thirty-four sales per­
sonnel. All of Moram's employees are American citizens. According 
to one report Moram*s annual level of business is about $70 million,®
The importance of Soviet companies like Sovfracht and Moram should 
be emphasised in the light of the marked increase in the USSR's mari­
time capabilities (see CHAPTER Vl), Soviet shipping in and around 
the United States has become a big business operation, Moram is cur­
rently responsible for locating customers for some of the USSR's lar­
gest shipping companies— the Far Eastern Steamship Company (FESGO), 
the Baltic Steamship Company, the Black Sea Steamship Company, and the 
Northern Steamship Company, Soviet shipping companies offer American 
clients more than sixty sailings per month to and from ports on the , 
east and west coasts, the Gulf of Mexico and the Great Lakes.
Belarus Machinery of USA Inc. was established in Milwaukee, Wis-
109
consin at the end of 1976. The Soviet FTO Traktoroeksport is one of 
the company's shareholders, Belarus Machinery is responsible for sel­
ling and servicing Soviet tractors exported to the United States and 
arranging for the importation of American tractors into the USSR. In 
the latter half of 1978, the Soviet FTO Traktoroeksport agreed to del­
iver $1,5-million worth of agricultural tractors to Belarus Machinery,^ 
Amongst the wholly Soviet-owned companies in the U.K. are the 
Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company Ltd., the Black Sea and Baltic General 
Insurance Company Ltd,, Nafta-GB Ltd,, Technical and Optical Equipment 
Ltd,, and United Machinery Organisation Plant Ltd, (UMO). The history 
of the Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company dates back to 7 June 1923, when 
it was first registered as Arcos Steamship Company Ltd. On 25 January 
1928, the name of the company was changed to Anglo-Soviet Shipping 
Company, During the 19508 and most of the 1960s the Anglo-Soviet Ship­
ping Company was principally engaged in chartering operations on be­
half of the USSR-based chartering organisation Sovfrakht, The Anglo- 
Soviet Shipping Company was also responsible for appointing agents 
and stevedores for Soviet merchant vessels calling at ports in the 
U.K. In the late 1960s the Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company became the 
agent for Soviet vessels calling at the Port of London, In 1969, the 
Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company assumed responsibility for arranging 
supplies of fuel and lubricants for Soviet vessels in most world ports 
as well as arranging such supplies for foreign vessels in Soviet ports. 
In February 1970, the company became the general agent for all Sov­
iet merchant ships operating in the U.K. and the Republic of Ireland, 
The Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company opened a branch office at Tilbury 
Dock in 1971 to facilitate the handling of containerised cargo. In 
1973, the Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company employed sixty people inclu­
ding eight Soviet directors,
110
Since 1973» ^ number of changes have taken place in the Anglo- 
Soviet Shipping Company. The company's chartering department was trans­
formed into a separate London-based company under the name Sovfracht 
(London) Ltd, In addition, the Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company set up 
three subsidiary companies— Charter Travel Company Ltd. (CTC Lines), 
Sadko Marine Supplies Ltd., and the Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company (Hum­
ber) Ltd, The Charter Travel Company was established to handle bus­
iness connected with cruises and main-line passenger services. Sadko 
Marine Supplies is responsible for arranging stores (e.g., fuel and 
food) for all Soviet vessels in U.K. ports, Sadko also arranges sup­
plies for Soviet merchant vessels in other world ports. The Anglo- 
Soviet Shipping Company (Humber) acts as a general agent for all Soviet 
vessels calling at Humber ports.
In 1976, the Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company employed seventy-six 
British citizens and nine Soviet nationals. The company's board of 
directors comprised one local national and eight Soviet citizens. The 
number and nationality of the employees of Anglo-Soviet Shipping Com­
pany’s subsidiaries are as followst Charter Travel Company, twenty- 
two British employees; Sadko Marine Supplies, five British employees; 
and Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company (Humber), twenty British employees. 
Soviet personnel (i.e., the directors and one senior Soviet employee)
assigned to Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company serve as directors of the
11subs id iary c ompan i es.
The Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company is responsible for collecting 
freight charges of USSR-based shipping companies from British exporters 
and importers. In addition, the company deals with claims against 
Soviet merchant vessels. The Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company employs 
a team of freight canvassers to maintain constant contact with British 
exporters and importers. In order to facilitate its operations in the
I l l
world charter market the Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company is represented 
by senior members of the Baltic Mercantile and Shipping Exchange. The 
Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company represents USSR-based shipping compan­
ies in international maritime organisations and conferences.
The Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company is a key participant in the 
door-to-door container service from the U.K. to Japan and Hong Kong. 
Containers are sent directly to Tilbury Dock where the Anglo-Soviet 
Shipping Company maintains transport services to Leningrad each week 
with first-class cellular containerships. In Leningrad the contain­
ers are transferred to the Trans-Siberian Railway for direct shipment 
to Nakhodka. The containers destined for Japan are shipped directly 
from Nakhodka while the containers for Hong Kong are shipped via Vlad­
ivostok,
The Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company also participates in a new
freight service from the U.K. to destinations in Iran and Af^anistan.
Commodities are loaded on special shallow-draft vessels (in Rochester,
Felixstowe, and Hull) for shipment to Leningrad. During the summer
months the vessels travel from Leningrad to the ports of Pahlavi and
Now Shahr via the Volga River and Caspian Sea, From Pahlavi and Now Shahr
the goods are shipped via land transport to such cities as Julfa, Teheran,
Kushka, Termes, and Kabul. During the winter months land transport
is used to ship commodities from Baltic ports to the aforementioned 
12destinations.
The Tilbury office of the Anglo-Soviet Shipping Company handles 
a sizeable portion of the port business of Soviet passenger-ships. Dur­
ing 1973» Soviet passenger-ships made approximately fifty calls at the 
Port of London. Soviet passenger-ships sail from London to New York, 
Montreal, the Atlantic islands, North Africa and the West Indies. Sov­
iet passenger-ships are known throughout the world for their excellent
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services and reasonable fares.
The Black Sea and Baltic General Insurance Company was establish­
ed in London in 1925* A sizeable portion of the company's share cap­
ital is owned by Ingosstralch— the USSR-based insurance organisation. 
Since its inception the Black Sea and Baltic Insurance Company has 
been primarily concerned with insuring risks connected with trade be­
tween the USSR and the West. The company has branches in France and 
the Lebanon, It also sells insurance through a number of agencies 
in the West. Some of Black Sea and Baltic's business is conducted 
with brokers and underwriters from the Corporation of Lloyds, In Lon^ 
don, the Black Sea and Baltic Insurance Company acts as a claims agent 
for Ingosstrakh. Between I96O and 1974, the capital of the company 
increased from E500,000 to £1,900,000.^^
The importance of the USSR's foreign insurance business has grown
considerably as a result of the marked increase in Soviet foreign trade. 
Exports from the USSR which are insured by Ingosstrakh (and its foreign 
companies) earn additional foreign currency for the Soviet Union (FTOs 
increase the prices of their exports in order to cover the cost of in­
surance). Ingosstrakh can also reduce the foreign currency expendi­
tures of the USSR by insuring the country's imports.Soviet contract 
proposals sometimes contain a clause which provides for a Soviet
importing organisation to insure its imports (which are purchased on
an f.o.b, basis) from the time they leave the seller's premises until 
they arrive at their final destination. This is somewhat unusual in 
an f.o.b. contract in that the buyer agrees to provide insurance at 
a time when the seller should still be responsible for safeguarding 
the commodities, F.o.b. contracts containing this special clause norm­
ally provide for the deduction of a certain percent of the invoice 
price to cover the cost of insurance from the time the goods leave the
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seller's premises until they are safely stored on the ship.
It is sometimes advantageous for Western exporters to employ 
the services of Soviet insurance companies when selling commodities 
to the USSR and other GMEA nations. The Black Sea and Baltic Insurance 
Company specialises in the insurance problems of GMEA members and enjoys 
close business relations with Soviet and East European organisations 
which are responsible for handling insurance policies and claims. Since 
Black Sea and Baltic is in an advantageous position to assess the risks 
of exporting commodities to GMEA nations the company is often able to 
offer cheaper premiums than its Western-owned counterparts. In addi­
tion to its policies for Western exporters, Black Sea and Baltic also 
provides comprehensive insurance policies for Western shippers and 
buyers. Black Sea and Baltic's expertise in East-West trade enables 
it to handle insurance claims promptly* Western insurance companies 
can request assistance (for a fee of course) from Soviet insurance 
agents in order to eliminate some of the pitfalls of insuring commodity 
transfers between East and West. In this respect Soviet insurance 
companies can act in the best interest of their Western counterparts 
since GMEA trading organisations would probably be more reluctant to 
file questionable claims knowing that a given Western insurance com­
pany has hired the services of Soviet insurance agents,
A sizeable portion of Black Sea and Baltic's business is connected 
with all-risk policies (damage, default etc.) and non-payment-risk 
policies for Western manufacturers exporting machinery and equipment 
to GMEA nations. The company's marine department is actively involved 
in writing insurance policies against hull and cargo risks. Black 
Sea and Baltic is presently attempting to expand its aviation insur­
ance business. For some time the company has tried to increase its 
business which lies outside the confines of East-West trade. In line 
with this aim Black Sea and Baltic recently started issuing life in-
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surance policies. In April 1972, the Black Sea and Baltic Insurance 
Company reportedly agreed to partially underwrite $26-million worth 
of insurance against foreign expropriation of American private invest­
ments in LDGs. According to the U.S. Overseas Private Investment Cor­
poration that was the first time the USSR had participated in insur­
ing American overseas investment,
Before World War II, London was an important market for Soviet 
petroleum exports. As we learned in CHAPTER I, the USSR established 
Russian Oil Products Ltd. in London to market Soviet petroleum and 
petroleum products. Immediately after the war the USSR began to scale 
down its operations in Western petroleum markets. As a result there 
was little need for Soviet petroleum companies in the West. Consequent­
ly, Russian Oil Products Ltd. was liquidated in the late 1940s, But 
a decade later the USSR began to show more interest in supplying pet­
roleum to Western buyers. In the late 1930s the Soviet-owned company 
Nafta-GB was set up in London to handle Soviet imports and exports 
of petroleum and petroleum products,
For some time the operations of Nafta-GB attracted little atten­
tion. However, by the late 1960s the company had 500 outlets in the 
U.K. and was reportedly under orders to gain an even larger share of 
the m a r k e t . U n d e r  the new marketing policy Nafta's oil derrick sym­
bol was discarded and replaced with a red, yellow and black Nafta sign. 
Moreover, the company hired a British manager who had helped launch 
the Total and Amoco chains in the U.K,^® Nafta also attracted a lot 
of business by selling its petrol three to four pence cheaper than 
leading brands.
In 1963, Fanny James and her nephew Rafael Hyams established 
the company Technical and Optical Equipment Ltd, to sell Soviet radios 
and cameras. Five years later (April I968) the USSR acquired the com-
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pany from the two British citizens. The history of Technical and Op­
tical Equipment brings to light at least one drawback connected with 
Western firms acting as marketing agents for Soviet FTOs. According 
to Marshall Goldman, after it was clear that Technical and Optical 
Equipment was making a profit the USSR, 'by means of a series of pol­
itical and economic pressures, forced the British owners /~James and 
Hyams_J7 out of their own company
Although Goldman did not elaborate on the aforementioned 'pol­
itical and economic pressures' which were applied against the former 
owners of Technical and Optical Equipment Ltd., there are many common­
ly used tactics which could be employed by FTOs to gain control over 
a small Western company operating as a retail or wholesale outlet for 
Soviet commodities. Firstly, the USSR is in a position to offer West­
ern owners a generous amount (of convertible currency) for their com­
pany. (Most /”Western_7 shareholders can be persuaded to sell if the 
price is right.) Secondly, FTOs could threaten to appoint a marketing 
agent in the same vicinity or they could set up their own operation 
(most likely with the assistance of a local company) for the purpose 
of driving a given company out of business. This could be accomplished 
by increasing the price of commodities exported to the retail or whole­
sale outlet (which would result in higher prices for local consumers) 
or simply selling products through the rival Soviet company (or appoint­
ed marketing agent) at prices below those charged by the retail or 
wholesale outlet. Thirdly, Soviet FTOs could threaten to drive a West­
ern company out of business by decreasing commodity deliveries (or 
stopping such deliveries altogether). The USSR could also threaten 
to carry out a press campaign against a retail or wholesale outlet, 
(Soviet FTOs could attack an outlet for charging exorbitant prices, 
providing inadequate servicing facilities, etc.) Of course, any tactics
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which are not businesslike might prove to be too risky. Indeed, if 
a small Western retail or wholesale outlet should decide not to sub­
mit to Soviet pressures (with the firm backing of the local business 
community) FTOs would either lose an outlet for their commodities or 
be required to make amends to the Western company.
The FTO Mashpriborintorg and Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd, are share­
holders of Technical and Optical Equipment, The company sells Soviet 
microscopes and photographic and optical equipment. Technical and 
Optical Equipment functions as Mashpriborintorg's sole agent in the 
U.K. In 1972, Technical and Optical Equipment sold over 100,000 radi­
os and approximately the same number of cameras. Some of the Soviet 
citizens expelled from the U.K. on spying charges in September 1971 
were employed in Technical and Optical Equipment,
United Machinery Organisation Plant Ltd, (UMO) was established 
in Letchworth in I969 to import and sell various types of machinery 
and equipment from the USSR. Some of the commodities handled by the 
company are as follows 1 earth-moving equipment, diesel generators, 
compressors, welding equipment, and helicopters, UMO acts as a rep­
resentative for Traktoroeksport, Avtoeksport, Mashinoeksport, Sudoimport, 
Tekhmashimport and Energomasheksport. UMO has spare parts and servic­
ing facilities in both Letchworth and Doncaster. Between 1972 and 
1974, UMO sold more than 200 fifteen-ton KrAS 256B dump trucks and 
30 thirty-ton 300-horsepower D572 bulldozers.
At the present time there is only one wholly Soviet-owned non­
banking company in Austria— Garant Versicherungs AG, The company was 
established in Vienna in 1958» and a sizeable portion of its share 
capital is held by Ingosstrakh. Over half of Garant's business is 
conducted with the FRG while Austria and Switzerland rank second and 
third respectively. Garant maintains a permanent representative in
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Belgium and operates through local insurance brokers in France, Switz­
erland and the Lebanon,
Garant's principal business is insuring against default and pro­
tracted payment. If for any number of reasons (e,g,, red tape, and 
failure to obtain enough funds) a Soviet importing organisation fails 
to meet its obligations sixty days after the due date Garant immediate­
ly pays the insured. Since 1974, insurance for late payment has 
become Garant's most important business, (in 1974, Garant's premium 
income from late-payment insurance totalled $567,263, while its prem­
ium income from machine and shipping insurance combined only totalled 
$539,014.)
Garant manufacturing-risk insurance covers the typical risks 
of cancellation of an order and non-acceptance of delivered goods as 
well as the risk of non-delivery of commodities due to a sudden import 
ban, cessation of diplomatic and economic relations, civil strife, or 
confiscation. In addition to the aforementioned insurance policy Gar­
ant offers shipping insurance, warehouse insurance, and insurance against
the breakage and malfunction of machinery until the trial runs have 
22been completed. Like the Black Sea and Baltic Insurance Company,
Garant insures some West to West commodity shipments.
There are three wholly Soviet-owned companies in Canada— Belarus 
Equipment of Canada Ltd., Stan Canada Machinery Ltd., and Emec Trading 
Ltd. These three.companies and a Canadian-Soviet company (Socan Aircraft) 
have sold over 5C million-rubles (roughly $68-million) worth of 
machinery and equipment. Approximately half (i.e., 24 million-rubles 
worth) of this machinery and equipment will be delivered during the 
period 1977-1980,^^
In 1973» the Soviet FTO Traktoroeksport and the Satra Corpora­
tion— an American company specialising in trade with the USSR— estab-
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lished two mixed companies to sell and service Soviet-made farm mach­
inery and equipment in Canada, One company— Belarus Equipment of Can­
ada Ltd,— was responsible for preparing the machinery and equipment 
for sale and providing after-sale servicing. Traktoroeksport owned 
80 percent of the company's share capital and the Satra Corporation owned 
the remaining 20 percent. The other company— Belarus Sales of Canada 
Ltd,— was responsible for selling the aforementioned machinery and 
equipment through a network of dealerships. The equity distribution 
in this company was reversed—  Satra owned 80 percent of the share capital 
and Traktoroeksport 20 percent. Between 1975 and 1976, Belarus Sales 
of Canada was liquidated and Belarus Equipment of Canada assumed sole 
responsibility for the marketing and servicing of Soviet-made farm 
equipment in Canada, Belarus Equipment of Canada is now a wholly Sov­
iet-owned company. The Soviet FTOs Traktoroeksport and Zapohast'eksport 
are shareholders of the company.
At the outset Belarus Equipment only sold agricultural tractors.
The company now sells a wide range of commodities including tractors, 
harvesters, excavators, construction machinery, and motorcycles. Between 
1973 3-nd 1978, Belarus Sales and Belarus Equipment sold 3,500 agricul-
oIl
tural tractors in Canada. Belarus Equipment has a training programme 
for its Canadian employees on the maintenance and servicing of Soviet 
machinery and equipment. The company's share capital totalled 505,000 
Canadian dollars (about $505,000) in 1975. During the same year Bel­
arus' assets stood at approximately 2,7 million Canadian dollars (about 
$2.7 million). -^5
Stan Canada Machinery Ltd. was established in Toronto in 1972.
One of the company's shareholders is the FTO Stankoimport. Stan Canada 
sells and services machine-tools and other types of industrial mach­
inery produced in the USSR, The company sold about 350 machine-tools
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from mid-1975 to mid-1978.^^ Stan Canada employs eleven Soviet cit­
izens including two of the company's vice-presidents. In addition to 
its head office in Toronto Stan Canada has a branch office in Montreal, 
Emec Trading Ltd, v$as established in March 1973 to represent 
the Soviet FTO Energomasheksport, Emec Trading has offices in Vancou­
ver and Winnipeg, The company is responsible for handling a wide range 
of commodities including hydrofoils and hydroelectric turbines. Since 
1973, Emec has imported thirteen Volga-70 cargo hydrofoils, The com­
pany is planning to import passenger hydrofoils. The president of 
Emec is a Soviet citizen, A Canadian citizen functions as the company's 
legal advisor.
There is one wholly Soviet-owned non-banking company in Germany—  
Schwarzmeer und Ostsee Transportversicherungs AG (Sovag), The company 
was set up in I927 to handle transportation insurance and operate in the 
German reinsurance market, Sovag was liquidated by the Nazis in 1941, 
and re-established in 1956 to issue transportation and fire insurance. 
Since 1971, Sovag's underwriting operations have included theft, mach­
ine, construction and credit-guarantee insurance. Sovag has a joint 
coverage agreement with Allianz— a West German insurance company— re-
OQ
garding machine and construction insurance,^ Sovag is based in Ham­
burg and reportedly has representatives in Belgium and France,
Soviet-Foreign (Mixed) Companies Operating 
Norih, Markets29
Companies in this section are owned by both Soviet and foreign share­
holders. Since the early 1970s the number of mixed companies has in­
creased significantly. Many of these companies are controlled by the 
USSR (i.e., the USSR owns over 50 percent of the share capital). In 
some cases the ownership of mixed companies is divided 50-50* In a
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few instances the USSR is a minority shareholder. Mixed companies 
not mentioned in this section are included in APPENDIX B,
There is only one American-Soviet profit-making company in the 
United States— U.S.-USSR Marine Resources Inc. The company was estab­
lished in Bellingham, Washington in 1976. The share capital of U.S.- 
USSR Marine Resources totals $50,000 and is divided equally between 
Sovrybflot (the Soviet fishing fleet) and the Bellingham Gold Storage 
Company, U.S.-USSR Marine Resources is responsible for catching, pro­
cessing and selling fish as well as servicing Soviet fishing vessels.
According to the agreement between the Bellingham Cold Storage 
Company and Sovrybflot, American fishing vessels are responsible for 
delivering hakefish to Soviet factory ships. After the hake have been 
processed on the factory ships a certain portion of the catch is ship­
ped to the Bellingham Cold Storage Company in American refrigerator 
ships. Bellingham is responsible for marketing the processed hake 
in the United States. Sovrybflot was motivated to set up the mixed com­
pany when American authorities decided to establish the 200-mile ex­
clusive economic zone after 1 March 1977. Approximately 10 percent 
of the total Soviet catch has come from areas which fall within this 
200-mile zone,^^ Soviet fishing vessels connected with the mixed com­
pany are required to obtain permission from U.S. authorities before 
operating in American waters.
There is one British-Soviet company in the U.K.—-East-West Leas­
ing Company, The company was established in London in 1973 to promote 
the leasing of machinery and equipment between GMEA nations and the 
West, The share capital of East-West Leasing Company is evenly divided 
between Moscow Narodny Bank (London) and the British bank Morgan Grenfell, 
There are two Austrian-Soviet companies operating in Austria—  
Asotra and Interprom Handelsgesellschaft mbH, Asotra began operating
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in 1976, and is owned by the Soviet freight forwarding organisation 
Soyuzvneshtrans, the Austrian company Express GmbH, and two subsidiar­
ies of the Swiss companies Panalpina and Danzas, Soyuzvneshtrans owns 
52 percent of Asotra's share capital, Asotra's operations include 
the transport of commodities from the USSR to Austria, the acceptance 
of goods in Austria for transport into/through the USSR, and the ship­
ment of commodities (both Soviet and foreign) through Austria for del­
ivery in other countries* There are approximately fifteen Asotra em­
ployees, Asotra's two managers are Austrian^citizens.
Interprom Handelsgesellschaft mbH wa.s established in Vienna in 
January 1978, The company's initial share capital amounted to 5 million 
Austrian shillings (about $278,000). Soviet FTOs own 60 percent of 
Interprom's share capital (Soyuzpromeksport, 50 percent; Soyuzgazeks- 
port, 5 percent; and Soyuzkhimeksport, 5 percent) and the remaining 
shares are owned by an Austrian company. The vice-president of Soyuz­
promeksport was nominated as director-general of Interprom. The com­
pany was set up to promote trade in raw materials and chemical products 
between Austria and the USSR, It is interesting to note that Inter­
prom eventually plans to expand its operations to third countries.3^
In 1976, the USSR owned share capital in eight companies opera­
ting in Belgium— -Scaldia-Volga, the Belgium-Soviet Trade Company, Nafta-B, 
Transworld Marine Agency, NV Ferchimex, Russalmaz NV, NV East-West 
Agencies, and NV Elorg Belgie. Scaldia-Volga was established in Brussels 
in 1964. Two-thirds of the company's share capital is owned by the 
FTOs Avtoeksport, Mashinoeksport, and Traktoroeksport. Soviet citizens 
comprise the majority of Scaldia-Volga's directors. The chairman and 
head of administration of Scaldia-Volga are Soviet citizens, Scaldia- 
Volga handles the preparation and sale of Soviet motor vehicles. The 
company also sells Soviet machine-tools and pressing and forging equip-
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ment,
Scaldia-Volga*s head office in Brussels (including the technical 
centre) has showrooms, spare-parts shops and a large service/repair 
centre. The company also has technical centres in Diegem, Charleroi, 
Namur, Liege and Ghent, In Antwerp, Scaldia-Volga has a depot for 
motor vehicles and a centre for the pre-sale preparation of Soviet 
automobiles. 32 Standard parts are imported from the USSR for the prep­
aration of Soviet automobiles in Belgium. Some of the Soviet automo­
biles which are prepared in Belgium are sold to Poland, Hungary and 
Bulgaria, In I969, Scaldia-Volga was on the verge of bankruptcy. Since 
then the company has made a remarkable recovery. During the first 
eleven months of 1976, Scaldia-Volga sold 14,000 Soviet automobiles; 
12,000 more than in 1971.
Before we cover the remaining Belgian-Soviet companies it should 
be mentioned that Scaldia-Volga and other such mixed companies in HTBs 
account for a significant portion of Soviet automobile sales in the 
West, According to Engibarov, mixed companies sold 40.5 percent of 
Soviet automobiles exported to capitalist countries in 1974,^^ Most 
of the remaining automobiles were sold via Western-owned companies 
which received marketing rights from the Soviet FTO Avtoeksport, (For 
examples of these Western-owned companies see p. 142,)
The Belgium-Soviet Trade Company (Belso) wag established in Ant­
werp in 1966. The Soviet FTOs Vneshposyltorg, Eksportles, Raznoeks- 
port and Prodintorg own 75 percent of the company's share capital. The 
remaining shares are divided amongst five Belgian firms, Belso special­
ises in the wholesale trade of foodstuffs and consumer goods. The 
company sells commodities to both Soviet and foreign buyers, Belso 
has sales offices in Brussels, Antwerp, Liege and Charleroi, In 1967» 
Belso established a department store in Brussels named Maison de la
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Russie. The store sells a variety of Soviet-produced goods including 
food, spirits, watches, cameras and handicrafts. In 1973» sales of 
Soviet commodities through Belso totalled $13 million. During the same 
period Belso sold $21-million worth of goods to the USSR,
Nafta-B was established in Antwerp in I967 to promote the export­
ation of Soviet petroleum and petroleum products to Belgium and neigh­
bouring countries. Prior to 1971» the USSR owned 60 percent of Nafta-B's 
share capital and was represented by four FTOs— Soyuznefteeksport, 
Soyuzpromeksport, Soyuzkhimeksport and Avtoeksport, The remaining 
shares were divided amongst Belgian shareholders including the Belgian 
Bunkering and Stevedoring Company and Société Commerciale Antoine Vloe- 
berghs. As a result of the issuance of 6,950 additional shares in 
1971, the USSR acquired a 90 percent interest in Nafta-B, In 1971» 
Nafta-B’s share capital totalled $2,6 million,
Nafta-B imports a sizeable amount of its petroleum from the USSR, 
However, Goldman has pointed out that in I969 and 1970, Nafta-B was 
selling a lot more petroleum than the USSR was exporting to B e l g i u m ,3^ 
The amount which exceeded Soviet exports presumably came from the Middle 
East. In addition to crude oil, Nafta-B purchases petrol, fuel oil and 
other refined petroleum products from the USSR, Nafta-B's petroleum 
is currently being refined by the Belgian firm Albatros. According 
to some reports Nafta-B is planning to construct a petroleum refinery 
in Antwerp to process crude oil from Soviet and other sources,35
Nafta-B sells most of its petroleum and petroleum products to 
Western Europe and North America, The company has branch offices in 
Copenhagen and Zurich, and sales outlets in Antwerp, Liege, Brussels 
and Bruges. Nafta-B has storage tanks and a storage terminal in Ant­
werp. Nafta-B's total sales in 1975 amounted to 23.2 billion Belgian 
francs (about $657 million).
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Transworld Marine Agency (TWM) was established in Antwerp in 
1970. At that time the company’s share capital totalled $142,800, In 
1972, TWM’s share capital was increased to $342,800, Five USSR-based 
organisations— Sovinflot, Sovfrakht, the Baltic Steamship Company, the 
Murmansk Steamship Company and the Latvian Steamship Company— own 75 per­
cent of TWM'8 share capital. The remaining shares are owned by Belgians, 
TWM is one of the largest shipping companies in the Benelux coun­
tries and represents at least twenty Soviet international lines, TWM's 
Belgium-based branch offices are located in Ghent, Ostend, Zeebrugge 
and Brussels. The company also has representative offices in the Nether­
lands (Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Delfzyl, Vlissengen and Terneuzen) a,nd the 
FRG (Düsseldorf and Frankfurt), TWM functions as a freight forwarder, 
customs representative, shipping agent, insurer and travel agent, TVM 
and its agents handled 1,310 Soviet vessels in 1973» and 1,4/12 in 1974,
NV Ferchimex was established in Antwerp in 1972 to market Sov­
iet fertilisers and chemical products in Belgium and neighbouring coun­
tries, The Soviet FTOs Soyuzpromeksport, Soyuzkhimeksport, Soyuznefte- 
eksport and Avtoeksport own 60 percent of the company's share capital.
The remaining shares are held by three Belgian firms— the Belgian Bunker­
ing and Stevedoring Company, Société Commerciale Antoine Vloeberghs 
and Steinman and Company,
Russalmaz NV was set up in Antwerp in 1973 by three Soviet FTOs—  
Almazyuvelireksport, Novoeksport and Soyuzpromeksport— and three Bel­
gian companies I the Belgian Bunkering and Stevedoring Company, the 
Antwerp Diamond Company and Diacem,3^ The USSR owns 80 percent of 
Russalmaz's share capital, Ihe company is primarily concerned with 
marketing Soviet diamonds in Western Europe, During the first half 
of 1975» the USSR delivered approximately $40-million worth of gemstones 
to the Antwerp market.
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NV East-West Agencies m s  established in Aartselaar in 1973 
to promote the sale of Soviet-made precision goods such as photographic 
equipment, optical supplies, radios, televisions, and accessories. It 
is a subsidiary of a Soviet-controlled company in the Netherlands under 
the same name (see third paragraph on this page). Before NV East-West 
Agencies was set up a Belgian company was responsible for the wholesale 
and retail marketing of the aforementioned Soviet commodities.
NV Elorg Belgie was established in Aartselaar in 1974 as a sub­
sidiary of a Soviet-controlled company in the Netherlands under the 
same name (see fourth paragraph on this page). Elorg Belgie is respon­
sible for handling the commercial and financial business connected 
with the export of Soviet computers and other electronic devices to 
buyers in Belgium and third countries. The company also prepares, 
buys, and sells computer programmes as well as repairs computers and 
other electronic devices. In addition to the parent company, the follow­
ing SFTGs oim share capital in Elorg Belgie; Nafta-B, Belso and Scaldia- 
Volga,
There are two Dutch-Soviet companies in the Netherlands-East- 
West Agencies and Elorg BV, East-West Agencies was established in 
1959 a.8 a wholly Dutch-owned company. In 1969» the USSR became the 
company's major shareholder. The Soviet FTO Mashpriborintorg owns 
a sizeable amount of the share capital in East-West Agencies. The 
company is based in the Hague and is responsible for selling Soviet- 
made photographic equipment, optical supplies and other precision goods,
Elorg BV was established in Hilversum in 1972 to sell Soviet 
computers in Western Europe and the Third World, adapt Western equip­
ment to Soviet Minsk and Ryad computers, and to operate as a computer 
service agency. The Soviet FTO Elektronorgtekhnika owns 65 percent 
of the company's share capital. The remaining shares are held by the
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Dutch firm Datacon, Total capital investment in Elorg BV was estim­
ated at $7.3 million in the spring of 1976. The company has about 
thirty employees including a Soviet director and a few Soviet technic­
ians.37
According to some reports Elorg BV has not been too successful.
In the early part of 1976, the company's monthly cash flow was estim­
ated at only $2,200. In addition, there have been a number of complaints 
from clients about the quality of Elorg's computer services. Moreover, 
the company appears to have experienced some difficulty adapting West­
ern peripheral equipment to Soviet computers. We should also keep in 
mind that Elorg's problems go beyond economic and technical matters.
In April 1976, Elorg's Soviet director, V, T, Khlystov, was expelled 
from the Netherlands following Dutch allegations that he used the com­
pany's resources to obtain confidential information on NATO aircraft 
production.3® According to one report the publicity stemming from this 
incident has made it difficult for Elorg to acquire new customers,39 
However, despite its many problems the company has been successful in 
at least three respects* Elorg has been able to introduce Soviet-built 
computers and Soviet technicians to the West European computer market; 
Elorg has played an active role in acquiring information about develop­
ments and trends in Western computer industries; and Elorg has been 
able to obtain equipment and technical material in Western markets 
which have been hitherto unavailable to the USSR,
There are two Canadian-Soviet companies operating in Canada—  
Morflot Freight Liners Ltd,, and Socan Aircraft Ltd. On 31 December 
1975» Pacific International Freight Liners Ltd. (PIF)--a Soviet-con­
trolled company— was transformed into Morflot Freight Liners Ltd, Like 
its predecessor, Morflot Freight Liners is controlled by the USSR. Only 
5 percent of Morflot's shares are held by a Canadian shareholder and
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Morflot is entitled to recall these shares at book value, Morflot 
represents the Soviet maritime organisation Sovinflot and acts as a 
general agent for Soviet shipping in and around Canada, Morflot is 
based in Vancouver,
Socan Aircraft was established in Calgary, Alberta in 1975 to 
install North American aviation equipment in the Soviet-built Yak-40—  
a medium-range jet— and to sell and service this aircraft in Canada,
The Soviet FTO Aviaeksport owns 67 percent of the company's share cap­
ital and the remainder is owned by Allarco Developments Ltd,— a large 
Canadian conglomerate, Socan was formed after nearly five years of 
negotiations and the agreement is subject to review by Soviet and Can­
adian shareholders at the end of each five-year period. The company's 
development has been delayed as a result of the Canadian government's 
reluctance to certify the Yak-40,
When the Yak-40 is certified Socan will import a stripped-down 
version of the plane from the USSR. Then the company plans to install 
the necessary equipment so the Gamadian version of the Yak-40 meets 
the approval of the Canadian Ministry of Transport, According to one 
report Socan is expected to sell between thirty and thirty-five Yak-40 
jets during the late 1970s and early 1 9 8 0 s , S o c a n  could also start 
marketing Soviet-made MI-8 and MI-10 heavy-duty helicopters, Soviet 
technicians will handle most of Socan*s servicing operations until enough 
Canadian technicians are qualified to perform such duties, Socan also 
has marketing rights in the United States, However, Socan's exports 
might face stiff competition in the United States since an American 
company is currently planning to import Yak-40 airframes and add Amer­
ican engines, equipment and wiring to the aircraft,
Socan's initial share capital amounted to 50,000 Canadian dollars 
(about $50,000), The company's chairman of the board of directors.
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chief executive officer, president, and managing director are all Gan- 
42 *adian citizens, Soviet citizens occupy three of the five positions 
on Socan*s board of directors.
In 1977» there were seven German-Soviet non-banking companies 
operating in the FRG— Neotype Techmaschexport GmbH, Plodimex Aussen- 
handels GmbH, Russische Holz GmbH, Sobren Ghemiehandel GmbH, Ubersee- 
schiffahrtsagentur Transnautic GmbH, Russalmaz AG, and Wesotra Sped- 
ition und Transport GmbH, Neotype Techmaschexport GmbH was established 
in Cologne in 1973 to promote the sale of Soviet machinery and equip­
ment connected with the printing industry. Prior to 1973» the USSR 
sold its printing machinery and equipment through a firm established 
by the West German company Anton Ohlert, The Soviet FTO Tekhmasheks- 
port initially held 75 percent of Neotype's share capital and Anton 
Ohlert oimed the remaining shares. In 1975» the FTO Tekhnopromimport 
became one of Neotype's shareholders. This researcher does not know 
whether Tekhnopromimport received new shares from the company or whether 
it purchased its shares from Tekhmasheksport or Anton Ohlert (or both). 
Neotype has sold machinery and equipment to 143 printing houses in the 
FRG and has sales outlets in a number of countries in Europe, Asia and 
Africa. Over half of Neotype's business involves third countries, 
Plodimex Aussenhandels GmbH was set up in Juelich in 1974 to 
sell Soviet wines and vodka to customers in the l*TîG and neighbouring 
countries. The initial share capital of Plodimex amounted to DM 1.3 
million (about $514,OOO), The FTO Soyuaplodoimport owns 5I percent 
of the company's share capital and the West German company Simex Aussen- 
handelsgesellschaft mbH— the company which had been responsible for 
importing Soviet vodka, red wine, brandy and champagne since I963-- 
ovms the remaining shares, Plodimex plans to sell commodities other 
than the ones mentioned above in the near future.
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Russische Holz GmbH (Russholz) was established in 1974 to pro­
mote the sale of Soviet wood, pulp, and paper products in the FRG. The 
shareholders of Russholz include the Soviet FTO Eksportles and several 
West German companies, Russholz*s general-director is a Soviet cit­
izen,
Sobren Ghemiehandel GmbH was set up in Muelheim in 1974 to buy 
and sell chemical products in the FRG on behalf of the Soviet FTO Soyuz­
khimeksport, The company's share capital totals DM 150,000 (about 
$68,000), Soyuzkhimeksport and the West German company Brenntag AG 
each own 49 percent of Sobren Ghemiehandel's share capital. The re­
maining shares are held by Ost-West Handelsbank AG— a wholly Soviet- 
owned Imnk in the FRG. Sobren Ghemiehandel is authorised to sign con­
tracts concerning compensatory deals between the FRG and the USSR,
In 1974, Uberseeschiffahrtsagentur Transnautic GmbH was set up 
in Hamburg to promote Soviet maritime operations in and around the 
FRG, The company's share capital is owned by Sovinflot and a West 
German firm, Uberseeschiffahrtsagentur Transnautic is yet another 
example of the USSR's growing interest in penetrating Western shipping 
markets,
Russalmaz AG was established in Frankfurt in 1975 to handle 
the export and import of diamonds, other precious gemstones, various 
types of precious metals and jewelry on behalf of the Soviet FTO Almaz­
yuvelireksport, Approximately 90 percent of the company's share cap­
ital Is owned by Almazyuvelireksport and the remainder is owned by a 
West German firm. The German shareholder is responsible for handling 
Russalmaz's day-to-day operations.
Wesotra Spedition und Transport GmbH was established in Cologne 
in 1976 by the Soviet FTO Soyuzvneshtrans, the German Federal Railways, 
and three West German transport companies, Wesotra*s responsibilities
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include I improving freight services between the FRG and the USSR; 
selecting the best routes for shipping commodities between the FRG 
and the USSR; co-ordinating the transport of cargo from third countries 
to the USSR; and co-ordinating the transport of cargo from the USSR to 
third countries, Soyuzvneshtrans owns 52 percent of Wesotra's share 
capital.
Some of the Finnish-Soviet companies operating in Finland are 
as follows* Konela, Suomen Petrooli, Teboil Oy, Koneisto AB, Finn-Elorg, 
and Saimaa Lines, Konela was established in Lauthasarri (a suburb of 
Helsinki) in 19^7 to sell and service Soviet motor vehicles and boat/ 
ship engines in Finland, At the present time the company is also respon­
sible for preparing Soviet motor vehicles so they will satisfy the 
demands of Finnish consumers, ^ Konela is Avtoeksport's sole agent 
in Finland, Konela maintains a large import and preparation centre 
in Raippo which can prepare up to 60 motor vehicles per day; a large, 
centralised spare-parts depot in Helsinki which stocks more than 25,000 
items for the vehicles; and 28 large, 14 medium-sized and about 50 
small service stations and repair shops throughout Finland, Hi© USSR 
owns 75 percent of Konela's share capital and the remaining portion 
is owned by Finnish shareholders, Konela's general-director and other 
top-level personnel are Soviet citizens,^
Since its inception Konela has sold approximately 150,000 Soviet 
automobiles and tractors in Finland, During the last few years Konela 
has been selling 10,000 to 12,000 Soviet automobiles annually to Finnish 
customers, Soviet automobiles and tractors comprise approximately 
10 percent of Finland's total annual sales of automobiles and tractors,
It is widely known that automobile servicing facilities in the 
USSR are considered underdeveloped vis-à-vis servicing facilities in 
the West, When the USSR started exporting automobiles to Vf estern markets
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Soviet manufacturers, FTOs and marketing companies were not prepared 
to meet the servicing demands of discerning Western consumers. As a 
result Soviet automobiles generated little interest despite their rel­
atively low prices. This taught Soviet automobile manufacturers/sellers 
a valuable lesson* unlike the average Soviet consumer who is required 
to purchase what the Soviet automobile industry provides for him, the 
typical Western consumer can select an automobile from a wide range 
of (domestic and foreign) manufacturers. If a Western consumer is not 
satisfied with a given manufacturer he simply takes his business else­
where, Since the early 1970s the USSR has made a serious effort to 
upgrade its servicing facilities abroad. This has reportedly led to 
a marked disparity between Soviet automobile servicing facilities abroad 
and such facilities in the USSR, According to Goldman, there are approx­
imately 1,000 Soviet cars for every Konela garage in Finland while in 
the USSR there are about 2,200 Soviet cars for each servicing facil-
Suomen Petrooli was set up as a Finnish company in 1932, In 
1946, the USSR became a shareholder of Suomen Petrooli, The company 
is primarily responsible for marketing Soviet petroleum and petroleum 
products in the eastern part of Finland, The FTO Soyuznefteeksport 
owns most of Soumen Petrooli's share capital, Soumen Petrooli is based 
in Helsinki,
Teboil Gy is based in Helsinki and is responsible for selling 
such products as petrol, kerosene, diesel fuel, lubricants, liquefied 
gas, and auto accessories. The shareholders of Teboil include Soyuz­
nefteeksport, Konela and Suomen Petrooli. In conjunction with Suomen 
Petrooli, Teboil supplies 400 automobile service stations and has 20 
fuel depots with a total capacity of 600,000 cubic metres, two tankers 
and over I50 tanker-trucks and other fuel-carrying v e h i c l e s , ^7
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Koneisto AB was established in Helsinki in 1964, and is respon­
sible for selling and servicing various types of Soviet machinery and 
equipment. The shareholders of Koneisto include Teboil Oy, Konela, 
and two Soviet FTOs— Sudoimport and Stankoimport. In addition to its 
shareholders, Koneisto represents the following Soviet FTOs* Mashino­
eksport, Mashpriborintorg, Energomasheksport, Tekhmasheksport, Tekhsnab- 
eksport and Litsenzintorg, Koneisto maintains commercial centres and 
servicing facilities in Helsinki, Hanko, Jyvaskyla, Kirkkonummi and 
Oulu, The Helsinki complex includes a showroom, warehouse and depot.
The Hanko complex includes production and storage facilities, showrooms, 
workshops and a spare-parts warehouse,
Finn-Elorg was established in Helsinki in 1974, The company's 
operations include the sale of Soviet computers. The Soviet FTO Elek­
tronorgtekhnika owns over ^0 percent of Finn-Elorg*s share capital.
The remaining shares are held by Teboil Oy and two Finnish companies, 
Saimaa Lines was set up in the early 1970s to promote the opera­
tions of the Soviet merchant fleet. The company handles both container­
ised freight and bulk cargo. In 1975» Saimaa Lines opened a new line 
for the transport of containerised cargo from Western Europe to Iran,
The route runs from Hamburg/Antwerp to Finland, When the goods arrive 
in Finland they are shipped via land transport (across the USSR) to 
Iran,
Some of the French-Soviet companies operating in France are as 
follows* Actif-Avto, Sogo and Company SA, Rusbois, Promolease and 
Fransov, Actif-Avto ira.s set up by the Soviet FTO Traktoroeksport and 
a French farm co-operative in Paris in I966 to assemble and sell Sov­
iet agricultural tractors and other farm machinery, Traktoroeksport 
ovms 70 percent of the company's share capital, Actif-Avto operates 
an office near Paris for receiving tractors and other machinery, and
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storing spare parts,
Sogo and Company SA was established in Paris in I968 to sell 
Soviet chemicals (e.g,, ammonia and methanol), patented medicines and 
raw materials for the pharmaceutical industry; and buy raw materials 
for the production of tyres, rubber goods, plastics and polyethylene. 
Amongst the company's shareholders are the FTO Soyuzkhimeksport and 
the French firm Gobert and Company, The initial share capital of Sogo 
and Company totalled 2 million French francs (about $400,000), The 
company's turnover amounted to approximately $150 million in 1973»
70 percent of this sum was connected with French exports to the USSR, 
and 30 percent with Soviet exports to France, In addition to its oper­
ations in France, Sogo and Company is planning to sell Soviet medicines 
in Spain,
Rusbois was established in Paris in 1969 to sell Soviet timber 
and wood products. The Soviet FTO Eksportles owns part of the company's 
share capital, Rusbois sold approximately $65-million worth of goods 
in 1973,
Promolease was set up in Paris in 1974 to lease various types 
of machinery and equipment to GMEA and Western clients. For example, 
the company purchases Soviet-made bulldozers to lease to the West, 
and buys Western-manufactured cargo containers to lease to Soviet and 
other GMEA clients. In 1977» Promolease was planning to extend its 
operations to the leasing of tankers, freighters, canning plants and 
road-building equipment. The shareholders of Promolease include Banque 
Commerciale pour 1' Europe du Nord (the Paris-based Soviet bank) and 
Credit Lyonnais,
Fransov was established in 1976 to catch, process and sell fish 
and other types of marine life. The company also provides services 
for Soviet fishing vessels which operate off the east coast of Africa,
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Sovrybflot owns 50 percent of the company's share capital and the re­
maining shares are held by French interests.
There are at least five Italian-Soviet companies operating in 
Italy— Stanitaliana SpA, Sovitalmare, Sovitpesca SpA, Dolphin Agenzia 
Maritima and Tecnicon SpA, Stanitaliana \m.s set up in Milan in I97I 
by the Soviet FTO Stankoimport and the Italian company Famo, Stanital­
iana buys and sells machine-tools and forging and pressing equipment 
on behalf of Stankoimport, The company also sells machine-tools for 
the Soviet FTO Tekhmasheksport, The initial share capital of Stanital­
iana amounted to 320 million lire (about $512,000); 84 percent of this 
capital was owned by Stankoimport, Stanitaliana is currently planning 
to build a showroom, spare-parts warehouse, machine-tool depot, work­
shop and a servicing facility in Assago, Between 1972 and 1974, Stan­
italiana' s sales of machinery and equipment increased from about $1.5  
million to about $6 ,9 million,
Sovitalmare was established in 1976 to charter merchant vessels 
for Italian-Soviet trade. The shareholders of Sovitalmare include 
Sovfrakht (Moscow) and the Italian state-owned shipping company Finmare, 
Over half of Sovitalmare's shares are reportedly held by the Italians, 
Sovitpesca was set up in Milan in 1976, The company’s adminis­
trative offices are located in Leghorn, Sovitpesca is responsible 
for transporting fish to Italy and third countries, distributing fish 
in Italy and third countries, and providing services for Soviet fish­
ing vessels.
Dolphin Agenzia Maritima was established in Genoa in 1976, The 
company is responsible for facilitating the operations of the Soviet 
merchant fleet, Sovinflot is the Soviet shareholder in Dolphin Agenzia 
Maritima,
On 15 September 1977» the Italian state-owned company Institute
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per la Ricostruzione Industriale (iRl) signed an agreement with Litsen- 
zintorg to establish the mixed company Tecnicon SpA, An affiliate of 
IRI— Italimpianti— owns ^0 percent of Tecnicon*s share capital and 
Litsenzintorg owns the other half. According to reports, Tecnicon 
will specialise in the design and construction of tin and steel mills
 ^Q
in third countries. It is interesting to note that unlike typical 
SFTGs which were set up to handle trade between the USSR and host coun­
tries, Tecnicon’s operations will be primarily connected with promoting 
Italian and Soviet trade with third countries.
There are two Japanese-Soviet companies in Japan— the United 
Orient Shipping Agency and Nisotra, The United Orient Shipping Agency 
was set up in Tokyo in 1969 to facilitate Soviet maritime operations. 
The initial paid-up capital of the United Orient Shipping Agency total­
led _50 million yen (about $139,000); 25 percent of the company's share 
capital was owned by Sovfrakht (Moscow), 2_5 percent by the (Soviet-owned) 
Far East Steamship Company, and 50 percent by Japanese interests.
In the latter part of 1977, the FTO Soyuzvneshtrans and three 
Japanese companies— Nippon Express Company, Nieshin Transportation 
and Warehousing Company, and Jeuro Container Transport Inc.— set up 
the mixed company Nisotra to operate the Trans-Siberian container ser­
vice (i.e., the transport of containers between the Far East and 
Western Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railway). According to the agree­
ment Soyuzvneshtrans owns 49 percent.of the company’s share capital 
and the remaining shares are divided equally amongst the Japanese part­
ners. In addition to handling freight Nisotra rents and leases con­
tainers, Nisotra*s seaborne transport services will be handled by the 
Far East Steamship Company and a Japanese shipping company on a 50-50 
basis,
According to one source the Japanese Foreign Ministry raised
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some objections over the establishment of Nisotra, One of the prin­
cipal objections stemmed from the fact that the USSR (along with other 
shareholders in Nisotra) could monopolise the freight-forwarding bus­
iness between Japan and Western Europe, Prior to the establishment 
of Nisotra it was pointed out that about sixteen Japanese freight-for­
warding companies were shipping goods from Japan to Western Europe 
via the Trans-Siberian Railway, The Japanese Foreign Ministry expressed 
concern over the fact that the USSR could force these companies to ship 
their cargo through Nisotra, This would give Nisotra a tremendous 
amount of influence as the proportion of cargo shipped between Japan 
and Western Europe via the Trans-Siberian Railway has risen from 1 per­
cent in the early 1970s to 20 percent in 1977
There are two Soviet-controlled companies in Norway— Koneisto 
Norge AS and Konela Norge Bil, Koneisto Norge was set up in Drammen 
in 1967 to distribute Soviet electrical engineering equipment, ships, 
machine-tools, forging and pressing equipment, precision instruments 
and bearings. The company's shareholders include Koneisto AB (Finland) 
and various FTOs.
Konela Norge Bil was established in Oslo to market Soviet motor 
vehicles. The Soviet FTO Avtoeksport is one of the company's share­
holders. In 1972, Konela Norge Bil set up an 8,000 square-metre tech­
nical centre in Drammen which includes vehicle-preparation workshops, 
warehouses for spare parts and a paint shop. Two years later the com­
pany opened a new 2,000 square-metre commercial centre in Oslo, At 
the present time Konela Norge Bil provides supplies and services for 
over 50 automobile service stations throughout Norway,Between 1974 
and 1975» Konela Norge Bil's automobile sales increased from 1,400 to
1,750.
There are three Soviet-Spanish companies operating in Spain—
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Sovhispan, Pesquerias Espanolas Sovieticas Gonjuntas SA and Intramar SA, 
Sovhispan was established in Barcelona in 1971 to process and market 
fish and fish products as well as provide services for Soviet fishing 
vessels operating near the Canary Islands, The authorised share cap­
ital of the company totals 56 million pesetas (about $836,000), Sov- 
rybflot owns 50 percent of Sovhispan*s share capital and the remaining 
portion is owned by two Spanish companies— General de Tabacos de Pil­
ipinas of Barcelona and Suardias Chartering of Madrid, In 1976, Sov­
hispan established a representative office in Moscow, During the same 
year the company was planning to build a complex in Tenerife to pro­
cess marine life and provide services for fishing vessels, Sovhispan 
sold approximately $29-million worth of Soviet fish products in 1975*
Pesquerias Espanolas Soviet Gonjuntas SA (Pesconsa) was estab­
lished in Madrid in 1975 to catch and sell fish. The initial share 
capital of the company totalled 5*6 million pesetas (about $84,000), 
Sovhispan is one of Pesconsa*s shareholders. One of Sovhispan*s dir­
ectors functions as Pesconsa*s president,
Intramar SA was set up in Madrid in 1976 to provide services 
for Soviet merchant vessels calling at Spanish ports. The company 
eventually plans to handle clients for Soviet passenger-ships. The 
Soviet maritime organisation Sovinflot and a Spanish firm are Intramar*s 
shareholders.
Amongst the Soviet-Swedish companies conducting commercial 
operations in Sweden are Matreco Handels AB and Scansov AB, Mat- 
reco Handels was established in Stockholm in 1957 to market and ser­
vice Soviet-made automobiles. The share capital of Matreco Handels 
totals 11,300,000 Swedish kronor (about $2,392,000); Avtoeksport owns 
Skr 11,000,000 (about $2,323,000) and Konela (Finland) owns the remain­
ing Skr 300,000 (about $69,000). In 1973, Matreco Handels employed
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approximately eighty-five people,^ The company has branch offices 
in Goteborg, Malmo, Gavle, Solleflea and Lulea, Matreco Handels is 
also represented by thirty-two sales and service agencies in Sweden, 
During 1978, Matreco Handels plans to open a large exhibition centre 
for passenger and commercial vehicles, farm equipment and industrial 
machinery,
Scansov AB was established in Stockholm in 1976 to facilitate 
seaborne trade between the USSR and Sweden, The company's share cap­
ital totals Skr 200,000 (about $46,000); Sovinflot owns 60 percent 
and the remaining shares are held by the Swedish company Fallenius 
and Lefflers, It is interesting to note that Scansov's Swedish share­
holder has a majority of members on the board of directors, Fallenius 
and Lefflers is also responsible for appointing Scansov's managing 
director, Scansov employed approximately twenty people in February 
1977.^ 3
In addition to the aforementioned companies in IMTEs the USSR 
has companies in a number of LDOs, Some of these companies are listed 
as follows* the Ethiopian-Soviet Trading Company Ltd,, Rafidian Fish­
eries Ltd,, the Soviet-Mozambique Fishing Company, the West African 
Automobile and Technical Engineering Company, the Fil-Sov Shipping 
Company, the Marine Industries of Singapore-Soviet Company Pte Ltd, 
and the Singapore-Soviet Shipping Company, The Ethiopian-Soviet Trad­
ing Company Ltd, (Ethso) v/as set up in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in I967 
to market Soviet motor vehicles, farm machinery and industrial equip­
ment. The Soviet FTO Enorgomasheksport owns 72 percent of Ethso*s 
share capital and the remaining shares are owned by an Ethiopian com­
pany, In addition to its main warehouse and sales facility in Addis 
Ababa, Ethso has several branches throughout Ethiopia,
Rafidian Fisheries Ltd, was established in Iraq in 1974, The
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share capital of the company totals 10 million Iraqi dinars (about 
$34 million), Iraq owns 5I percent of Rafidian Fisheries' share cap­
ital. The USSR has provided cold storage facilities and fishing vessels 
for the company. Soviet specialists have also trained Iraqi personnel 
working for Rafidian Fisheries, An Iraqi functions as the company's 
president and a Soviet citizen serves as vice-president.
The Soviet-Mozambique Fishing Company began operating in 1977,
The company's operations include catching, processing and marketing 
marine life. Some of the processing is done on Soviet factory ships.
The products of the Soviet-Mozambique Fishing Company are sold in both 
Mozambique and third countries. The company's share capital and profits 
are divided 3O-5O between Mozambique and the USSR,
The West African Automobile and Technical Engineering Company 
(WAATECO) was set up in Lagos, Nigeria in 19&7 to promote the sale 
of Soviet lorries, dump trucks, agricultural tractors, cross-country 
vehicles, buses, motorcycles and bicycles in Nigeria and other West 
African countries. In addition to its large commercial and technical 
complex in Lagos, WAATECO has branches in Kano, Jos, Benin, Maiduguri, 
Sokoto, Katsina, Ibadan and Kadun, The company has erected a number 
of standard buildings throughout Nigeria which contain workshops, ser­
vice centres, storage rooms for spare parts, demonstration rooms and
offices, WAATECO is now quite active in Liberia, Togo, the Ivory Coast
54and Equatorial Guinea.^
The Fil-Sov Shipping Company was established in the Philippines 
(Manila) in 1974 to facilitate the operations of the Soviet merchant 
fleet, A Philippine investor, E. M. Conjungco, oi-ms 60 percent of 
Fil-Sov*s share capital and the remaining shares are held by the Soviet 
maritime organisation Sovinflot, According to some reports the USSR 
has pumped funds into the company in order to cover operating losses.
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However, this policy has not altered the 60-40 share capital ratio.
The Marine Industries of Singapore-Soviet Company Pte Ltd, (Marissco) 
was set up in Singapore in June 1975 by the Singapore company Straits 
Fisheries Pte Ltd, and Sovrybflot, The company was initially establish­
ed to purchase marine life from Soviet fishing vessels and act as an 
agent for Soviet fishing vessels calling at ports in Singapore, Marissco's 
authorised share capital totals $12 million. The company's share cap­
ital and profits are divided 50*50 between Straits Fisheries and Sov­
rybflot, In June 1976, Marissco agreed to purchase 8,000 metric tons 
of fish and other types of sea foods from the Soviet FTO Prodintorg. 
According to one estimate Marissco will purchase about 27,000 metric 
tons of sea products from Prodintorg in 1979/1980, These marine pro­
ducts will be reprocessed and repacked in Singapore and then sold under 
the trade name 'Neptune's Pride', In the latter part of 1977, Marissco 
was planning to set up a $12-million seafood processing and storage
complex which could eventually become Singapore's first fully integrated
55seafood processing facility.
The Singapore-Soviet Shipping Company (Sosiac) m s  established 
in Singapore in 1967 to provide supplies and services for Soviet mer­
chant vessels operating in waters around Singapore. The company's 
shareholders are Sovinflot and a private local company. At the outset 
Sosiac's chartering activities were only connected with the USSR-based 
Far Eastern Steamship Company, However, by the early 1970s Sosiac 
was responsible for chartering merchant vessels from other Soviet ship­
ping companies.
Western-Owned Companies Functioning as Agents 
of Soviet Commercial Organisations
Although its network of foreign-based companies has grown considerably
I4l
the USSR still relies heavily on wholly Western-owned companies to 
market commodities on behalf of Soviet FTOs, Some of these Western 
agents are employed to operate within a given country. On the other 
hand Soviet trading organisations sometimes utilise the services of 
Western-owned companies to market goods in third countries.
Western commercial agents can be appointed directly by FTOs or 
appointed by Soviet companies/representative offices operating outside 
the USSR, Likewise, the day-to-day operations of commercial agents 
can be monitored by Soviet FTOs (via telephone, telex etc,) or foreign- 
based representatives of FTOs, Personnel from Soviet FTOs sometimes 
travel to the West in order to define broad commercial policy goals 
to their agents. In some cases foreign commercial agents are paid on 
a commission basis. In other cases agents receive a certain percent­
age of Soviet commodity deliveries, A few foreign agents receive cash 
payments from FTOs,
The successful implementation of the USSR’s export scheme requires 
a highly sophisticated marketing network. At the present time the 
Soviet Union is relatively weak in marketing expertise and advertising 
technology and hence unable to cope with the fierce competition in 
world markets without the assistance of foreign agents who are keenly 
aware of the demands of local consumers. The use of foreign agents 
also eliminates the need for foreign currency expenditures to set up 
and maintain foreign-based companies. Moreover, foreign agents are 
responsible for establishing a foothold for Soviet commodities in world 
markets. If a particular Soviet export drive is unsuccessful the USSR 
simply ceases to offer such commodities in selected markets and is 
not faced with the problem of maintaining or liquidating a costly for­
eign-based company. But as we discovered previously, Soviet trading 
organisations can terminate their agreements with foreign agents and
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set up their own marketing companies (or simply buy out the Western 
agents) if selected Soviet commodities have successfully penetrated 
world markets.
In some cases Western companies are selected to market Soviet 
exports because these companies participate in the production of Sov­
iet commodities* After the French company Line SA concluded a co-pro­
duction agreement with the October Revolution Machine-Building Plant 
in Minsk it was announced that Line SA would be responsible for dis­
tributing Soviet-made machine-tools in the ESC,56 However, in most 
cases Western marketing agents do not participate in the production 
of Soviet commodities. At the present time a sizeable proportion (i.e., 
over 50 percent) of Soviet automobile exports are sold through Western- 
owned companies which do not participate in the production of Soviet 
automobiles. Some of the larger wholly Western-owned companies that 
import and sell Soviet automobiles are as follows: Satra Motors Ltd,
(U.K.), Lada Canada Ltd, and Satra Motors Inc. (U.S.),
The Soviet FTO Litsenzintorg is responsible for exporting and 
importing licences and patents. At the beginning of 1976 there were 
at least eleven Western companies acting as agents for Litsenzintorg.
In most cases a standard agreement is drawn up between Litsenzintorg 
and its agents. This agreement normally gives an agent the right to 
search for buyers of Soviet licences within a certain geographic area. 
In addition to consultations with Soviet technicians, Litsenzintorg's 
agents receive advertising material and technical documents. After 
locating prospective buyers of Soviet licences the agents are expected 
to assist Litsenzintorg in negotiating and concluding contracts. In 
virtually all cases agents are not authorised to sign contracts on 
behalf of Litsenzintorg, The agents are also required to keep Litsen­
zintorg informed about the licence trade in selected countries, pro-
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vide Litsenzintorg with reports on patent and licence legislation, 
and arrange exhibitions, symposia and conferences, Litsenzintorg's 
agents receive a commission from licence payments,
A few of the USSR's business arrangements with Western agents 
indicate that Soviet traders (and their supervisory organs) are some­
times required to place commercial considerations above ideological 
motivations. Before Soviet diamond-marketing companies were set up 
in Belgium and the FRG it was almost impossible for the USSR to sell 
its industrial diamonds in Western markets without the co-operation 
of De Beers Consolidated of South Africa, As a result the USSR agreed 
to market its diamonds through De Beers.38 Although the USSR is no 
longer forced to rely exclusively on the marketing services of De Beers, 
it is reasonable to assume that Soviet diamond exporters still conduct 
a fair amount of business through the South African company (e,g,,
Soviet diamonds are still being sold through De Beers in London).
Soviet personnel are seldom assigned to wholly Western-owned 
companies for the purpose of preparing/selling Soviet commodities, Sov­
iet goods sold through foreign agents are generally ready for consum­
ers before they are exported. If some preparation is necessary it 
usually does not require a great deal of technical expertise and is 
normally the responsibility of the foreign agent (e.g., placing Sov­
iet commodities in attractive Western-made packages). But in a few 
cases Soviet technicians have been assigned to foreign companies for 
the purpose of preparing raw or half-finished exports. According to 
a member of the British Cabinet Office, Soviet personnel were assigned 
to De Beers Consolidated (London) to prepare Soviet diamonds. These 
technicians reportedly worked behind 'closed doors' and only selected 
South African and British advisory personnel had direct access to them,39
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Soviet Personnel Rendering Technical Assistance 
to Western Firms Following the Sale of Soviet 
Industrial Licences
A number of IMTEs (e.g., France, the FRG, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the 
U.K. and the U.S.) are now purchasing Soviet industrial licences. Many 
of these licences are connected with the design and production of power- 
generating equipment and laser devices, and processes in ferrous and 
non-ferrous metallurgy, electronics, chemistry and mineral extraction. 
Although it is more common to find Western technicians operating in 
the USSR under licence agreements an increasing number of Soviet tech­
nicians are being temporarily assigned to Western firms to provide 
technical assistance following the sale of industrial licences, Litsen­
zintorg recently sold a licence to an American company (for a period 
of twelve years) concerning the underground gasification of coal, A 
provision for Soviet technical assistance was included in the agree­
ment.^^
Soviet Technicians Assigned to Western Companies 
for the Purpose of Inspecting Commodities 
Earmarked for Export to the USSR
Soviet commodity inspectors are temporarily assigned to companies in 
a number of Western nations to ensure that exports from the West meet 
the specifications of Soviet buyers. Before signing trade contracts 
Soviet FTOs sometimes request the right to send inspectors to Western 
manufacturing companies. Western governments often approve such re­
quests in the interest of promoting trade with the USSR, At the end 
of 1975 there were seventy-one Soviet inspectors attached to British 
companies. During a debate in the House of Commons an MP from the 
Conservative Party pointed out that Soviet industrial inspectors assigned
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to British companies were involved in spying operations in the early 
1970s and were consequently sent back to the USSR,^^
Permanent Soviet Industrial Exhibitions
During 1979» the USSR plans to open up a permanent industrial exhib­
ition in Lulea, Sweden* The exhibition space will be used by the Sov­
iet FTOs Avtoeksport and Mashinoeksport to display automobiles and 
farm machinery. According to one source the exhibition space was grant­
ed in exchange for a Soviet promise to supply timber for the Lulea 
sawmill.
The planned Soviet industrial exhibition in Lulea is one of the 
first examples of Soviet economic penetration of this nature. It could 
become a popular method of advertising/selling Soviet commodities espec­
ially if other localities are willing to grant exhibition space in 
exchange for Soviet commodities. However, even if other countries 
reject barter arrangements it might still be in the USSR's interest 
to pay (hard currency) for permanent exhibition space. Indeed, the 
cost of permanent exhibition space would probably be cheaper than estab­
lishing and maintaining a company*
Representative Offices of Soviet Organisations
The USSR has a number of foreign-based representative offices which 
are responsible for promoting, but not actually participating in, the 
business operations of the organisations they represent. Such offices 
are established for at least two reasons. Firstly, the cost of setting 
up and running a representative office tends to be much lower than the 
cost of establishing and operating a joint-stock company. Secondly,
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the host country might not favour the establishment of a Soviet com­
pany that could seriously disrupt local (and perhaps nationwide) bus­
iness conditions or present a threat to national security,Intourist—  
the Soviet organisation for foreign travel— and Aeroflot— the Soviet- 
owned airline— both have representative offices in the United States, 
Intourist was granted permission to open its office in New York under 
the U.S.-USSR Cultural Exchange Agreement of 1957* (This agreement 
also gave the American Express Company permission to open up a repre­
sentative office in Moscow,) Intourist's New York office is only author­
ised to carry out information operations; its commercial business is 
conducted by American travel agencies which are accredited by the U S S R , ^3 
Aeroflot has offices in New York and Washington, D.G. Aeroflot 
was granted permission to open its offices under Article 12 of the 
bilateral Civil Air Transport Agreement of I966, Aeroflot's offices 
in the United States are not authorised to operate as ticket agents. 
Tickets are sold by Pan American Airways (and a few other airlines) 
on behalf of Aeroflot,
Soviet-Foreign (Mixed) Representative Companies
Companies in this category were set up to promote, but not actually 
participate in, the commercial operations of a number of Soviet-for­
eign business interests. There are at least two Soviet-foreign rep­
resentative companies operating in IMTEs— the U,S,-USSR Trade and Econ­
omic Council Inc. and Groupement d' Interet Economique pour le Dével­
oppement des Echanges Commerciaux entre 1' URSS et la France, The U.S.- 
USSR Trade and Economie Council was incorporated in New York in Septem­
ber 1973 oa the basis of an intergovernmental protocol of June 1973 
which stressed the need for such a council. The U.S.-USSR Trade and
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Economic Council is similar to a joint chamber of commerce and its 
main goals are 'to create a business and government environment in 
the U.S. and USSR conducive to expanded commercial relations, to re­
search major bilateral trade issues, and to assist in the implementa­
tion of commercial agreements',^^ The council maintains offices in 
New York and Moscow and its dues-paying members include over 200 pri­
vate American companies and about 100 Soviet economic organisations.
The U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council does not negotiate and sign 
commercial contracts but it often renders contract-negotiating assis­
tance, sponsors technical seminars and commodity exhibits, and arranges 
appointments for visiting businessmen. The council also publishes a 
bi-monthly journal covering a wide range of economic issues. A number 
of top-level private businessmen and governmental officials have held 
administrative positions in the council (e.g., the U.S. Secretary of the 
Treasury, William E. Simon; the president of Occidental Petroleum Cor­
poration, Armand Hammer; the Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade, Nikolai 
S. Patolichev; and the Chairman of the State Bank of the USSR, Vlad­
imir S. Alkhimov), The U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council is class­
ified as a nonprofit corporation.
Groupement d' Interet Economique pour le Développement des Ech­
anges Commerciaux entre 1' URSS et la France (Gisofra) was established 
in 1971 by three state-owned French banks— Banque Nationale de Paris, 
Credit Lyonnais and Société General— and Banque Commerciale pour 1' 
Europe du Nord, Like the U.S,-USSR Trade and Economic Council, Gisofra 
does not negotiate and sign commercial contracts, Gisofra*s primary 
function is to co-ordinate the operations of French buyers and sellers 
with Soviet sellers and buyers, Gisofra is classified as a nonprofit 
company but its shareholders presumably profit from the venture by 
financing a large portion of the trade generated by it.
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Joint Chambers of Commerce
The USSR participates in joint chambers of commerce in a number of 
IMTEs including the U.K., France, Italy, Belgium and Finland, The 
Russo-British Chamber of Commerce was established in I916, Fifty-nine 
years later the Russo-British Chamber of Commerce was transformed into 
the British-Soviet Chamber of Commerce, In 1976, the members of the 
British-Soviet Chamber of Commerce included 45 Soviet FTOs and 650 
major British firms,
The Franco-Soviet Chamber of Commerce began operating in I967.
It is reportedly one of the most active joint chambers of commerce in 
the West, The Franco-Soviet Chamber of Commerce is responsible for 
collecting and disseminating material on economic trends, technological 
developments, commercial legislation, tariffs, transportation, insurance, 
tourism, etc. The joint chamber also makes arrangements for exhibitions, 
fairs, conferences and trade missions,
During the latter half of 1977» members of the Italian-Soviet 
Chamber of Commerce met in Moscow, Discussions were held on a wide 
range of topics including prospects for the use of the transferable 
ruble (the CMEA unit of value) in Italian-Soviet trade. The members 
also agreed to hold discussions on the following topics during 1977 
and 1978* scientific and technical co-operationj trade co-operation 
and mixed companies; industrial production and production integration; 
financial problems; and joint operations in third countries.
Commercial Counsellors' Offices 
in Soviet Embassies
From the late 1940s to the early 1960s commercial counsellors* offices 
in Soviet embassies represented one of the few means of direct Soviet
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access to Western markets. During that period only a few Soviet trad­
ing companies were operating in the West and trips by Soviet foreign 
trade missions to IMTEs were infrequent. As a result, trading organ­
isations in the USSR often requested the assistance of commercial coun­
sellors' offices when negotiating contracts with foreign companies. 
Commercial counsellors' offices also represented a source of informa­
tion for both Soviet and Western traders. In addition to the afore­
mentioned functions, commercial counsellors' offices made arrangements 
for Soviet trade missions and fairs.
The importance of commercial counsellors' offices started declin­
ing when large official Soviet trade representations (see next section), 
joint commercial commissions and nuitierous SFTGs were set up in the 
West during the 1960s and 1970s, At this time most commercial coun­
sellors' offices only have a minor role to play in Soviet foreign trade. 
Indeed, foreign businessmen who contact commercial counsellors' offices 
for assistance are likely to be told that such offices only have a 
'loose relationship' with FTOs and SFTGs and, consequently, all requests 
for assistance should be placed with 'more appropriate organisations'.
In all likelihood commercial counsellors' offices continue to play a 
key role in countries where the USSR has not set up a network of special­
ised commercial organisations.
Official Soviet Trade Representations
The USSR is granted permission to set up official trade representations 
in foreign countries through intergovernmental agreements. Such agree­
ments normally contain provisions for foreign governments to establish 
trade representations in the USSR, In Article 5 of the 1972 Agreement 
Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
150
ment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Renublics Regarding Trade, the 
USSR was given permission to establish an official 'trade representa­
tion' in Washington, D.G. Article 5 also gave the United States the 
right to set up an official 'commercial office' in Moscow, According 
to Section 3 of Article 5» the USSR's trade representation in the United 
States does not have the right to affect the operations of Soviet FTOs, 
The trade representation is permitted to provide office facilities 
for employees or representatives of FTOs but such individuals cannot 
be officers or members of the administrative, technical or service 
staff of the trade representation, or participate directly in the ne­
gotiation, execution or fulfilment of trade transactions. The Soviet 
trade representation in the United States is entitled to all of the 
privileges and immunities which are enjoyed by the Soviet Embassy in 
Washington, D.G, In addition, the Soviet trade representative and
his deputies are entitled to all of the privileges and immunities en-
70joyed by members of the diplomatic staff of the Soviet Ebibassy,
The Soviet trade representation in the United States began its 
operations in October 1973. The trade representation has three divis­
ions* USA Market and Economic Conditions Division, Raw Materials Div­
ision and Machinery and Equipment Division, The USA Market and Econ­
omic Conditions Division is primarily involved in studying a variety 
of bilateral economic and political issues, U.S. legislative develop­
ments, and the regulations of several U,S. governmental agencies. The 
other divisions (which employ the services of representatives of Sov­
iet FTOs) are primarily concerned with providing information services 
for American and Soviet business interests. In addition to the afore­
mentioned functions the Soviet trade representation sometimes makes 
travel arrangements and provides logistical support for Soviet trade 
missions visiting the United States, The trade representation is also
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responsible for the administration of major Soviet commercial exhib­
itions in the United States, In 19?6, there were thirty Soviet citizens
working for the trade representation in the United States (including
71
the trade representative and his three deputies).
The organisational makeup of the official Soviet trade represen­
tation in the United States does not differ significantly from that 
of its counterparts in other IMTEs, For example, the official Soviet 
trade representation in Sweden comprises a trade representative, two 
deputy trade representatives, a jurist, an economics section (includ­
ing a section chief and two senior economists), a machinery and equip­
ment section, a raw materials section and a navigation group. There 
were approximately forty-five employees of the official Soviet trade 
representation in Sweden during the early part of 1977. The employees 
included thirty-three Soviet citizens who were responsible for repre­
senting forty-three FTOs and other economic organisations. It is 
interesting to note that the mixed company Matreco Handels AB is rep­
resented in the official Soviet trade representation in Sweden.
Temporary Soviet Purchasing Commissions
The USSR is authorised to set up temporary purchasing commissions through 
intergovernmental agreements. Such commissions are usually established 
to purchase machinery and equipment for large industrial projects in 
the USSR. In October 1972, the United States granted the Soviet Union 
permission (following a request from N. Patolichev) to establish the 
Kama Purchasing Commission in New York City. Under the original agree­
ment the commission ims set up provisionally for a period of one year 
and its operations could be extended, by mutual agreement, for three 
additional periods of one year each. The Kama Purchasing Commission
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is subordinate to the Ministry of Foreign Trade of the USSR and the 
official Soviet trade representation in the United S t a t e s , T h e  Kama 
Purchasing Commission does not enjoy diplomatic immunity and privileges.
At the outset the Kama Purchasing Commission's primary functions 
were to procure American machinery and equipment for the Kama River 
Truck Complex in the USSR, supervise the transport of these commodities 
to the USSR, and arrange for the training (at American companies) of 
Soviet technicians who would be operating the machinery and equipment. 
Since 1972, the U.S. government has authorised the Kama Purchasing 
Commission to operate on behalf of four other large projects in the 
USSR— the Kuibyshev Fertiliser Complex, the Cheboksary Tractor Plant, 
the Moscow International Trade Centre and natural gas exploration in 
Yakutsk,
In 1976, there were approximately thirty-one representatives 
of Soviet FTOs working in the United States for the Kama Purchasing 
Commission, These representatives have the authority to negotiate 
(but not sign) contracts with American companies. According to the 
U.S. Department of Commerce, the Kama Purchasing Commission has excel­
lent access to decision-makers in Moscow, As a result, American com­
panies are often able to negotiate contracts through the commission
74instead of making expensive marketing trips to the USSR, The Kama 
Purchasing Commission will presumably continue to operate in the United 
States as long as there are industrial projects in the USSR which re­
quire sizeable imports of American machinery and equipment.
J oint Intergovernmental Commissions for the 
Promotion of Commercial Relations Between 
the USSR and Market-Type Economies
Since the late 1960s the USSR has participated in the establishment 
of a number of joint economic commissions on the basis of intergovern­
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mental agreements. There are two types of joint intergovernmental 
economic commissions— universal and specialised. Universal commiss­
ions include the Joint U.S.-USSR Commercial Commission; the British- 
Soviet Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific and Tech­
nical Co-operation; the French-Soviet Intergovernmental Commission 
for Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation (the 'Grand Com­
mission'); the Austrian-Soviet Intergovernmental Commission for Econ­
omic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation; and the Soviet-Swedish 
Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific and Technical 
Co-operation, As we learned in CHAPTER I, universal commissions are 
responsible for setting up specialised commissions (or working groups). 
Top-level members of the Soviet government often participate in joint 
economic commissions (e.g., N. Patolichev served as chairman of the 
Joint U.S.-USSR Commercial Commission),
As a rule, joint economic commissions hold at least one meeting 
each year. Meetings between members of a joint commission normally 
take place in the USSR on one occasion and the country of the other 
party on the following occasion. Although joint economic commissions 
are not responsible for negotiating trade contracts they play a key 
role in determining the level of trade between the USSR and selected 
MTEs, The agreements which are draim up by joint intergovernmental 
economic commissions sometimes contain growth targets for trade as 
well as guidelines for achieving such projected increases (e.g., meth­
ods of improving trade financing).
As the name implies, universal economic commissions are respon­
sible for dealing with a wide range of problems. The Joint U.S.-USSR 
Commercial Commission was established in May 1972 to negotiate*
an overall trade agreement including reciprocal MFN treatment; 
arrangements for the reciprocal availability of government credits; 
provisions for the reciprocal establishment of business facilities 
to promote trade;
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an agreement establishing an arbitration mechanism for settling 
commercial disputes,75
In addition, the Joint U.S.-USSR Commercial Commission was set up to:
study possible U.S.-U.S.S.R, participation in the development of 
natural resources and the manufacture and sale of raw materials 
and other products;
monitor the spectrum of U,S,-U,S,S.R, commercial and economic re­
lations, identifying and, when possible, resolving issues that 
may be of interest to both parties,76
The fifth session of the British-Soviet Intergovernmental Com­
mission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation was held 
in London in May 1976. The Soviet mission was led by the Chairman 
of the State Committee for Science and Technology, V. A, Kirillin, 
According to a Soviet source: 'The Joint Commission welcomed the pro­
gress made in establishing contacts and in defining possible areas 
of co-operation for the participation of Soviet organisations in the 
construction in the U.K. of industrial projects, including those within 
programmes for the development of the nationalised sectors of Brit­
ish industry'.77
The seventh session of the Soviet-Swedish Intergovernmental Com­
mission for Economic, Scientific and Technical Co-operation was held 
in Moscow in the early part of 1978, During the session working groups 
were set up in the pulp and paper, timber, woodworking, food and power- 
engineering industries. The topics which were discussed by the joint 
commission during the seventh session included Sweden's intention to 
participate in a production complex in the USSR, Sweden's interest 
in importing Soviet natural gas in the early 1980s and the joint pro­
duction of commodities which could be marketed in third countries. The 
Soviet and Swedish members of the joint commission also made plans 
for joint symposia, exchanges of specialists and information, and the 
joint testing of equipment, instruments and materials,7®
Specialised joint commercial commissions sometimes perform impor-
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tant functions. For example, in August 1977» the French-Soviet Ship­
ping Commission met in Paris to review developments under the existing 
maritime agreement "between the two countries and to discuss prospects 
for future growth of French-Soviet maritime co-operation,79 The Nor­
wegian-Soviet Fisheries Commission met in January 1978 to establish 
marine-life quotas for Norwegian, Soviet and third-country fishing 
vessels operating in the Barents Sea.®^
Soviet Foreign Trade Missions
The trade mission is one of the most effective (and least costly) means 
of penetrating world markets. For over a half century the USSR has 
been sending trade missions to the West but their impact on foreign 
markets seldom generated much interest until the early 1970s, Soviet 
trade missions in the West are now quite commonpla.ee and it is rather 
difficult to find an IMTE without at least one such mission present 
at any given time,
Soviet trade missions are often small (e.g., five to ten members) 
and include some of the most noteworthy Soviet experts in selected 
fields, A sizeable proportion of the members of such missions have 
previously travelled to the West and are familiar with the languages 
and customs of host countries. The leaders of Soviet trade missions 
usually hold top-level positions in ministries and FTOs, Soviet for­
eign trade missions normally remain in host countries for one or 
two weeks.
There are three principal types of trade missions* buying, sell­
ing/advertising and intelligence (or a combination of the three). Sov­
iet buying missions are authorised to negotiate and, on some occasions, 
sign contracts on behalf of Soviet FTOs and other Soviet organisations
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involved in trade. Since individual buying missions are often respon­
sible for purchasing a certain group of commodities for the entire 
Soviet economy these missions possess an enormous amount of purchasing 
power. For example, a Soviet grain-buying mission acquired a fair amount 
of notoriety when it purchased over 700 million bushels of grain 
from the United States during the summer of 1972, Nearly 440 million 
bushels of wheat (i.e,, approximately 25 percent of the total American 
wheat crop for 1972) were included in the aforementioned figure. The 
grain purchases, according to a U.S, government publication, depleted 
American grain reserves, created farm-product shortages, forced up the 
price of food for American consumers, and created problems for American
freight terminals, shipping lines and harbours which were required to
R1handle the grain exports. But that was only half of the story, A 
number of Americans criticised the USSR for carrying out its buying 
operations under a sliroud of secrecy. This supposedly placed American 
sellers in a disadvantageous position. Moreover, a large segment of 
the American population was flabbergasted to learn that the USSR was 
able to make its massive purchases at a time when the U.S, government 
was paying export subsidies to keep the price of American grain at 
competitive levels. This policy reportedly cost American taxpayers 
over $300 milliono And finally, a few Americans even suspected Soviet 
traders of operating as speculators by purchasing grain futures before 
the massive sales. Under such conditions, when the USSR started placing 
orders for large quantities of grain and the price of futures started 
rising, Soviet traders could sell their options and use the profit to 
help pay for their country's grain imports.
The tactics used by Soviet grain buyers in the United States 
during the summer of 1972 should come as no surprise. The fact that 
Soviet buyers operate as monopsonists has been known since the estab™
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lishment of the monopoly of foreign trade. Each Soviet buying (and 
selling) mission is given a specific assignment. All members of Soviet 
trade missions must pursue a common goal. Since the USSR’s require­
ments for grain were large, members of the Soviet grain-buying mission 
knew that they had to divide their orders amongst a number of American 
grain merchants in order to avert a rapid increase in price, (if Sov­
iet traders had placed a large single order the full impact of the 
purchase would have been immediately knovm and the seller could have 
adjusted the price in accordance with market conditions.) So, after 
arriving in the United States, members of the Soviet grain-buying mis­
sion placed orders with a number of grain merchants who were all keen 
on selling to the USSR, Since individual grain merchants had little 
or no idea that Soviet buyers were dealing with other sellers most 
Americans were unaware of the full impact of Soviet orders until it 
was too late. Indeed, the members of the buying mission placed most 
of their orders before the marked price increases.
Some of the adverse publicity which was directed toward the USSR 
following the grain purchases of 1972 appears to be unfounded. We 
should keep in mind that a Soviet trade mission cannot carry out its 
operations without securing permission from the host country's govern­
ment. Now a Soviet foreign trade mission might request that publicity 
on its presence in a given MTE be kept at a minimum. However, such 
a request can be easily disregarded. It is quite possible that the 
Nixon Administration was willing to offer Soviet traders a fair amount 
of assistance in 1972 in order to strengthen American-Soviet relations, 
As a result,the American government might well have decided to keep 
publicity on the buying mission at a minimum. According to Marshall 
Goldman, the American government was largely responsible for placing 
the cloak of secrecy over Soviet grain-buying operations in the United
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States during 1972,
The point should be made that Soviet buying missions cannot oper­
ate secretly in Western markets without collaborating with foreign 
sellers. Western exporters normally opt to deal secretly with Soviet 
importers since any premature information leaks regarding imminent 
massive purchases would tend to drive up the price of commodities before 
the exporter has an opportunity to purchase his supplies. And Soviet 
buying missions should not be criticised for (secretly) dividing their 
purchases between a number of Western exporters. As we just learned, 
if the Soviet Union had placed its entire order with one exporter the 
market would not have been able to cover such a large single purchase 
without levying a significant price increase on the USSR.
Now the next problem— -should Western governments remove subsid­
ies on commodities which will soon be purchased by the USSR?— is not 
so easy to solve. The U.S. government is supposedly responsible for 
creating the most favourable conditions for American producers/ 
suppliers of grain. However, the U.S, government is also responsible 
for acting in the best interest of the entire American population. The
immediate aftermath of the grain sales of 1972 indicated that the U.S.
83government had not acted judiciously, But Goldman has pointed out 
that the grain sales amounted to a net gain for the United States.
If the U.S. government had reacted differently it is conceivable that 
Soviet buyers would have cut their purchases or taken their business 
elsewhere (or simply gone home empty-handed),
Once Soviet traders have gained access to Western markets we 
can expect them to deal as sagaciously as any other operators. So, 
the suspicion that the USSR was operating in the American futures mar­
ket might have been premature but certainly not outside the realm of 
comprehension. Since any speculative operation requires a thorough
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knowledge of market conditions it is reasonable to assume that the 
USSR would first conduct its operations in the futures market via West­
ern agents. This risk-sharing scheme would have a number of advantages. 
Firstly, as stated, the risks would be shared by two (or more) parties. 
Secondly, Western agents would most likely welcome Soviet speculators 
as partners since such speculators would be state supported and hence 
have adequate funds to cover all risks. Moreover, Soviet speculators 
would probably experience little trouble finding Western partners in 
the light of the fact that they would be in an advantageous position 
to co-ordinate their activities with the operations of Soviet buyers.
It is still not clear whether all American merchants are in a
better frame of mind to deal with Soviet t r a d e r s , p u t  at least some
Americans are well aware of the fact that Soviet traders should not
be regarded as bumpkins. Indeed, any Soviet trader who operates in
the West is required to think and act on the same level as all other
participants in the marketplace. This point was aptly expressed by
the former U.S, Secretary of Agriculture Earl Butzj
, , , . the Russians buy . . , grain in this country like any other 
commercial purchaser. They buy it in the private grain trade mar­
ket from whomever they want to buy it at whatever price they need 
to pay to get it.86
As a result of the USSR's grain-buying operations during the sum­
mer of 1972, the entire American business community undoubtedly learned 
some rather revealing facts about the Soviet Union's ability to pene­
trate and operate in Western markets. But only time will tell if Amer­
icans are prepared to deal sagaciously with Soviet traders. The Amer­
ican government has taken a step which will undoubtedly decrease the 
effectiveness of the USSR's grain-buying tactics which were utilised 
in the early 1970s* At this time U.S. grain exporters are required 
to report to the Department of Agriculture all grain sales over 100,000 
tons within 24 hours after the purchase.®7 This is one encouraging
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development. However, the point should be stressed that Western gov­
ernments could do a lot more for their traders. Without actually get­
ting involved in trade operations, governments of Western nations 
could easily provide a vast amount of (economic) information which 
would put their market operators on a more equal footing with Soviet 
monopsonists. Such a policy would not undermine the principles of a 
market-type economy. Indeed, it would actually strengthen the position 
of Western entrepreneurs engaged in trade with the East, Under such 
conditions Soviet officials might well have to concede that MTEs can 
truly operate in a rational fashion vis-à-vis centrally planned econ­
omies.
Before the USSR started showing much interest in exporting fin­
ished products to the West the activities of Soviet selling/advertis- 
ing missions were somewhat limited. The export of raw materials and 
half-finished products seldom called for much marketing expertise since 
Western buyers had a general idea of the goods offered by the USSR 
and were relatively content with the quality and price of such commod­
ities, But now that the USSR is starting to manufacture finished pro­
ducts which are capable of competing with commodities from Western 
industries Soviet traders have started to place great emphasis on mar­
keting and advertising operations in the West,
Trade fairs have become an important means of marketing Soviet 
commodities for at least two reasons. Firstly, Soviet sellers are 
given free access to a large number of foreign buyers from all parts 
of the world. This reduces the need for Soviet traders to travel around 
looking for customers. Trade fairs also give Soviet sellers access 
to foreign buyers who operate in areas that are not open to Soviet 
citizens. Secondly, trade fairs represent a relatively inexpensive 
means of promoting Soviet exports. For example, a Soviet fur exhibit
I6l
might only require a few boxes of furs to give buyers a good idea of 
the variety and quality of such commodities. The personnel and trans­
portation costs connected with this type of exhibit would be quite low. 
One might think that Soviet machinery and equipment exhibits would be 
rather costly. However, the USSR can now use its marketing companies 
in the West to prepare and transport machinery and equipment for trade 
fairs. Personnel who work for such companies are called upon to par­
ticipate in trade fairs which means that technicians and salesmen do 
not have to be sent from the USSR in many cases,
Soviet participation in a trade fair in Düsseldorf during 1975 
led buyers to order over $100-million worth of commodities from Soviet 
FTOs.^® During April and May 1976, the USSR participated in a trade 
fair in Hanover, Sixteen FTOs offered a wide range of commodities 
including a 500,000-kilowatt steam turbine, turbo-generators, automo­
biles, televisions, radios, cameras, a Yak-40 jet, an MI-8 helicopter, 
a KA-26 helicopter and merchant vessels (models of the merchant vessels 
were displayed at the fair).^^ During the period July 1976 to T4ay 1978, 
the USSR participated in trade fairs in the following cities* Bogota, 
Buenos Aires, Chicago, Helsinki, Marseilles, Sao Paulo and Vienna,
Selling/advertising missions are especially useful for promoting 
the sale of Soviet exports in countries which run a large trade sur­
plus with the USSR, For example, in the latter half of 1977, a Sov­
iet trade mission visited eleven Canadian cities in an effort to pro­
mote Soviet exports.90 In 1976, the USSR exported 41,9 million-rubles 
worth of goods to Canada and imported 501*7 million.
Selling/advertising missions are also used to promote Soviet 
services. The Soviet Ministry of the Maritime Fleet has been espec­
ially active in sending missions abroad. For example, in Kuala Lumpur 
on 9 December 1976, a Soviet shipping mission negotiated an agreement
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with the Freight Committee of the Rubber Industry of Malaysia regard­
ing the shipment of Malaysian rubber to Europe in Soviet merchant ves­
sels,
Trade missions are sometimes used for information-gathering pur­
poses, Such missions have increased significantly as a result of the 
numerous co-operation agreements which have been signed between the 
USSR and its trading partners since the early 19?0s, In the latter 
part of April 1976, a six-member Soviet mission led by Viktor A, Lobanov* 
Deputy Minister of the Power-Machine Building Ministry— travelled to 
the U.K. for discussions with executives in the field of electrical 
and nuclear power. The visit was a follow-up to meetings which were 
held in Moscow between members of a British mission (organised by the 
British Nuclear Forum) and Soviet technicians, (it should be pointed 
out that many visits by trade missions are based on reciprocity.) At 
the end of their ten-day visit to the U.K., the members of the Soviet 
mission signed a protocol enabling the two countries to search for 
areas of mutual commercial interest.
Between September and October 1978, a seven-member Soviet mission 
interested in agricultural equipment and techniques spent thirteen days 
visiting various organisations in seven American states. The mission 
was sponsored by the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic Council. The members 
of the mission included L. N, Efremov, First Deputy Assistant to the 
Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Science and Technology;
E. A. Kalinin, First Deputy to the Minister of the Tractor and Agri­
cultural Equipment-Building Ministry; A, F, Mukhin, head of the Tech­
nical Directorate of the Ministry of Machinery for Animal Husbandry 
and Feeding; N. N. Markelov, director of NATI (the research institute 
for automobiles and tractors); and E. P. Gubin, section head of the 
All-Union Institute of Agricultural Economics,
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One of the few published reports of a Soviet information-gather­
ing mission appeared in an article written by N. N, Smelyakov, Deputy 
Minister of Foreign 'Trade of the USSR, Smelyakov has made a number 
of trips to the West while serving with the Ministry of Foreign Trade,
He also functioned as chairman of the Amtorg Corporation in New York 
during the 1950s. Throughout most of his article Smelyakov spoke high­
ly of the American, German and Japanese business communities. He had 
great respect for America's economic strength and praised the German 
economy for its ability to meet the demands of the world market. But 
Smelyakov had the highest praise for the Japanese economy. (He often 
used the phrases 'business America' and 'super business Japan',) Like 
most foreign businessmen who visit Japan, Smelyakov was impressed by 
the character and determination of the Japanese people. Advertising 
techniques used by the Japanese (e.g., the placement of waterproof 
watches in attractive aquariums) also caught Smelyakov's eye,^^ However, 
Smelyakov i^ras probably impressed most of all by Japan's ability to 
produce high-quality commodities and improve the technological innova­
tions of other countries. After examining perfect castings in a Japan­
ese foundry, Smelyakov remarked that he was depressed because even 
in the best Soviet casting shops products of such quality were difficult 
to find, (in the article Smelyakov, who was once a foundry worker 
himself, asked his comrades to pardon his remark about the inferior 
quality of Soviet castings.^^) On another occasion Smelyakov visited 
a Japanese silicate factory which had been constructed on the basis 
of a Soviet licence, Smelyakov pointed out that it took the Japanese 
just over six months to construct the factory while the same type of 
factory sometimes takes two and one-half years to construct in the 
USSR,
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Soviet Participation in Non-Aid Industrial 
Projects in the West
On occasion the USSR will submit tenders for internationally advertised 
industrial projects. For example, in February 1977, the USSR announced 
that one of its FTOs had signed a contract worth an estimated $137.5 
million with the Ministry of Petroleum Resources of Nigeria for the 
construction of two petroleum pipelines on a turnkey b a s i s , T h e  
contract was secured for the USSR by the FTO Tsvetmetpromeksport which 
placed a more favourable bid than contractors from the United States, 
France, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands and the FRG,
Tsvetmetpromeksport will act as general contractor for the con­
struction of the two pipelines. One pipeline will be laid from a pet­
roleum refinery at Warri to the town of Ikorodu, The other will extend 
from Ikorodu to the towns of Ibadan and Ilorin, The planned length 
of the two pipelines combined is 800 kilometres. Both pipelines are 
expected to be in operation by October 1978.
Under the contract Tsvetmetpromeksport is responsible for carry­
ing out prospecting work, delivering building equipment, conducting 
construction operations, and putting the pipelines into operation.
About 700 Soviet engineers, technicians and other skilled workers 
will participate in the project. Approximately 10,000 tons of Sov­
iet equipment (including bulldozers, excavators, trailers, tractors, 
pipe carriers, pipe-laying machines, truck-mounted cranes and welding 
machines) will be delivered to Nigeria. It is interesting to note 
that Tsvetmetpromeksport has hired a British firm as a subcontractor 
to carry out design work for the pipeline project,
The USSR has also participated in a few industrial projects in 
IMTEs since the early 1970s, For example, the Soviet Union helped 
construct a metallurgical complex in the southern part of France. In
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addition, Soviet technical assistance was utilised in the construction
of a large metallurgical complex in Scandinavia and two atomic power
gg
stations in Finland,  ^ It is also interesting to note that in the 
early part of 1978, the USSR offered to construct a zinc smelter (val­
ued at over flOO million) in the Republic of I r e l a n d , T h e  proposal 
was made following an offer by an American company,
Soviet participation in non-aid projects in the West could in­
crease significantly as a result of the USSR's willingness to operate 
jointly with Western-owned companies. As we learned previously, such 
co-operation has already begun. For example, the Soviet FTOs Energo- 
masheksport and Tekhnopromeksport, and the German company Deutsche 
Babcock and Wilcox agreed to build a 310-mega;\ratt electrical unit 
for the Gostanera Sur Power Station in A r g e n t i n a , I n  1972, the 
USSR and the Westinghouse Corporation placed a bid to supply generating 
units for the Grand Coulee Dam in the United States, A short time 
later the Westinghouse Corporation teamed up with the USSR once again
to bid on a contract connected with the Rock Island hydroelectric pro-
102ject in the United States, We should also recall that the Italian- 
Soviet company Tecnicon SpA was set up to construct tin and steel mills 
in third countries (see p, 135)* Furthermore, in a protocol which 
was signed in 1977, India and the USSR agreed to set up coke-oven bat­
teries in third countries,
Soviet Technicians Working in 
Less-Develoned Countries
Between 1970 and 1975, the number of Soviet (economic) technicians 
working in LDGs on aid and non-aid projects grew from 10,600 to 17,785; 
an increase of 68 percent (see TABLE 2,l), In 1976, almost half of 
these technicians were based in Algeria, Iran, Iraq and Syria, During
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1976, Afghanistan and India (combined) employed approximately 2,350 
Soviet technicians while Iraq employed about 2,900 and Somalia 1,000, 
According to GIA estimates the annual salaries of Soviet technicians 
can run as high as $15,000 to $20,000 each. If other costs and allow­
ances are added these estimates could be doubled,
TABLE 2.1
SOVIET ECONOMIC TECHNICIANS EMPLOYED IN 
LESS-DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 1970-1975*
Year Middle East 
and South 
Asia
Africa Latin
America
East Asia Total
1970 6,455 4,010 35 100 10,600
1971 6,600 4,200 75 150 11,025
1972 7,225 3,760 190 25 11,200
1973 8,295 4,590 185 25 13,095
1974 8,375 6,000 300 10 14,685
1975 11,500 5,930 330 25 17,785
^Minimum estimates of technicians present for a period of one 
month or more.
Source* CIA, Communist Aid to Less Developed Countries of the 
Free World, 1979 (July 1976), pT%I "
LDGs are often required to spend foreign currency on Soviet tech­
nicians, Such foreign currency expenditures are usually earmarked 
for salaries, round-trip airfare between the USSR and the host coun- 
try,105 holiday pay (if the technician spends his holiday in the host 
country), round-trip airfare between the host country and the USSR 
if the technician spends his holiday in the Soviet Union and life in­
surance premiums. If the period of employment is over one year Sov­
iet technicians are often permitted to bring their families. The cost 
of transporting a technician's family is also borne by the host coun­
try. In addition to direct foreign exchange expenditures the host 
country is responsible for some of the maintenance costs of the tech-
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nician (and his family) including medical care and hospitalisation 
benefits, office and laboratory facilities, transportation for offic­
ial business in the host country and furnished h o u s i n g . 1^6
A number of Soviet technicians are employed in LDGs to train 
local personnel. By the end of 1976, the USSR's training programme 
in LDGs had produced 300,000 skilled workers and 150,000 managerial, 
administrative and research personnel for Soviet-funded p r o j e c t s .1^7 
Many industrial development contracts between the USSR and LDGs now 
contain provisions for the construction of permanent training facil­
ities to guarantee a continuing supply of skilled local personnel.
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When Soviet planners desire to import, the cheaper the better. 
It is we who, when offered goods cheaply, insist on stopping them by 
anti-dumping restrictions. At least in this respect they /i.e., Sov­
iet planners^/ may be more sane than we are!
— Alec Nove
CHAPTER III
WESTERN PARTICIPATION IN INDUSTRIAL PROJECTS 
IN THE USSR
Soviet interest in large-scale industrial co-operation with IMTEs after 
World War II was brought to light in April I966 when a Soviet foreign 
trade mission headed by the Minister of the Automobile Industry, Alex­
ander Tarazov, went to Italy in order to negotiate a contract with 
Fiat for the construction of an automobile complex in the USSR, Short­
ly after the arrival of the trade mission the Soviet Foreign Minister, 
Andrei Gromyko, travelled to Italy for the purpose of participating 
in the negotiations. Gromyko's visit marked the first time a Soviet 
foreign minister held talks in Italy since the end of World War 11,^
This indicated that Soviet leaders were beginning to stress the impor­
tance of utilising Western technology to increase and upgrade automo­
bile production in the USSR, The Fiat deal of I966 was worth approxim­
ately E29O million (about $812 million at that time) and proved to be the 
largest undertaking in the history of the Fiat company. Fiat alone 
was responsible for supplying about El08-million (about $302-million) 
worth of equipment for the Volga Motor Works in Togliatti.
The Volga Motor Works was expected to produce approximately 600,000 
automobiles a year (400,000 modified Fiat-124 cars and about 200,000
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others),^ The Fiat deal was responsible for undermining one of the 
remaining vestiges of Stalinist foreign trade policy. From 1946-1965, 
the USSR obtained Western technology from licences and turnkey plants 
without relying on Western technicians to teach operational procedures 
to Soviet industrial personnel. However, as a result of the Fiat deal 
about 2,500 Soviet technicians were trained in Italy, In addition, 
up to 850 Westerners (520 from Fiat) were assigned to the Volga Motor 
Works at one time.^ This level of exposure to Western techniques and 
personnel *fas unprecedented since the end of World War II,
Various Types of Industrial Projects in 
the Soviet Union
There are three principal types of industrial projects in the USSR 
which utilise foreign capital. Industrial undertakings which fall 
within the first category will be called compensatory projects. These 
projects are suitably named in the light of the fact that project-rela­
ted commodity deliveries from the Soviet Union are used to pay for (all) 
imported machinery, equipment and technical services connected with the 
project. Compensatory projects call for at least two contracts* one 
for the sale (or purchase) of foreign equipment and know-how, and the 
other for the purchase (or sale) of Soviet project-related commodities.
In almost all cases the foreign supplier (exporter) agrees to import 
Soviet project-related commodities. However, it is also possible for 
the foreign supplier to arrange for another Western company to purchase 
a given amount of project-related commodities.
Industrial projects falling within the second category will be 
referred to as barter projects. Such projects call for imports which 
will be paid off on the basis of Soviet commodities that are not pro­
duced from the project itself (i.e., goods/services other than the
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products of a given project are used to pay for imports connected with 
this project). As in the case of compensatory projects, barter pro­
jects call for at least two contractsi one for the sale (or purchase) 
of foreign machinery, equipment and technical services; and the other 
for the purchase (or sale) of a wide range of Soviet commodities. 
Industrial undertakings which fall within the third category 
will be called non-compensatory projects. As the name implies, the 
USSR is unable to import machinery and equipment for industrial pro­
jects on the basis of commodity payments (i.e.. Western exporters are 
unwilling to accept Soviet commodities as payment for machinery, equip­
ment and technical services). In the light of this fact non-compen­
satory projects must either satisfy an acute need in the Soviet econ­
omy or be set up to produce commodities which can be eventually sold 
to a wide range of buyers in world markets.
Western Investment in Compensatory Projects 
in the USSR
In the mid-1960s Soviet officials started encouraging the establish­
ment of compensatory projects in the USSR. Such projects are impor­
tant to the USSR for a number of reasons. Firstly, they are based 
upon long-term industrial co-operation (usually ten to fifteen years) 
and hence become an integral part of the country's scheme for planned 
economic development. Since Soviet officials maintain absolute con­
trol over compensatory projects in the USSR (i.e., Westerners are not 
permitted to own share capital in such projects or any other projects 
in the Soviet Union) it is easy to see how the operations of these 
projects could be conducted in order to comply with national economic 
objectives. Secondly, compensatory projects sometimes require a tre­
mendous amount of capital and technology. Without Western assistance
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the USSR would be forced to channel a large share of its investment 
resources into these projects at the expense of undertakings in other 
sectors of the economy. Thirdly, compensatory projects can eventually 
reduce (or eliminate) the USSR's demand for specific imports from the 
West (e.g., a project which produces spark plugs might reduce the num­
ber of such commodities imported by the Soviet Union), Finally, and 
perhaps most important, the USSR's obligations connected with the im­
portation of Western machinery, equipment, licences and technical ser­
vices for compensatory projects are covered by the output of these 
projects. As a result, Soviet obligations arising from such projects 
should be seen in a different light than ordinary trade deficits with 
Western nations.
In addition to satisfying Soviet requirements for selected com­
modities and providing the means for purchasing Western technology, 
compensatory projects can also become important foreign currency earn­
ers, Indeed, when all project-related foreign debts have been met 
the output which exceeds domestic requirements can be exported to the 
West for cash. According to a Soviet source, 20-30 percent of the 
output of most compensatory projects is earmarked for export to for­
eign creditors.^ Therefore, between 70 and 80 percent of the output 
from compensatory projects can be used in any way which suits the wishes 
of Soviet officials. A, Voinov sums up the advantages of compensatory 
projects (or compensatory 'enterprises')*
Since accounts with the Western partner are settled on the basis 
of the output of the newly created enterprise its /”i,e,, the enter­
prise' s_J7 construction does not burden the balance of payments, 
and after completion, thanks to additional guaranteed deliveries 
to the world capitalist market the enterprise^/ guaran­
tees the steady receipt of convertible currency,5
In the light of the aforementioned advanta,ges the USSR has attempt­
ed since the late 1960s to promote compensatory projects via trade 
agreements with IMTEs, For example. Article 2 of the Agreement on
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Trade and Economie Co-operation Between the USSR and France for the 
Period 1970-1974, mentioned the possibility of ’creating certain in­
dustrial complexes /~projects__7 that correspond to the economic inter­
ests of both countries, with the stipulation that part of the product­
ion of such complexes will be imported by interested organisations 
and firms of the other country for the full value of equipment supplied 
and services rendered'.^
It is interesting to note that compensatory projects were dis­
cussed in great detail during the economic debate of the Twenty-Fifth 
Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), During 
the course of the discussions it was noted, that these projects have 
only been set up for the development of raw materials and the product­
ion of semi-finished goods. As a result, some of the participants 
called for the establishment of compensatory projects for the product­
ion of finished goods. Moreover, it ifas generally acknowledged that 
compensatory projects should play a greater role in Soviet foreign 
trade, especially with IMTEs.^
TABLE 3,1 provides data on compensatory agreements negotiated 
between the USSR and IMTEs during the period 1969-1976. On the basis 
of these agreements the IfâSR is entitled to import at least $7,138-mil­
lion worth of Western commodities on a compensatory basis.® Our atten­
tion should be drawn to the fact that some compensatory projects cited 
in TABLE 3.1 differ markedly with respect to export potential. For 
example, the Italian (Montedison)-Soviet chemical plants require im­
ported equipment totalling $500 million while projected exports from 
the plants between 1975 3,nd 1985 fall short of this sum. On the other 
hand the Italian (ENI, Finsider)-Soviet natural gas project calls for 
$190-million worth of imports while exports between 1975 and I985 are 
expected to reach $4,400 million (i.e., the value of natural gas exports
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TABLE 3.1
SELECTED SOVIET COMPENSATORY AGREEMENTS/ 
PROJECTS, 1969-1976
Commodity/
industrial
undertaking
Contractor Estimated 
value of 
Soviet 
imports 
(millions 
of $)
Year of 
initial 
purchases
Year of 
initial 
Soviet 
exports
Value of project- 
related exports 
(millions of $)
1975-80 1981-85
Natural gas Austria
(OeMV,
Voest-
Alpine)
110 1969 1969 900 1,000
East Siber­
ian fores­
try project
Japan 163 1969 1969 Deal completed 
in 1974
Natural gas FRG
(Ruhrgas, 
Mannesmann)
1,500 1970 1974 2,800 4,700
Natural gas Italy 
(ENI, Fin­
sider)
190 1971 1974 1,200 3,200
Natural gas France 
(Gaz de 
France, 
Vallourec)
250 1972 1976 700 1,462
East Siber­
ian wood- 
chip plant
Japan 45 1972 1972 145 50
Ust-Ilimsk
timber
complex
France
(Parsons
and
Whitemore)
60 1974 1977 34 50
Chemical
plants
France 
(Litwin)
100 1974 1977 50 60
Kuibyshev 
ammonia 
and urea 
complex
United
States
400 1975 1978 2,000 2,500
Chemical
plants
Italy
(Monted-
500 1975 1977 175 250
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TABLE 3,1— Continued
Commodity/
Industrial
undertaking
Contractor Estimated 
value of 
Soviet 
imports 
(millions 
of $)
Year of 
initial 
purchases
Year of 
initial 
Soviet 
exports
Value of project- 
related exports 
(millions of $)
1975-80 1981-85
South Yakut­
ian coal at 
Ghulman
Japan 450 1975 1989 r sic 7 80 660
Kursk iron 
ore pellet­
isation 
plant
ERG
(Krupp, 
Korf, Salz- 
gitter, 
Siemens 
and Demag)
1,000 1975 NA 450 1,000
Second East 
Siberian 
f orestry 
project
Japan 550 1975 1975 1,100
Chemical
plants
Italy
(ENI)
1,000 1975-80 NA NA NA
Chemical
plants
France
(Creusot-
Loire)
220 1975 1979 100 225
Aluminium
complex
France
(p u k )
600-1,000 1976 NA NA NA
Source* Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 15 December 1976, 
p, 9» quoting Soviet Business and Trade. No'i Ï4. 8 December 1976, The 
year of initial Soviet exports connected with the South Yakutian coal 
project at Ghulman is undoubtedly cited incorrectly in TABLE 3,1, In 
all likelihood Soviet exports will begin in 1979.
for the eleven-year period is projected to exceed the value of imports 
by over twenty-three times). It should also be noted that in most 
cases exports from compensatory projects during the period I98I-I985 
are projected to exceed exports for the period 1975-1980.
Japanese-Soviet compensatory projects came under serious consider­
ation in the mid-1960s. The proposed projects were aimed at exploiting
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the vast natural resources of Siberia and the Soviet Far East and would 
supposedly result in significant economic gains for both countries.
From the Soviet perspective the projects would hasten the development 
of natural resources and boost the level of industrialisation in Siber­
ia and the Soviet Far East.^ On the other hand compensatory projects 
in these regions would be long-term sources of raw materials for Japan­
ese industries.
The agreement on the East Siberian forestry project was signed in 
the late 1960s, Under the terms of the agreement Japan was responsible 
for supplying $133-million worth of equipment and $30-million worth 
of consumer goods over a three-year period for the development of tim­
ber resources near the Amur River, Soviet timber exports to Japan 
from 1969-1973 paid for most of the imported equipment and consumer 
goods. The Japanese credit which was granted to the USSR for the pur­
chase of the equipment called for a 20 percent downpayment with repay­
ment of the balance over a period of five years (1969-1973) &t 5.8 
percent interest per annum. Deferred payments were arranged for the 
$30-million worth of consumer goods. The agreement set the initial 
price of Soviet timber exports to Japan at $21 per cubic metre and 
provided for an increase of 1 percent of the base price for each 
year after 1970.^^ Ten Soviet FTOs and fourteen Japanese companies 
participated in the Efeist Siberian forestry project,
On the basis of previous discussions the next undertaking is 
best described as a barter project. However, it might be wise to mention 
this project now as it is so closely connected with Japanese-Soviet 
projects cited in TABLE 3.1. According to one source, Japanese par­
ticipation in the construction of a Soviet port on Wrangel Bay during 
the early 19?0s 'was a logical corollary to the discussions on joint 
development of raw materials', The port is capable of handling 10 mil­
lion tons of coal and 800,000 tons of wood chips per annum (in addition
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to an unknown quantity of other commodities). Japan granted the USSR 
an $80-million seven-year credit (at 6 percent interest per annum) to 
purchase equipment and technical services for the construction of the 
port. The USSR was required to make a cash downpayment of 12 percent.
To pay off the credit the USSR exported wood and wood chips to Japan.^^ 
In addition to promoting Japanese-Soviet trade the port on Wrangel Bay 
handles commodities shipped from Japan to Western Europe,
The agreement on the East Siberian wood-chip plant was signed 
in December 1971. Under the terras of the agreement Japan will receive 
wood products from the plant during the period 1972-1981, The $45- 
million credit was granted to the USSR for a period of six years at 
an annual interest rate of 6 percent,
Since 1974, Japan has agreed to supply well over $l-billion worth 
of credits for compensatory projects in the USSR, In mid-1974, Japan 
agreed to help the USSR build coal-mining enterprises in the southern 
part of Yakutia, Under the terms of the agreement Japan is required 
to deliver $450-million worth of machinery, equipment and other com­
modities to the Soviet Union. Exports of coking coal from the enter­
prises will be used to pay for the Japanese equipment and other supplies. 
In September 197^, Japan and the USSR negotiated a second compensatory 
deal on the development of timber resources in Eastern Siberia, Under 
the terms of this agreement Japan granted the USSR a $550-million credit 
for the purchase of equipment, materials and consumer goods. The USSR 
started exporting processed wood chips and larch pulp wood to Japan 
in 1975 to pay for Japanese equipment and s u p p l i e s , ^6
Japan is also interested in developing Soviet natural gas resour­
ces, In February 1973, the USSR offered Japan an opportunity to par­
ticipate in assessing the feasibility of developing natural gas deposits 
in Yakutia. The following year both Japan and the United States con-
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eluded agreements of intent to participate in the search for Yakutian 
natural gas. At that time the Americans and the Japanese were expect­
ed to contribute $100 million each for the $600-million exploratory 
venture. However, the U.S. Export-Import Bank was unable to partic­
ipate in the scheme (as a result of congressional restrictions on U.S, 
government credits to the USSR) which meant the Soviet Union would have 
been required to pay market interest rates for American credits/loans. 
Needless to say, the USSR refused to accept credits/loans for the ven­
ture at market interest rates. Without American participation Japan 
decided to bow out of the deal. Approximately two years later Japan 
and the United States became interested once again in the development 
of Yakutian natural gas reserves. On 31 March 1976, Japan extended 
the USSR a $25-million credit to help finance the search for natural 
gas in Yakutia, At about the same time the Bank of America extended 
the USSR a $25-million credit for the same purpose. About 80 percent 
of the Japanese credit came from Japan's Export-Import Bank and the 
balance was supplied by private sources. The Japanese credit was ex­
tended for a period of six years at an annual interest rate of 6,375 
17percent. The fact that Japan and the United States are now only 
contributing one-fourth of their initial offers indicates the USSR 
was able to accumulate additional capital from its own resources for 
the exploratory venture during the two years of stalemate. Total nat- 
ux’al gas reserves in Yakutia are estimated at 13,000 billion cubic 
metres. If the USSR decides to develop these reserves an estimated 
$3*9"billion worth of credits from the United States and Japan might 
be needed for the construction of various projects including a gas 
pipeline from Yakutia to the Pacific Ocean, a gas liquefaction plant 
and a berth for gas-carrying vessels. These credits would be repaid 
by annual deliveries of ten billion cubic metres of Soviet gas to both
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Japan and the United States over a period of twenty to twenty-five
Ifiyears, °
In 1975» Japan agreed to supply $152,5-million worth of credits 
to the USSR for the exploration of petroleum and gas reserves under 
the continental shelf off Sakhalin Island, The credits fell into three 
categories. The first credit amounted to $22,5 million and was connect­
ed with the purchase of computers and other equipment. It was grant­
ed for a period of five years (plus a three-year grace period) at an 
annual interest rate of 6,75 percent. The second credit totalled $30 
million and was earmarked for maintenance and labour costs. The credit 
was granted for a period of five years at an annual interest rate of 
7,25 percent, Japan also agreed to extend the USSR a $100-million 
* explorât!on-risk credit'. This credit will be repaid in the form 
of petroleum and gas over an eighteen-year period if production opera­
tions begin. However, the USSR is not required to repay the credit 
if it is not economically feasible to set up production facilities. 
During 1977, petroleum and gas deposits were found under the contin­
ental shelf off Sakhalin I s l a n d , ^0
Since I969, Austria, the FRG, France and Italy have extended 
the USSR over $2«billion worth of credits for the development of Sov­
iet natural gas reserves. The credits were primarily used to purchase 
large-diameter pipes and pipeline-laying equipment for the construct­
ion of the Orenburg natural gas pipeline. The credits will be repaid 
via deliveries of Soviet natural gas over a period of twenty years 
or more. In addition to their participation in Soviet natural gas 
projects, the FRG, France and Italy have agreed to provide the USSR 
with approximately $2.5-billion worth of credits for other types of 
compensatory projects including a timber complex, chemical plants, 
an iron ore pelletisation plant and an aluminium complex.
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At the present time over 90 percent of the Soviet natural gas
exported to Austria, the FRG, Italy and France is connected with com-
?1pensatory agreements. ' This figure enables us to draw some rough 
conclusions (about natural gas) from official Soviet foreign trade 
statistics and the data in TABLE 3.1. Unfortunately, this researcher 
is unaware of other estimates which would enable us to deal with other 
commodities (e.g., timber, coal and chemicals) that are connected with 
compensatory projects in the USSR.
First of all let us assume that 95 percent of the Soviet natural 
gas exported to Austria, the FRG, Italy and France is connected with com­
pensatory agreements. Under such conditions Austria imported approxira- 
ately 5^*3 million-rubles (about $73.8-million) worth of Soviet project- 
related natural ga.s in 1975» 88.5 million-rubles (about $120.4-million) 
worth in 1976; and 100,9 million-rubles (about $137.2-million) worth in 
1977. Therefore, Austria imported about $331,4-million worth of Soviet 
project-related natural gas during the three-year period 1975"1977. 
According to TABLE 3,1, the USSR expects to export $900-million worth of 
project-related natural gas to Austria during the six-year period 1975" 
1980, If so, the USSR will be I’equired to export approximately $568.6- 
million worth of project-related natural gas to Austria during the three- 
year period 1978-1980 (or $l89.5"million worth for each of the three 
years). It is quite possible that the USSR will come close to achieving 
its export plan. As we learned, Soviet exports of project-related nat­
ural gas to Austria grew from $120,4 million in 1976, to $137,2 million 
in 1977; an increase of l4 percent. If Soviet exports of natural gas to 
Austria continue to grow by l4 percent each year during the period 1978- 
1980, then Soviet exports of gas during this period will amount to about 
$538.0 million. (Note that any rise in the price of natural gas would 
make it easier for the USSR to achieve its target.) However, even if 
the USSR fails to export $900-million worth of gas to Austria during
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the period 1975-19&0, It is only fair to point out that the value of 
Soviet exports of project-related natural gas to Austria during the 
period 1975-1977 is already three times larger than the value of pro­
ject-related machinery and equipment exported from Austria,
The FRG imported approximately 276,7 million-rubles (about $376.3“ 
million) worth of Soviet project-related natural gas during the three- 
year period 1975“1977. According to TABLE 3*1, the USSR plans to ex­
port $2,800-million worth of project-related natural gas to the FRG 
during the six-year period 1975-1980. In order to achieve this goal 
the USSR will be required to export $2,423.7-million worth of project- 
related natural gas during the three-year period 1978-1980 (or $807,9” 
million worth for each of the three years). Soviet exports of project- 
related natural gas to the FRG grew from about $116,8 million in 1976, 
to about $188,1 million in 1977; an increase of 61 percent. In the 
event Soviet exports of natural gas to the FRG increase by 61 per­
cent each year during the period 1978-1980 (which is a mighty bold 
assumption), then natural gas deliveries during this three-year period 
will amount to $1,575*2 million. It is immediately obvious that Sov­
iet exports of natural gas to the FRG will have to increase by much 
more than 61 percent each year during the period 1978-1980 in order for 
the USSR's export plan to be achieved. But if Soviet exports of pro­
ject-related natural gas only increase by 40 percent each year during 
the period 1978-1980, the USSR will be able to pay for all project- 
related machinery and equipment exported from the FRG,
Italy imported approximately 178,4 million-rubles (about $242.6- 
million) worth of Soviet project-related natural gas during the three- 
year period 1975-1977* TABLE 3.1 shows that the USSR plans to export 
$1,200-million worth of project-related natural gas to Italy during 
the period 1975-1980, This means that the USSR will be required to
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export $957.4-milllon worth of project-related natural gas during the 
period 1978-1980 (or $319.i-million worth for each of the three years). 
Soviet exports of project-related natural gas to Italy grew from $67.3 
million in 1976, to $125.8 million in 1977; an 87 percent increase.
If this trend continues (which again is a mighty bold assumption) the 
USSR will experience no trouble in achieving its export target.
France imported approximately 88.1 million-rubles (about $119.8- 
million) worth of Soviet project-related natural gas during the two- 
year period 1976-1977. TABLE 3.I shows that the USSR plans to export 
$700-million worth of project-related natural gas to France during the 
five-year period 1976-1980, In order to achieve this goal the USSR 
will be required to export $580.3-million worth of natural gas to France 
during the three-year period 1978-1980 (or $193.^ “million worth for 
each of the three years). In 1977» Soviet project-related natural 
gas exports to France amounted to $86.9 million. If Soviet natural 
gas exports to France increase by just over 45 percent each year during 
the period I978-I98O, the USSR will be able to achieve its export plan.
It might be interesting to note that during the two-year period 
1975-1976, Soviet natural gas production (in physical terms) increased 
at an annual average rate of 11 percent while Soviet natural gas ex­
ports (in physical terms) increased during the same period at an annual 
average rate of 36 percent, (However, we should keep in mind that 
Soviet exports of gas still comprise a small portion of Soviet natural 
gas production. In 1975, Soviet exports of gas /"in physical terms__/ 
amounted to 6.7 percent of Soviet natural gas production while in 1976 
this figure stood at 8 percent.) We should also take note of the fact 
that the rate of growth of Soviet natural gas production (in physical 
terms) and the rate of growth of Soviet natural gas exports (in phy­
sical terms) have both declined since 1975 (i.e., the rate of increase 
in Soviet natural gas production fell from 12.2 percent in 1975» to 10,9
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percent in 1976, while the rate of increase in Soviet exports of gas de­
clined from 37.9 percent in 1975, to 33.7 percent in 1976, Such compar­
isons can be quite useful if they are made over a period of years. But 
Westerners might have trouble making future comparisons as the figure for 
Soviet exports of gas (in m^) was excluded from 1977 Soviet trade statistics. 
In 1973» the Occidental Petroleum Corporation and the USSR nego­
tiated one of the largest commercial deals between a private company 
and government trade organisations. The Occidental deal will run for 
a period of twenty years and is worth between $7 billion and $20 bil-
po
lion. The deal is split into two parts. The first part involves 
the construction of a terminal and industrial complex in the Baltic 
Sea port of Ventspils, the construction of a similar terminal in the 
Black Sea port of Odessa, and the construction of an ammonia pipeline 
between Odessa and Togliatti.^8 According to a Soviet source, the 
USSR will pay for all its imported American equipment connected with 
the Occidental deal via commodity deliveries (e.g., ammonia, potash 
and urea) from Soviet industrial projects utilising such equipment,^4 
The second part of the Occidental deal involves a series of barter 
transactions and hence cannot be regarded as an intrinsic part of our 
discussions on compensatory projects. However, since we would gain 
little by covering this material at a later point a brief summary 
of the second part of the Occidental deal will be presented at this 
time. Under the terms of the second part of the deal Occidental Pet­
roleum will export about one million tons of superphosphoric acid each 
year to the USSR during the period 1978-1997. The USSR will pay for 
the superphosphoric acid by exporting to the Occidental Petroleum Cor­
poration about 2.1 million tons of ammonia each year over a ten-year 
period commencing in 1978, approximately 1,5 million tons of ammonia 
each year during the next ton years (1988-1997) and 1 million tons
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of potash and 1 million tons of urea each year for the period 1978“
1997.^^
In 1972, three American-owned companies— Tennessee Gas Transmis­
sion Company (Tenneco), Brown and Root Inc., and Texas Eastern Trans­
mission Corporation— and the USSR were considering a scheme (often 
referred to as the North Star project) which called for the extraction 
of natural gas from the Tyumen area in Western Siberia, the construct­
ion of a natural gas pipeline from the Tyumen gas fields to Murmansk, 
and the creation of facilities to promote the transport of gas from Mur­
mansk to the United States and France, Under the scheme approximately 
1,5 billion cubic feet of natural gas would be exported to the United 
States each day and 5^0 million cubic metres to F r a n c e . I n  1974, 
the North Star project was all but abandoned as a result of the U.S. 
Export-Import Bank’s inability to provide adequate financing facilities.
Two years later the North Star project was revived when the U.S. Ex­
port- Import Bank requested that French, German and British banks pro­
vide credits/loans for the realisation of the project, (The Export- 
Import Bank would presumably guarantee American financial obligations 
for imports of Soviet natural gas so the USSR would not experience any dif­
ficulty in repaying the credits granted by French, German and British 
financial institutions.) If the North Star scheme is put into opera­
tion it could be worth over $10 billion. According to one estimate 
the FRG could provide $2-billion worth of credits (most likely for 
the purchase of pipes and compressor stations); France $1.6 billion 
(for a liquefaction plant); and the U.K., $1,4 billion (for cranes 
and bulldozers). In addition, $4,1 billion would be needed to construct 
gas-carrying tankers and $1 billion to build a receiving terminal in 
the United States.
During the early part of 1977, the Bendix Corporation— an American
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company— and the USSR were discussing the possibility of setting up 
a rather novel type of compensatory project. If an agreement is nego­
tiated the Bendix Corporation will construct a $30- to $40-million 
spark-plug manufacturing plant in the USSR, The plant would be cap­
able of producing between 50 million and 70 million spark plugs 
per year. Credits/loans for the deal would probably come from American 
commercial banks. The spark plugs would carry the Bendix name and 
be stamped 'made in the USSR*. Approximately 75 percent of the plant's 
output would be sold in the USSR and 25 percent exported through Bendix’s 
International marketing network. Foreign currency earnings from the 
sale of the exported spark plugs would be used to repay the American 
credits/loans. Two clauses in the proposed deal are somewhat unusual. 
Firstly, although the project would be under the direction of Soviet man­
agers the Bendix Corporation would have the right to dictate the type 
of spark plug produced for export and a Bendix official assigned to 
the plant would have the power to accept or reject spark plugs for ex­
port, Secondly, the Bendix Corporation would have the right to partic-
pQ
ipate in any discussions concerning further investment in the project.
Another American company offered to set up a clothing-manufact­
uring factory in the USSR on a compensatory basis. If the scheme is 
approved the American company will be responsible for supplying the 
factory with new patterns each year in order to keep up with changes 
in fashion. The company would also be required to purchase between 
20 and 30 percent of the factory’s output over a period of ten years.
If necessary, cloth would be exported from the United States to the 
Soviet clothing-manufacturing factory.
In the early part of 1975» the U.K. extended the USSR a £950- 
million government-backed line of credit. This move was aimed at im­
proving the competitive position of British exporters vis-à-vis their
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counterparts in other BITEs. (Government-backed credits usually carry 
lower interest rates than credits without such support,) An improve­
ment in the competitive position of British exporters was recognised 
as a necessary step toward correcting the large imbalance in Anglo- 
Soviet trade.However, after a period of two years only £124 million 
(or 13 percent) of the line of credit had been used, A few reasons 
have been suggested for the lack of Soviet interest in the so-called 
'cheap* credit package. Firstly, the reluctance of many British com­
panies to quote fixed prices has been cited as a primary reason for 
the lack of large British export contracts with the U S S R ,32 (Soviet 
traders tend to reject contracts with floating prices.) Secondly, 
at least one Soviet analyst felt that there was a 'lack of desire, 
a lack of real drive on the part of British industries to win back 
the share of the Soviet market which used to belong to them for so 
many years in the past*.33 Thirdly, it is sometimes mentioned that 
British exporters lose large contracts as a result of their reluctance 
to negotiate compensatory agreements with the USSR, In April 1976,
L, A, Kostandov, the Minister of the Soviet Chemical Industry, mentioned 
in London that the USSR was planning to import about E3.5”Lillion worth 
of commodities for its chemical industry during the period I976-I98O.
But he emphasised that the USSR was primarily interested in compensa­
tory d e a l s . 3 4  At the same time V .  P. Pavlov, the deputy Soviet trade 
representative in the U.K., warned British exporters that they might 
lose major Soviet orders to European and American competitors if they 
(i.e., British exporters) did not change their attitude toward compen­
satory d e a l s . 35 On another occasion L, A, Kostandov mentioned that Brit­
ish companies could organise a consortium to supply machinery and equip­
ment for a petrochemical project in the USSR, (in other words the 
USSR was practically offering the U.K. a contract.) The British com-
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punies would be paid via deliveries of commodities from the petrochem­
ical project over a period of ten to fifteen years. Kostandov even sug­
gested that any net foreign currency earnings from the project (i.e., 
earnings from project-related exports which exceed the amount necessary 
to pay for goods imported from the U.K.) could be used to purchase 
additional foreign (British) machinery, equipment and other supplies,36 
In May 1977» the Soviet FTO Tekhmashimport and a consortium of 
U.K.-based companies— Davy Powergas, Imperial Chemical Industries (iGl) 
and Klockner Ina Industrial Plant— agreed to participate in a compen­
satory deal which calls for the construction of two methanol plants 
in the USSR. The $275“million deal between the consortium and the 
USSR represented Britain's first major involvement in Soviet compen­
satory projects,37 The deal was publicised (by both British and Sov­
iet sources) as an important means of improving Britain's trade bal- 
ance with the USSR^ as well as increasing British receptivity to the 
idea of trading on a compensatory basis. The Davy-IGI-Klockner deal 
involved the negotiation of three separate contracts. Under the terms 
of the first contract Davy Powergas is responsible for designing, con­
structing and commissioning the two methanol plants. IGI and Klockner 
both negotiated contracts with the USSR for the purchase of methanol 
from the two plants.39 According to one report approximately 300,000 
tons of methanol (or 20 percent of the output of the two plants) will 
be exported to IGI and Klockner over a ten-year period (1981-1990),^^ 
Although the next arrangement is similar in some respects to 
the aforementioned compensatory deals it is nevertheless extraordinary 
and should be placed within a special category. Under this arrange­
ment selected West European countries have agreed to participate in 
the construction of natural gas pipelines in the southwestern part 
of the USSR in return for transport services connected with the pur-
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chase of natural gas. However, the natural gas which is delivered to 
Western Europe will not he transported via the previously mentioned 
pipelines. In November 1975, Austria, France, the FRG, Iran and the 
USSR agreed to participate in this unusual deal. Just prior to this 
arrangement Austria, France and the FRG agreed to purchase 11 bil­
lion cubic metres of natural gas from Iran each year from I98I-2OO3.
It was initially decided that a pipeline should be constructed across 
Turkey and the Balkans in order to transport the Iranian gas to West­
ern E u r o p e , 4^ But after the USSR was invited to participate in the 
discussions a far different scheme for transporting the gas was adopt­
ed, Under the new scheme the 11 billion cubic metres of Iranian 
gas earmarked for Western Europe will be transported to the southwest­
ern region of the USSR. Then instead of constructing a pipeline from 
the southwestern part of the USSR to Western Europe, the Iranian gas 
will be used in the southwestern region of the USSR and an equivalent 
amount of Soviet natural gas (presumably from West Siberian gas fields) 
will be sent to Western Europe via existing pipelines. One part 
of the deal calls for the construction of a gas pipeline from the south­
ern part of Iran to the city of Astara on the Iranian-Soviet frontier. 
Austria, France, the FRG and the USSR will participate in the construct­
ion of the $3"Billion pipeline. Another part of the deal involves 
West European participation in the construction of gas pipelines in 
the southwestern part of the USSR. In all, 13.4 billion cubic metres 
of Iranian gas will be exported each year to the USSR under the terras 
of the agreement— 11 billion cubic metres originally earmarked for Aus­
tria, France and the FRG; 2 billion for the USSR;43 and .4 billion 
allowed for ivastage. According to one report the gas exported to the 
USSR will cost between $,90 and $1,00 per 1,000 cubic feet. The USSR 
is expected to place a 63 percent surcharge (as a transit fee) on the
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11 billion cubic metres of natural gas exported to Western Europe/^
In December 1975, the FRG extended the USSR a DM 1,2-billion ($452,8- 
million) line of credit to purchase commodities (e.g., steel pipes) 
from German manufacturers for the construction of Soviet gas pipelines 
in conjunction with the Iranian gas deal. The USSR will have up to 
twelve years to repay this credit. Payments from the FRG to the 
USSR for gas transport services will be used to cover Soviet obliga­
tions connected with the line of credit,
Barter Projects
In the latter part of 1972, Pepsico— an American company— agreed to 
participate in the construction of a Pepsi-Cola plant in the USSR,
Under the terms of the agreement Pepsico was required to supply equip­
ment, technical services and Pepsi-Gola concentrate. In exchange,
Pepsico received Soviet vodka and wines which could be sold in world 
markets. The Pepsi-Gola produced in the USSR was earmarked for dom­
estic consumption.
The Pepsico deal has evolved into a fairly promising business 
operation. Between 1973 &nd 1976, two Pepsi-Gola plants were set up 
in the USSR. In August 1976, Pepsico announced that it would partic­
ipate in the construction of three new Pepsi-Gola plants in the USSR, 
According to reports, the equipment and Pepsi-Gola concentrate supplied 
by Pepsico for the tliree plants will be paid for (on a 'dollar for 
dollar' basis) via Soviet vodka exports to P e p s i c o ,46 January 1978, 
Pepsico agreed to set up five additional Pepsi-Gola plants in the US8R,47 
Once again the equipment and Pepsi-Gola concentrate supplied by Pepsico 
will be paid for by deliveries of Soviet vodka. It might be interest­
ing to note that Soviet vodka exports to the United States increased
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from 375,000 rubles (about $510,000) in 1975, to 1,565,000 rubles (about 
$2,128,400) in 1977.
The Pepsico deal must have pleased Soviet leaders for at least 
two reasons. Firstly, the USSR was able to obtain Western technology 
in exchange for a commodity which did not require a great deal of addit­
ional capital investment,Secondly, the USSR was seemingly in a 
position to start exporting vodka to Pepsico as soon as equipment for 
the plants was shipped to the USSR, Under such conditions long-term 
credits for the construction of the Pepsi-Gola plants would be unnec­
essary, As a result, any interest payments connected with the construct­
ion of the plants were most likely minimal.
As a rule, the USSR prefers joint industrial projects in which 
the foreign participant agrees to accept full payment for his exports 
in the form of goods produced in the Soviet Union, However, the USSR 
is currently considering proposals for joint projects in which the 
Western partner agrees to accept partial payment for his exports in 
the form of goods produced in the Soviet Union, For example, in 1976, 
Alfred Dunhill— a British company— offered to construct a cigarette 
factory in the USSR, The company agreed to extend the USSR a ten-year 
credit for the purchase of equipment, packaging materials and primary 
products (presumably tobacco), Alfred Dunhill suggested that between 
20 and 30 percent of the credit could be repaid in the form of Soviet 
g o o d s , 4 9  (in all likelihood cigarettes would only comprise a fraction 
of these goods,) Alfred Dunhill also offered to promote the sale of 
Soviet cigarettes through its international marketing network in addit­
ion to helping the USSR improve cigarette-packaging techniques,
Non-Gomnensatory Projects 
In virtually all cases non-compensatory projects (i,e,, joint Indus-
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trial undertakings which are not classified as barter projects or com­
pensatory projects) are set up in the USSR for only two reasons. First­
ly, non-compensatory projects should satisfy acute economic needs, (it 
is widely known that consumer demand alone does not constitute the 
need for such projects in the USSR.) Secondly, if non-compensatory 
projects are not set up to satisfy pressing needs in the Soviet econ­
omy then these projects must be capable of earning enough foreign cur­
rency to cover construction costs.
One of the most successful non-compensatory projects is the Vol­
ga Motor Works which was mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
The Volga Motor Works currently produces over 600,000 cars each year, 
or roughly 30 percent of Soviet automobile production.The motor 
works is responsible for producing the Lada— the Soviet automobile 
which is similar in design to the Fiat-124, (Ladas are sold in the 
USSR under the name '2higuli',-^ )^ According to one source, Ladas com­
prise approximately two-thirds of all Soviet automobile exports,
Ladas appear to be selling quite well in the West, In 19?6, 
it was announced that Satra Motors Inc.— an American company— would 
eventually import 10,000 Ladas per y e a r ,53 During the first eight 
months in 1977, over 8,000 Ladas were sold in the U,K, Sales during 
this period were almost 5^ percent higher than sales during the first 
eight months of 1976, It was projected that Ladas would represent 
approximately 1 percent of new car sales in the U.K. during 1977. In 
Britain the Lada is outselling the following types of automobiles* 
Alfa-Romeo, Mercedes-Benz, BMW and Saab, During 1977, the Canadian 
company Lada Canada Ltd, signed a $35“million contract connected with 
the importation of Ladas, According to the president of Lada Canada, 
a new Lada is at least $500,00 cheaper than any other new car in Can­
a d a ,  -35 In 1977» New Zealand was planning to import up to 1,000 Ladas,
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It was projected that the Lada would sell for $1,500 less than the 
(Italian-made) Fiat in New Z e a l a n d , -36 TABLE 3.2 shows the quantity 
and value of Soviet automobile exports to selected IMTEs for the years 
1970, 1976 and 1977.
TABLE 3.2
SOVIET AUTOMOBILE EXPORTS TO SELECTED INDUSTRIALISED 
MARKET-TYPE ECONOMIES, 1970-1977.
Country 1970
Quantity Value
thou­
sands
of
rubles
1976
Quantity Value
thou­
sands
of
rubles
1977
Quantity Value
thou­
sands
of
rubles
The U.K. 256 151 9,498 7,699 14,921 13,954
the FRG 74 42 13.872 15,469 10,530 13,585
France - - 12,584 11,881 12,946 13,280
Belgium 
(inc, cars 
without 
motors)
994 476 14,635 17,103 10,043 12,480
Finland 4,288 2,570 11,817 13,318 9,061 10,507
The'Nether­
lands 1,213 598 6,154 7,096 8,814 9,976
Denmark 487 269 5,833 6,415 4,099 4,212
Source* Official Soviet foreign trade statistics.
It is interesting to note that the Volga Motor Works plans to 
produce two new Soviet-designed motor vehicles which could be exported 
to the West by the early 1980s, One model will be classified as a 'super­
mini' and equipped with front-wheel drive, a one-litre engine, two 
side doors and a hatchback. The other model— the 'Niva'— is a four-wheel 
drive cross-country vehicle based upon the Lada design. The USSR plans 
to produce 20,000 Niva vehicles in 1978. The Niva will be sold in the
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West for about £4,000 (approximately $8,000)/6^
The USSR occasionally hires Western firms to construct facilities 
for tourists and foreign businessmen. Up till now most of these facil­
ities have been constructed on a non-compensatory basis. In 1974, 
the USSR decided to employ Western companies for the purpose of con­
structing the Centre for International Trade and Scientific-Technical 
Relations in Moscow, The trade centre will cost well over $110 million 
and will contain a twenty-storey office building, a 2,000-seat confer­
ence hall, two hotels with a combined capacity of 1,225 rooms, a con­
cert hall, a 500“seat cinema and an underground garage for 600 auto­
mobiles, The U.S. Export-Import Bank and Chase Manhattan Bank each 
provided $36-million worth of credits for the project and the USSR 
provided $8 million in cash,-3® The Kama Purchasing Commission in New 
York is responsible for negotiating with American suppliers. Accord­
ing to the Chairman of Gosbank, Vladimir S, Alkhimov, the Centre for 
International Trade and Scientific-Technical Relations will probably 
pay for itself (via receipts from foreign businessmen and tourists) 
in six y e a r s . 39 (in other words the trade centre might be capable of 
earning over $110-million worth of convertible currency for the USSR 
every six years, or over $18 million annually,) The USSR has not pub­
lished any estimates on the amount Westerners will be required to pay 
for using the trade centre's facilities. However, one Western source has 
warned that the Moscow trade centre 'will be as expensive as anything 
near the Paris Bourse or the City of London',6^
Foreign capital can enable the USSR to develop natural resources 
in one industry which will lead to an increase in the amount of raw 
materials available for export in another industry. For example, in 
July 1976, Japan agreed to extend the USSR credits for the purchase 
of three Japanese natural-gas processing plants (presumably on a non­
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compensatory basis), Vladimir Alkhimov pointed out that the plants 
would enable the USSR to process and consume 10 billion cubic metres 
of natural gas each year which is equivalent in calorific capacity 
to 10 million tons of petroleum,6^ (in other words natural gas could 
replace petroleum as a fuel in the USSR and hence leave more petroleum 
for export.) As we learned previously, Soviet industrial projects 
which are constructed on the basis of foreign capital can also reduce 
the USSR's demand for selected foreign commodities in the long run. 
Indeed, the Soviet Union might find that it is more advantageous to 
import production facilities for mineral fertilisers than it is to 
request fertiliser deliveries from foreign countries each year.
For the time being the USSR will continue to depend upon raw- 
material exports (e.g., petroleum, natural gas, timber and ores) as 
a valuable source of convertible currency. As the existing supplies 
of raw materials are depleted it will become more costly for the USSR 
to locate and develop new sources. In the light of this fact the USSR's 
interest in utilising foreign capital and technology will seemingly 
increase. This will call for improved methods of attracting foreign 
capital into the USSR. It also means that greater emphasis could be 
placed on preliminary studies for determining the effectiveness of 
utilising foreign capital in the Soviet economy.
On Measuring the Effectiveness of Utilising Foreign 
Credits for the Creation of Industrial Projects in 
" the Soviet Unionëz
According to Grinev and Lebedinskas, foreign credits can be utilised 
for industrial projects in the USSR if such credits guarantee a higher 
degree of effectiveness than domestic (Soviet) capital investment, or 
if sufficient domestic (Soviet) resources are not available for a par­
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ticular industrial project. Before negotiating a credit agreement 
with a foreign contractor, Soviet officials are expected to make ex­
tensive calculations on the effectiveness of utilising foreign credits 
for a given project. One of these calculations involves comparing the 
costs of utilising foreign credits for a particular industrial project 
(i.e., the deliveries of Soviet industrial output which are required 
to repay the credit plus interest) with the costs of constructing the 
project exclusively on the basis of domestic (Soviet) resources,^3 When 
considering the utilisation of foreign credits for domestic industrial 
projects Soviet economists must pay close attention to international 
interest rates, international repayment schemes and foreign trade prices 
in order to safeguard against unprofitable undertakings. In some cases 
Soviet economists are encouraged to search for ways of bringing about 
changes in conditions which are unfavourable for the use of foreign 
credits in industrial projects, (in other words Soviet economists 
are not merely instructed to reject unfavourable proposals. By work­
ing out various problems with their foreign counterparts Soviet econ­
omists might be able to bring about changes which would make the pro­
posals beneficial for both parties.)
There are two principal indicators which show the desirability 
of utilising foreign credits for industrial projects in the USSR— the 
absolute effect (absolyutnyi effekt) and effectiveness (effektivnost). 
The absolute effect is the difference between the commodity gains from 
the utilisation of foreign credits and the expenditures (i.e., commod­
ity deliveries to creditor nations) which are connected with the use 
of such credit. In other words the absolute effect is the surplus 
production which is placed at the disposal of the debtor nation as a 
result of the utilisation of foreign credit. Effectiveness can be 
determined by comparing a wide range of economic effects resulting
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from, the utilisation of foreign credit with the volume of production 
required to repay the credit plus interest, Grinev and Lebedinskas 
used five formulae showing various economic effects in order to cal­
culate the effectiveness of utilising foreign credits for Industrial 
projects in the USSR.
The first formula deals with the macroeconomic effect 'Eq' of 
import-export deliveries connected with the use of foreign credit when 
reduced to one point in time. It is written as follows*
T
\  ,T " t
Et ° / . (Zit - Zet) (1 + r)
Where
T represents the length of the international agreement, in 
years j
t represents a specific year within the agreement;
2i^ represents national economic expenditures for all products 
imported inyear 't* on the basis of credit granted for 
that year /i.e., the amount the USSR would be required 
to spend in order to produce the commodities which are im­
ported on the basis of credit/7» in rubles;
Ze^ represents national economic expenditures on all products 
exported in year 't' to repay the credit plus interest, in 
rubles;
r represents the coefficient for the calculation of intertem­
poral expenditures. /"The coefficient is most likely der­
ived from the rate of interest ,__7
As we learned previously, most Soviet industrial projects which 
are set up on the basis of foreign capital must produce a certain amount 
of commodities for export (especially to repay foreign credits). This 
enables us to measure the reduction in the cost of producing a unit 
of output as a result of increased production for export. The formula 
for the effect which is connected with economies of scale^^ is
as follows*
C  r (Cl + IKi) - (G2 + IK2) _7 Vat
t = 0
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Where
Gjl represents the cost of producing a unit of output in year 
't' which is produced exclusively for the satisfaction of 
domestic needs, in rubles;
G2 represents the cost of producing a unit of output in year 
't’ taking into consideration the increase in production 
which is necessary to produce commodities for export, in 
rubles ;
Kj, represents capital investment per unit of output exclusive­
ly for domestic needs, in rubles;
Kg represents capital investment per unit of output taking
into consideration the increase in production which is nec­
essary to produce commodities for export, in rubles;
I represents the normative coefficient of effectiveness of
capital Investment /"i.e., a centrally determined coefficient 
for minimum rate of return__/;
^2t represents the volume of production delivered to the Soviet 
economy in year 't*, in physical units.
In some cases exports from a given Soviet industrial project 
will exceed the amount necessary to repay the credit plus interest.
The formula for calculating the effect 'Eg' of commodity deliveries 
which exceed the amount necessary to cover obligations connected with 
the credit agreement is as follows*
EEg / . (Pet Xi.ekv.t 2ch,e,t) Vit
t “ 0
Where
Pet represents foreign trade prices of products for export 
at the time of delivery during year *t', in transfer­
able rubles;
Xi.ekv.^ represents the coefficient of effectiveness of the im­
port equivalent in year 't*;
Zch.e.t represents national economic expenditures of the USSR 
on 'net* exports in year 't', i.e., on exports exceed­
ing the amount delivered to repay the credit plus inter­
est, in rubles;
V^^ represents the volume of exports from a given economic 
project in year *t*, in physical units.
Foreign credits can also enable the USSR to commence work on an 
industrial project before Soviet capital is available for such a pro­
ject, The formula for the effect 'Ey' of an early commencement of a 
given project is as follows*
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nEEy - / . IKY
m - 1
Where
n represents the amount of time saved in putting an industrial 
project into operation, in years (or months);
m represents a specific year (or month);
K represents capital investment per unit of output in a given 
industrial project, in rubles;
V represents the volume of output of the industrial project 
which is delivered to the Soviet economy in year (or month) 
'm*,
And finally, it is necessary to compare the production costs 
of a given commodity from a foreign-financed industrial project in 
the USSR with; the cost of producing the same commodity in a Soviet- 
financed enterprise, the cost of importing this commodity into the 
USSR, and the cost of producing a substitute commodity in a Soviet- 
financed enterprise. These data make it possible to calculate the 
effect 'Eg' of satisfying Soviet requirements for a particular commod­
ity from the output of a foreign-financed industrial project in the 
USSR, The formula is as follows;
T
Ez “ 2_! (Sit “ ®2t) (Vzt - Vit)
t = 0
Where
represents the cost of producing a given commodity in 
a Soviet-financed enterprise, or the cost of importing 
this commodity, or the cost of producing a substitute 
commodity in a Soviet-financed enterprise during year 
't', in rubles;
represents the cost of a given commodity from an indus­
trial project constructed on the basis of foreign credit 
during year *t', in rubles.
The overall effect (obshchii effekt) 'E* of utilising foreign 
credits for the construction of an industrial project in the USSR is the 
sum of the aforementioned effects,
E -  Eq. + Ejç + Eg + Ey + Eg.
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The effectiveness of utilising foreign credits for the construct­
ion of an industrial project in the USSR can be determined from the 
following formula*
T
+ Eg + Ey + Ez+ r)
-----------------------------------------
, ,T - t 
Ze^(l + r)
Soviet Participation in Compensatory Projects 
in the West
We have just learned that Western participation in Soviet industrial 
projects could become an important part of East-West trade. However, 
it „is only fair to point out that the USSR appears to be interested 
in boosting the level of its participation in compensatory projects 
in the West. For example, in the early part of 1978 it was announced 
that the USSR will invest approximately $2 billion for the development 
of phosphate resources in Morocco, Soviet capital will be used to 
develop the Me Kala phosphate mine and construct a railway from the 
mine to a harbour in Essaouira, The USSR will receive raw Moroccan 
phosphate, triple-super phosphate and phosphoric acid in return for 
its investment, (it is interesting to note that the USSR will not 
be permitted to sell these commodities to third countries,) V/hen Sov­
iet credits have been paid off, phosphates and phosphate derivatives 
will be exported to the USSR in exchange for Soviet petroleum, timber 
and chemical products,6-3
Future Soviet investment in MTEs will probably not be limited to 
traditional compensatory projects. Moreover, such investment might not 
be confined to IDGs. For example, one GMEA country— Rumania— has just
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invested $53 million for the development of coal resources in the United 
States ( V i r g i n i a ) T h e  investment was made on the basis of a $53“ 
million loan granted to Rumania by a consortium of VJestern-omed banks 
(including Banque Commerciale pour 1' Europe du Nord), Rumania will 
receive high-grade metallurgical coal in return for its investment.
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line for the delivery of the 11 billion cubic metres of Soviet gas 
to Western Europe,
43This gas is presumably payment for Soviet assistance in the 
construction of the Iranian natural gas pipeline.
^^Financial Times, 1 December 1975, P* 5«
^3see Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 7 January 1976, p. 14, 
quoting Agefi. 23 December 1975.
46moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 25 August 1976, p. 5, 
quoting Reuter East-West Trade News, 18 August 1976.
*^^ The Times, 11 January 1978, p. 6,
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the USSR could argue that the United States received vodka 
for commodities which required only a marginal amount of capital invest­
ment, Indeed, the Americans have a comparative advantage in the pro­
duction of Pepsi-Cola while the Soviets enjoy a comparative advantage 
in the production of vodka,
^%oscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 10 November 1976, p. 2, 
quoting Ecotass, 1 November 1976.
^^Mosoow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin. 27 October 1976, p. 4, 
quoting Soviet Business and Trade. 13 October 1976.
3^N. Smelyakov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade of the USSR, 
mentioned that it was necessajry to find a more suitable name for mar­
keting the Zhiguli abroad. The reason was simple: the name Zhiguli
sounds much like 'gigolo' and words in the Arabic language which mean 
'ignoramus' and 'false'; see N. N, Smelyakov, 'Delovye vstrechi', Novy 
mir, December 1973» p. 236. Smelyakov also mentioned that the name 
of the Soviet automobile 'Zaporozhets' was changed to 'Yalta' because 
the former sounds similar to a Finnish word for 'pig tail*,
3^Financial Times, 28 November 1977» p. 4.
33m o s c o w  Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 27 October 1976, p. 4, 
quoting Soviet Business and Trade. I3 October 1976,
^^The Times. 5 September 1977» p. 15*
33moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 26 October 1977» p. 9» 
quoting Reuter East-West Trade News, 19 October 1977.
^^Financial Times, 4 July 1977» p. 4.
37Financial Times, 28 November 1977» p. 4.
3^Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 1 December 1976, p. 3» 
quoting Business Week, 6 December 197^.
59journal of the US-USSR Trade and Economic Council, Vol. 2,
No, 4 (October-November 1976), p. 8.
68moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin. 1 December 1976, p. 3» 
quoting Business Week, 6 December 1976. ~
6^Soviet News, 3 August 1976, p. 288.
6^V. Grinev and A. Lebedinskas, 'Opredelenie effektivnosti priv- 
lecheniya inostrannykh kreditov dlya sozdaniya na territorii SSSR proiz- 
vodstvennyldi moshchnostei', Planovoe khozyaistvo. No. 6, 1975» pp. 39-47*
For example, if a given amount of machinery costs 1,500,000 
rubles to produce in the USSR it might be advantageous for Soviet offic­
ials to consider importing such machinery for the construction of an 
industrial project if the imported machinery can be paid off in the 
form of commodity deliveries from the project which cost, say, 1,000,000 
rubles to produce.
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^^Grinev and Lebedinskas pointed out that it would be possible 
to construct a similar formula to measure the effect of utilising the 
latest technological developments in industrial projects set up on the 
basis of foreign capital.
^^Financial Times. 31 January 1978, p. 4.
66moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin. 18 January 1978, p. 13, 
quoting Business Week. l6 January 1978.
Despite the strong Marxist-Leninist contempt for capitalist aims 
and methods, the pragmatists whose task it is to operate a collectiv­
ist economy have long ago realised that international business will 
for an indefinite time have to be conducted within a capitalist frame 
of reference.
— Samuel Pisar
CHAPTER IV 
THE FINANCING OF SOVIET FOREIGN TRADE
We learned in CHAPTER I that NEP was responsible for bringing about 
a significant increase in Soviet operations in world financial markets. 
Soon after the period of War Communism Soviet leaders began to encour­
age long-term foreign investment in the USSR as a means of promoting 
the rapid industrialisation of the Soviet economy. Ordinary foreign 
trade operations also increased appreciably after the introduction 
of NEP indicating that Soviet leaders were interested in using foreign 
markets to satisfy the country's immediate economic requirements. The 
growth of Soviet foreign commercial operations under NEP necessitated 
the development of the USSR's trade financing mechanism, Soviet banks 
were encouraged to strengthen their ties with world financial markets 
and the chervonets was conceived as a means of eventually serving as 
the basis of Soviet (and perhaps worldwide) foreign trade financing,
Soviet foreign trade policy was altered drastically under Stalin, 
By the late 1920a Western investment in the USSR was no longer encour­
aged and Soviet currency could not be legally used to finance foreign 
trade. As a result, Soviet foreign trade had to be either conducted 
on a barter basis or financed by foreign currencies. Moreover, by
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the late 1920s there was some evidence that the USSR was using foreign 
trade as a means of gaining economic independence from the Western 
(capitalist) world. But Stalin's foreign trade policy did not lead 
to a sharp decline in Soviet commercial operations until after 1932* 
During the late 1920s and early 1930s, exports of Soviet raw materials 
were increased in order to help pay for massive imports of Western 
machinery and equipment which were required for the rapid industrial­
isation of the Soviet economy. In addition, Western nations were will­
ing to extend the USSR credits during this period in an attempt to 
shake off the ill effects of the Great Depression by stimulating Sov­
iet demand for Western commodities. This led to a marked increase 
in Soviet foreign indebtedness between the late 1920s and the early 
1930s.
As we learned in CHAPTER I, Soviet foreign trade turnover declined 
sharply after 1932. Soviet trade surpluses during the period 1933-193&
enabled the USSR to pay off most of its foreign debt. By the late
1930s it appeared as though the USSR was on the verge of achieving 
independence from Western financial markets. This situation contin­
ued for almost two decades if we overlook the USSR's commercial/finan­
cial obligations connected with Lend-Lease, However, the evidence 
suggests that Stalin never favoured severing all ties with Western 
financial markets. Indeed, Soviet commercial banks in the West continued 
to operate (albeit in a restricted fashion) despite the adverse condit­
ions which existed from the late 1930s to the mid-1950s.
By the mid-1960s Western nations were beginning to sens© the 
presence of the USSR in their financial markets. Less than a decade 
later the Soviet Union had made a significant impact on every major 
financial market in the Western world. Such an impact is not surpris­
ing in the light of the USSR's enormous economic capabilities. After
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a lengthy period of deliberation Soviet leaders have found once again 
that it is in their best interests to make full use of the opportun­
ities which exist in world markets. As a result of the USSR's expand­
ing operations in world markets the vehement criticism of Western econ* 
omic systems is slowly losing its prevalence in Soviet foreign policy. 
At this time Soviet critics of East-West interdependence are overshad­
owed by policy-makers who appear to be preoccupied with the promotion 
of long-term economic co-operation between the USSR and MTEs,
The Operations of the Foreign Trade Bank 
of the USSR
The Foreign Trade Bank of the USSR (Vneshtorgbanit) is directly respon­
sible for supervising and controlling Soviet foreign currency opera­
tions. Although Vneshtorgbank was established in 1924, the State Bank 
of the USSR (Gosbank) handled most of the Soviet Union's foreign cur­
rency transactions until the early 1960s. Indeed, between 1924 and 
i960, Vneshtorgbank's foreign currency operations were primarily con­
fined to non-commercial areas (e.g., tourism and diplomatic missions) 
and it was recognised by some critics as nothing more than a semi-auton- 
omous branch of Gosbank. During the late 1950s both the volume of 
Soviet foreign trade and the number of countries trading with the USSR 
began to increase significantly. As a result, Soviet officials decided 
that most foreign currency operations of the USSR should be the respon­
sibility of a single specialised bank. In I96I, Vneshtorgbank's opera­
tions were expanded to include commercial transactions with FTOs which 
were previously handled by Gosbank.
According to one source, Soviet officials increased Vneshtorgbank's 
role in the sphere of foreign trade financing for 'prestige' reasons.
When the USSR began to welcome medium- and long-term credits/loans
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from IMTEs some Soviet officials thought that it would be improper 
for Gosbank to guarantee such credits/loans. In addition, it was recog­
nised that any Soviet bank maintaining close relations with Western 
financial institutions would be required to conduct some of its opera­
tions according to Western financial norms. As we shall learn, Gos­
bank would have great difficulty conducting present-day financial opera­
tions with the West without undermining its professed immunity from 
all of the so-called 'contradictions' of world financial markets.
Like most large Western commercial banks, Vneshtorgbank is a 
joint-stock company. Its shareholders include Gosbank, the Ministry 
of Finance, Ingosstrakh, the Central Union of Consumers' Co-operatives 
and a number of FTOs. Vneshtorgbank's resemblance to Western banks 
and its close connections with commercial organisations in MTEs have 
given the bank a reputation for being the most capitalistic organisa­
tion in the USSR, Indeed, there are oven some Westerners who think 
that the Soviets working for Vneshtorgbank are more capitalistic than 
capitalists in the West. One Westerner sized up the Soviet bankers 
in Vneshtorgbank as follows: 'On the one hand there is a peasant-like
greed and on the other the sophistication of high finance*,^ Never­
theless, the fact remains that Vneshtorgbank's operations are still 
strongly influenced by Gosbank (and the Ministry of Finance), Accord­
ing to one source, Gosbank supplies Vneshtorgbank with a large amount 
of (ruble) funds and a sizeable number of top-level personnel,3 More­
over, the chairman of Vneshtorgbank normally serves as a member of
Gosbank's board of managers and the two banks periodically exchange 
4personnel.
At the present time Vneshtorgbank handles virtually all types 
of financial transactions which are connected with Soviet foreign trade 
(including government financial agreements). Most analysts agree that
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Vneshtorgbank has a monopoly over the financing of Soviet foreign trade. 
The bank makes and accepts payments on behalf of Soviet FTOs and pro­
vides credit for them, Vneshtorgbank also provides credit for some 
Soviet enterprises which manufacture commodities for export. More­
over, the bank is authorised to grant credits and loans to both foreign 
companies and individuals. In addition to the aforementioned functions 
Vneshtorgbank handles a wide range of non-commercial transactionsj 
accepts deposits from both Soviet and foreign sources; opens accounts 
in rubles and foreign currencies; deals abroad in gold, silver and 
other precious metals; guarantees commercial paper issued by Soviet 
FTOs; and buys and sells foreign currencies,^
Soviet foreign trade operates according to the principles of 
preisausgleich. When world market prices for Soviet exports are below 
Soviet wholesale prices, exporting FTOs sometimes receive funds from the 
state budget (via Gosbank-Vneshtorgbank) which will offset their losses, 
(in other words Gosbank-Vneshtorgbank use funds from the state budget to 
make up the difference to exporting FTOs if the ruble proceeds /"which 
are calculated on the basis of official exchange rates/7 from their 
exports fall short of Soviet wholesale prices,) In the event world mar­
ket prices for Soviet exports exceed domestic (Soviet) wholesale prices 
Gosbank-Vneshtorgbank can be called upon to transfer any excess earnings 
of exporting FTOs to the state budget. When world market prices for 
Soviet imports exceed Soviet wholesale prices, importing FTOs sometimes 
receive funds from the state budget (via Gosbank-Vneshtorgbank) which 
will offset their losses, (in other words Gosbank-Vneshtorgbank can use 
funds from the state budget to pay importing FTOs the difference between 
the ruble amounts paid to these FTOs by Soviet wholesalers and the 
amounts paid by importing FTOs to foreign exporters.) If Soviet whole­
sale prices for imported commodities exceed the amounts paid for such 
imports, Gosbank-Vneshtorgbank can be called upon to transfer any excess
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earnings of Soviet importers to the state budget.
One of Vneshtorgbank's most important operations involves the 
buying and selling of foreign currency in accordance with the USSR's 
foreign exchange policy. According to the Chairman of Gosbank, Vlad­
imir Alkhimov, Vneshtorgbank carries out extensive operations in West­
ern financial markets in order to obtain maximum earnings from foreign 
currency resources, Soviet foreign currency reserves are usually kept 
in the most stable currencies to safeguard against losses through de­
valuation. In addition to its operations in 'spot' foreign exchange 
markets Vneshtorgbank buys and sells foreign currencies in 'forward' 
foreign exchange markets, (For a discussion of 'spot' and 'forward* 
foreign exchange markets see footnote number 22 on pp. 284-285,) Of 
course, Vneshtorgbank has a policy of depositing foreign currency in 
(Western-based) banks which offer the highest deposit rates,^
The marked growth in Soviet foreign trade since the mid-1960s 
has led to a concomitant increase in the activities of Vneshtorgbank. 
Between 1966 and 1972, Vneshtorgbank's assets increased from 3,8 bil­
lion rubles to 10.1 billion. At the beginning of 1977, the bank's 
assets stood at 26,1 billion rubles (about $35*5 billion). TABLE 4,1 
provides data on Vneshtorgbank from 1 January 1975 to 1 January 1977»
It is impossible to calculate the exact amount of convertible 
currency included in Vneshtorgbank's balance sheet without gaining 
access to highly classified data. However, we can make some very rough 
estimates on the basis of Soviet foreign trade statistics. In 1974, 
approximately 54 percent of Soviet foreign trade (export and import 
operations) was conducted with socialist countries (i.e., OMEA members 
and a few non-members); in 1975, 56 percent; and in 1976, 56 percent. 
About 31 percent of Soviet foreign trade was carried out with IMTEs 
in 1974, 3i percent in 1975, and 33 percent in 1976. And approximately
TABLE 4.1
BALANCE SHEET OF THE BANK FOR FOREIGN TRADE 
OF THE USSR, 1 January 1975-1 January 1977 
(in rubles and kopecks)
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Assets 1 January 1975 1 January 1976 1 January 1977
Cash, current 
and other 
accounts
3,680,881,153.86 3,276,155,099.39 4 ,191.313,913.89
Credits 
granted, 
guarantees 
and accept­
ances
12,883,627,330.29 18,859,599,797.04 21,923,960,654.49
Securities, 
shares and 
stocks
21,831,195.76 22,466,562.38 28,308,941.93
Other assets 2 .879.131.55 . 3.694.253.71 . 5,994,035.. 33
Total 16,589,218.811746 22,161,915,712.52 26,149,577,565764
Liabilities _ 1_ January 1975 .. 1 January 1976 1 January 1977
Share and
reserve
capital
668,985,986.54 741,985,986.54 834,985,986.54
Resources 
on current 
and other 
accounts
10,625,298,770.37 14,098,208,827.23 15,213,471,691.12
Credits 
received, 
guarantees 
and accept­
ances
5 ,193,844,456.85 7,199.713,818.59 9,970,482,311.28
Net profit 94,800,447.14 115,460,852.20 . 123,453,293.95
Other
liabilities . _ 6,289,150.56 6.546,227.96 7.184,282.75
Total 16,589,218,811.46 22,161,915,712.52 26,149,577,565764
Sources: Vneshn.yaya torsovlya. No. 9. 1975. p. 30; and Moscow
Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 12 October 1977, p. 12.
15 percent of Soviet foreign trade was conducted with LDCs in 1974, 
12 percent in 1975, and 12 percent in 1976. Since Vneshtorgbank is
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primarily responsible for financing Soviet foreign trade it would be 
reasonable to assume that the breakdown of funds included in the bank's 
balance sheet (or the ratio of rubles to foreign currency) roughly 
resembles the way in which the USSR finances its trade with various 
types of foreign countries. It is widely known that most Soviet trade 
with socialist countries is financed on the basis of non-convertible 
(transferable) rubles. In addition, it is widely accepted that most Sov­
iet trade with IMTEs is financed in hard currency.^ Now the amount 
of convertible currency (i.e., hard currency and soft currency^) in­
volved in Soviet trade with LDGs is a little more difficult to estimate. 
However,it is generally accepted that most Soviet trade with LUOs is 
conducted on the basis of bilateral agreements which are denominated 
in non-convertible clearing dollars (see p. 237). So, the amount of 
trade between the USSR and LDCs which is financed via hard and soft 
currencies is probably small. On the basis of the aforementioned data 
and assumptions it is probably fair to say that the amount of convert­
ible currency included in Vneshtorgbank's total assets is a sum not 
much lower or greater than 30 percent of the bank's total assets.
After studying the assets side of Vneshtorgbank's balance sheet 
for only a few moments most Western bankers would point out that the 
sum under the category 'credits granted, guarantees and acceptances' 
is relatively large. On 1 January 1975» this sum comprised 78 percent 
of total assets; on 1 January 1976, 85 percent; and on 1 January 1977,
8A percent. The amount of credit granted by most Western commercial 
banks lies somewhere between 55 and 70 percent of total assets. West­
ern bankers would also quickly notice that the sum under the category 
'securities, shares and stocks' is extremely small. On 1 January 1977, 
this sum comprised only 0,1 percent of total assets. In Western com­
mercial banks the balance-sheet sum which is attributed to investments 
(e.g., government gilt-edged securities) often amounts to 10 or 15 per-
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cent of total assets. However, there is nothing extraordinary about 
the fact that Vneshtorgbank's operations differ somewhat from those 
of the average Western commercial bank. Indeed, many Western bankers 
would be surprised if Vneshtorgbank stepped up its investment operec­
tions in the light of the fact that a market for securities does not 
exist in the USSR,
It is interesting to note that the ratio of funds in the cate­
gory 'cash, current and other accounts’ to total assets declined sig­
nificantly between the early and mid-1970s. On 1 January 1972, this 
ratio stood at 35 percent; on 1 January 1975» 29 percent; on 1 January 
1976» 18 percent; and on 1 January 1977, 19 percent. So what was the 
reason for this rapid decline from 1 January 1972 to 1 January 1976?
It is fairly obvious that banks desiring to increase their liquidity 
position channel additional funds into the balance-sheet category 'cash, 
current and other accounts'. Between the early and mid-1970s the USSR 
recorded some rather large trade deficits with IMTEs, These deficits 
led to a marked increase in Vneshtorgbank’s borrowing operations in 
the West, It is possible that officials in Vneshtorgbank (and perhaps 
top-level Party members) decided that it would be wise to maintain a 
ready supply of financial resources during the first half of the 1970s 
in the interest of improving the USSR's creditworthiness. Indeed, 
at a time when Vneshtorgbank was just beginning to play an active role 
in world financial markets a simple misjudgment by Soviet bankers might 
well have thrown a monkeywrench into the USSR's plans for improved 
financial co-operation with IMTEs, Therefore, Vneshtorgbank minimised 
the possibility of an embarrassing financial predicament by keeping 
a safe supply of cash on hand, in current accounts, and in deposit ac­
counts, But as we have seen, this policy began to wither away in the 
mid-1970s.
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We should now turn our attention to the liabilities side of Vnesh­
torgbank' s balance sheet. Share and reserve capital comprised just 
over 3 percent of Vneshtorgbank's total liabilities on 1 January 1977. 
There is nothing unusual about this so we shall quickly move on to 
the second category, Vneshtorgbank's major depositors include other 
Soviet banks, Soviet FTOs, the International Bank for Economic Co-oper­
ation (IBEC) and the International Investment Bank (IIB), The amount 
of convertible currency deposited in Vneshtorgbank is undoubtedly large 
in the light of the fact that virtually all Soviet organisations author­
ised to deal in foreign currencies (e,g,, FTOs, hotels and government 
shops) must use Vneshtorgbank's facilities. Indeed, we don't often 
hear of Soviet organisations (excluding banks) depositing funds in 
Chase Manhattan Bank (or any other Western-owned financial institution). 
As a rule the USSR does not permit its commercial organisations (again 
Soviet banks excluded) to shop around for the highest interest rates. 
Vneshtorgbank also receives convertible currency deposits from a limited 
range of foreign banks. Financial institutions in individual CMEA 
nations and banks in LDCs might be given concessionary deposit rates 
for placing convertible currency resources in Vneshtorgbank, However, 
it seems likely that any concessions would be in transferable rubles 
(or a similar form of payment) and not convertible currency.
Credits received by Vneshtorgbank comprised 38 percent of the 
bank's total liabilities on 1 January 1977. This figure would appear 
extraordinarily large to any banker who is unfamiliar with the Soviet 
foreign trade system. Banks in MTEs which are responsible for finan­
cing foreign trade (e.g., commercial banks and merchant banks) obtain 
almost all of their financial resources from current and deposit ac­
counts, Western banlcs offer a wide range of services in order to en­
courage individuals and organisations to open up current accounts. These
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banîts also attract financial resources from individuals, trading com­
panies and other banks by offering competitive deposit rates for funds 
placed in accounts for specific periods (e.g., thirty days, three months, 
six months, one year, two years, three years, etc.). On the basis of 
funds in current and deposit accounts Western banks grant credits and 
loans to trading companies. As a rule Western trading companies are 
free to conduct business with a wide range of financial institutions. 
However, a Western-type financial market does not exist in the USSR 
(if we disregard black market operations). Moreover, Soviet FTOs, in 
virtually all cases, are not permitted to carry out their own financial 
operations in world markets. As we have learned, Vneshtorgbank has a 
monopoly over the financing of Soviet foreign trade. Since Soviet 
FTOs are not permitted to receive credits and loans directly from for- 
ei^ sources. Western banks must grant credits and loans to FTOs via 
Vneshtorgbank, This is the reason for the large amount of credit grant­
ed to Vneshtorgbank.
Now one might think that Vneshtorgbank would play a more active 
role in attracting foreign currency deposits from Western banks and 
trading companies. Such a move would give the USSR access to convert­
ible currency without paying high interest rates. Indeed, it is com­
mon knowledge that interbank deposit rates are slightly lower than 
free-market interest rates for credits and loans. However, Soviet 
officials have been reluctant to encourage an expansion of Vneshtorg­
bank's operations in this direction for a number of reasons. Firstly, 
some of the government-supported credits currently available to Vnesh­
torgbank carry interest rates which are well below interbank deposit 
rates. Secondly, Vneshtorgbank would have to become a full-time oper­
ator in world financial markets. It would be useless for Vneshtorg­
bank to look for depositors only at times when it is necessary to obtain
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funds for financing foreign trade. Few Western bankers (if any) would 
make deposits in Vneshtorgbanic knowing that the USSR requires hard 
currency in order to finance its trade deficits. In addition, the 
costs of keeping pace with developments in world financial markets 
would be quite high. Since free-market interest rates for credits/loans 
are now only slightly higher than interbank deposit rates, banks must 
be able to find borrowers at the same time (or even before) deposits 
are received. Such activity leaves little room for error and calls 
for a high level of expertise. Soviet officials might also be reluct­
ant to increase Vneshtorgbank's participation in world financial mar­
kets in the light of the fact that the USSR already has nine foreign- 
based banks operating in major Eurocurrency markets. As we shall learn, 
these banks have been quite successful in attracting deposits from 
Western banks and trading companies. In addition to the aforementioned 
arguments it should be pointed out that the time might not be right 
for Vneshtorgbank's emergence as a full-time operator in world finan­
cial markets. Over time Western bankers have more or less accepted 
the presence of the so-called 'small' Soviet foreign trade banks in 
their financial systems. But Vneshtorgbank would hardly be regarded 
as just an ordinary socialist banlc operating in Western markets. Within 
a short period of time Vneshtorgbank could conceivably become a key 
manipulator of conditions in selected financial markets in the West 
( with the help of other Soviet organs ), This might lead Western bank­
ers to take concerted action against Vneshtorgbank, Western banîcers 
could simply agree to stop depositing funds in banks on Soviet soil 
(or such bankers could stop depositing funds in Soviet brinks altogether). 
This, of course, would curb the USSR's foreign currency operations with­
out eroding the reputation of Soviet financial institutions. In all 
likelihood Soviet banks would eventually agree to operate within the
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guidelines established by Western bankers. Another course of action 
against Vneshtorgbank would be far more harmful. Western bankers could 
place short-term funds in Vneshtorgbank and then fail to extend the 
period of these deposits knowing that Vneshtorgbank granted medium-term 
credits/loans on the basis of short-term deposits. Such action could 
easily destroy the USSR's impeccable standing in world financial mar­
kets.
We should now return to our discussion on Vneshtorgbank's liabil­
ities. It is quite possible that the percentage of hard currency in 
the category 'credits received, guarantees and acceptances* is higher 
than the percentage of hard currency in the category 'resources on 
current and other accounts'. As we learned previously, Western banks 
(excluding Soviet-owned banks operating in the West) are reluctant to 
deposit hard currency in Vneshtorgbank (above a token sum) but they 
will extend credits/loans to the bank if the USSR pays market interest 
rates (or if Western governments agree to make up the difference be­
tween low interest rates charged to the USSR and free-market rates).
In studying this problem it is important to keep in mind that the cat­
egory 'resources on current and other accounts' most likely has a high­
er proportion of rubles than the category 'credits received, guarantees 
and acceptances' as the organisations responsible for supplying Vnesh­
torgbank with ruble funds would be more inclined to make deposits than 
grant credits to the bank.
From the published data on Vneshtorgbank's activities it is not 
possible to calculate the amount of credit received by the bank dur­
ing any given year. Indeed, we only know Vneshtorgbank's credit pos­
ition on specific days (e.g., the amount of credit Vneshtorgbank had 
on its books on 1 January 1977)* It is also important to remember 
that financial resources placed in the category 'credits received,
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guarantees and acceptances’ on 1 January 1977» undoubtedly included
credits granted before 1976, However, it is possible to make a rough
estimate of the amount of credit extended to Vneshtorgbank by IMTEs
in any given year by using Soviet foreign trade statistics. We know
that the typical contract connected with Soviet imports from IMTEs
calls for a 15-20 percent cash downpayment. This would indicate that
the USSR purchases roughly 80-85 percent of its imports from IMTEs
on credit, (Of course, it is important to realise that the USSR makes
some of its cash downpayments on the basis of loans obtained in Western
financial markets.) Now we must not forget barter trade and other
11schemes for financing Soviet commerce with IMTEs. Let's assume that 
approximately 10-15 percent of Soviet imports from IMTEs are connected 
with barter arrangements and non-typical methods of payment. On the 
basis of these assumptions it is possible to estimate that between 
7,358.7- and 8 ,116.2-million rubles worth of (hard currency) credit 
was extended to the USSR (Vneshtorgbank) in 1976, to finance Soviet 
imports from I M T E s . ( i t  is quite obvious that a sizeable part of 
of this credit was actually granted to the USSR during I976 because 
a high proportion of Soviet foreign trade is financed on a short-term 
basis. However, no attempt will be made to estimate the amount of 
short- medium- and long-term Soviet foreign trade which took place 
during 1976.)
On the Financing of Soviet Trade 
with the West
Before the late 1960s there were only a few textbooks and articles 
dealing with the financing of East-West trade. By the mid-1970s this 
situation had changed markedly. For about twenty years after the end 
of World War II almost all Soviet trade with IMTEs was conducted on
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either a short-term (i.e., payment for commodities within one year) 
or barter basis. As a result, the financing of Soviet trade with IMTEs 
was a relatively simple matter and almost any textbook on foreign trade 
could serve as a guide. However, the rapid expansion of many forms 
of CMEA trade with IMTEs during the early and mid-1970s has given 
rise to a number of publications on the financing of East-West trade. 
Interest in this field should increase as the USSR becomes more ven­
turesome in its international financial dealings.
Between I965 and 1977, there were only two years (I967 and 1974) 
when the USSR recorded a (visible) trade surplus with IMTEs. This 
is a good indication that hard currency resources are in short supply 
in the USSR, For many years the Soviet Union has used various schemes 
to decrease its hard currency deficit. One scheme involves cutting 
imports and expanding exports. However, the disadvantages of this 
policy are so obvious that it is only used as a last r e s o r t , A  sim­
ilar scheme calls for more balanced trade between the USSR and creditor 
nations with little or no change in the USSR's trade position vis-à-vis 
debtor nations. Soviet officials frequently mention that the USSR's 
trade with the United States and the FRG should be more balanced. (Both 
the U.S. and the FRG maintain surpluses in their trade with the USSR.) 
But we seldom hear Soviet officials calling for more balanced trade 
with the U.K. (For quite some time Soviet exports to the U.K. have 
been considerably larger than British exports to the USSR.) The Sov­
iet Union also encourages Western exporters to accept some payment 
in the form of Soviet commodities. If a Western-produced commodity 
is not urgently needed in the USSR a Western exporter might be required 
to accept Soviet goods for over half the value of his shipment. But 
if the acquisition of a given commodity is quite important a Western 
exporter might only be required to accept Soviet goods amounting to
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10 or 20 percent of the value of his contract, (it is interesting
to note that the USSR prefers to export manufactured commodities on
l4a barter basis rather than raw materials. The reason is simplet 
a number of Soviet raw materials /"e.g., petroleum, natural gas and 
timber__7 can be sold more readily for hard currency than Soviet man­
ufactured products.)
According to most estimates the USSR's hard currency indebt­
edness (i.e., Soviet trade-related debts to IMTEs) amounted to over 
$10 billion at the end of 1977. Compensatory projects could become 
an important means of improving the USSR's trade balance vis-à-vis 
IMTEs. It is conceivable that the USSR's trade position with IMTEs 
could start to improve by the early 1980s if earnings from compensa­
tory projects increase according to Soviet projections. However, it 
is wise to keep in mind that although compensatory projects have gen­
erated some interest in the West their future success in eliminating 
the USSR's hard currency trade deficits depends on a number of key 
factors which we know little about at this time (e.g., the future demand 
for Western technology in all sectors of the Soviet economy, the future 
level of Western investment required to develop Soviet natural resour­
ces, the production costs of the same natural resources jfor substitutes^ 
in the West, and the willingness of IMTEs to become dependent on vital 
supplies of Soviet raw materials).
The Financing of Compensatory 
Projects in the USSR
Compensatory projects normally involve six parties: the Soviet impor­
ter, the Soviet exporter, the foreign exporter, the foreign importer, 
Vneshtorgbank, and a Western bank (or a consortium of Western banks). 
It was mentioned previously that compensatory projects call for at
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least two contracts. The Soviet importer agrees to purchase machin­
ery, equipment and technical services from the Western exporter, and 
the Western importer (remember that the Western importer can be the 
Western exporter, another Western buyer or both) agrees to purchase 
products from the compensatory project which will cover the sums paid 
for the machinery, equipment and technical services. At this time it 
might be wise to mention that the Western exporter (supplier) does 
not have to wait a number of years before he is paid off via the out­
put of the industrial project. In almost all cases the Soviet impor­
ter (buyer) obtains commodities for a compensatory project on the basis 
of medium- and long-term buyer's credits and supplier's credits. At 
the present time the USSR favours buyer's credits as they tend to be 
slightly cheaper than supplier's credits. 5^ Both buyer's credits and 
supplier's credits make it possible for the Western supplier to receive 
immediate payment for his exports to the USSR, Then at some future 
date the Western importer is responsible for purchasing commodities 
from the compensatory project, (This procedure will be explained in 
greater detail a little later,)
Ever since Western governments began participating in East-West 
trade by granting credits with low interest rates and guaranteeing 
credits granted by private domestic banks the USSR has become even 
more reluctant to pay market rates for credits from I M T E s . A  few 
government financial institutions in the West (e.g,, the U.S. Sxport- 
Import Bank) offer credit to foreign borrowers at interest rates far 
below those prevailing in the free market. This credit is normally 
granted in conjunction with credit from private sources. Although 
private banks usually charge market rates for credit the low govern­
ment interest rates tend to make the combined rate quite favourable. 
Instead of actually granting credits to foreign borrowers some Western
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governments guarantee credits granted by private domestic banks. For 
example, the Export Credits Guarantee Department (EGGD) was set up in 
the U.K. to provide government credit insurance for British lenders.
By guaranteeing credits, Western governments agree to cover the losses 
incurred by private banks if foreign borrowers fail to pay off their 
financial obligations. This reduces some of the risk connected with 
the granting of credit and enables private banks to provide credit for 
foreign borrowers on more favourable terms,
Soviet officials are well aware of the fact that Western export­
ers are becoming more interested in the Soviet market in the liglit of 
the adverse economic conditions in IMTEs, By increasing their imports 
from IMTEs Soviet traders maintain that they are helping to ameliorate 
economic conditions in the West, This is another reason for the USSR's 
reluctance to pay market interest rates for Western credits.
Both the USSR's reluctance to pay market interest rates and the 
desire of Western companies to secure Soviet contracts led to a 'cred­
it race' which began in the early 1 9 6 0 s , I n  1976, a number of IMTEs 
attempted to establish guidelines for the granting of credits in order 
to slow down the credit race. The guidelines dealt with minimum pre-
delivery payments, minimum interest rates and maximum periods for var-
18ious types of credits. However, it seems that the guidelines have 
not been very effective in curbing the practice of cutting interest 
rates to secure Soviet contracts. In May 1978» the British government 
announced that interest rates were being reduced for credits granted 
under the U.K.'s export credit agreement with the USSR following the 
reduction in French and Italian interest rates on credits to the USSR.^^ 
Now there are some cases when Soviet importers are unable to 
obtain Western government-supported credits. Knowing that the Soviets 
are averse to paying market interest rates, Western exporters will
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sometimes increase the price of their commodities and use this addit­
ional income to cover the cost of arranging credits for the USSR at 
rates below those charged in the free market (i, e., Western exporters 
will make up the difference to banks which grant Soviet importers con­
cessionary rates). Although the USSR does not approve of this scheme 
Soviet officials are more inclined to accept higher contract prices 
than interest rates which appear too high.
We shall now return to the financing of compensatory projects. 
When a Soviet FTO agrees to import commodities for a compensatory pro­
ject Vneshtorgbank and the foreign supplier are responsible for plan­
ning the financing of the deal. Compensatory deals occasionally call 
for the importation of sizeable amounts of Western machinery and equip­
ment (e.g., steel pipes). Since Vneshtorgbank's hard cuxrency resour­
ces are usually insufficient to finance these deals Western banks are 
called upon to provide financial assistance. In some cases the for­
eign supplier might be asked to contact banks in the West, However, 
at this time Vneshtorgbank maintains correspondent relationships with 
approximately 1,600 foreign banks (a large number of these banks are 
in IMTEs) which means that the USSR has good access to most financial 
markets.
As we learned, the USSR will normally try to obtain medium- and 
long-term buyer's credits from banks in the West, Such credits enable 
the USSR to pay cash for its imports. Since a buyer's credit calls 
for a Western exporter's bank (in many cases the Western exporter's 
bank is one of Vneshtorgbank's correspondents) to place hard currency 
resources at the disposal of Vneshtorgbank the credit is often referred 
to as a loan which is tied to specific commodity purchases. On rare 
occasions Vneshtorgbank receives a buyer's credit in the form of a 
lump sum. This enables the Soviet importer (via Vneshtorgbank) to
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pay off the Western exporter immediately for all commodities connect­
ed with a particular compensatory project. When the Western exporter 
is required to make a number of commodity deliveries a line of credit 
is extended to Vneshtorgbank which gives the Soviet importer access 
to a specific amount of hard currency credit for a certain length of 
time. Under this scheme Vneshtorgbank, acting on behalf of the Soviet 
importer, is entitled to draw credits which correspond to the value 
of each commodity shipment. When the USSR receives a buyer's credit 
the Soviet importer is required to issue promissory notes, guaranteed 
by Vneshtorgbank, for each day on which it will pay a certain portion 
of the principal plus interest to the Western financial institution(s) 
that granted the credit. These promissory notes are usually negotia­
ble instruments (i.e., they can be discounted and re-discounted in 
world money markets),
Under the terms of compensatory agreements the Western importer 
will eventually start receiving shipments of commodities from the USSR, 
In most cases these shipments will amount to a sum which is equal to 
or greater than the value of project-related machinery, equipment and 
technical services exported to the USSR, Now it is the USSR's turn 
to receive payments connected with a particular compensatory project.
In some cases the Western importer opts to pay cash for Soviet pro­
ject-related commodities. Under such conditions the Western importer 
would normally obtain a loan from Western banks. However, the Western 
exporter could also request credit from the USSR (i.e., Vneshtorgbank), 
Such credit would most likely be granted on a short-term basis as the 
Western importer would be able to place the Soviet project-related 
commodities on the market soon after they are received. Of course, 
the payments from the Western importer would be used by Vneshtorgbank 
to cover hard currency debts connected with the importation of Western
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commodities into the Soviet Union,
Unlike buyer's credits, supplier's credits are granted by an 
exporter to an importer, (Remember, in the case of buyer's credits 
the exporter's bank is responsible for granting credit to the impor­
ter.) Before the USSR starts importing machinery and equipment for 
a compensatory project on the basis of a supplier's credit, Vneshtorg­
bank must send a letter of credit to the Western exporter, A letter 
of credit is a promise issued by an importer's bank (e.g., Vneshtorg­
bank) to an exporter stating that the importer's bank will guarantee
the financial obligations of the importer if all conditions in the
2X
letter of credit are met. There are two types of letters of credits 
irrevocable and revocable. The terms of an irrevocable letter of cred­
it cannot be altered without the consent of all parties involved. On 
the other hand the terms of a revocable credit can be modified or can­
celled at any time without notice. Therefore, it is easy to understand 
why virtually all exporters demand the issuance of irrevocable letters 
of credit.
In most cases the importer's bank first sends a letter of credit 
to the exporter's bank. After the exporter's bank has taken note of 
the conditions in the letter of credit the letter is passed on to the 
exporter. If the exporter's bank accepts the conditions in the letter 
of credit (i.e., if the bank agrees to handle the financial business 
of the exporter under the letter of credit) the document becomes a 
confirmed letter of credit. In the event the exporter's bank does not 
accept the conditions in the letter of credit the document is known 
as an unconfirmed letter of credit,
A confirmed letter of credit is highly desirable (at least from 
the exporter' point of view) since it indicates that officials in both 
the importer's bank and exporter's bank feel that the importer will
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meet all of his financial obligations. As we shall learn, under a 
confirmed letter of credit the exporter's bank is often responsible 
for discounting bills of exchange drawn up by the exporter and discount­
ing promissory notes issued by the importer. Under an unconfirmed 
letter of credit only the importer's bank is prepared to assure the 
exporter that the importer will meet all of his financial obligations.
The exporter's bank is not required to discount bills of exchange and 
promissory notes issued under an unconfirmed letter of credit.
Bills of exchange are often used in connection with supplier's 
credit schemes, A bill of exchange is a written order drawn up by 
an exporter and sent to an importer requiring the importer to pay a 
certain sum to the exporter on a given date, A bill of exchange be­
comes a negotiable instrument when it is signed (accepted) by the im­
porter (and guaranteed by Vneshtorgbank in the case of the USSR) and 
returned to the exporter, (Bills which have been signed by the import­
er are often referred to as 'acceptances'.) If a contract calls for 
the shipment of all goods at once only one bill of exchange is norm­
ally required. However, compensatory deals usually call for the issu­
ance of a number of bills of exchange as commodity shipments normally 
take place over a certain period of time.
Bills of exchange have varying periods of maturity (e.g,, 60 
days, 90 days, 6 months, 1 year, etc.). In the event an exporter 
wishes to receive payment before the bill has matured (this is usually 
the case) the exporter’s bank will often purchase the bill for its 
face value minus a certain sum for discounting and related charges.
Under a confirmed letter of credit the exporter's bank usually agrees 
to provide discounting facilities for the exporter on a non-recourse 
basis (i.e., the exporter's bank will discount bills of exchange and 
promissory notes guaranteed by the importer's bank without taking action
232
against the exporter In the event the importer's bank is unable to 
honour its financial obligations). If the exporter's bank refuses 
to discount a bill of exchange the exporter can take the bill to other 
banks operating in Western money markets. In most cases the export­
er is required in the letter of credit to include shipping documents 
(e.g., the invoice, the bill of lading, the insurance policy and the 
inspection certificate) with the bill of exchange when the bill is 
discounted. Under such conditions the credit is known as a documen­
tary (supplier's) credit. After the bill of exchange has been discount­
ed it can be held until its maturity date (at which time it is present­
ed to Vneshtorgbank or a bank designated by Vneshtorgbank for collect­
ion) or re-discounted in the money market. In some cases the Soviet 
importer might decide to issue promissory notes (guaranteed by Vnesh­
torgbank) to the Western exporter. Under such a scheme the exporter 
is not required to draw up bills of exchange. The process for collect­
ing payment via promissory notes is the same as for bills of exchange. 
Although Soviet officials have a reputation for being rather 
reluctant to accept novel financing schemes recent developments indi­
cate that the USSR is becoming more receptive toward different approach­
es to the financing of trade between the USSR and IMTEs (especially 
if the Soviet Union benefits from such schemes). For example, the 
$275“million compensatory deal between the consortium of U.K.-based 
companies— Davy Powergas, IGI and Klockner Ina Industrial Plant— and 
the Soviet FTO Tekhmashimport differed markedly from traditional meth­
ods of financing Anglo-Soviet trade. After negotiating with the USSR 
for over a year the consortium appeared to be in a less favourable 
position than its foremost rival— the West German company Lurgi, Accord­
ing to reports, the consortium was in a disadvantageous position be­
cause it was tendering in sterling while Lurgi was tendering in Deut-
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sche marks. When the USSR compared the two prices on the basis of
22spot exchange rates the Davy-IGI-Klockner price was about £17 mil­
lion higher. However, under a scheme devised by Morgan Grenfell, a 
British bank, the consortium was able to switch its tender from ster­
ling to dollars which resulted in a 6 percent price reduction. At 
the time of the negotiations sterling was being traded at a discount 
(i.e., below par) vis-à-vis the dollar and the mark in the forward 
foreign exchange market (in other words foreign exchange dealers felt 
that the value of sterling would depreciate over time). Under these 
conditions it was advantageous for the consortium to use the Morgan 
Grenfell scheme. In a nutshell, the scheme enables, say, a British 
exporter to denominate his contract (or tender) in a foreign currency 
which is being traded at a premium vis-à-vis sterling and to sell the 
payments over the delivery period in the forward foreign exchange mar­
ket, By using this scheme the exporter's sterling income would be 
considerably higher than if the contract had been based on the spot 
rate for sterling at the time of the negotiations. As a result, the 
additional income can be used to reduce the price of the contract,
Morgan Grenfell, acting on behalf of the consortium, demonstra­
ted to Soviet officials that the consortium could match Lurgi's price 
by tendering in marks and selling the marks for sterling in the for­
ward foreign exchange market. Following this move the USSR requested 
that the two competitors submit tenders in dollars. This lowered the 
consortium's tender while Lurgi's price was increased (the dollar was 
being traded at a discount vis-à-vis the mark in the forward foreign 
exchange market). In the final analysis the consortium's (dollar) 
tender proved to be slightly better than the (dollar) tender submitted 
by Lurgi.
It should be mentioned that the USSR never openly favoured the
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U.K.'s decision to switch from financing trade in sterling to finan­
cing trade in foreign currency. Following the Davy-IGI-Klockner deal 
the USSR made a special effort to point out that dollar financing for 
the two methanol plants did not set a precedent. This attitude is 
unlikely to change as long as the USSR maintains a favourable balance 
of trade with the U.K. Indeed, Soviet officials obviously reckon that 
it is much easier to use surplus earnings from Anglo-Soviet trade to 
pay off British exporters than it is to convert sterling balances into 
dollars in order to cover obligations with British exporters.
Although the USSR appeared to make a major concession by accept­
ing the dollar financing scheme the overall terms of the deal must 
have pleased Soviet authorities. In the first place British export­
ers became involved in a major compensatory deal. This will undoubt­
edly have a favourable impact on the negotiations which are presently 
taking place between the U.K. and the USSR on future compensatory pro­
jects including chemical plants, pulp and paper plants, and factories 
for the production of light machinery and equipment. Secondly, 85 per­
cent of the contract was covered by government-supported buyer's cred­
its instead of the customary 80 percent. According to one report the 
credits were extended for a period of eight and one-half years at an 
annual interest rate of about 7 percent,
The Financing of Soviet Foreign Trade 
on a Non-Gompensatory Basis
In the last section we learned some basic methods of financing Soviet 
trade with IMTEs, The commercial documents (e,g,, letters of credit, 
bills of exchange and promissory notes) which were mentioned are wide­
ly used for all types of Soviet trade with the West, In addition, 
the banking operations which are connected with compensatory projects
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do not differ from those which are connected with ordinary commodity 
transfers on a medium- and long-term basis. It is therefore unneces­
sary to devote any more time to the procedural details of financing 
Soviet foreign trade on a medium- and long-term basis.
In some ways the methods of financing Soviet foreign trade on 
a short-term basis are similar to the methods used to finance other 
types of trade. Letters of credit are the most common method of finan­
cing Soviet foreign trade on a short-term basis. This is the safest 
way of financing trade since the importer's bank guarantees the finan­
cial obligations of the importer. Under the terms of letter-of-credit 
financing Vneshtorgbank has two key responsibilities. Firstly, the 
bank is responsible for guaranteeing both promissory notes issued by 
Soviet importers and bills of exchange drawn up by Western exporters 
(and signed by Soviet importers). Secondly, Vneshtorgbank is responsi­
ble for collecting hard currency payments on behalf of Soviet exporters.
In addition to letter-of-credit financing there are at least 
two other methods of financing Soviet foreign trade on a short-term 
basisÏ payment on cash-against-documents terms and payment on open 
account terms. Since both of these schemes do not require the issu­
ance of letters of credit they are normally used in cases where there 
is a great deal of mutual trust between an exporter and an importer.
In order to receive payment on a cash-against-documents basis an ex­
porter presents shipping documents to his bank. These documents are 
then sent to the importer's bank. Under normal conditions the export­
er is paid a few weeks after the importer's bank receives the shipping 
documents. In some cases the exporter is paid immediately after pre­
senting the shipping documents to his bank. (Under such conditions 
a small amount would be deducted from the total price of the exporter's 
contract.) Then the documents are forwarded to the importer's bank.
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After a certain length of time the exporter's bank receives a sum from 
the importer's bank which is equal to the total price of the exporter's 
contract.
The financing of trade on an open account basis involves the 
highest amount of risk. At the present time this method is seldom 
used for financing trade between the USSR and the West. Under the 
terms of open account financing an importer is permitted to take pos­
session of commodities before the exporter receives a cash payment 
or negotiable instrument. The exporter sends shipping documents to 
the importer either before or about the same time that commodity ship­
ments take place. The importer is then responsible for making sure 
that the exporter is paid according to the terms of the commercial 
contract.
Barter Agreements
The USSR sometimes negotiates barter agreements with IMTEs, We usually 
think of barter trade as the exchange of goods and services on a short­
term basis without the use of money. On rare occasions the USSR is 
able to obtain a full shipment of Western commodities for a shipment 
of Soviet goods of equal value. Under such conditions a contract is 
drawn up for the mere exchange of commodities.
In some cases the USSR attempts to reduce the price of a given 
shipment of Western commodities by offering to exchange Soviet goods 
for a portion (say 10 or 20 percent) of these Western commodities. Such 
schemes normally call for two contracts. One contract is connected 
with the financing of trade on a hard currency basis. The financing 
techniques connected with this contract do not differ from those which 
have already been mentioned. The second contract, of course, is mere­
ly a promise to deliver a certain amount of Soviet goods/services to
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the Western partner within a specified amount of time.
Switch Transactions
It was mentioned previously that most of the USSR's trade with LDGs 
is financed on the basis of non-convertible clearing dollars. This 
scheme calls for the exportation of Soviet commodities which carry 
dollar (world market) prices. After receiving these commodities LDGs 
must either pay the USSR immediately (from clearing-dollar balances) 
or agree to export goods and services to the USSR of equal (dollar) 
value over a certain period of time. Since many LDGs are unable to 
pay for Soviet exports immediately these countries opt to cover their 
trade deficits via future commodity exports to the USSR. As a result,
LDGs issue promissory notes (or sign bills of exchange issued by Sov­
iet exporters) stating that they will repay the USSR on the basis of 
future clearing-dollar earnings from the sale of goods and services 
to Soviet importers.
In some cases the USSR is able to purchase commodities from IMTEs 
by turning over its clearing-dollar balances to Western exporters. These 
exporters can then obtain goods from LDGs on the basis of the clearing- 
dollar balances and sell the commodities for hard currency in world 
markets. However, some exporters in IMTEs are reluctant to accept com­
modity payments from LDGs. In such cases the USSR can sell its clear­
ing-dollar balances via any number of 'switch houses' in the West. Switch 
houses are responsible for locating traders who are willing to pay con­
vertible currency for clearing-dollar balances. If a switch house is 
able to find a buyer for a clearing-dollar balance the USSR receives 
a given amount of convertible currency which can be used to purchase 
commodities from IMTEs,
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The Financing of Soviet Trade with 
IMTEs on a Clearing Account Basis
The USSR presently conducts most of its trade with Finland on the basis 
of bilateral agreements. Such agreements stipulate that the trade be­
tween the two countries should be balanced each year (i.e., imports 
and exports connected with Finnish-Soviet trade should be approximately 
equal). Under the terms of the bilateral agreements Finnish-Soviet 
commercial deals are financed via ruble clearing accounts. The 
procedure is quite simple. Ruble clearing accounts are opened in Vnesh­
torgbank and the central bank of Finland. When a Finnish exporter del­
ivers commodities to the USSR he is paid (by Vneshtorgbank) in rubles. 
The Finnish exporter subsequently exchanges these rubles for Finnish 
marks at the central bank of Finland. (Note that these rubles are non- 
convertible; they are merely swapped for Finnish marks at the central 
bank of Finland.) The rubles are then placed in a ruble clearing ac­
count in the central bank. When a Finnish importer receives commod­
ities from the USSR he instructs the central bank of Finland to pay 
a given ruble sum to the Soviet exporter. This sum is subsequently 
transferred from the ruble clearing account in the central bank of 
Finland to a ruble clearing account in Vneshtorgbank. The Finnish 
importer is then responsible for repaying the central bank (in marks) 
after the imports have been sold.
It might be interesting to note that countries other than Fin­
land and the USSR can take advantage of the clearing-account agreement 
signed between the two countries. For example, in the mid-1970s the 
Armco Steel Corporation— an American company— was attempting to sell 
a semi-submersible oil rig to the USSR, However, the company was at 
a disadvantage because low-cost financing was not available from Amer­
ican financial institutions. In order to compete with a Japanese com­
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pany, Armco decided to offer a joint bid with the Finnish company 
Rauma-Repola Oy, The deal between Armco and Rauma-Repola meant that 
the USSR could pay for part of the oil rig via clearing rubles. As 
a result, the bid by Armco and Rauma-Repola proved to be more attract­
ive to the USSR than the Japanese offer,
On Soviet Economic Aid and Military Deliveries 
to Less-Developed Countries
For quite some time the USSR has achieved rather large trade surpluses 
with LDGs. In 1970, the USSR's trade surplus with LDGs amounted to 
690,3 million rubles (about $766,2 million); in 1971, 55^*^ million 
rubles (about $613,4 million); in 1972, 664,1 million rubles (about 
$803,6 million); in 1973, 1,201,2 million rubles (about $1,633*6 mil­
lion); in 1974, 1,004,7 million rubles (about $1,366.4 million); in 
1975, 311.2 million rubles (about $423.2 million); in 1976, 913*1 mil­
lion rubles (about $1,241.8 million); and in 1977, 2,340,8 million 
rubles (about $3,183.3 million). Most analysts agree that Soviet econ­
omic aid and military deliveries have been primarily responsible for 
these surpluses. Indeed, without such aid and deliveries the USSR 
might well have difficulty achieving even small trade surpluses with 
LDGs,
Economic aid from the USSR is granted to a wide range of LDGs 
in the form of Soviet goods and services. Such commodities are usually 
priced on the basis of world market prices hence the contracts connected 
with the USSR's aid programme are normally denominated in non-convert­
ible clearing dollars. Since most LDGs are unable to pay immediately 
for large shipments of Soviet commodities the USSR extends credits 
to these countries in the interest of increasing Soviet exports. Cred­
its which fall under the USSR's aid programme are normally granted
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on favourable terms (e.g., interest rates often range between 1.5 and 
5 percent). It is important to keep in mind that credits granted to 
LDGs under the USSR's aid programme are used almost exclusively for 
the purchase of Soviet commodities. In addition to interest-bearing 
credits, the USSR also provides LDGs with interest-free credits and 
grants (gifts).
Since the mid-1950s Soviet economic aid and military deliveries 
have played a key role in strengthening the USSR's commercial ties 
with LDGs, Like aid^related exports, some Soviet military deliveries 
are financed by clearing-dollar credits (on favourable terms). In 1976, 
Soviet military deliveries to LDGs were estimated at $2,190 million.
This sum was over five times larger than the amount of Soviet economic 
aid granted to LDGs during the same period (see TABLE 4.2 and TABLE 4,3). 
It is also important to note that Soviet economic aid and military del­
iveries to LDGs in 1976 amounted to over half (i.e., 51 percent) of 
the value of Soviet exports to LDGs during the same year,^^
TABLE 4,2
SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLIES FOR LOGS, 
AGREEMENTS AND DELIVERIES 
(in millions of dollars)
Year Value of agreements Deliveries
1955-1966 4,500 3,575
1967 525 500
1968 500 500
1969 350 450
1970 1,150 1,000
1971 1,600 850
1972 1,500 1,205
1973 2,800 3,010
1974 3,500 2,250
1975 2,000 1,685
1976 2,190
Total 20,875 17,215
Source: CIA, Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of
the Free World, 1976 (August 1977), p. 3.
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TABLE 4.3
SOVIET ECONOMIC AID TO LDGS, 
EXTENSIONS AND DRAWINGS 
(in millions of dollars)
Year Aid extended Aid drawn
1954-1966 5,065 2,245
1967 291 310
1968 379 310
1969 494 355
1970 198 385
1971 1,125 440
1972 802 430
1973 661 490
1974 580 690
1975 1,299 485
1976
Total 11,769
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6,560
Source: CIA, Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of
the Free World, 1976, p. 7,
It was mentioned previously that credits connected with the USSR's 
economic aid programme are normally granted on more favourable terms 
than commercial credits from world financial markets. For example, 
in November 1976, the USSR agreed to provide Peru with a line of credit 
which gave selected Peruvian buyers access to ten-year credits at an­
nual interest rates between 4 and 5 p e r c e n t . I t  is interesting to ■
note that some state-owned companies in LDGs receive Soviet credits 
on more favourable terms than privately owned companies. On 13 Feb­
ruary 1974, the USSR agreed to provide Argentina with a credit to fi­
nance deliveries of Soviet machinery, equipment and technical services. 
Under the agreement Argentine state agencies are entitled to ten-year 
credits at 4,5 percent annual interest while private Argentine compan-
p Q
les are required to pay 5 percent interest for their ten-year credits.
In most cases Soviet economic aid is tied to specific industries
in LDGs, The industries which have held prominent positions in the
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Soviet economy (i.e., the heavy industries) have greatly influenced 
the USSR’s foreign aid policy. Indeed, the USSR has joined other in­
dustrially developed countries in recognising the importance of the 
Third World as a market for the output of highly specialised home in­
dustries, During the period 1954-1976, approximately 75 percent of 
Soviet economic aid offered to LDGs was earmarked for electric power, 
manufacturing and extractive industries (see TABLE 4.4),
TABLE 4.4
DISTRIBUTION OF SOVIET ECONOMIC AID 
EXTENDED TO LDGS, 1954-1976
Economic sector Percent
Manufacturing and extractive industries 55
Electric power 20
Transportation and communications 8
Agriculture 6
Geological prospecting 6
Education, science, culture and health
Total 100
Source: CIA, Communist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of
the Free World, 1976, p, 8 ,
Soviet aid-related credits for specific industrial projects in 
LDGs are often granted on very favourable terms. For example, in 1977, 
the USSR granted India a 3*5 million-ruble credit which is repayable 
over a period of fifteen years at an annual interest rate of 2 ,5 per­
cent. The credit is earmarked for the purchase of Soviet machinery, 
equipment and technical services for the development of copper reserves 
in the Malanjkhand region,Moreover, Soviet credits for specific 
commodity purchases are frequently granted on very favourable terms.
In April 1977, the USSR granted India a 25O million-ruble credit which 
is repayable over a twenty-year period (plus three years grace) at an 
annual interest rate of 2.5 percent. The credit can be used to finance
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imports of Soviet machinery and equipment for steel plants, coal mines 
and other sectors of the Indian economy,
Soviet technical missions play a key role in determining the 
direction and level of Soviet economic aid. These missions comprise 
leading technicians from many sectors of the Soviet economy and are 
responsible for assessing the feasibility of proposed projects in LDCs, 
In most cases a foreign government will ask the USSR to send a tech­
nical mission. In other cases the USSR will offer to send a technical 
mission to an LDG if Soviet intelligence agencies deem such a move to 
be in the best interests of the Soviet Union. During the last decade 
Soviet technical missions have been responsible for generating a sig­
nificant amount of business for Soviet FTOs, In the early part of 
1977» Soviet technical mission was sent to Costa Rica for the purpose 
of studying the feasibility of projects planned by the Oficina de Plan- 
ificacion Nacional (Ofiplan) for the period 1977-1981. Amongst the 
planned projects is a $700-million to $1,000-million aluminium plant 
with a 760 kilowatt hydroelectric unit,^^
The State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations is responsible 
for formulating and controlling the USSR's economic aid programme. The 
committee is given the task of apportioning limited Soviet aid resour­
ces on the basis of economic and political considerations. Represen­
tatives of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations are res­
ponsible for negotiating economic aid agreements with LDGs, Leaders 
of Soviet organisations which supply goods and services to LDGs under 
the USSR's foreign aid schemes also participate in the negotiations. 
After the aid agreements have been drawn up, top-level Party and gov­
ernment officials are often called upon to sign them,^ ^
The USSR's foreign aid programme has helped the country in a num­
ber of respects. Firstly, the USSR has been able to stimulate interest
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for its industrial products and technical services. As a result, the 
Soviet Union is now competing in markets which have traditionally been 
commercial strongholds of IMTEs,Secondly, by investing its surplus 
capital in labour-intensive economies the USSR has been able to over­
come some of the problems connected with its manpower shortages. In­
deed, some of the USSR's production targets can be realised through 
commodity shipments from Soviet-funded industrial projects in LDGs. 
Thirdly, commodity shipments from Soviet-funded projects in LDGs can 
also be diverted to selected world markets. Steel destined for some 
markets in Africa and Southeast Asia can be shipped (via land or sea) 
more cheaply from Soviet-funded plants in India than it can from the 
USSR, Moreover, a successful Soviet-funded project creates an on-going 
demand for additional Soviet deliveries to either replace worn machin­
ery or expand the project's operations. And finally, a successful 
Soviet-funded project can generate interest in initiating other pro­
jects utilising Soviet machinery, equipment and technical services.
The Soviet foreign aid programme appears to be holding up quite 
well despite adverse publicity from such countries as the United States 
and China. Needless to say, the two countries differ markedly in their 
criticism of the Soviet foreign aid programme. Ever since the USSR 
started extending a fair amount of economic and military aid, Ameri­
cans have criticised the Soviet Union for using foreign aid as a means 
of promoting Marxism-Leninism in LDGs, Leon M. Herman states *
The reasons that motivate the Soviet leaders to extend aid to the 
developing nations are, in short, largely external to the specific 
needs of the recipients. They do not spring from a desire to bring 
relief from temporary economic pressures, such as food shortages 
or balance-of-payments difficulties. Rather, the sights of the 
Soviet leadership are fixed on finding ways to promote the build­
ing of economic institutions likely to produce the 'correct' his- 
torymaking changes in these countries. They would not be Marxist 
politicians if they acted otherwise.34
The Chinese, of course, take a different view of Soviet foreign aid.
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Taking the cunning schemes of U.S. imperialism as its example,
Soviet revisionist social-imperialism has in recent years made 
heavy inroads in Asia, Africa and Latin America in the name of 
providing economic and military 'aid'. In this way it has carried 
out expansion and aggression in a number of countries in these 
continents. Such 'aid' is an important component part of the Sov­
iet revisionists' plot to collude and contend with U,S, imperial­
ism in a vain attempt to redivide the world ; it is one of the ways 
they ruthlessly enslave and exploit Asian, African and Latin Amer­
ican people.35
It is quite obvious that part of the USSR's foreign aid programme 
is aimed at promoting Soviet-type economic (and political) institutions 
in LDGs, However, it is only fair to point out that Soviet economic 
aid has helped to raise the standard of living for some people in LDGs, 
Moreover, much could be said about the fact that Soviet economic aid 
helps to reduce the balance-of-payments deficits of LDGs and even takes 
some of the pressure off world financial markets. Indeed, without 
clearing-dollar financing LDGs would either be forced to pay market 
rates for commercial credits or governments of IMTEs would have to 
provide additional amounts of economic aid at the expense of straining 
the delicate structure of the international monetary system.
There is no conclusive evidence that the USSR is scheming to 
to gain control over LDGs via its aid programme. But even if it is, 
recent reports seem to suggest that the USSR has a long way to go. For 
almost two decades India has been considered one of the USSR's most 
important recipients of economic aid,^  ^ However, a few years ago Bhabani 
Sen Gupta pointed out that the United States had rendered over twice as 
much aid for India's economic development as the USSR, Moreover,
Sen Gupta contends that 'Despite the socialist rhetoric of India's 
economic and social planning, India is well advanced on the road to 
capitalist development, and Soviet scholars have long given up hope 
that it would traverse the noncapitalist path'.^  ^ And the setbacks 
for the USSR in Egypt and Somalia indicate that despite significant 
infusions of economic and military aid the Soviet Union can still be
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sent packing at a moment's notice.
Soviet Visible Exports as a Means of Financing 
Imports from the West
Although the USSR has recorded some rather large trade deficits with 
IMTEs during the 1970s it is still important to note that throughout 
this period most Soviet imports from IMTEs were financed on the basis 
of Soviet exports. According to trade statistics published by the 
USSR, Soviet exports to IMTEs amounted to ?2 percent of Soviet imports 
from these countries in 1976, and 89 percent in 1977. As we learned, 
when a Western importer receives Soviet commodities he must either 
pay off the Soviet exporter immediately (in goods or cash) or agree 
to pay for the commodities at some future date. If the Western import­
er wishes to pay at some future date he must send promissory notes 
to the Soviet exporter (or Vneshtorgbank) or sign (accept) bills of 
exchange issued by the Soviet exporter. These promissory notes and 
bills of exchange can either be held by the Soviet exporter (or Vnesh­
torgbank) until they mature (at which time they can be presented to 
the importer's bank for collection) or the notes and bills can be dis­
counted in Western money markets. The earnings of Soviet exporters 
are usually placed in Vneshtorgbank or Soviet banks in the West, Such 
earnings, of course, are used to pay for Soviet imports.
It was mentioned previously that the USSR has recorded some rather 
large trade surpluses with LDGs during the 1970s, Clearing dollars 
represent a significant portion of these trade surpluses. In some 
cases the USSR is able to finance its imports from IMTEs on the basis 
of clearing-dollar balances. However, it is generally accepted that 
such transactions are unable to cover all Soviet trade deficits with 
IMTEs. Now it is quite possible that the USSR finances some of its
24?
debts with IMTEs on the basis of surplus hard currency earnings from 
LDCs. We know from Western reports that some Soviet trade with LDCs 
is financed with hard currency. For example, in October 1975» the 
Financial Times reported that Vneshtorgbank and two London-based banks—  
Citicorp International Bank Ltd, and Lloyds Bank International Ltd.—  
arranged two Eurocurrency loans for Argentina totalling $50 million.
The loans were guaranteed by the central bank of Argentina and report­
edly obtained to finance deliveries of equipment from the Soviet FTC 
Energomasheksport, Prior to receiving the two loans Argentina was 
required to repay a significant portion of its foreign debt which led 
to a marked reduction in the country's foreign currency reserves,
This might well have been the reason for Vneshtorgbank's participation 
in the loans. In the light of Argentina's precarious financial posi­
tion it seems possible that hard currency payments for Energomasheksport's 
equipment might have been out of the question for some time if Argen­
tina had been required to raise the two loans without Vneshtorgbank's 
assistance. It is interesting to note that Vneshtorgbank functioned 
as a co-manager of the consortium which arranged the two loans. By 
serving in such a capacity Vneshtorgbank was able to help determine 
the participation fees connected with the loans. So, Argentina might 
have received the loans on relatively favourable terms, Soviet lend­
ing and borrowing operations in world financial markets will be dis­
cussed in greater detail in CHAPTER V, For the moment it is only nec­
essary to be aware of the fact that LDGs sometimes pay rather signif­
icant sums of hard currency for Soviet exports,
Government-Supported Credits for the USSR 
We learned previously that the USSR is reluctant to pay market interest
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rates for credit. Part of this reluctance stems from the belief that 
IMTEs can benefit from trade with the USSR without charging exorbit­
ant interest rates. It should also be mentioned that the USSR usually 
attempts to secure credits from IMTEs for the longest periods. In 
1976, Vladimir Alkhimov pointed out that interest rates on government- 
supported credits granted to the USSR by France, Italy, Japan, the 
U,K, and other countries were around 6 or 7 percent while interest 
rates in the free market were about 10 percent. According to Alkhimov, 
countries which grant credits to the USSR on favourable terms benefit 
in a number of ways.
Our /”the USSR's^ / purchases in these countries provide jobs and 
state revenues through tax receipts. At the same time our purchases 
expand production and raise the countries' technological level and 
competitive ability,40
Alkhimov also mentioned one important reason for Soviet interest in 
obtaining credits on a medium- and long-term basis. During the early 
1970s the price of petroleum and natural gas increased by over 400 
percent, coal and metals (excluding gold) between 200 and 3OO percent 
and gold about 400 percent. If Soviet officials had decided to pay 
cash for the deliveries of Western machinery and equipment for the 
Volga Motor Works the USSR would have been required to export far more 
petroleum, gas, gold etc, in the mid-1960s than it will be required 
to export during the 1970s in order to pay off the long-term credits 
plus interest.(Of course, there is no evidence that Soviet plan­
ners actually foresaw significant increases in world market prices 
for Soviet petroleum, gas, gold etc,)
A number of Western governments have extended lines of credit 
to the USSR for periods up to five years. (A line of credit enables 
a borrower to draw a certain amount of credit over a given length of 
time,) Most government-supported lines of credit amount to well over 
$1 billion each. These lines of credit are extremely important to the
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USSR as they give Soviet officials a good idea of the amount of hard 
currency available for financing Soviet imports from IMTEs, Now it 
is widely known that IMTEs grant government-supported credits which 
are not connected with lines of credit. However, such credits are only 
granted on a case-by-case basis (i.e,, a Western exporter and a Soviet 
importer usually have no way of knowing whether government-supported 
credits are available for their contract until government authorities 
have made a decision). Of course, government approval is required 
for each credit granted under lines of credit extended by Western gov­
ernments, But in such cases both the Western exporter and Soviet im­
porter have at least a fair idea that their contract will be financed 
on the basis of government-supported credits.
During the mid-1970s five Western governments extended the USSR 
lines of credit totalling $7.6 billion. The largest line of credit 
amounted to $2,8 billion and was extended by France for a period of 
five years (1975-1979). Under the French line of credit, long-term 
credits for contracts below $100 million carry an interest rate of 
7.55 percent including all fees and premiums. Long-term credits for 
contracts exceeding $100 million carry an interest rate of 7.2 percent, 
French government-supported credits can be granted for periods up to
eight and one-half years. Contracts which involve such credits call
42for a 20 percent cash downpayment,
Britain, Japan, Italy and Canada also extended government-backed 
lines of credit to the USSR during the mid-197Us* The U,K,'s line 
of credit amounted to £950 million (or about $1,8 billion at the time 
it was granted). Interest rates on British government-supported cred­
its are around 7 percent, Japan's line of credit totalled $1,6 bil­
lion and was granted to finance specific projects in the USSR, Interest 
rates on Japanese government-supported credits range between 6 and
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9 percent. In October 1975» the Italian government extended the USSR 
a $900-million line of credit. The credit was broken down into three 
tranches: $550 million for 1976, $175 million for 1977# and $175 mil­
lion for 1978. Interest rates on Italian government-supported credits 
are around 7.55 percent, Canada's Export Development Corporation ex­
tended a $500-million line of credit to the USSR in May 1975. Cred­
its granted under this agreement carry an interest rate of 7.5 percent,
It is important to keep in mind the fact that most govemment-
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supported credits carry fixed interest rates, (In other words a gov­
ernment-backed credit which is granted for a period of seven years 
will normally carry the same rate of interest throughout the seven- 
year period.) This, of course, enables the USSR to calculate the exact 
cost of borrowing. On the other hand. Eurocurrency (or free-market) 
loans to the USSR usually carry floating rates (i.e., interest rates 
are permitted to fluctuate).
In the latter part of 1976, the president of the U.S.-USSR Trade 
and Economic Council, Harold B, Scott, pointed out that the USSR had 
utilised only 50 percent of the aforementioned French line of credit,
10 percent of the aforementioned Canadian line of credit and 5 percent 
of the aforementioned British line of credit. On the basis of these 
facts Scott concluded that the Soviets appear to be rather 'conserva­
tive' when it comes to borrowing from I M T E s . N o w  the notion that 
the USSR is cautious about going too far into debt with IMTEs seems
to be well founded. The disadvantages of over-borrowing are obvious: 
such a policy could place the USSR in a precarious financial position 
and result in a fair amount of adverse publicity. But the USSR's rec­
ord hardly suggests that Soviets are reluctant to borrow if conditions 
are favourable, Soviet planners are constantly looking for Western 
credits (on favourable terms) which will enable the USSR to boost its
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export potential. In the words of one of Vneshtorgbank's directors,
A. S, Maslov, 'When there is a favourable and profitable proposal, 
we take i t ' I t  might be interesting to note that the USSR sometimes 
attempts to obtain credits for Western machinery and equipment in the 
face of rising world market prices for these commodities. For example, 
in April 1974, Japan extended the USSR a $450-million credit to pur­
chase Japanese machinery and equipment for the development of South 
Yakutian coal deposits. About a year and a half later (November 1975) 
the USSR insisted that Japan should provide an additional $1^0 million
for the coal project in order to cover the rising costs for Japanese
47machinery and equipment. Soviet planners undoubtedly estimated that 
additional exports of coal (or rising world market prices for coal) 
would cover the costs of importing more Japanese machinery and equip­
ment.
It should also be mentioned that the USSR's reluctance to start 
borrowing immediately after a line of credit has been extended can 
give one the impression that the Soviets could care less about accept­
ing credits from a particular IMTE, However, as the expiration date 
of the line of credit approaches the Soviets have been known to develop 
a hearty appetite for hard currency credits. Let's consider the £950- 
million line of credit which was extended to the USSR by the U.K. in 
February 1975* (Remember that the line of credit was extended for a 
period of five years.) About a year and a half after the line of cred­
it had been extended (i.e., in July 1976) only 4 percent (£36 million) 
was u t i l i s e d , B u t  by November 1977, the amount drawn from the line 
of credit had risen to about £450 million (47 p e r c e n t),This  marked 
increase is a good indication that the line of credit will be fully 
utilised by February 1980,
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Private Credits for the Financing of Soviet 
Imports from the West
I'/hen government-supported credits are unavailable the USSR is often 
required to finance its Western imports through private banks. The 
interest rates (plus participation and commitment fees) for credits 
granted by private sources are usually higher than those which are 
connected with government-supported credit schemes. Moreover, private 
lenders normally place floating interest rates on their credits.
The FRG has not extended much low-cost credit to the USSR, How­
ever, it is interesting to note that the USSR has not pushed for a 
significant change in the FRG's lending policy. According to one source, 
the USSR is willing to pay cash (either from its own reserves or from 
funds obtained in Eurocurrency markets) for a sizeable amount of its 
imports from the FRG as the constant appreciation of the Deutsche mark 
tends to make even short-term financing in marks relatively expensive,
The West German bank Ausfuhrkredit GmbH (AKA) is quite active 
in financing trade between the USSR and the FRG, Shareholders of AKA 
include a number of West-German private banks. Since AKA specialises
in trade financing it is able to provide credits at rates slightly
51below those prevailing in the free market. As a rule, AKA and other 
banks in the FRG finance German-Soviet trade via supplier's credits.
Between October 1974 and September 1977» banks in the FRG extend­
ed lines of credit totalling approximately DM 3*7 billion (about $1,6 
billion at 1977 exchange rates) for German-Soviet gas pipeline deals.
In September 1977» ^ consortium of West German banks granted Vneshtorg­
bank a DM 300~million credit (about $133 million). According to one
report the credit was granted for a period of ten years at a fixed rate 
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of interest. In January 1978, a consortium of West German banks 
extended a DM 600-million line of credit (about $285 million) to Vnesh­
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torgbank for the purpose of financing Soviet imports of German steel 
pipes. Under the terms of the agreement Vneshtorgbank is entitled to 
draw DM 600-million worth of credits over a period of one year (January 
1978-January 1979). The USSR will repay such credits over a period 
of seven years.
The low level of American-Soviet non-agricultural trade is often 
blamed on the U.S. government's reluctance to provide adequate cred­
it facilities for Soviet importers. In some cases the USSR is forced 
to pay market rates for credits in order to finance imports from the 
United States, However, it should be noted that the USSR seldom pur­
chases commodities in the United States if the same goods (or substi­
tutes) are sold in countries which offer more favourable terms for cred­
it,Recognising that a fair amount of business is lost by not pro­
viding adequate financing facilities for Soviet importers, American 
commercial banks have started proposing credit schemes aimed at boost­
ing American-Soviet trade. One of the most interesting schemes was 
divulged by Bank of America at a special meeting of the U.S.-USSR Trade 
and Economic Council in February 1975* The plan called for the crea­
tion of a three-year, $500-million revolving credit facility which 
would give the USSR access to short-term credits after individual agree­
ments have been finalised between American exporters and Soviet import­
ers. According to a Bank-of-America official, the charges connected 
with these credits would most likely be more favourable than market 
rates for medium- and long-term credits,
Soviet Hard Currency Earnings from Selected 
Visible and Invisible Exports
The USSR does not publish statistics on its earnings from a number 
of visible exports and all invisible exports. Some of the important
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visible exports which are not cited in official Soviet trade statis­
tics include gold and other precious metals, and non-industrial dia­
monds and other precious gems. The Soviet merchant fleet and tourist 
industry account for a sizeable portion of the USSR's invisible earn­
ings, However, as the USSR's commercial and financial activities grow, 
the Soviet Union could start earning quite a lot of hard currency from 
other invisible sources. These sources include Soviet banking services 
(both in the USSR and abroad) and dividends paid to Soviet sharehold­
ers of foreign-based companies,
Soviet Gold Sales in the West
Official statistics on Soviet gold reserves, production and sales are 
not published by the USSR, (The USSR published data on its gold re­
serves until the mid-1930s.) Since the end of World War II, Western 
analysts have been publishing estimates on the size of annual Soviet 
gold sales in the West, These estimates are based upon (estimates of) 
the amount of Soviet gold imported by individual Western nations. In 
the light of the fact that most Western nations are reluctant to give 
an accurate account of their gold operations it is obviously difficult 
to make a reliable estimate on the amount of Soviet gold which is sold 
in the West each year. Therefore, we should always allow for a mar­
gin of error when using estimates on Soviet gold sales. In addition 
to Soviet gold sales. Western analysts have also produced estimates 
on the annual level of Soviet gold output. On the basis of these es­
timates the USSR is ranked as the world's second largest gold producer. 
As in the case of Soviet gold sales, we should allow for a margin of 
error when using estimates on Soviet gold production, TABLE 4,5 pro­
vides data on Soviet gold output and sales during the period 1950-1973.
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TABLE 4.5
SOVIET GOLD OUTPUT, SALES AND 
RESERVES, 1950-1973 
(in metric tons)
Year Output* Sales to 
the West*
Sales to, 
the West
other
uses*
Change in 
Reserves^
Reserves*
1950 128 5 + 123 1,446
1951 140 — - 5 + 135 1,581
1952 149 - - 6 + i43 1,724
1953 150 67 125 6 + 77 1,801
1954 149 67 65 7 + 74 1,875
1955 145 67 65 8 + 70 1.945
1956 151 133 135 10 -f- 8 1,953
1957 157 231 230 11 - 85 1,868
1958 166 196 195 12 — 42 1,826
1959 175 222 265 14 - 61 1,765
i960 188 178 185 15 5 1,760
1961 201 173 280 16 ■f 12 1,772
1962 215 191 190 19 -f 5 1,777
1963 229 489 490 20 - 280 1,497
1964 244 401 400 21 - 178 1,319
1965 260 488 490 23 - 251 1,068
1966 278 •P* — 25 + 253 1,321
1967 249 13 10 28 + 208 1,529
1968 304 10 10 31 ■f 263 1,792
1969 3I8 - 5 33 + 285 2,077
1970 336 - 50 37 + 299 2,376
1971 345 20 90 42 + 283 2,659
1972 360 190 200 57 + 113 2,772
1973 371
1975 (Plan)404
280 330 86 + 5 2,777
^Kaser's estimates.
^Estimates from the Bank for International Settlements.
Sources: Michael Kaser, 'The Soviet Balance of Payments', Inter­
national Currency Review. Vol. 6, No, 3 (May-June 1974), p, 60j and 
data obtained via this researcher's personal correspondence with the 
Bank for International Settlements,
It should be pointed out that estimates on Soviet gold produc­
tion cited in TABLE 4,5 differ markedly from other estimates. Accord­
ing to some sources Soviet gold production throughout the 1950s and 
early 1960s fluctuated between 8,8 million troy ounces (about 2/4 met­
ric tons) per year and 19.3 million troy ounces (about 6OO metric tons).^^
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However, in 1964, the GIA published much lower estimates which were 
supposedly based on documents supplied by the Soviet defector Colonel 
Oleg Penkovsky, According to the updated estimates Soviet gold pro­
duction in the early 1960s fluctuated between 4,3 million troy ounces 
(about 134 metric tons) per year and 4,9 million troy ounces (about 
152 metric tons). Estimates from the U.S. Bureau of Mines placed 
Soviet gold production at 5*1 million troy ounces (about 159 metric 
tons) for 1963, and approximately 5.6 million troy ounces (about 1?4
58metric tons) for 1964, An employee of Radio Free Europe has estim­
ated that Soviet gold production amounted to 242 metric tons in 1972,
59
and 275 metric tons in 1973.
For decades gold has served as an important means of covering 
Soviet trade deficits with IMTEs, At one time gold was so important 
to the USSR that production costs of the metal were seldom taken into
60
consideration. If Soviet leaders wished to increase the country's 
gold reserves few objections were raised on the grounds that gold pro­
duction was unprofitable. In 1974, the production costs for Soviet 
gold were estimated at $75.00 or $85.00 per troy o u n c e , S i n c e  the 
price of gold did not rise much above $45.00 per troy ounce until the 
early 1970s it is possible that the USSR was selling gold at a loss 
for some time, (it is assumed that production costs for Soviet gold 
were about the same in the 1960s as they were in the first half of 
the 1970s.)
The data in TABLE 4,5 show that Soviet gold production has in­
creased markedly since the early 1950s. In the light of the fact that 
few Western credits and loans were granted to the USSR between 1946 
and 1966, it was wise for the USSR to increase its gold production 
as the metal represented an important means of financing Soviet for­
eign trade. For example, the sharp increase in Soviet gold sales which
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took place from 1963-1965 was undoubtedly connected with the huge ship­
ments of Western wheat to the USSR during the same period. Since 
gold was one of the few Soviet commodities which could be readily sold 
in IMTEs it is not surprising that gold production was encouraged in 
the USSR during the 1950s and 1960s despite the costs. But why did 
gold production continue to increase in the early 1970s when Western 
credits were granted to the USSR on a fairly large scale? The answer, 
of course, is quite simple* between January 1972 and January 1974,
the world market price for gold increased from $45.70 to $129.11 per 
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troy ounce. Indeed, after 1972, gold production in the USSR became 
a profitable undertaking (if the aforementioned estimates on the cost 
of producing Soviet gold are accurate). Now can we say that the mark­
ed increase in Soviet gold sales from 1972-1973 was connected with 
the massive Soviet purchases of American wheat during the same period? 
Perhaps, but we should also bear in mind that the United States grant­
ed the USSR a $750-million credit in 1972 for the purpose of financing 
American grain exports to the USSR during the period 1972-1973* lu 
the light of this fact it is doubtful that the sharp increase in Sov­
iet gold sales during 1972 and 1973 can be attributed solely to Sov­
iet purchases of American wheat. However, the overall Soviet trade 
deficit with IMTEs in 1972 (about $1,209.7 million) and in 1973 (about 
$1,141.3 million) might well have induced the USSR to step up its oper­
ations in world gold markets. According to one estimate the USSR sold 
$325-million worth of gold in 1972, and $800-million worth in 1973*^^
But these estimates could be too low. According to estimates by the 
Bank for International Settlements (BIS), the USSR sold 200 metric 
tons of gold in 1972, and 330 metric tons in 1973 (see TABLE 4,5). In 
the event the USSR sold its gold for $58.00 per troy ounce in 1972 (i.e., 
the average price for gold in 1972), and $97*00 per troy ounce in 1973
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(the average price in 1973), the USSR would have earned $373 million
from gold sales in 1972, and $1,029 million in 1973*
Soviet gold sales amounted to 7 million troy ounces (about 218 
64
metric tons) in 1974, The following year sales dropped to approx-
65imately I50 metric tons. According to one source,between 25O and
300 metric tons of Soviet gold, worth an estimated $1 billion to $1,2
66
billion, were sold in world markets during 1976, However, another 
source estimated that the USSR sold about $1,4-billion worth of gold 
in 1976.^7 Soviet gold sales in 1975 and 1976 indicate that there 
is not necessarily a strong correlation between Soviet grain imports 
from the West and Soviet gold sales. Indeed, in 1975, the poor Sov­
iet grain harvest did not lead to massive gold exports (as far as most 
of us Icnow) from the USSR, But in 1976, Soviet gold sales increased 
markedly in the face of an excellent grain harvest. During 1977, 'com­
munist countries' sold about 450 metric tons of gold (presumably in 
the West), This amount of gold would be worth approximately $2,2 bil­
lion at $150.00 per troy ounce. If the USSR was responsible for 75
percent of the gold sales attributed to 'communist countries' during
681977, Soviet earnings would have totalled about $1,6 billion.
As one of the major gold-selling nations, the USSR has shown 
on a few occasions that it is capable of bringing about marked changes 
in the price of gold. According to London merchant bankers, Soviet 
gold sales from January through the early part of April 1972, helped 
to stabilise conditions in world gold markets. However, when rumours 
started circulating in mid-April about a decline in South African gold 
production (South Africa is the world's largest gold producer) the 
USSR temporarily suspended its selling operations. This move helped 
bring about a sharp increase in the price of gold. In August 1972, 
rumours that the USSR would have to sell large quantities of gold to
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finance grain imports led to a marked decrease in the price of the
metal. When the USSR temporarily halted its selling operations in
the latter part of 1972, the price of gold increased,
The USSR's success in obtaining credits and loans from IMTEs has
brought about a fundamental change in Soviet gold-selling tactics. As
we learned, the USSR was often required to sell gold in the 1950s and
1960s in order to finance imports from IMTEs. Whenever the USSR was
forced to finance large trade deficits gold prices normally fell as
a result of rumours that Soviet traders would soon begin selling part
of their reserves. However, at this time Soviet trade deficits do not
necessarily lead to an increase in Soviet gold sales. The USSR now
has easy access to Western credits which means that Soviet gold traders
can plan their activities according to conditions in the marketplace.
If a Soviet trade deficit leads to a sharp decline in the price of
gold Soviet traders could decide to hold on to their supplies. In
the event the price of gold falls too low the Soviets could be induced
to enter the market as buyers. Indeed, the USSR has been operating
70as a buyer in world gold markets for some time. ' When the Soviet 
trade position improves and the price of gold increases, Soviet trad­
ers could decide to sell some of the gold obtained in the West (for 
a handsome profit) along with some of their Soviet gold. Nowadays 
we can expect the USSR to borrow funds from IMTEs if projected increases 
in the price of gold are greater than interest charges on hard currency 
credits and loans.
In addition to its operations in the world bullion market (i.e., 
the market for gold bars and ingots) the USSR has also been quite ac­
tive in the market for gold coins and medals. In the latter part of 
1975, Dresdner Bank agreed to market the chervonets— the Soviet ten- 
ruble gold coin weighing 7.74 grammes, (The reader should not confuse
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the gold coin with the bank note mentioned in CHAPTER I,) Vneshtorg­
bank was responsible for negotiating and signing the deal with the 
West German bank, A London gold dealer saw the chervonets as a means
of selling Soviet gold reserves without moving prices too sharply in
71the bullion market. On the other hand, Michael Kaser maintained 
that the decline in world market prices for bullion encouraged the Sov­
iets to produce the chervonets in an attempt to receive the most hard
72currency from their sales of the precious metal. The USSR's decision 
to start minting the chervonets was undoubtedly influenced by the fact 
that the demand in the West for legal-tender gold coins increased sig­
nificantly during 197^. According to Kaser, the chervonets apparently 
replaced an earlier scheme which called for the mass production and 
marketing of Soviet gold jewellery in the West. The chervonets start­
ed selling for DM 95«00 in the FRG and $36,50 in the United States,
These prices were reportedly 4 to 5 percent above the world market
73price for 7*7^ grammes of bullion. The USSR set the premium for
the chervonets below the premiums for other legal-tender coins (e.g.,
the Krugerrand) in an attempt to gain a strong foothold in the market.
At the outset the chervonets became so popular that the premium was
7h
raised to 8 percent.
In the latter part of 1977» the gold, silver and platinum commem­
orative coins for the I98O Moscow Olympics became legal tender in the 
USSR, This move was seen as an attempt to boost sales of the coins 
in the West as some countries charge a value-added tax on coins which 
are not legal tender,According to one source a consortium of West­
ern companies— the Numinter Group— will be responsible for marketing 
the coins in the West, It is projected that the Numinter Group will 
sell about $150-million worth of the commemorative c o i n s , ^6 (Note 
that this figure / ”$150 million^/ is only the face value of the coins.)
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Soviet earnings from the coins will he used to finance the Moscow Olym­
pics,
The USSR also produced 10,000 one-ounce gold medals to commem­
orate the Apollo-Soyuz space flight. Many of the medals were sold in 
the West, In mid-1975, the USSR was selling the medals for about $340,00 
apiece. (American coin dealers were selling the Apollo-Soyuz medals 
for $425.00 eaoh,^^) At that time one troy ounce of gold (bullion) 
was worth about $162,00,
We should now turn our attention to Soviet gold reserves. Through­
out the 1950s and early 1960s, estimates on Soviet gold reserves fluctu­
ated between 112,5 million troy ounces (about 3»499 metric tons) and 
290 million troy ounces (about 9,019 metric tons). However, in 1964, 
the CIA published estimates on Soviet gold reserves which were consid­
erably lower than the aforementioned figures. The updated estimates 
were supposedly based on documents supplied by Colonel Penkovsky, These 
estimates placed Soviet gold reserves between 70,7 million troy ounces
(about 2,199 metric tons) and 85.2 million troy ounces (about 2,650
78
metric tons). Therefore, at the official rate of $35.00 per ounce 
Soviet gold reserves in the early I96OS were worth an estimated $2,474,5 
million to $2,982,0 million, (The reader should note that these estim­
ates differ from Kaser's estimates in TABLE 4,5.)
As we learned, the USSR increased its gold sales from I963-I965 
in order to pay for imports of Western grain. According to statistics 
from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) Soviet gold sales in the 
West amounted to $260 million in 1957» $210 million in 1958, $255 mil­
lion in 1959, $200 million in I96O, $275 million in I96I, and $215 mil-
79lion in 1962, Soviet purchases of wheat from Australia, Canada,
France, the FRG and the United States in I963, were partially respon­
sible for Soviet gold sales amounting to $550 million during that year,®^
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During the early months of 196^ 1- the USSR sold about $330-million worth
of gold in Western markets.Following the gold sales in I963, the
USSR claimed that its gold reserves had not been markedly reduced. One
Soviet report mentioned the discovery of a large gold field on the
Kolyma River, East German reports in the early 1960s mentioned new
gold discoveries in Central Asia, Kazakhstan and Transcaucasia which
were supposedly capable of producing as much gold as the eastern and
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northeastern regions of the USSR produced at that time. Moreover, 
a number of Soviet reports mentioned that modem machinery and mining 
techniques were being employed to increase gold production in the USSR, 
In 1965, Soviet gold sales in the West amounted to approximately
83$550 million. Once again the USSR indicated that its gold reserves 
would not be significantly reduced as a result of increased gold sales, 
Soviet reports mentioned new gold discoveries in Uzbekistan and Kaz­
akhstan (on the Irtysh River), as well as new ore-dressing plants and 
increased prospecting in the Kyzyl-Kum D e s e r t . O v e r  40 percent of 
the Soviet gold which was sold during I965 ($225 million or 200 metric 
tons) was placed on the market during the three-month period immediate­
ly following the signing of contracts in August for the importation 
of 6,040,000 metric tons of Canadian wheat (and wheat flour) into the 
USSR from 1965-1966, Some of the Soviet gold was sold in London while 
another portion was reportedly sold through the BIS.^^
Reports published in the West indicate that Soviet gold product­
ion during the early 1960s did not keep pace with Soviet gold sales 
during the same period. According to one report Soviet gold product-
n X
ion amounted to $644 million from 1960-1964, This sum is well under 
half the size of estimated Soviet gold sales during the same period. On 
the basis of output and sales estimates, Western analysts concluded that 
Soviet gold reserves fell sharply during the first half of the 1960s,
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One source claimed that Soviet gold reserves fell from $3,000 million
in 1956, to $2,000 million in 1964.^^ At the end of I965, the GIA
88
placed Soviet gold reserves at 1,000 metric tons amounting to about 
$1,124 million at the official rate of $35.00 per troy ounce. (Kaser*s 
estimate /""TABLE 4.5.7 Soviet gold reserves in I965 is almost the 
same as the estimate by the GIA.)
As we learned from TABLE 4.5, Soviet gold sales decreased sig­
nificantly from 1966-1971. If the GIA estimates are accurate, one 
reason behind the slow down in Soviet gold-selling operations is quite 
obvious, (indeed, the Soviets would have been forced to scrape the 
bottom of the gold barrel in order to remain key operators in the mar­
ketplace.) However, we must also take into consideration the fact that 
Western government-supported medium- and long-term credits became the 
chief method of financing Soviet trade deficits with IMTEs from I966- 
1971 (and indeed after that period). During the period I966-I97I, 
such credits amounted to more than $2 b i l l i o n , I n  the light of this 
fact the USSR might have been reluctant to sell part of its gold re­
serves during the late 1960s and early 1970s, even if such reserves 
amounted to well over the estimated 1,000 tons. According to Paul 
Einzig, the USSR might well have decided in the mid-1960s that the 
price of gold would rise significantly vis-à-vis major Western curren­
cies in the near future. Therefore, it was clear that gold reserves 
had to be increased. The fact that Western nations started granting 
credits to the USSR on a large scale during the latter part of the 
1960s must have heartened Soviet officials since such credits meant 
that most Soviet gold production could be used to build up the country's 
reserves, Einzig states:
The Soviet Government shared the assumption held by hoarders of 
gold, that a substantial devaluation of the dollar could not be 
delayed for very long, and it considered it worthwhile to pay
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Interest on foreign credits rather than use up its gold stock in 
payment for essential i m p o r t s .90
There is little doubt that Soviet gold reserves increased mark­
edly between 1966 and 1972, According to Franz Pick, Soviet gold re­
serves amounted to about $10.8 billion in 1972 at the official rate 
of $35.00 per troy ounce. At the free-market price of $65.00 per troy 
ounce these reserves were worth an estimated $20,1 billion,However,
according to another source the market value of Soviet gold reserves
. 92
amounted to $8.8 billion in mid-1973. Western analysts have estimated
that in 1976, Soviet gold reserves in Gosbank were anywhere between
2,700 and 8,700 metric tons. On the basis of the latter estimate (8,700
metric tons) Pick calculated that the USSR's gold stock would be worth
$11.8 billion at the official price of $42,22 per troy ounce, and $45,0
billion at the free-market price for gold at the end of 1975*^^ But
according to another source the Soviet gold stock amounted to 3,250
94
metric tons in the early part of 1977. On the basis of this estimate 
(3,250 metric tons) the USSR has the fifth largest gold stock in the 
world. (The top four gold holders are the United States, the IMF, 
the FRG and France.) Of course, there are even lower estimates. In 
1977, the CIA estimated that the USSR's gold reserve amounted to 1,870 
(metric) tons.^^ The marked difference between estimates on Soviet 
gold reserves indicates that it would be rather difficult to draw 
any meaningful conclusions from a given estimate.
In all likelihood the USSR would be reluctant to sell off a large 
portion of its gold stock even if Soviet holdings are quite substan­
tial, As we learned, the USSR can now obtain credits and loans quite 
easily from world financial markets. Moreover, any massive sales are 
bound to reduce the price for gold. In the middle part of 1978, gold 
was selling for around $200,00 per troy ounce. With prices like that 
the USSR could well be content to keep its sales around the 1977 level
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(i.e., about 338 metric tons). According to the GIA, Soviet gold pro­
duction amounted to 350 (metric) tons in 1976. By I98O, Soviet gold 
production could reach 420 (metric) tons,^^ In the event the USSR 
keeps selling gold at the 1977 level (by weight) Soviet reserves will 
probably not increase (if annual domestic consumption totals 75-100 tons).
Before we turn our attention to a new topic it might be inter­
esting to study some of the gold markets in which the USSR operates. 
According to the IMF, the USSR was operating in the London gold mar­
ket and a number of gold markets in Western Europe during the early 
19508.9^ Until the late 1950s the USSR sold most of its gold in West­
ern Europe where more favourable free-market rates for transferable 
sterling could be obtained. However, after the introduction of unified 
exchange rates for sterling in 1958, most Soviet gold was consigned 
directly to the U.K. and sold through the London gold market. During 
1959, the U.K.’s gold imports were valued at $967,5 million of which 
$255.2 million (or 26 percent) came from the USSR,^^ This sum ($255.2 
million) represented all (recorded) Soviet gold sales in 1959, A few 
years later the situation had changed. As we learned, the USSR sold 
about $215-million worth of gold in 1962, and $550“million worth in 
1963* During 1962, the U.K. imported $106,9-million worth of Soviet 
gold ( or 50 percent of total estimated/7 Soviet gold sales). One 
year later the U.K. imported $281,2-million worth of Soviet gold (or 
51 percent of total /"estimated^/ Soviet sales)^^ while $250-million 
worth of total (estimated) Soviet sales was sold in Western Europe 
(primarily in Paris).
By the mid-1960s London was no longer considered a major market
for Soviet gold. In 1965, the U.K.'s gold imports totalled $1,378,3
million of which $112,6 million (or 8 percent) represented purchases 
101
from the USSR, The $112,6-million worth of Soviet gold imported
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by the U.K. in 1965 represented 21 percent of total (estimated) Soviet 
gold sales for that year. According to the IMF, the USSR established 
a bank in Beirut during I963 (the Beirut branch of the Moscow Narodny 
Bank) to 'diversify' Soviet gold s a l e s . T h r e e  years later a Soviet 
bank (Wozchod Handelsbank) was established in Zurich. Since the lev­
el of Soviet-Swiss trade was rather low at that time a number of bank­
ers surmised that the bank would be used to facilitate Soviet gold 
sales in the West,^^^ In all likelihood the USSR did not decide to 
diversify its gold sales merely for the sake of earning higher profits 
in other markets. It is quite obvious from IMF reports that Western 
analysts were able to monitor Soviet operations in the London gold 
market quite closely. Therefore, if the USSR sold most of its gold 
through the London market in a given year, Western analysts had a rough 
idea of total Soviet gold sales for that year. This was unacceptable 
for the USSR, By setting up gold-selling outlets (i.e., banks) in a 
number of markets the USSR could spread its sales over a much wider 
sphere and hence make the information-gathering process somewhat labor­
ious for Western analysts. Moreover, by operating in countries which 
are more reluctant to divulge data on gold sales (e.g., the Lebanon 
and Switzerland) the USSR could make the intelligence operations of 
Western analysts even more difficult. In the early 1970s the Moscow 
Narodny Bank established another branch in Singapore. It might be 
interesting to note that Singapore is one of the key gold markets in 
Asia,
We can assume that very little Soviet bullion is shipped direct­
ly to foreign dealers, (if most Soviet bullion was shipped directly 
to foreign dealers the USSR would be exporting the metal constantly.)
In all likelihood the USSR sends large shipments of gold to selected 
markets on a few (unannounced) occasions each year, A sizeable amount
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of this gold is shipped by air. Soviet banks operating in the West 
are responsible for picking up gold exported by the USSR. The gold 
is subsequently placed in the banks' vaults. Since the banks do not 
o;m the gold the value of the metal does not appear on the banks' bal­
ance sheets. Indeed, Soviet foreign-based banks (SFBBs) merely agree 
to protect the valuables (gold and other precious metals) of their 
deposit-box holders. After a period of time the owners of the gold 
(e.g,, Vneshtorgbank and Gosbank) instruct SFBBs to sell a portion 
of the metal to various buyers. The orders authorising the sale of 
this gold contain instructions on how the proceeds will be handled.
The owners of the gold can: l) request that the funds be sent direct­
ly to them; 2) request that the earnings be deposited in SFBBs; 3) in­
struct SFBBs to deposit the funds in Western-owned banks; or 4) instruct 
SFBBs to pay off Soviet debts on the basis of earnings from the sale 
of the gold,
Soviet Sales of Other Precious Metals
Estimates from a few Western sources indicate that Soviet hard currency 
earnings from precious metals (excluding gold) are quite substantial.
In studying these estimates we should use a certain amount of caution 
for at least two reasons. Firstly, estimates sometimes prove to be 
inaccurate. Therefore, as in the case of gold, we should allow for a 
(rather large) margin of error when using estimates on Soviet sales 
of other types of precious metals. Secondly, estimates on Soviet earnings 
from the sale of selected products in the West (i.e., goods which are 
not cited in Soviet trade returns) are usually given in dollars. This 
can lead one to conclude that the USSR receives all payments in the 
form of hard currency. We can be sure that most of the USSR's exports
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of precious metals to the West are destined for IMTEs, Therefore, 
it is correct to assume that almost all of the USSR's earnings from 
such exports are in the form of hard currency. However, we should 
also be aware of the fact that Soviet exports of precious metals are 
sometimes purchased by LDGs, In such cases payment could be in the 
form of commodities, (Of course, some of these commodities from LDGs 
could be sold for hard currency. For example, the USSR could decide 
to exchange some of its platinum for Venezuelan petroleum. In all 
likelihood the USSR would have no trouble selling the petroleum for 
hard currency,)
In 1973» Soviet platinum sales were estimated at $325 million 
while nickel sales amounted to $25 m i l l i o n , D u r i n g  1976, Soviet 
sales of precious metals (excluding gold) were estimated at $600 mil­
l i o n . A c c o r d i n g  to another estimate published in 1978, annual Sov­
iet platinum and palladium sales in the West now amount to over $200 
million,
Soviet Diamond Sales in the West
For reasons which were mentioned in the last section, we should also 
use some caution when studying dollar estimates for Soviet diamond 
sales. According to one analyst, Soviet diamond sales in the West 
increased from $200 million in 1972, to $420 million in 1973.^^^ In 
1976, the USSR sold an estimated $800-million worth of diamonds in 
the West,^^® Wilczynski claims that annual Soviet diamond sales in 
the West amount to approximately $500 million,
It is interesting to note that in 1975, the president of the 
Israel Diamond Exchange, Moshe Schwitzer, reported that the USSR was 
selling diamonds in world markets for prices which were nearly 50 per-
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cent lower than those prevailing in the free-market. As a result,
Asian dealers cancelled $10-million worth of orders for Israeli polished
gems. According to the report the USSR's policy was aimed at raising
hard currency and not at undermining Israel's diamond-selling opera- 
110tions,
Soviet Foreign Currency Earnings 
from Invisible Exports
It is generally assumed that most of the USSR's invisible income is
derived from the merchant fleet and tourist industry. In 1975, the
USSR's net earnings from the merchant fleet were estimated at $400
million while net earnings from the tourist industry totalled an estim-
111
ated $150 million. In 1976, the USSR's net earnings from the mer­
chant fleet and tourist industry (combined) were estimated at $550 
112million. Of course, these estimates include all net earnings from 
the merchant fleet and tourist industry. Therefore, we must keep in 
mind that both convertible and non-convertible currencies are included 
in these estimates. In the light of the USSR's success in penetrating 
Western shipping markets (see CHAPTER Vl) we might assume that net 
earnings from Soviet maritime operations contain a rather significant 
amount of hard currency (say, 10-20 percent or $40 million to $80 mil­
lion), Moreover, it is generally accepted that Western tourists spend 
(or exchange) more hard currency in the USSR than the Soviet government 
provides for its citizens who are permitted to travel in the West, But 
in the final analysis it is almost impossible to give an accurate es­
timate on net hard currency earnings from the Soviet merchant fleet 
and tourist industry without some assistance from Gosbank or Vneshtorg­
bank, At the present time there is no evidence that Soviet officials 
are willing to provide such assistance.
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The USSR also obtains a fair amount of hard currency via Soviet
nationals living abroad. According to Wilczynski, remittances from
Soviet citizens living abroad fall between $100 million and $200 mil- 
113lion each year. But once again a sizeable portion of this estimate 
probably includes non-convertible currencies.
At the present time the net profits of Soviet companies in the 
West are usually ploughed back, (More will be said about this a little 
later,) Since the companies (including banks) are still relatively 
small thé profits are seldom large enough to justify annual dividend 
payments to shareholders in the USSR, However, as the operations of 
the companies increase, dividends might be paid to Soviet shareholders 
on a regular basis. These funds could be used to cover trade deficits, 
set up new companies in the West etc. In addition to its hard currency 
earnings from companies in the West, the USSR could start earning quite 
a lot of hard currency from services provided by commercial-financial 
organisations in Moscow, As we learned, Moscow could become a major 
world trade and financial centre. If this happens, Soviet banks (in 
Moscow) will handle an increasing number of financial transactions 
between FTOs and Western firms, and Soviet commercial organisations 
will be set up to act as consultants for Westerners operating in the 
USSR,
On the Problem of Soviet Hard 
Currency Indebtedness
In order to present a fair analysis of Soviet hard currency indebted­
ness it is necessary to clear up a few problems which we have not dis­
cussed up till now. We know that the USSR's visible trade talanoe 
with IMTEs is one method of assessing the USSR's hard currency position. 
The key problem is this* does the USSR record all of its visible trade?
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Now it is widely known that the USSR does not mention such commodities 
as gold bullion, non-industrial diamonds, and platinum and other prec­
ious and semiprecious metals in its trade statistics. However, are 
sales of these commodities included in official Soviet foreign trade 
statistics? In all likelihood most (or all) Soviet exports of non­
industrial diamonds, other precious and semiprecious gems, platinum 
and a wide range of semiprecious metals are included in Soviet trade 
statistics. Moreover, many exports of services (e.g,, the enrichment
1 1/j
of uranium by the USSR for IMTEs ) are included in Soviet trade sta­
tistics.
Most of us are aware of the fact that Soviet foreign trade sta­
tistics include figures for total Soviet exports to individual Western 
countries. It is also known that the figures for total Soviet exports 
to individual MTEs can be much larger than the sum of the commodity 
groups listed under these countries, TABLE 4.6 shows the difference 
between total Soviet (visible) exports to five IMTEs during 1976 and 
the sum of commodity groups listed under each country. The sizeable 
residual in TABLE 4.6 (376.7 million rubles or about $512.3 million) 
proves that the USSR includes an important group of commodities in 
its published statistics without actually naming them. So what are 
these commodities? Perhaps D, J. I. Matko and Alec Nove solved the 
problem in an article written for Ttie Three Banks Review (March 1962, 
pp, 18-19). In dealing with a similar problem the two analysts men­
tioned that the USSR, like most other countries, does not include gold 
bullion movements (sales) in its trade statistics. Since gold bullion 
sales are not included in the residual it would be reasonable to assume 
that almost all sales of commodities like gems (e.g., diamonds) and 
selected metals (e.g,, platinum, palladium and nickel) appear in the 
residual,
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TABLE 4.6
TOTAL SOVIET VISIBLE EXPORTS TO SELECTED 
COUNTRIES DURING I976 AND THE SUM OF 
COMMODITY GROUPS LISTED UNDER 
EACH COUNTRY 
(in millions of rubles)
Country Total Soviet 
visible exports
Sum of com­
modity groups
Residual
U.K. 824,9 566,5 258,4
Belgium 323.1 265.9 57.2
FRG 1,069.2 1,042.7 26,5
Switzerland 108,1 90,6 17.5
France 773.8 756.7 17.1
Total 376,7
Source: Official Soviet foreign trade statistics.
It might be interesting to take a brief look at the residual 
in TABLE 4,6 which is connected with Anglo-Soviet trade. In 1976, 
the U.K. imported E208,8-million worth of 'non-metallic mineral man-
<1 -j cr
ufactures' (i.e., diamonds and other precious gems) from the USSR,
At the official rate of El “ 1.23 rubles in December 1976, E208.8 mil­
lion would be equal to 256,8 million rubles. With little doubt, we 
have found most of the commodities exported to the U.K. which the USSR 
failed to mention in its trade statistics,
TABLE 4 ,7 shows the USSR's balance of (visible) trade with IMTEs 
during the period 1970-1976, In order to get a more accurate picture 
of the USSR's hard currency indebtedness we would have to include net 
earnings (or losses) from invisible trade. This would be quite dif­
ficult. We learned previously that the USSR's net earnings from the 
merchant fleet amounted to an estimated $400 million in 1975* But how 
much hard currency was included in this sum? It was mentioned before 
that the Soviet merchant fleet has been quite successful in penetra­
ting Western shipping markets. This would indicate that the USSR earns
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quite a lot of hard currency from its maritime operations. However, 
it is important to keep in mind that when Soviet merchant vessels oper­
ate in Western markets they often pay hard currency for supplies (fuel, 
food etc.) and services. Moreover, it is quite possible that on some 
occasions Soviet merchant vessels operate at a net hard currency loss. 
For example, if a Soviet merchant vessel transports commodities from 
Leningrad to Luanda (Angola) on a clearing account basis (i.e., the 
Soviet goods and transport services are not sold for convertible cur­
rency) the vessel might actually record a net hard currency loss if 
it is required to stop for supplies/services in West European ports 
and unable to pick up any hard currency transport business along the 
way, (Of course, it should be mentioned that even if a Soviet vessel 
loses a little hard currency on its journey the loss would probably 
not be as great as it would be if the USSR was forced to hire a Western- 
owned merchant ship to transport Soviet commodities.)
TABLE 4.7
SOVIET BALANCE OF TRADE WITH INDUSTRIALISED 
MARKET-TYPE ECONOMIES 
(in millions of dollars^)
Year Soviet imports 
from IMTEs
Soviet exports 
to MTEs
Soviet gold Balance 
sales
1970 2 ,819.5 2 ,390.8 56.0 - 372,7
1971 2,887.0 2,757.7 102.0 - 27.3
1972 4 .163.2 2,953.5 325.0 - 884.7
1973 6,241.2 5,099.9 800.0 - 341.3
1974 8,359.2 8,509.9 1,050.0 f 1,200.7 
725.0 - 4,120.21975 13,195.5 8 ,350.3
1976
Total
14,717.4 10,654.8 1.200,0 - 2,862.6 
:"7!408.1
^The following exchange rates were used to convert rubles into 
dollars; for 1970-1971» 1 ruble = $1,11; for 1972. 1 ruble = $1.21; 
for 1973-1976, 1 ruble » $1.36.
Source: Official Soviet foreign trade statistics.
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In 1975» the USSR's net earnings from the tourist industry were 
estimated at $1^0 million. But how much hard currency was included 
in this sum? It was mentioned previously that the USSR receives more 
hard currency from Western tourists than it permits its citizens to 
take out of the country when they visit the West, However, any estim­
ate on the USSR's net hard currency earnings from the tourist indus­
try (without the assistance of Gosbank or Vneshtorgbank) would be pure­
ly arbitrary.
Although little has been said up till now about the Trans-Siberian 
Railway (the Soviet 'land bridge*) it is important to mention that the 
Soviet Union is already earning a fair amount of hard currency by trans­
porting goods destined for Western and Eastern markets via this rail­
way, The importance of the railway will probably increase in the near 
future. In addition, Soviet net hard currency earnings from technical 
services (which are not included with the USSR's visible trade), air 
transport and Soviet citizens living abroad could amount to a few mil­
lion dollars. However, such earnings are probably small enough for 
us to overlook at this time. Since Soviet goods are delivered f,o,b, 
to the USSR's border we can assume that no extra charges are placed 
on Soviet natural gas and petroleum destined for Western Europe (and 
elsewhere) until such commodities leave the USSR,
During the last decade many Western analysts reckoned that the 
USSR either achieved a small hard currency surplus in its invisible 
trade with MTEs or suffered a small deficit. Net hard currency earn­
ings from the Soviet merchant fleet could now amount to over $75 million 
each year. Moreover, the Soviet Union's annual net hard currency earn­
ings from the tourist industry could go as high as $60 million. How­
ever, it is unlikely that net hard currency earnings from other forms 
of invisible trade (e.g., insurance) would add much to the combined net
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hard currency earnings of the merchant fleet and tourist industry. Let's 
just assume that the USSR's net hard currency earnings from the mer­
chant fleet, the tourist industry and a few other sources of invisible 
income amount to $150 million each year. This is indeed a significant 
sum but it is only half of the problem. Western nations charge the 
USSR sizeable amounts of hard currency each year for services. Indeed, 
the Arthur Andersen Company which was set up in Moscow to teach West­
ern accounting techniques to Soviet businessmen is most likely paid 
in hard currency. In addition, the USSR has spent a fair amount on West­
ern industrial licences. We should also note that the USSR has lately 
paid enormous sums for Western banking services (e.g., annual interest on 
Soviet debts could amount to over $500 million). So, Soviet invisible 
trade with IMTEs could now result in a (large) net loss for the USSR, 
TABLE 4.8 shows Soviet trade surpluses with LDGs for the period 
1970-1976, If we knew the amount of hard currency involved in Soviet 
trade with LDGs we would have a better understanding of the USSR’s 
financial position vis-a-vis IMTEs, (Of course, any net hard currency 
earnings from LDGs could be used to cover trade deficits with IMTEs.)
It was mentioned previously that Soviet foreign trade banks sometimes 
arrange hard currency loans for LDGs, In some cases these loans are 
not connected with the sale of Soviet commodities, (in CHAPTER V we 
will learn that Soviet banks occasionally lend hard currency to LDGs 
in order to take advantage of profitable interest rates.) But in other 
cases, loans arranged by Soviet banks are utilised by LDGs to buy 
Soviet exports. However, reports on such loans are so infrequent that 
few conclusions can be drawn from this information. We should also 
keep in mind that the USSR uses hard currency earnings from some LDGs 
to cover Soviet debts with other LDGs, (The USSR must use hard curren­
cy to finance its trade deficits with a few LDGs,)
2?6
TABLE 4.8
THE USSR'S BALANCE OF TRADE 
WITH LDGS, 1970-1976 
(in millions of rubles)
Year Soviet exports 
to LDGs
Soviet imports 
from LDGs
Balance
1970 1.835.9 1,145.6 + 690.3
1971 1.825.1 1,270,7 + 554.4
1972 2.007.9 1,343.8 + 664,1
1973 2.936.5 1,735.3 + 1,201.2 
+ 1,004.71974 3.388.7 2,384.0
1975 3,310.0 2,998.8 + 311.2
1976
Total
3.740.1 2 ,805,1 + .
+ 5.360.9
Source 1 Official Soviet foreign trade statistics.
We learned previously that the USSR has granted a fair amount 
of economic aid to LDGs, Almost all of this aid is repaid via commod­
ity deliveries from LDGs. The GIA estimated that from 1970-1976, LDGs 
received about $3,340-million (approximately 2,632 million-rubles) 
worth of (gross) economic aid from the USSR, Part of this sum could 
have been used to make repayments on Soviet economic aid granted to 
LDGs prior to 1970. However, since Soviet economic aid is usually 
used to make commodity purchases let's simply deduct the total amount 
of such aid received by LDGs during 1970-1976 (i.e., 2,632 million 
rubles) from the total deficit stemming from Soviet trade with LDGs 
during the same period, (No attempt will be made to calculate the 
interest on the trade deficit.) This leaves 2,728,9 million-rubles 
worth of Soviet deliveries of military supplies and other commodities 
which had to be financed on the basis of clearing-dollar credits and 
hard currency cash payments.
In all likelihood a high proportion of the aforementioned sum 
(2,728,9 million rubles) comprises military supplies. Up till now
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only a few estimates have been published on hard currency cash sales 
of Soviet military supplies, Gur Ofer maintains that (hard currency) 
cash sales of Soviet military supplies were probably quite limited
116before 1973. (At the time he arrived at this conclusion Ofer was
aware of an estimated $125-million worth of Soviet arms sales on a
117
cash basis to Libya during the period 1971-1973# ) Ofer also suggests
that after 1973 ^ much greater proportion of Soviet military deliver­
ies went to petroleum-exporting countries indicating the possibility
118
of increased hard currency cash sales. However, the latest avail­
able GIA estimates indicate that Soviet hard currency earnings from 
exports of military supplies might well have decreased after 1973#
TABLE 4,9 shows the amount of Soviet military deliveries to selected 
regions in the Third World from 1972-1976# In 1972, the Middle East 
received an estimated $970-million worth of military supplies from the 
USSR (or 81 percent of all Soviet exports of armaments to the Third 
World), By 1973, this figure had increased to $2,655 million (or 88 
percent of all exports of Soviet armaments to the Third World). After 
1973, the estimated amount of Soviet military deliveries to the Middle 
East fell sharply. In 1976, the Middle East received an estimated 
$830-million worth of military supplies from the USSR (or only 38 per­
cent of all Soviet armaments exported to the Third World), Since Afri­
can countries have become more important recipients of Soviet military 
supplies it is rather doubtful that a significant proportion of the 
aforementioned 2,728.9 million-rubles worth of military supplies and 
other commodities was financed on the basis of hard currency cash pay­
ments, Even if 25 percent of the 2,728,9 million-rubles worth of arm­
aments and other commodities was financed by hard currency cash pay­
ments the amount (i.e., 682,2 million rubles or roughly $928 million) 
would be small in comparison with the total Soviet trade deficit with
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IMTEs during the period 1970-1976 (see TABLE 4,7 on p, 273),
TABLE 4,9
SOVIET MILITARY DELIVERIES TO SELECTED 
REGIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD, 1972-1976 
(in millions of dollars)
Geographic
region
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976
Africa 55 75 235 600 1,070
Latin America 0 10 25 55 80
Middle East 970 2,655 1,785 850 830
South Asia 180 .-..270 205 180 210
Total 1,205 3,010 2,250 1,685 2,190
Source; GIA, Gommunist Aid to the Less Developed Countries of 
the Free World, 1976 (August 1977). n, 3.
The trade deficit cited in TABLE 4,7 is much lower than some 
estimates on Soviet net hard currency indebtedness. For example, the 
CIA estimated that the USSR’s net hard currency indebtedness at the 
end of 1976 amounted to $14 b i l l i o n , T h e  estimate in TABLE 4,10 
is even higher. Of course, interest charges have not been added to 
the deficits in TABLE 4,7, However, even if a compound interest charge 
of 10 percent is added to each deficit in TABLE 4,7 the total still 
falls short of $10 billion. So why is there such a difference between 
the Soviet trade deficit cited in TABLE 4,7 and estimates on Soviet 
net hard currency indebtedness? Perhaps it should be mentioned once 
again that Soviet foreign trade banks sometimes receive hard currency 
loans and deposits simply for the purpose of relending such funds to 
non-Soviet borrowers. For example, Vneshtorgbank might receive a hard 
currency loan (or deposit) not to finance Soviet foreign trade, but 
for the purpose of relending the funds (usually for higher interest 
charges) to, say, Vietnam’s foreign trade bank. In this case the amount 
lent to (or deposited in) Vneshtorgbank would probably be classified
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by some Western analysts as part of the USSR's net hard currency in­
debtedness even though the funds would not be used to finance Soviet 
foreign trade deficits. Moreover, Soviet foreign-based banks are now 
actively involved in lending funds to Western borrowers that are not 
classified as financial institutions (in other words, Western analysts 
might not take some of these loans into consideration when making estim­
ates on net Soviet hard currency indebtedness),
TABLE 4.10
NET HARD CURRENCY INDEBTEDNESS OF THE USSR 
AT THE END OF I976 
(in millions of dollars)
Estimated drawings on official
export credit commitment   ...............  6,386
Supplier's credits ............................. . 3»700
Net hard currency position with
Western banks^,    ................   5.912
Total net debt 16,198
^ata collected at the end of September 1976 from banks in the 
U.S., the U.K., the FRG, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Italy, Sweden, 
Canada, Japan and Switzerland, and foreign branches of U.S. banks in 
the Carribbean and Far East,
Source* East-West Markets (Chase World Information), 7 March 
1977, pp. 7-8.
Of course, hard currency funds lent to (or deposited in) Soviet 
banks must be classified as debts of the USSR no matter if such funds 
are used to finance Soviet foreign trade or not. However, it is nec­
essary to recognise the distinction between the two cases. If Soviet 
banks lend hard currency to Soviet FTOs for the purpose of financing 
the USSR's foreign trade deficits then the Soviet Union is responsible 
for repaying its own banks so they, in turn, can meet their financial 
obligations with Western creditors, IVhen Soviet banks lend hard cur­
rency to non-Soviet organisations these banks are still responsible
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for repaying their Western creditors. But in this case Soviet banks 
have a claim on non-Soviet organisations and not on the USSR,
It should also be pointed out that the USSR might be forced to 
borrow hard currency from Western financial markets to facilitate its 
economic/political penetration into LDGs, In order to make a favour­
able impression on LDGs, Soviet personnel assigned to these countries 
will sometimes spend hard currency for local goods and services. How­
ever, after a certain amount of time has passed the hard currency spent 
by the USSR in a given LDG might well start to flow back into Soviet 
hands,
According to Soviet statistics the USSR’s 197? trade deficit with 
IMTEs was well below the deficit for 1976, In 1977, the USSR imported 
9,929.9 million-rubles (about $13,304.7-million) worth of goods from IMTEs 
and exported 8,817.3 million-rubles (about $11,991.5-million) worth 
of goods to these countries resulting in a deficit of 1,112,6 million 
rubles (about $1,313*1 million). However, if we bring Soviet gold sales 
into the picture (remember that the USSR sold about $1.6-billion worth 
of gold in 1977) the Soviet Union achieved a hard currency trade sur­
plus of roughly $100 million in 1977* In the light of this fact we
can assume that the USSR did not increase its hard currency indebted­
ness in 1977 as a result of its trade with IMTEs, But in all likeli­
hood the USSR's hard currency surplus in 1977 was not large enough to 
cover principal and interest payments on previous debts indicating that 
the USSR was forced to increase its hard currency indebtedness vis-à-vis 
IMTEs during 1977. (For example, if the USSR's debt service ratio 
/”i.e,, total annual payments of principal and interest as a percent­
age hard currency exports__7 with IMTEs stood at 20 percent in 1977, 
then principal and interest payments from the USSR to IMTEs during that
year would have amounted to approximately $2,398.3 million.)
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On Soviet Creditworthiness
The marked increase in Soviet hard currency indebtedness during the 
1970s has resulted in some concern over the USSR's ability to meet 
its financial obligations. At one time Western economists considered 
a debt service ratio of 12 percent to be quite high. According to 
TABLE 4,11, the USSR's debt-service ratio has exceeded 12 percent since 
1968, (it should be noted that the debt-service ratios in TABLE 4.11 
were probably based upon total Soviet hard currency indebtedness and 
not just trade-related deficits with IMTEs.) Now one might think that 
the USSR had trouble obtaining credits from IMTEs when the Soviet debt- 
service ratio amounted to 20 percent in 1975» However, this was not 
the case. In fact, Soviet officials probably concluded that it was 
easier to obtain credits during 1975/1976 than ever before, (As we 
learned, a number of Western governments extended credits to the USSR 
during this period.)
There are a number of reasons to believe that hard currency cred­
its will be available to the USSR despite rising Soviet trade deficits 
with IMTEs, Firstly, most Western lenders agree that the USSR has 
an impeccable financial record. Moreover, many of these lenders feel 
that Soviet officials wish to maintain that impeccable financial record. 
Secondly, the Western world has recognised the importance of the Sov­
iet market. In an attempt to ameliorate world economic conditions. 
Western nations have been willing to extend credits to the USSR on 
favourable terms. And thirdly. Western lenders are now starting to 
look at Soviet trade deficits in a different light. As we learned 
before, compensatory projects could solve part of the USSR's hard cur­
rency indebtedness problem. During the initial stages of such projects 
Western analysts should expect a marked increase in Soviet trade def­
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icits with IMTEs. But after a period of years the deficits should be
120covered via commodity deliveries from the USSR, In addition, most 
Western analysts agree that rigid centralised planning will prevail 
in the USSR for many years to come. Although Soviet bankers have ac­
knowledged that the USSR is willing to borrow funds from IMTEs on a 
large scale, such funds will be used, in virtually all cases, to boost 
Soviet export potential. In the words of A, S. Maslovt 'all , . .
import needs should be covered by export possibilities. This is the
121
law for socialist planning*.
TABLE 4.11
SOVIET HARD-GURRENGY DEBT-SERVIGE 
RATIOS, 1960-1975 
(in percent)
Year Debt service as a percentage 
of Soviet hard currency exports
i960 5
1961 8
1962 12
1963 14
1964 15
1965 12
1966 11
1967 11
1968 13
1969 15
1970 18
1971 18
1972 20
1973 17
1974 15
1975 20
Sources: John Farrell and Paul Ericson, 'Soviet Trade and Pay­
ments with the West*, in Soviet Economy in a New Perspective, compiled 
by the U.S. Congress, J oint Economic Committee, 94th Gong., 2nd sess, 
(Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 738;
and John Farrell, 'Soviet Payments Problems in Trade with the West', 
in Soviet Economic Prospects for the Seventies, compiled by the U.S. 
Congress, Joint Economic Committee, 93^ Gong., 1st sess, (Washington, 
B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973/, p. 692.
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Per Sniegelï How does the monetary crisis affect the business 
of Soviet banks in the West?
Andrei Dubonossovt The instability in the Western monetary sys­
tem has the same negative effect on the business of Soviet banks as 
it does on all other financial institutions which operate here.
Per Spiegel: Does that mean you favour a stable Western monetary
system?
Andrei Dubonossov* Certainly, certainly. Stability is the basis 
for sound business.
Per Spiegel: As a Soviet banlcer are you not sensing a certain
contradiction? You are worried about a system that you inwardly re­
ject?
Andrei Dubonossov: I am not worried about it. My attitude co­
incides with the attitude of my country. In connection with the pol­
icy of co-existence. Western stability is of great significance for us.
Per Spiegel: What do you think— as a Soviet banker in the cap­
italist system— about Lenin's teaching that the destruction of the 
bourgeois economy is dependent upon the destruction of its payments 
system?
Andrei Dubonossov: One should not quote Lenin out of context,
— An excerpt from Per Spiegel's interview with the 
Soviet international banker Andrei Dubonossov,
CHAPTER V
SOVIET OPERATIONS IN WORLD FINANCIAL MARKETS
The Eurocurrency Market
The terms Eurocurrency market and Eurodollar market are often inter­
changeably used. The Eurodollar market as we know it today began de­
veloping in the mid-1950s. Eurodollars were first described as dollars 
held by financial institutions in the U.K. and Western Europe, The 
dollars began accumulating in British and European banks as a result 
of American foreign trade deficits, military expenditures and arbit­
rage,^ However, Eurodollars are now commonly known as dollars held
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outside the United States. Indeed, there are (Euro-) dollar markets 
throughout the world. One method of providing funds for the Eurodol­
lar market involves the placing of dollars in foreign banks. For ex­
ample, an American investor may decide to withdraw dollars from his bank 
in the United States in order to make deposits in a Luxemburg bank. 
Another way of channelling dollars to the foreign currency market in Lux­
emburg is a little more complex. Let's assume that a London bank, as 
a result of a commercial transaction of one of its customers, has a 
credit balance with a bank in New York, Let us also assume that a 
businessman in Luxemburg asks his bank for dollars to finance the im­
portation of commodities from the United States, In order to provide 
the funds for its client the Luxemburg bank accepts the dollar deposit 
transferred by the London bank from its account in New York, The read­
er should note that this operation has resulted in the creation of 
credit. The London bank still has a claim (i,e,, on the Luxemburg 
bank instead of the New York bank) while the Luxemburg bank has a claim 
on the New York bank which can be used to finance the commercial opera­
tions of its client.
Eurodollars are preferred by both lenders and borrowers for a
number of reasons. Firstly, the Eurodollar market is considered a 
2
worldwide market that is not directly controlled by international 
organisations (e.g., the IMF) and national monetary authorities. Few 
governments place heavy restrictions on the amount of dollars deposited 
in domestic banks or the amount of dollars lent/re-deposited by these 
banks. In most cases Eurodollar lending does not call for an adherence 
to liquidity ratios which are established by national monetary author­
ities for other types of lending. Secondly, virtually all financial 
institutions (and individuals) have easy access to Eurodollars if they 
are prepared to pay market rates for such funds. Thirdly, as long as
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Eurodollars remain convertible they represent a form of ready cash 
which can be used for any type of International financial transaction. 
Borrowers normally receive Eurodollars in the form of loans which are 
not tied to specific commodity purchases, (in other words Eurodollar 
loans can be used in any way that suits the wishes of the borrower.) 
This freedom often induces the USSR to borrow Eurocurrencies instead 
of government-backed credits even though the interest rates for the 
former are higher than the latter.
The principal Eurocurrency markets are found in the U.K. (London); 
the United States (New York); Western Europe (Luxemburg, Paris, Frank­
furt, Zurich, Rome, Amsterdam); Canada; Singapore and Japan (Tokyo).
(The market for dollars in Asia is often referred to as the Asiadollar 
market.) Other Eurocurrency markets exist in the Bahamas, the Cayman 
Islands and Panama, In 1976, dollars comprised 78 percent of all funds 
in the Eurocurrency market,^
Early Soviet Operations in 
Eurocurrency Markets
For some time Western analysts thought that socialist financial institu­
tions might have been responsible for founding the Eurodollar market. 
During the early 1950s Soviet and other GMEA foreign trade banks start­
ed shifting their dollar deposits from American financial institutions 
to banks in the U.K. and Western Europe, According to Paul Einzig, 
the conditions during the cold war might have induced GMEA banks to 
adopt such a policy.
The view was widely held that their /"i.e., the GMEA b a n k s m a i n  
object was to conceal from the American authorities the size of 
their dollar holdings by disguising them as the holdings of Lon­
don or Paris banks. In re-depositing their dollars, Communist 
banks wished to safeguard themselves against the risk of a seiz­
ure of their funds by the United States authorities in case of
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an aggravation of the Gold War, The possibility of legal action 
taken by creditors of Imperial Russia to attach Soviet deposits 
might also have been in the minds of the Soviet authorities.5
On the other hand GMEA banks might have been attempting to establish 
a base for future Eurodollar operations in London and Paris, It should 
be noted that many central banks, commercial banks and large corpor­
ations throughout the world deposited dollars in U.S.-based banks in 
spite of the low interest rates prevailing in America, The reason 
behind this policy is quite clear* by depositing small sums in U.8.- 
based banks the depositors (as well as other organisations and indiv­
iduals in the depositors' countries) would be in a position to request 
loans, credits and deposits from American banks at some future date. 
However, since American financial institutions (based in the U.S.) 
were prohibited from lending to communist countries under the Johnson 
Debt Default Act of 1934, there was little or no reason for GMEA coun­
tries to deposit dollars in the United States, But GMEA banks had 
much to gain by depositing their funds elsewhere. Indeed, by placing 
deposits in British and West European banks GMEA members assumed that 
financiers in the U.K. and Western Europe would soon feel obliged to 
place deposits in GMEA banks (both within the bloc and abroad) as well 
as extend loans/credits to GMEA trading organisations.
At the outset Soviet banks offered to deposit their dollars for 
interest charges below those prevailing in the free-market,^ As a rule, 
these deposits were made on a short-term basis. When British and West 
European banks were offered dollar deposits at attractive rates they 
reduced the amount of dollars deposited by correspondent banks in the 
United States and started accepting dollar deposits from banks opera­
ting outside of the United States, Soon after Soviet banks had estab­
lished themselves as lenders (or depositors) of Eurodollars these banks 
quickly started operating as borrowers, British and West European banks
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that accepted deposits from Soviet banks found it difficult to refrain 
from placing deposits in Soviet banks when rates were favourable. By 
1963, Soviet foreign-based banks (i.e., the Moscow Narodny Bank and 
Banque Commerciale pour 1' Europe du Nord) were operating on a fairly 
large scale as borrowers and lenders of Eurodollars but their position 
had changed from net depositors/lenders (vis-à-vis Western owned banks)
■7
to net borrowers. Until the late 1960s Soviet operations in the Euro­
dollar market were primarily conducted on a short-term basis. However, 
as Soviet banks became known as scrupulous operators in Eurodollar 
markets such banks were able to obtain deposits on a medium-term basis.
Until recently the USSR has mentioned next to nothing about its 
operations in the Eurodollar market. (Of course, Soviet authors have 
attacked the so-called 'contradictions' of the Eurodollar market for 
some time,^) In the mid-1970s an article was published in Moscow Nar­
odny Bank's Quarterly Review which provided a rather revealing account 
of the USSR's early operations in the Eurodollar market. The article 
was written by K. J. H. Robbie— a British economist working for Mos­
cow Narodny, Althou^ Robbie's statistical material is way out of 
date, the unique character of his article compels us to study some 
of the main points.
In the mid-1950s foreign currency deposits in Moscow Narodny 
Bank (MNB) and Banque Commerciale pour 1' Europe du Nord (Eurobank) 
appeared to follow developments in Soviet foreign trade (see TABLE 5.I). 
Balances were built up as Western importers paid for Soviet commodities 
and balances were reduced when Soviet importers paid for Western goods. 
However, after 1957» deposit changes in both banks appeared to be in­
fluenced by other factors. According to Robbie, the marked increase 
in deposits in 1959 can be attributed to MNB's success in attracting 
foreign currency deposits from non-socialist sources,^ However, Robbie
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offers no explanation for the decrease in deposits during I958; a year 
when the USSR recorded a trade surplus with IMTEs,
TABLE 5.1
THE SOVIET UNION'S TRADE,AND DEPOSITS IN SOVIET- 
OWNED BANKS IN THE U,K, AND WESTERN EUROPE 
(in millions of dollars)
Year Change in deposits at Euro­
bank plus change in corres­
pondent accounts (deposits) 
at Moscow Narodny Bank
The Soviet Union's 
trade balance with 
Western Europe, North 
America and Japan
1956 + 48,1 + 33.8
1957 + 74,4 + 54,0
1958 - 44.5 + 59.1
1959 + 304,1 + 113.1
i960 - 19.4 - 47.0
1961 + 99.4 + 13.6
Source: K, J, H, Robbie, 'Socialist Banks and the Origins of
the Euro-currency Markets', Moscow Narodny Bank, Quarterly Review 
(Winter 1975-1976), p. 29, quoting Annual Reports of Eurobank and Mos­
cow Narodny Bank, and Direction of Trade,
TABLE 5*2 shows the marked difference in the size of deposits
in MNB and Eurobank during the period 1955-1962. According to Robbie,
the data suggest that socialist banks might have preferred to make
10wholesale foreign currency deposits in Eurobank up until the late
1950s Paris was considered a more developed Eurocurrency market
11
than London at that time. This would indicate that the propor­
tion of foreign currency deposits in MNB connected with trade finan­
cing was most likely higher than the proportion in Eurobank from 1955" 
1958. Indeed, it is quite possible that Eurobank utilised a signifi­
cant portion of these deposits from socialist countries for purposes 
other than trade financing (e.g., some of the funds were undoubtedly 
deposited/re-deposited in non-socialist banks).
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TABLE 5.2
DEPOSITS IN SOVIET-OWNED BANKS IN 
THE U.K. AND WESTERN EUROPE 
(in millions of dollars)
Year Deposits in Eurobank Correspondent 
accounts (deposits) 
in Moscow Narodny 
Bank
Total
1 9 5 5 1 1 5 . 0 2 3 . 5 1 3 8 . 5
1 9 5 6 142.5 44,1 186,6
1 9 5 7 2 1 5 . 3 4 5 . 7 261.0
1 9 5 8 1 9 6 . 3 20.2 216,5
1 9 5 9 377.5 143.1 520.6
i 9 6 0 357.1 144,1 501.2
1 9 6 1 422.4 178,2 600,6
1 9 6 2 4 9 5 . 6 214.5 710.1
Source: Robbie, 'Socialist Banks , , p. 30, quoting Annual
Reports of Eurobank and Moscow Narodny Bank.
As we can see from TABLE 5*3» during the mid- and late 1958s
most of the deposits in MNB were placed by banks. According to Robbie,
12virtually all of these deposits were made by socialist banks. In 
most cases the non-bank depositors were organisations connected with 
East-West trade. The reader will note that during the period under 
consideration the growth of bank deposits in MNB was quite erratic.
This can be explained by the erratic nature of East-West trade as well 
as the re-channelling of funds by socialist banks to the Paris market. 
We learned previously that during the mid-1950s MNB was primarily 
involved in financing East-West trade while Eurobank was conducting 
a fair amount of wholesale Eurocurrency business. However, it was 
not too long before MNB began operating in the wholesale market. On 
28 February 1957» MNB deposited $800,000 in a London merchant bank,
A little over six months later MNB made a deposit of $1 million in the 
same account. On 24 October 1957» MNB withdrew $1 million from the 
account in the merchant bank. According to Robbie, this was one of
298
TABLE 5,3
FOREIGN CURRENCY DEPOSITS IN 
MOSCOW NARODNY BANK 
(in pounds)
Year Deposits by banks Deposits by non-banks
1954 December 819,863 212,801
1955 June 313,255 218,062
December 18,697 351,630
1956 June 1,251.945 455,805
December 107,718 368,308
1957 June 15,653 373.363
December 7,186,766 409,489
Source* Robbie, 'Socialist Banks . , p, JO,
the first concrete examples of MNB investing surplus dollars in a whole­
sale foreign-currency deposit market. In the early part of April 1958, 
a U.S.“dollar deposit account was opened in MNB in the name of a social­
ist bank. On 5 April 1958, Eurobank deposited $5 million in this account 
for a period of one month. On the 9th, 10th and 18th of April 1958, 
additional one-month deposits were made totalling $7 million. These 
funds provided MNB with the means to make further deposits both in the 
U.K. and abroad. On 5 April 1958, MNB deposited $5 million in the 
aforementioned London merchant bank. On 18 April an additional $5 mil­
lion was deposited in the same bank 'at an adequate margin over the
13deposit rate' (i,e,, the London merchant bank offered MNB a higher 
rate of interest than MNB offered to its depositors). Within a short 
period of time MNB had opened accounts in two Canadian banks, another 
London merchant bank and a European bank. Most of MNB's deposits were 
made in U.S. dollars for a period of one month each.
Although MNB's wholesale Eurocurrency operations involved rather 
small sums ($5 million and below) during 1958, Robbie estimated that 
the bank's activities might have accounted for a 10 percent increase
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in the size of the London Eurocurrency market for that year. During 
the latter part of 1959» MNB's wholesale Eurocurrency operations in­
creased significantly. This period perhaps marks the beginning of 
MNB's large-scale Eurocurrency operations both in the U.K. and abroad. 
TABLE 5-4 shows MNB’s two-way Eurocurrency operations during 1959. Tn 
addition to the marked increase in the amount of dollar deposits made 
by MNB during 1959» the bank also increased the number of its deposit 
accounts as well as the amount of non-dollar deposits. At the end of 
1939» MNB was dealing with about thirty banks in the wholesale Euro­
currency market. In contrast to the typical one-month Eurocurrency 
deposits which were made during 1958» deposits placed in MNB (as well 
as deposits made by MNB) had a wide range of maturities (e.g., call,
7 days, 14 days, and 1 to 6 months). Moreover, the size of individual 
deposits started growing in the late 1950s.
TABLE 5.4
EUROCURRENCY DEPOSITS BY BANKS 
IN MOSCOW NARODNY DURING I939 
(in pounds)
Month Deposits received^ Deposits re-lent
End of January 1,999,559 2,231,495
February 5,774,605 6 ,031,131
March 5,811,269 6,043,205
April 6 ,335,274 6,567,210
May 4 ,170,214 4 ,580,722
June 17,832,584 18,219,259
July 15,641,946 16,229,333
August 19,969,814 20,222,277
September 21,050,750 21,551,346
October 25,145,718 28,510,601
November 30,247,873 31,610,777
December 28,243,919 28,226,598
^Differences between the columns can be attributed to such items 
as U.S.-dollar current accounts and holdings of currency notes.
Source* Robbie, 'Socialist Banks , , ,', p, 32.
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TABLE 5.5 shows the source of foreign currency deposits in MNB and 
the ways in which MNB used these funds. The reader should also take 
note of the various currencies which were deposited in MNB, A number 
of important conclusions can be drawn from TABLE 5*5» Firstly, the 
widespread assumption that Soviet foreign trade banks made large deposits 
in Canadian banks during the late 1950s and early 1960s is at least 
partially true. Secondly, although socialist banks provided 70 percent 
of MNB's dollar resources, only 40,4 percent of MNB's deposits in social­
ist banks were comprised of dollars. We should also note that virtually 
all of MNB's non-dollar deposits were made in socialist banks. These 
facts clearly indicate that GMEA banks were more interested in obtain­
ing non-dollar funds during this period. The increase in the amount 
of trade between GMEA and the U.K. and Western Europe provided the 
basis for such borrowing activity,
Robbie's article went a long way towards explaining the early 
Eurocurrency operations of Soviet foreign-based banks (SFBBs). How­
ever, it was inevitable that the article could go no further. After 
the early 1960s Soviet trade with the West grew significantly and both 
the size and number of SFBBs had to be increased in order to meet the 
rising Soviet demand for Eurocurrency financing. In addition to its 
own trade financing operations the USSR is required to assist GMEA 
members and other so-called 'friendly' nations (e.g., Vietnam, North 
Korea and Angola) with their trade financing activities. Nowadays 
it would not be surprising to learn that Bank of America deposited 
$1 million in MNB, However, if it could be proven that MNB placed 
the same $1 million in the central bank of Angola (or any number of 
other banks) the outcry would be deafening. But the clamour would 
not only come from Western politicians. Indeed, most financiers in 
all parts of the world would be appalled if such data were published.
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If MNB's secrets were published what would stop someone from divulging 
Bank of America's lending and borrowing operations? For this very 
reason banking secrecy exists. Needless to say, both socialist and 
capitalist bankers (if the distinction is even possible) would have it 
no other way.
TABLE 5.5
CURRENCY COMPOSITION OF FOREIGN CURRENCY 
DEPOSITS IN MOSCOW NARODNY BY BANK 
CATEGORIES, DECEMBER I959 
(in percent)
Source of funds U.S. $& Sw, fr.
b
BM B, fr.c D, All cur­
rencies
Socialist banks 
U.K. merchant
70,0 56.8 3.0 - - - 58,0
banks
U.K. interna­
tional banks 8.0 43.2 83.5 100.0 100,0 100,0 31.7
Canadian banks 
West European
10,0 6.3
banks 2.0 — 10.5 - - - 3.4
Other banks - - 3.0 - - - 0,6
All banks 62.8 12.8 20,2 3.0 0.5 0,7 100,0
Uses of funds U.S. $8- Sw. fr. DM BM^ B. fr.G All cur­
rencies
Socialist banks 40,4 100,0 97.4 100,0 100,0 62.2
U.K. merchant banks 4,0 
U.K. international
— — — — - 2.5
banks 30.3 - 2,6 - •• - 19.5
Canadian banks 
West European
25.3 — — 15.8
banks - - - — MM — _
Other banks - - - - — — —
All banks 62.6 12.9 23.3 — 0.5 0.7 100,0
The reader's attention should be drawn to the fact that the per­
centage figures for dollars listed under 'source of funds' do not add up 
to 100 percent (yO.O + 8,0 + 10,0 + 2,0 == 90.O) whereas in all other 
cases the percentage figures add up to 100 percent, Robbie did not 
offer an explanation for the missing 10 percent,
^Bekomarks— West German marks of limited convertibility,
^Belgium francs.
^Dutch guilders.
Source* Robbie, 'Socialist Banks , , ,', p,
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Recent Soviet Operations in 
Eurocurrency Markets
Generally speaking, until the mid-1970s Vneshtorgbank did not obtain
l4
Eurocurrency loans from Western-owned banks nor did the bank par­
ticipate with Western-owned financial institutions in the granting of 
Eurocurrency loans to various countries. Throughout the 1950s and 
early 1960s Vneshtorgbank (and Gosbank) obtained Eurocurrencies through 
SFBBs, Since SFBBs were expected to operate like their Western-»owned 
counterparts it was fitting that Soviet bankers in the West should han­
dle all of the wheeling and dealing connected with Eurocurrency loans. 
Once SFBBs obtained Eurocurrency deposits such funds could be passed 
on to Vneshtorgbank, In the latter part of I963 the International 
Bank for Economic Co-operation (IBEC) was set up in Moscow, The IBEG is 
jointly owned by GMEA members and one of its principal functions is 
promoting short- and medium-term trade between GMEA members via trans­
ferable ruble clearing accounts. However, the IBEG was also set up to 
operate in world financial markets. In the light of this fact the 
USSR gained indirect access to Eurocurrency funds in the mid-1960s 
via the IBEG, In 1970, the International Investment Bank (lIB) was 
set up in Moscow, The IIB is also jointly owned by GMEA members and 
its principal functions include the financing of industrial develop­
ment in GMEA nations and the promotion of economic integration within 
GMEA. Like the IBEG, the IIB operates in Eurocurrency markets hence 
the USSR has indirect access to Eurocurrency resources via another GMEA 
organisation,
In the latter part of 1974, Vneshtorgbank was trying to raise 
a $100-million Eurocurrency loan through a consortium of Western banks. 
According to one source that was Vneshtorgbank's first attempt to nego­
tiate a Eurocurrency loan via a syndicate of (Western-owned) banks,
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During the first half of 1974, the USSR reportedly experienced some 
difficulty in obtaining supplier's credits from Western exporters.
This might have been the reason behind Vneshtorgbank's entry into the 
market. By obtaining such a large sum, the USSR would have been in 
a position to pay off a number of Western exporters without being con­
cerned about the availability or terms of individual supplier's credits. 
On the other hand Soviet officials may have reckoned that the time 
was right for Vneshtorgbank's entry into Eurocurrency markets in the 
light of Soviet schemes for future large-scale Eurocurrency operations, 
Vneshtorgbank was attempting to obtain the aforementioned loan for a 
period of five years at a rate of 1 percent over the London interbank 
offered rate (LIBOR).
In February 1975» Vneshtorgbank received the $100-million loan 
which had been under negotiation since the latter part of 1 9 7 4 . Just 
two months later Vneshtorgbank received a $250-million Eurocurrency 
loan via a consortium of over twenty French, American and other banks.
The loan was granted for a period of five and one-half years at 1 ^/8
19percent over LIBOR. Between the latter part of 1975 and the early
stages of 1976, Vneshtorgbank received a five-year $400-million Euro-
20
currency loan from a consortium of batnks. Then in July 1976, Vnesh-
21torgbank received a five-year $250-million Eurocurrency loan. Thus 
within a period of about eighteen months Vneshtorgbank raised $1 billion 
in the Eurocurrency market alone.
It is well worth noting that the sharp increase in Soviet Euro­
currency borrowing which took place during 1975 and 1976 might have been
unplanned. Just prior to this period Soviet officials had every right 
to be pleased with developments in the USSR's trade with the West,
Indeed, the growth of Soviet exports to the West and the availability 
of funds in Eurocurrency markets indicated that conditions could not
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be much better for the importation of large amounts of Western mach­
inery and equipment into the USSR, But the situation soon turned sour* 
Alec Nove aptly explains what happened;
Then in 1975 came a shock* Soviet exports fell, as a result of 
the Western recession, while imports rose steeply, partly as a 
result of orders already placed, and partly as a consequence of 
the deplorable harvest of 1975» which led to very large purchases 
being made in the United States and Canada* To cap everything, 
the price of gold fell. Therefore the Soviet Union ran into short­
term payments difficulties and its debt increased s t e e p l y . 22
From August 1976 to February 1978, Vneshtorgbank did not receive 
any publicly announced Eurocurrency loans. Now this might lead one 
to conclude that Soviet officials had become quite concerned about the 
USSR's hard currency indebtedness by the middle of 1976. However, 
before reaching any conclusions we should take a closer look at the
problem. It is necessary to keep in mind the fact that 1975 was the
last year of the 1971-1975 Five-Year Plan and Soviet officials were 
most likely reluctant to jeopardise the fulfilment of planned economic 
objectives by restricting imports from the West, Therefore, despite 
the aforementioned adverse economic conditions during 1975» Soviet 
officials must have reckoned that, all things considered, it was far 
more important to increase the country's hard currency indebtedness 
than to slow doim the country's economic development. The $400-mil- 
lion loan, and the $250-million loan which followed in July 1976, could 
have been earmarked for imports from IMTEs under the new (l976-1980) 
Five-Year Plan. Moreover, it is conceivable that these two loans (plus 
other credit facilities available to the USSR) were sufficient to fi­
nance (planned) imports from the West up until the early part of 1978,
There are other reasons to indicate that the temporary cessation
of publicly announced Eurocurrency loans to the USSR could have been 
the result of factors not connected with the assumption that the Soviets 
were getting concerned about the country's rising hard currency indebt-
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edness. Firstly, although Soviet banks continued to receive relative­
ly favourable terms on Eurocurrency loans throughout the mid-1970s» 
the cost of borrowing increased between April 1975 and November 1976.
When Soviet borrowers resumed their operations in Eurocurrency markets 
in the latter half of 1975» the cost of a five-year Eurocurrency loan 
for the USSR stood at approximately 1 ^/4 percent over LIBOR^^ (com­
pared with 1 ^/8 percent during the early part of the year). Any in­
crease in the cost of loans induces borrowers to reassess their plans.
As we learned, a number of government-supported lines of credit were 
extended to the USSR during the mid-1970s. We should also note that 
a fair amount of publicity about Soviet borrowing activities and in­
debtedness started to appear during the period under consideration.
The USSR is naturally sensitive about such issues. In June 1976, three 
large American banks— Bank of America, Chase Manhattan Banic and Citibank-
announced that they would not participate in a Eurocurrency loan for
24
the USSR which was being negotiated at that time. But there is little 
evidence that this reluctance was connected with Soviet payments prob­
lems. Such reluctance might well have stemmed from the fact that Sov­
iet officials often demand the most favourable interest rates without 
giving Western creditors enough financial information to establish 
the risks of lending to the USSR, So, it is possible that Soviet author­
ities were not overly concerned about the country's hard currency in­
debtedness, However, Western reports regarding possible Soviet financial 
difficulties might have induced the Soviets to scale down their overt 
borrowing operations for a brief period.
As we learned, the USSR has access to hard currency via the IBEG 
and IIB. Since the IBEG and IIB are not wholly owned or legally con­
trolled by the USSR (the share capital of the two banks is divided 
amongst all GMEA nations) it is difficult to classify the banks as
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Soviet organs. But a number of Western critics argue that the USSR 
is in a position to greatly influence the operations of both banks.
According to Glen Smith, 'the International Bank for Economic Coopera­
tion is headquartered in Moscow and in many ways operates as an intra­
bloc subsidiary of the Foreign Trade Bank /"Vneshtorgbank^ How­
ever, most Westerners agree that in a legal sense the IBEG and IIB 
operate in Eurocurrency markets on behalf of the entire GMEA bloc.
Hard currency funds lent to (or deposited in) the two GMEA banks be­
come the responsibility of the banks' shareholders. This is extreme­
ly important for the USSR, In the event the USSR reaches its Eurocur­
rency borrowing limit in the eyes of Western creditors, hard currency 
can be made available to the USSR via the IBEG and IIB. If Soviet 
officials wish to lessen the impact of their borrowing activities in 
Eurocurrency markets they can request that the two GMEA banks obtain 
a portion of the total amount of hard currency needed (i.e., a concert­
ed operation involving Vneshtorgbank and the IBEC and IIB). This might 
have happened in January 1976 when Moscow Narodny Bank reported that 
both Vneshtorgbank and the IIB received Eurocurrency loans. (The loan 
that the IIB received was valued at $350 million.) Part (or all) of 
the sum which was received by the IIB could have been subsequently 
channelled to Vneshtorgbank without most Western financiers knowing 
(or caring). Indeed, up till now the West has not been too concerned 
about what happens to hard currency funds in the IBEG and IIB as long 
as principal and interest payments are made on time. But this situa­
tion could be changing. Some Western bankers are starting to demand 
that GMEA banks provide information on how Eurocurrency funds will be 
used. Moreover, to offset the lack of Soviet data Western banks are now 
exchanging information (under the auspices of the BIS) on the state of 
the Soviet economy (see East-West /"Fortnightly Bulletin_/ 16 May 1977, p. 8).
In March 1978, Vneshtorgbank received a $400-million loan from
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a consortium of Western banks. The loan was granted for a period of
26
seven years at a rate of 3/4 percent over LIBOR, The reader's atten­
tion should be drawn to the fact that while the duration of the loan 
was increased from previous norms (i.e., from five to seven years) 
the cost of borrowing fell sharply (i.e., fees over LIBOR fell from 
1 ^/4 percent to ^/4 percent).
In addition to being an active borrower in Eurocurrency markets 
Vneshtorgbank occasionally functions as a lender of hard currency (out­
side of the USSR). When lending Eurocurrency funds to foreign coun­
tries Vneshtorgbank usually joins banking consortia comprised of other 
Soviet banks, Western-owned banks and GMEA banks. During the latter 
half of 1975» Vneshtorgbank participated in two Eurocurrency loans 
for LDGs, On both occasions Vneshtorgbank functioned as a co-manager. 
(Remember that managers of Eurocurrency loans set the participation 
fees.) The first loan amounted to $150 million and was granted to 
Turkey, The second loan totalled $50 million and was granted to Argen­
tina (see p, 247). According to some reports no Soviet exports were
27connected with the loan for Turkey. In July 1976, Vneshtorgbank 
participated in a $600-million Eurocurrency loan for the IIB, Then 
in January 1977» Vneshtorgbank provided funds for a DM 150-million 
($63-million) loan to Cuba, (For an account of Vneshtorgbank's borrow­
ing and lending operations in Eurocurrency markets from January 1975" 
August 1978 see APPENDIX G.)
An Overview of the Structure and Operations 
of Soviet Foreign-Based Banks
The operations of SFBBs have grown considerably during the past decade, 
A sizeable portion of this growth can be attributed to the increase 
in financial transactions between East and West. However, it is inter-
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esting to note that SFBBs now ascribe part of their success (or fail­
ure) to operations which lie outside the confines of East-West trade.
As a rule, SFBBs are fully chartered credit and deposit instit­
utions, Such banks operate according to the laws and banking norms 
prevailing in host countries, SFBBs are entitled to accept deposits 
from a wide range of sources and place deposits in a number of finan­
cial institutions. The granting of hard currency resources to organ­
isations involved in East-West trade is one of the most important func­
tions of SFBBs, In many cases SFBBs provide such resources to GMEA 
organisations on favourable (preferential) terms. According to one 
Soviet source;
Banks of socialist countries conducting operations in Western coun­
tries have ever increasing opportunities to obtain resources from 
the capitalist financial market. As we Imow, the important objec­
tives of these banks are to accumulate available resources and grant 
credits in foreign currency to socialist countries on favourable
terms,28
SFBBs also play an important role in arranging and granting hard 
currency credits/loans to LDGs (see APPENDIX C), Small credits/loans 
are sometimes granted to LDGs by SFBBs alone. However, when large 
Eurocurrency loans are granted to LDCs, SFBBs participate along with 
Western-owned banks. On a few occasions SFBBs have granted loans to 
IMTEs (see APPENDIX C), Eurocurrency loans from SFBBs to social­
ist countries, LDCs and IMTEs are not necessarily connected with Sov­
iet foreign trade. In some cases SFBBs function as managers (or co­
managers) of Eurocurrency loans.
Although SFBBs are authorised to accept deposits from all types 
of persons such banks normally do not offer services to non-commercial 
depositors. However, there are always exceptions. For example if the 
president of General Motors Corporation or Chase Manhattan Bank wishes 
to open an account in Moscow Narodny Bank it is doubtful that his re­
quest would be denied. Employees of SFBBs are sometimes permitted to
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open deposit accounts. Moreover, some SFBBs offer their employees bank 
credit (on relatively favourable terms) for any number of reasons (e,g., 
automobile and home purchases).
Until the 1960s, SFBBs operated almost exclusively as middlemen 
between large Western commercial banks and state-controlled financial 
institutions in the USSR, other GMEA countries and LDGs, By operating 
in such a fashion SFBBs were often regarded as transfer organisations,
(SFBBs would obtain financial resources from world markets and immed­
iately transfer such funds to government-controlled banks,) Since 
SFBBs conducted most of their business with other banks, final borrow­
ers in GMEA (e.g,, FTOs) seldom came into contact with SFBBs, The 
situation is much the same today. As we learned, Soviet FTOs must 
conduct virtually all of their financial business through Vneshtorgbank. 
Moreover, most FTOs in other GMEA countries operate in the same fash­
ion, This policy will probably not change for a good long time. It 
should also be mentioned that SFBBs still prefer to grant credits/loans 
to state-controlled (as opposed to private) banks in LDGs, However, 
in IMTEs (and in a few LDCs such as Singapore), SFBBs appear to be 
making more contact with final borrowers than ever before.
It is generally assumed that the primary function of most SFBBs 
is the financing of East-West trade. However, the day-to-day opera­
tions of individual SFBBs are by no means identical. For some time 
Moscow Narodny Bank (MNB) and Eurobank were responsible for selling 
quite a lot of Soviet gold in the West, But at the present time Woachod 
Handelsbank in Zurich is considered the most active gold trader of all 
SFBBs. During the early 1970s MNB was quite active in the Eurobond 
market (i.e., the market for bonds denominated in Eurocuzrenoies), By 
the end of 1976, MNB had all but ceased its operations in the Eurobond 
market. On the other hand Eurobank still operates in the Eurobond
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market from time to time.
One might expect that SFBBa have common goals and operate in a
fully integrated fashion. Of course, it would he extremely difficult
to verify this assumption without gaining access to unpublished records
of the banks' operations. We learned previously that MNB and Eurobank
passed Eurocurrencies back and forth during the mid- and late 1950s,
According to some sources, operations of this nature are still being
29conducted within the network of SFBBs, Indeed, if Wozchod Handels- 
bank is offering a relatively favourable rate of interest for dollar 
deposits MNB might decide to withdraw its short-term dollar deposits 
from, say, an American bank and transfer these dollars to its account 
in Wozchod Handelsbank, A number of SFBBs sometimes participate in 
the same consortium loan. During January 1976, six SFBBs participated 
in a $350-million Eurocurrency loan to the IIB, Many other examples 
of SFBBs operating together can be found in APPENDIX G. It would also 
be reasonable to assume that a fair amount of rapport takes place be­
tween various SFBBs in the light of the fact that some SFBBs own share 
capital in other SFBBs. However, we should be careful about assuming 
that SFBBs were set up to operate within a tightly-knit network. This 
would imply that the operations of one SFBB are largely determined 
by the needs of other SFBBs. There is little reason to believe this.
In all likelihood MNB would not place dollar deposits in other SFBBs 
(above a token sum) if such funds could be used more profitably out­
side of the network. Moreover, MNB might well withdraw its dollar 
deposits from, say, Wozchod Handelsbank and deposit these dollars in 
bank of America if the deposit rates paid by the American bank are 
higher. Now we should not rule out the possibility that at some future 
date Soviet officials might attempt to bring about a higher degree 
of cohesion between SFBBs, But such a move would run counter to bank-
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ing norms in the West and would most likely undermine the USSR’s care­
fully nurtured reputation in world financial markets.
It was mentioned previously that dividends from Soviet-owned 
companies in the West could become an important source of hard currency 
for the USSR, The available data on the operations of SFBBs suggest 
that the banks normally do not pay dividends to their shareholders.
One of the few indications that SFBBs have ever sent dividends to their 
shareholders in the USSR appeared in a published interview with the 
Soviet international banker Andrei Dubonossov. When asked by Per Spiegel 
if Soviet banks in Western Europe always send a portion of their pro­
fits to Moscow, Dubonossov replied that these banks sometimes pay div- 
idend5 (presumably to shareholders in Moscow). However, Dubonossov 
may have been referring to dividends paid to Soviet shareholders for 
the purpose of increasing the banks' share capital. This is quite 
different from the actual transfer of funds to Moscow, As we shall 
learn, the net profits of SFBBs are sometimes used to increase the 
amount of share capital in these banks. But the transfer of funds 
to Moscow is not required for this operation. The banks' annual reports 
occasionally state that Soviet shareholders decided to use part of the 
profits to increase the amount of share capital in SFBBs, In addition, 
shareholders of SFBBs sometimes request that a portion of the profits 
be used to increase the banks' reserves.
It is generally accepted that Soviet officials are responsible
for guiding the operations of SFBBs, According to some sources, a
supervisory council is responsible for defining the broad objec- 
31tives of SFBBs, The supervisory council is based in the USSR and 
comprises representatives of SFBBs' shareholders. We would expect a 
number of supervisory-council members to be employed by Gosbank (in­
cluding the state savings banks), Vneshtorgbank, Stroibank and selected
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Soviet FTOs as these organisations are principal shareholders of SFBBs,
In addition, employees of some SFBBs are conceivably members of the 
supervisory council since various SFBBs own share capital in other 
SFBBs (e.g., Ost-West Handelsbank owns share capital in MNB). So what 
role does the supervisory council play? In all likelihood supervisory- 
council members are not responsible for closely monitoring the opera­
tions of SFBBs, It would be almost impossible for supervisory-council 
members in Moscow to be aware of all the intricate day-to-day opera­
tions of SFBBs, Moreover, some supervisory-council members occupy 
top-level positions in Gosbank, Vneshtorgbank and other Soviet organ­
isations, If these individuals were required to supervise the opera­
tions of SFBBs frequently they would have little time for other commit­
ments, Therefore, it appears as though supervisory-council members 
have one primary function; presiding over the annual general meetings 
of SFBBs, This role enables supervisory-council members to evaluate 
the annual operations of SFBBs and appoint Soviet executives to var­
ious positions within these banks. On some occasions supervisory-council 
members visit SFBBs when annual general meetings are not being held.
Such visits are often on an informal basis (i.e., supervisory-council 
members may pay short visits to SFBBs while serving with foreign trade 
missions). However, in other cases supervisory-council members are 
required to visit SFBBs for the purpose of presiding over 'extraoidin- 
ary general meetings'. This normally indicates that marked changes 
must be made in the structure/operations of SFBBs,
As a rule, the day-to-day operations of SFBBs are supervised 
by Soviet executives holding key positions in these banks. The highest 
governing body in SFBBs is the board of directors. The members of 
individual boards of directors are selected at annual general meetings 
(or 'extraordinary general meetings'). Some members of the boards of
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directors opt to retire during the course of annual general meetings
while others request an additional term. The period of service for
directors of SFBBs differs widely, A few directors only serve with
individual banks for two or three years while other directors spend
over a decade with the same bank. For example, Sergei Alexeev served
32as a top-level executive in Eurobank for over fourteen years.
Directors of SFBBs are often selected from the ranks of super­
visory-council members while 'retired* members of SFBBs frequently 
serve as members of the supervisory council. Therefore, a director 
of MNB who served in London for, say, three years could be assigned 
to the supervisory council in Moscow, After working in the USSR for 
a few years this former director of MNB could be sent back to London 
for another three-year term. On the other hand the aforementioned 
director/supervlsory-council member could be assigned to another SFBB 
(e,g,, Wozchod Handelsbank) after serving with the council. This is 
quite common. It is also a well-known fact that a director of a SFBB 
can be reassigned to another SFBB without serving an interim term with 
the supervisory council. For example, Andrei Dubonossov retired from 
MNB and was promptly assigned to Ost-West Handelsbanl^  in Frankfurt,
In unusual cases a director of one SFBB can serve as a director of 
another SFBB at the same time. For example, during the mid-1970s 
0, N, Kulikov served as director in both MNB and Banque Unie Est-Ouest 
(Luxemburg),
Not all boards of directors of SFBBs follow the same organisa­
tional pattern, MNB's board of directors is solely comprised of Sov­
iet citizens, Eurobank's board of directors includes both Soviet 
and French bankers, A French national functions as the chairman (pres­
ident) of Eurobank's board of directors,Wozchod Handelsbank also has 
a mixed (Soviet-Swiss) board of directors but in this case a Soviet
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citizen functions as chairman of the board,
A number of former directors of SFBBs etre assigned to key posts 
in the USSR, Indeed, one almost gets the impression that SFBBs serve 
as proving grounds for top-level executives in Vneshtorgbank, For 
example, the following former directors of MNB have served (or are 
serving) as directors of Vneshtorgbank: V. A, Drovossekov, N, V. Nikit-
kin and A. S. Maslov. Former directors of SFBBs are also assigned to 
posts in Gosbank, G, I, Skobelkin— a former director of MNB— is cur­
rently functioning as the manager of Gosbank's foreign and economic 
research department. According to some sources, when Sergei Alexeev 
retired from Eurobank he became an advisor to the Chairman of Gosbank,^ 
Boards of management are responsible for carrying out the day- 
to-day operations of SFBBs, The managers (and deputy managers) opera­
ting in SFBBs are usually specialists in financing trade between the 
USSR and specific geographic areas. All of the larger SFBBs employ 
bankers who have expert knowledge of financial conditions in the follow­
ing areas: Africa, Asia, Eastern Europe, Latin Amercia, North America,
the U.K. and Western Europe,
The managers of SFBBs are theoretically supervised by members 
of the boards of directors. As a rule the boards of management of 
SFBBs are dominated by local nationals. There are at least two reasons 
for this policy. Firstly, the USSR is unable to assign its citizens 
to SFBBs without the approval of local authorities. It is doubtful 
that local authorities would agree (at this time) that all (or most) 
management positions in SFBBs should be occupied by Soviet nationals. 
Moreover, local bank employees (especially members of bank unions) 
might argue that an increase in the number of Soviets in SFBBs could 
lead to an increase in the number of unemployed local bankers. Second­
ly, it would be difficult for the USSR to provide Soviets who are thor-
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oughly familiar with conditions in Western financial markets. Such 
experience not only requires an excellent command of the language(s) 
of the host country hut also many years of dealing with market forces 
in the Western world. An innocent mistake by a manager can often lead 
to a catastrophic situation. For obvious reasons Soviet officials 
wish to minimise the chances of unnecessary errors taking place within 
their foreign banking network. Therefore, local nationals appear to 
be the most logical candidates for management positions within SFBBs,
As Soviets become more adept at functioning in world financial markets 
it is conceivable that the USSR might attempt to increase the number 
of Soviet managers in SFBBs,
The employees of SFBBs not functioning as directors or managers 
(e.g., members of economics departments, foreign exchange dealers, 
legal advisors, clerks, librarians, secretaries etc,) are, in most 
cases, local nationals. As a rule, local nationals are placed in charge 
of individual departments in S F B B s . T h e  total number of personnel 
in individual SFBBs differs markedly. Some of the smaller SFBBs have 
less than 100 employees while a few of the larger SFBBs (e.g., MNB and 
Eurobank) employ around 300*
The economics departments in SFBBs are responsible for compiling 
and analysing data on economic conditions in local and world markets.
The studies and reports of individual economics departments are often 
circulated throughout the Soviet international banking network giving 
a number of bankers and traders access to useful material, A portion 
of this material is sent to institutions in the USSR, The chief econ­
omists in SFBBs usually serve as advisors to the bank's directors.
Some economics departments even function in a public capacity. For 
example, MNB employs six or seven economists who are responsible for 
publishing a Press Bulletin and Quarterly Review in addition to their
316
other activities. The Press Bulletin is published each week and con­
tains material from non-Soviet sources on general developments in East- 
West trade, translated articles from the Soviet press, interviews with 
Soviet traders and bankers, various seminars on East-West commerce, 
official ruble exchange rates and foreign trade statistics from a wide 
range of Eastern and Western nations. Approximately 1,500 Press Bulletins 
are sent each week to selected trading companies, banks, universities and 
individuals. MB's Quarterly Review is highly regarded by economists 
in the U.K. and abroad. As a rule, the Quarterly Review is not primar­
ily concerned with East-West trade. It normally contains a commentary 
on general trends in world markets, and articles on foreign currencies 
(e.g., the dollar, the Deutsche mark, the pound sterling, the Swiss 
franc, the Japanese yen etc.) and gold, (Soviet gold production, sales 
and reserves are not mentioned in these articles.) In addition, some 
interesting articles on Soviet companies in the West and Soviet opera­
tions in Eurocurrency markets have been published in MNB's Quarterly 
Review. Eurobank also publishes a press bulletin and quarterly review. 
Since their inception SFBBs have functioned as contact centres 
for Soviet and Western traders. Idien travel to and from the USSR was 
difficult, SFBBs saved traders a great deal of time and money by par­
ticipating in the negotiation of contracts. Since Soviet traders now 
have good access to Western companies, and businessmen in the West 
are more or less free to visit the USSR, it might be reasonable to 
assume that SFBBs have lost some of their importance as East-West con­
tact centres. However, SFBBs will probably continue to be convenient 
centres for Soviet and Western businessmen to meet. Although the USSR 
does not maintain diplomatic and commercial relations with the Republic 
of South Africa at this time, Soviet leaders could eventually decide that 
it is advantageous to buy uranium (directly) from South Africa. Now it is
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a fair assumption that contracts connected with such imports would 
not be negotiated in Pretoria, Gape Town or Moscow, However, since 
Soviet and South African traders presently conduct a fair amount of 
their international business in the U.K. and Western Europe, SFBBs 
could become key negotiating centres for uranium deals between the two 
countries. It should also be mentioned that Soviet and South African 
traders share common interests as major producers of gold and diamonds. 
It is possible that these traders meet on occasion in order to discuss 
developments in gold and diamond markets, SFBBs represent ideal meeting 
places for such discussions (especially those connected with gold).
We learned previously that the USSR occasionally stores quite 
a lot of gold in the vaults of SFBBs. It would seem logical that such 
gold would be eventually sold. But under some conditions the USSR 
might be able to profit from its gold stocks in the West without re­
moving the gold from vaults in SFBBs, Let's assume that at some point 
it would be more advantageous for the USSR to finance its trade deficits 
via Western credits than by selling gold (e.g., when credit is cheap 
and the price of gold low). If the USSR is not in a precarious finan­
cial position Soviet importers would probably be able to obtain West­
ern credits quite easily (especially in a buyer's market). However, 
if Western lenders should ever have doubts about the USSR's credit­
worthiness they might start demanding some form of collateral before 
granting credits to Soviet FTOs, Under such conditions the vaults 
in SFBBs could be opened up for selected Western bankers. Once West­
ern lenders are convinced that the USSR has enough gold in the West 
to cover principal and interest payments they would most likely offer 
credits to the USSR on relatively favourable terms.
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Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd.
On 18 October 1919 the Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd, (MNB) was established 
in London, The adverse political and economic conditions during the 
1920s hampered the bank's development. However, by the mid-1920s Sov­
iet trade with IMTEs started to increase rapidly which resulted in 
a fair amount of new business for MNB. As a consequence of the growth 
in Soviet foreign trade MNB set up a branch in Paris in 1925» an agency 
in New York in 1926, and a branch in Berlin in 1928. At the end of 
1929, MNB's total assets exceeded E8 million,
The marked decrease in Soviet foreign trade during the mid- and 
late 1938s greatly reduced the operations of MNB, From 1934-1935»
MNB's branches in Paris and Berlin were closed down and the bank's 
shareholdings in various financial institutions (e.g., the Transit 
Bank of Riga, the Svenska Bank, the Far Eastern Bank and Banque Commer­
ciale pour 1' Europe du Nord) were sold. The decline in American-Soviet 
trade resulted in the closing of MNB's agency in New York. In 1932,
MNB's share capital stood at El,750*000. By 1937» the bank's share 
capital had fallen to E525»000,^^
After World War II, MNB's operations began to expand. At the 
end of 1948, MNB's total assets stood at E15.5 million, compared with 
only El.5 million at the end of 1945* However, the improvement in 
MNB's activities was short-lived. In May 1950, MNB closed its Shanghai 
branch which had been set up in 1934. By the end of 1952, MNB's total 
assets only amounted to E6 million.
MNB's growth after 1952 has been quite steady. Indeed, except 
for a slight setback in 1958» MNB's total assets have increased each 
year since 1952,^^ TABLE 5*6 shows the growth in MNB's activities 
after 1959. The most noteworthy period of growth took place from 1971-1976,
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TABLE 5,6
DEVELOPMENT OF MOSCOW NARODNY 
BANK, 1960-1976 
(in millions of pounds)
Year Total assets Advances to customers, 
including bills dis­
counted
Correspondents' 
accounts (depos­
its) with the bank
i960 55.6 36.3 51.4
1961 78.1 54.4 63.6
1962 103.9 64.7 76,6
1963 185.8 140.7 158,3
1964 204.8 134.9 172,8
1965 233.1 197.5 197.1
1966 251.0 178.2 209.6
1967 299.5 191.3 245.5
1968 322.3 261.0 270.6
1969 331.9 235.0 273.9
1970 363.9 275.7 318.8
1971 391.8 284.6 340.4
1972 584.8 454.3 462.7
1973 835.9 671.9 706.9
1974 1,116.2 NA NA
1975 1.213.5 NA NA
1976 1,518.3 NA NA
Sources: Moscow Narodny Bank, Fiftieth Anniversary Year, Oct­
ober 1919-October 1969 (Stevenage Herts: The Bay Tree Press), p. 10;
and Moscow Narodny Bank, Annual Reports. 1972-1976,
when MNB's total assets increased from £391.8 million to £1,518.3 mil­
lion; an increase of 288 percent. During the period 1960-1973, funds 
included in the category 'advances to customers, including bills dis­
counted' fluctuated between 62 percent of total assets (1962) and 85 per­
cent (1965). Throughout the same period the funds included in the 
category 'correspondents' accounts with the bank' fluctuated between 
92 percent of total liabilities (I960) and 74 percent (1962). The 
reader should note that MNB established a branch in Beirut in I963, 
and a branch in Singapore in 1971. In the light of this information 
it is interesting to note that MNB's total assets only increased by 
10 percent from 1963-1964, while the bank's total assets increased by
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49 percent from 1971-1972. However, MNB was financing quite a lot
of trade between GMEA and the Middle East before the Beirut branch 
41was set up. This would explain the modest increase in MNB's activ­
ities following the establishment of the branch. On the other hand,
MNB’s operations in Singapore and surrounding areas were rather limited 
until the establishment of the Singapore branch. As a result, a marked 
increase in MNB's total assets followed the establishment of this branch.
We should now turn our attention to the assets side of MNB's 
balance sheet for 1976 (TABLE 5»7). The sum representing 'advances 
to customers and other accounts' comprised 75 percent of MNB's total 
assets at the end of 1976, Since MNB is primarily involved in the 
financing of East-West trade, a sizeable portion of the £1,132.3 mil­
lion is most likely channelled to foreign trade banks in CMEA countries. 
As we learned, banks operating in the West can grant loans to GMEA 
banks or place deposits in these socialist banks. However, from MNB's 
balance sheet there is no way of telling the way in which GMEA banks 
receive hard currency funds. MNB also grants loans to LDGs and IMTEs 
(see APPENDIX C). On occasion MNB grants loans to final borrowers (as 
opposed to banks). For example, in the early part of 1975» MNB's Beirut 
branch participated in a $40-million Eurocurrency loan to the Middle 
East Airlines,
Since 1973» MNB has not published data which would enable analysts 
to calculate the bank's 'advances to customers* as well as the sum rep­
resenting 'other accounts', (It is possible that MNB classifies organ­
isations involved in East-West trade as its 'customers',) According 
to MNB's 1973 Annual Report, the sum in the category 'advances to cus­
tomers, including bills discounted' amounted to £671.9 million. The 
report also stated that 'advances to customers and other accounts' 
amounted to £669.7 million while the sum in the category 'bills dis-
TABLE 5,7
BALANCE SHEET OF MOSCOW NARODNY BANK, LTD., 
INCLUDING THE BRANCHES IN BEIRUT AND 
SINGAPORE, 31 DECEMBER I976 
(in pounds)
321
Assets
Gash in hand and at banks
Money at call and short notice
Short-term deposits
British and other government 
treasury bills
Investmentsi
British government and 
other quoted securities 
Unquoted securities
Bills discounted
Advances to customers and other accounts 
including amounts due from subsidiaries (E300)
Bank property including furniture and fittings 
and motor cars at cost less depreciation
Liabilities of customers for obligations 
as per contra
Total
Liabilities
Capital %
Authorised * 40,000,000 ordinary
shares of Ei each 
Issued * 36,500,000 ordinary
shares of El each fully paid ,.,
Reserve account 
Profit and loss account
Current, deposit and other accounts including 
provision for taxation and inner reserves and 
amounts due to subsidiaries
Obligations for account of customers 
as per contra
Total
15.506.000
157.595.000
60.409.000
5.076.000
3.857.000
4.684.000
110.313.000
1.132.266.000
5.968.000
22.633.000
1.518.307.000
36.500.000 
7,800,000
10,000
1.451.364.000
22.633.000
1.518.307.000
Source: Moscow Narodny Bank, 1976 Annual Report.
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counted' totalled £88.7 million. If we subtract £88,7 million from 
£671.9 million we learn that 'advances to customers' amounted to £583.2 
million (or 87 percent of 'advances to customers and other accounts').
Now if we subtract £583.2 million from £669.7 million we learn that 
'other accounts' totalled £86,5 million (or I3 percent of 'advances 
to customers and other accounts'). In the event that significant changes 
have not taken place in the structure of MNB's balance sheet we can 
calculate that 'advances to customers' in 1976 amounted to roughly 
£985.1 million (87 percent of 'advances to customers and other accounts'). 
However, significant changes might well have taken place in MNB's bal­
ance sheet. Perhaps the funds included in 'other accounts' began to 
increase markedly (vis-à-vis 'advances to customers') after 1973. We 
will leam a little later that this might have happened when MNB's Sing­
apore branch stepped up its operations in the Asian real estate market.
In addition to granting loans, MNB discounts bills of exchange 
and promissory notes for GMEA and Western traders. The sum for 'bills 
discounted' comprised 7 percent of MNB's total assets at the end of 
1976. When GMEA banks grant credit (on behalf of CMEA exporters) to 
Western importers such banks receive bills of exchange and promissory 
notes which have been signed by the Western importers. These bills 
and notes can either be held until maturity or they can be discounted 
in Western money markets. If a GMEA bank needs liquid resources (cash) 
such bills and notes can be discounted in, say, MNB. As a result of 
this operation the GMEA bank receives liquid resources and MNB obtains 
negotiable instruments which can either be held until maturity or re­
discounted in the money market. Of course, if the bills and notes are 
held until maturity MNB stands to gadn a fair amount from interest 
charges. Now to look at this subject a little differently, let's assume 
that a Soviet importer sends a promissory note to a Western exporter.
Let's also assume that the Western exporter does not wish to hold the
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note until it matures. Under such conditions the promissory note can 
be discounted in, say, MNB, Now if MNB holds the note until it matures 
MNB is in a position to present this note to Vneshtorgbank for collection. 
We should note that the interest payments from the Soviet Union have been 
used to promote the development of the Soviet international banking 
network. If the Western exporter had decided to present the note to 
a Western bank for discounting, the Western bank would have collected 
interest payments from the Soviet Union.
Funds in the categories 'cash in hand and at banks' and 'money 
at call and short notice' comprised 11 percent of MNB's total assets 
at the end of 1976. This proportion is about average for a commercial 
bank. In addition to its liquid resources, MNB has 4 percent of its 
total assets in short-term (anywhere from 30 to 36O days) deposit ac­
counts. These accounts can be in any number of banks both within and 
outside CMEA,
It is interesting to note that MNB started operating in the mar­
ket for British and other government treasury bills during 1974, Be­
tween the end of 1975 &nd the end of 1976, MNB's holdings of British 
and other government treasury bills fell from £5,108,000 to £5,076,000, 
MNB's investments in British government and other quoted securities 
have fallen markedly since the early 1970s, At the end of 1971, MNB's 
investments in this category amounted to £28,897,506 (or 7 percent of 
total assets). By the end of 1976, MNB's investments in British gov­
ernment and other quoted securities stood at £3,857,000 (or 0,3 per­
cent of total assets), MNB's holdings of unquoted securities (most 
likely share capital of Soviet companies in the West) started appearing 
in MNB's 1973 Annual Report. At the end of 1973, MNB's holdings of 
unquoted securities amounted to £663,138 (or 0,1 percent of total assets). 
By the end of 1976, MNB's holdings of unquoted securities stood at
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£4,684,000 (or 0.3 percent of total assets).
We should now turn our attention to the liabilities side of M B ’s 
balance sheet (TABLE 5 * 7 ) • Funds in the category 'current, deposit 
and other accounts' comprised 96 percent of MNB's total liabilities 
at the end of 1976. Since 1973# MNB has not published data on the 
amount of funds deposited by 'correspondents'. In 1973# funds included 
in the category 'current, deposit and other accounts' amounted to £806,2 
million. 'Correspondent accounts*with MNB in 1973 totalled £706.9 mil­
lion (or 88 percent of 'current, deposit and other accounts'). If 
significant changes have not taken place in the structure of MNB's 
balance sheet we can estimate that 'correspondent accounts' with MNB 
in 1976 amounted to approximately £1,277,2 million (88 percent of 
£1,451.4 million),
TABLE 5.8 shows MNB’s profit and loss accounts from I972-I976. 
Since the early 1970s there have been modest increases in MNB's profits 
each year. As we learned, dividends are seldom paid to Soviet share­
holders, (MNB's principal shareholders include Gosbank, Vneshtorgbank, 
Stroibank, Tsentrosoyuz, Eksportles, Eksportkhleb, Ingosstrakh, Mashino-
eksport, Prodintorg, Soyuznefteeksport, Raznoeksport, Soyuzkhimeksport 
Ixo \
and Stankoimport, ) During the period 1972-1976, almost all of MNB's
net profits were channelled to the reserve account. After transferring 
a large share of the net profit to the reserve account MNB's directors 
often propose that such funds be used to increase the bank's share 
capital. From 1972-1976, MNB's (paid-up) share capital increased from 
£7 million to £36.5 million. Part of this increase can be attributed 
to annual bonus issues of share capital (on the basis of funds in the 
reserve account) which took place between 1972 and 1976. For example, 
in 1975# MNB's directors proposed the issuance of 1 million, one-pound 
shares to the bank's shareholders on the basis of funds in the reserve
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TABLE 5.8
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNTS OF MOSCOW 
NARODNY BANK, 1972-1976 
(in pounds)
1222 1222 222ft 2222 222É&
Balance brought
forward 9.964 24,532 27,071 36,912 13,000
Net profit for 
the year, after 
taxation based 
thereon includ­
ing corporation 
tax at 52 per­
cent (49 per­
cent in 1973, 
and 40 percent 
in 1972), and 
after making 
transfers to 
and from inner 
reserves, out 
of which pro­
vision has been 
made for dimin­
ution in the val-
ue of assets 1,214,568 1,302,539 1,359,841 1,425,829 1,497,000
Less :
Proposed 
transf er 
to re­
serve
account 1,200,000 1.300.000 1,350,000 1,450.000 1,500,000
Balance carried
forward 24,532 27,071 36,912 12,741 10,000
figures have been rounded off.
Sources* Moscow Narodny Bank, Annual Reports. I972-I976.
account. From 1975"1976, MNB’s share capital increased from £15.5 mil­
lion to £36.5 million. This increase was largely the result of the 
issuance of E20-million worth of share capital (20 million shares at 
one pound each) which was paid for in cash. The majority of these 
shares were probably purchased by Gosbank and Vneshtorgbank.
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At the end of 1976, MNB owned 100 percent of the share capital 
in four companies. The companies are as followsi Monah Nominees Pte, 
Ltd, (Singapore), Mosnar Investment Holding Go. Ltd, (U.K.), Mosnar 
Securities Ltd. (U.K.), and Popular Nominees Ltd. (U.K.), In addition, 
MNB owns share capital in two SFBBs— Banque Unie Est-Ouest and Wozchod 
Handelsbank. At the end of 1976, MNB owned 26 percent of the share 
capital in Banque Unie and 17 percent of the share capital in Wozchod 
Handelsbank,
In 1976, MNB's board of directors comprised eight Soviet citizens. 
The board included one chairman and managing director, two deputy chair­
men, and five directors. One deputy chairman functioned as the head 
of the Singapore branch, and one director functioned as the head of 
the Beirut branch. The salary of MNB's chairman and managing director 
amounted to £21,560 in 1976, The salaries of the remaining members of 
the board fell between £2,501 and £22,500, It might be interesting to 
note that MNB's directors are permitted to own a small portion of the 
share capital in the bank (usually one to five shares).
During the last two decades the operations of MNB have appeared 
quite frequently in Western press reports. This is not unusual in the 
light of the fact that MNB is perhaps the best known Soviet bank in 
the West. Most of the press reports on the activities of MNB have 
been connected with the bank's day-to-day operations (e.g., MNB’s par­
ticipation in a consortium loan to a GMEA bank). However, since the 
early 1970s MNB has received a lot of unwanted press coverage. We 
learned previously that economists in MNB are responsible for writing 
reports on gold in the bank’s Quarterly Review, In the summer of 1972, 
one of MNB's economists stated in the Quarterly Review that if all 
South African gold output was sold the price of gold would be about 
$50,00 per ounce. (At that time gold was selling for about $66.00
32?
per ounce.) The statement follows*
. . . the price which would prevail if all South African output 
were sold is around $50 per ounce, and this price (corrected for 
inflation) should, everything being equal, be re-established when 
and if South Africa resumes a full sales policy,^3
The statement was most likely valid but it nevertheless created numer­
ous problems. Soon after the Quarterly Review was published the price 
of gold reportedly dropped from $66,00 per ounce to $61,25. According 
to Western reports it was not South African sales that reduced the 
price but the statement in MNB’s Quarterly Review. Western reporters 
lost no time in making the most out of this issue. One reporter was 
able to capture the sentiments of Eduard P, Gostev, the head of Woz­
chod Handelsbank, When asked what he thought of MNB's statement Gostev 
replied ’I think it's nutty’ Since Wozchod Handelsbank has been 
responsible for selling quite a lot of Soviet gold, Gostev's sentiments 
were probably even more acrid when he was discussing the issue with 
Soviet bankers. Another Western reporter, realising that a Soviet 
economist might have been responsible for the drop in the price of gold, 
used the issue to criticise the entire Soviet economic system.
So quite possibly, some poor Moscow Narodny economist is being 
advised to learn more about market economics or prepare to spend 
the winter in Moscow. If so, however, such censure would hardly 
be fair. If his own government knew something about market econ­
omics it would know that the application of a market system in 
Russia itself could go a long way towards making life more comfort­
able. Then being sent home might not be a punishment,45
Throughout the latter part of 1975 and the early part of 1976,
MNB received quite a lot of publicity over the case involving the Aus­
trian financial institution Creditanstalt-Bankverein and a consortium 
of British and other banks, MNB functioned as a member of this con­
sortium, During 1973 ^ud 1974, the aforementioned consortium supplied 
funds for a commercial deal on the basis of letters of credit issued 
by Creditanstalt. In 1975» Creditanstalt failed to honour all of its 
financial obligations connected with the letters of credit. As a result,
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Moscow Narodny officials decided to block Creditanstalt's access to
$3 million which Creditanstalt had placed in a deposit account in MNB,
According to some reports MNB offered to hand over the $3 million to
a British court until the matter was settled. However, Creditanstalt
rejected this proposal and issued a writ against MNB, After conferring
with their legal staff, Moscow Narodny officials decided to turn the
$3 million over to Creditanstalt, The case will eventually be decided
46in the Austrian courts.
We learned previously that MNB established a branch in Singapore 
in 1971, At the end of 1972, it was announced that the Singapore branch 
had increased MNB's total assets and profit by quite a large m a r g i n , ^2 
However, this increase was not solely connected with the financing 
of East-West trade. Indeed, MNB's 1972 Annual Report stated that the 
Singapore branch was 'actively involved* in operations other than those 
connected with the financing of East-West trade. Although the Singa­
pore branch was involved in a lot of business outside the confines of 
East-West trade, Moscow Narodny officials in London appeared to be con­
vinced that such activity was being conducted in a sagacious manner.
The Bank /""i.e., MNB_7 is indeed fortunate in having in this ter­
ritory /"i.e., in Singapore// a Management v:ho have the experience 
and capacity to deal with the many intricate problems connected 
with the successful inauguration of a new enterprise.'^
Moscow Narodny's 1973 Annual Report also contained evidence that the 
operations of the Singapore branch were expanding rapidly. Moreover, 
Moscow Narodny officials in London were still confident that the Sing­
apore branch was operating sagaciously: 'Our Branch's interests are
4o
well diversified and fully secured*.
On the basis of early reports Soviet officials had every right 
to be pleased with the operations of MNB's branch in Singapore, Accord­
ing to one source, within two years the branch became one of the lar­
gest banks in Singapore, At the end of 1973» the 'earning assets' of
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MNB's Singapore branch amounted to approximately $588 million. This
sum represented 14 percent of the 'earning assets' of all banks in
Singapore,Soviet officials could also proudly point out that the
lending operations of MNB's branch greatly exceeded those of the First
51National City Bank's branch in Singapore,
The euphoria connected with the success of MNB's Singapore branch 
was short-lived. At the end of 1975» MNB announced that its Singapore 
branch was forced to cover 'bad and doubtful d e b t s ' . A  number of 
these 'bad and doubtful debts' were connected with the branch's deal­
ings with Mosbert Holdings— a Hong Kong company. In 1972» Amos Dawe—  
the former chairman of Mosbert Holdings— and Teo Poh Kong— the former 
manager and advisor of MNB’s Singapore branch were introduced, Dawe 
was interested in obtaining loans for property development in Asia 
and Teo Poh Kong considered property development as the most profitable 
form of (long-term) investment. The match was perfect. Between 1972 
and 1975» the Singapore branch granted Mosbert credits/loans totalling 
$61 million. This sum represented approximately 75 percent of all 
credits/loans granted to Mosbert.53
Mosbert Holdings collapsed in 1975 and MNB's Singapore branch 
was left holding the bag, MNB’s losses as a result of the Mosbert 
collapse could amount to millions of dollars.5^ However, the embarrass­
ment connected with the affair was probably more damaging than any 
pecuniary losses. Indeed, for three years MNB's Singapore branch was 
dealing closely with a company which, according to Bank of America, 
had engaged in 'fictitious, fraudulent and dishonest transactions',55 
Moreover, a few critics suggested that the MNB-Mosbert connection was 
part of a Soviet plot to infiltrate the Chinese business community in 
Hong Kong.5^
The Soviets are currently attempting to improve the reputation
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of MNB's branch in Singapore. The branch is now under the direction
of a Soviet managing director and two Soviet deputy general managers.
(The branch was previously run by a Soviet general manager, a Soviet
deputy general manager, and a local manager and advisor.) Teo Poh
57Kong no longer works for MNB.^' In addition, Moscow Narodny officials
announced that the entire profit of the Singapore branch for 1976 was
58
utilised to cover some of the 'bad and doubtful debts'. Moreover, 
one of MNB's shareholders (presumably Gosbank or Vneshtorgbank) made de­
posits in the Singapore branch in order to strengthen the branch's posi­
tion, Interest payments for these deposits will only come from future 
profits of the b r a n c h , A  brief statement from MNB's new chairman 
and managing director, 0, N. Kulikov, gives one the impression that 
the Singapore branch's operations (at least for the meantime) will be 
closely monitored from London (or Moscow),
Our Branch in Singapore has gone through a period of necessary 
retrenchment in its activities to allow for the reinforcement of 
the branch's organisation and improvement of the structure of its 
operations, I am confident that the measures we are taking and 
the support given will enable the branch to strengthen its posi­
tion, 60
On 21 December 1976, MNB's shareholders held an 'extraordinary 
general meeting' in London, The members of the meeting included Vlad­
imir Alkhimov (Chairman of Gosbank) and A, R, Makeev (Deputy Chairman 
of Vneshtorgbank), During the course of the meeting (or perhaps before) 
S. A, Shevchenko— the chairman and managing director of MNB since the 
early 1970s— and S, A. Ovseitchik— the former general manager of the 
Singapore branch— resigned from MNB, In all likelihood Shevchenko 
and Ovseitchik will not serve with another SFBB, The new chairman 
and managing director of MNB is now responsible for clearing up any 
remaining problems in Singapore as well as improving the reputation 
of MNB. With little doubt, one of Kulikov's principal goals is to 
convince the world banking community that MNB is truly a bank which
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is preoccupied with the financing of East-West trade. According to
MNB's 1976 Annual Report;
The Bank's principal function continues to he the fostering and 
financing of East-West trade, and it is on the development of this 
trade that our prosperity firmly rests.
Mosbert Holdings was by no means the only company that created 
problems for MNB, In August 1977, it was announced that MNB lent a 
British munitions company— Cylinder Formings Ltd,— E2 million over a 
seven-year period (1971-1977), MNB first started lending to Cylinder 
Formings when the company was involved in the production of machine- 
tools, However, when Cylinder Formings switched over to munitions,
MNB still kept up its business connections with the company. Some of 
Cylinder Formings' contracts came from NATO. After deciding that Cylin­
der Formings could no longer meet its financial obligations, Moscow 
Narodny officials requested in July 1977 that a receiver be appointed.
At the time of its closure, Cylinder Formings owed MNB between £800,000 
and £1,000,000,^^ It is interesting to note that the former managing 
director of Cylinder Formings claimed that the company could not obtain 
some contracts because the British Ministry of Defence was aware of 
MNB's dealings with Cylinder Formings,
Since MNB officials had access to files belonging to Cylinder 
Formings it was mentioned that NATO secrets might have fallen into the 
hands of Soviet agents. Therefore, the British Ministry of Defence 
was called in to investigate the matter. It was later announced that 
no classified material had been connected with any of Cylinder Formings' 
contracts. In all likelihood MNB's dealings with Cylinder Formings 
would not have attracted so much attention if the company had been 
liquidated a few months earlier. Indeed, during July 1977, it was 
also disclosed that a type of tank in the British army had been supplied 
with Soviet-made spare parts for its cooling system,
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Before MNB's dealings with Cylinder Formings had been forgotten 
another case involving MNB came to light. On this occasion a writ 
was filed against MNB alleging that the bank had wrongfully sold shares 
in a company which was responsible for constructing a resort in Hong 
Kong. MNB granted loans to a Panama-based Chinese entrepreneur, Edward 
Wong Wing Cheung, for the development of the aforementioned resort,
Cheung offered MNB share capital in his Hong Kong Resort Company— the 
company responsible for constructing the resort— as collateral. Accord­
ing to one report, other banks stopped financing the project when it 
became known that a Soviet bank was involved. As a result, the Hong 
Kong Resort Company was liquidated and, despite protests from Cheung, 
the share capital was transferred to MNB, Soon after this move MNB 
sold the shares. Cheung argued that the sale of the shares was wrong 
because MNB's loans had been granted on a long-term basis (in other 
words Cheung did not owe MNB any money at the time of the sale). The 
loans (plus interest) granted to Cheung by MNB amounted to roughly 
$67.5 million.^
During the early and mid-1970s the adverse political and economic 
conditions in the Lebanon hampered the operations of MNB's Beirut branch. 
Despite these problems the assets of the Beirut branch increased by 
over 10 percent during 1972 and 1973* Since most of the Beirut branch's 
business is connected with 'off-shore' transactions (i.e., transactions 
with banks and trading companies outside the Lebanon) it is possible 
for the branch to operate in spite of local difficulties. At the end 
of 1976, MNB announced that its branch in Beirut was fully operational.
In the mid-1970s MNB established a representative office in Mos­
cow. A Soviet employee of MNB, Oleg Lapushkin, was placed in charge 
of the office. Then in November 1977, MNB, the Bank of Scotland and 
Morgan Grenfell set up a joint representative office in Moscow, (The
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joint representative office replaced MNB's office in Moscow.) Accord­
ing to a MNB report, the joint office 'will oversee the interests of 
all three banks and their customers, in particular by maintaining con­
tacts and liaising with the relevant Soviet institutions and with inter­
national and foreign bankers in M o s c o w * . T h e  joint representative 
office was set up to combine MNB's expertise in East-West trade finan­
cing, with the experience of Morgan Grenfell and the Bank of Scotland 
in arranging and providing EGGD-backed credits for major projects. The 
joint office is currently managed by Oleg Lapushkin,
It is interesting to note that in September 1973, MNB became the 
first Soviet-controlled bank to participate in a loan arranged by an 
affiliate of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.^^ 
Then in February 1978, MNB participated for the first time in the grant­
ing of an EGGD-backed dollar buyer credit. The credit was granted to 
Poland for the purchase of barley from the U.K,^^ In August 1978, MNB 
helped provide a £10,5-million loan for the London Borough of Lambeth.
Banque Commerciale pour 1' Europe 
du Nord SA ? Eurobank)'
Banque Commerciale pour 1' Europe du Nord was set up in Paris in 1921 
by White Russian emigrants. Four years later the bank was sold to the 
USSR. Since 1925, all share capital in Banque Commerciale has been 
owned by Soviet organisations. According to one source, Gosbank owns 
48,32 percent of the share capital in Eurobank, Vneshtorgbank owns 21.45 
percent, and Stroibank, Eksportles and Tsentrosoyuz own most of the 
remaining shares.
At the end of 1976, Eurobank's board of directors comprised four 
French nationals and three Soviets, A French national functions as 
president of the board and a Soviet citizen occupies the position of 
vice-president. Two Soviet members of the board are based in the USSR
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with Eurobank's shareholders (Gosbank and Vneshtorgbank), These two 
members usually attend Eurobank's annual general meeting in Psiris al­
though their presence is not mandatory.
Eurobank is one of the most active SFBBs in the sphere of con­
sortium lending (see APPENDIX G). For many years Eurobanit has main­
tained close financial relationships with a number of banks in Latin 
America (e.g., the central bank of Cuba), Eurobank is perhaps the 
most active SFBB in Eurobond markets. Just recently Eurobank purchased 
a portion of the $30~million worth of floating-rate notes issued by 
Bank Handlowy w Warszawie.^^
Eurobank's operations can be broken down into three broad cat­
egories. Approximately 45 percent of the bank's activity is connected 
with Eurocurrency business (i.e., the borrowing, lending and deposit­
ing of Eurocurrencies). Roughly 40 percent of Eurobank's business 
concerns export/import transactions. (Most of these transactions are 
connected with Soviet foreign trade.) About 15 percent of Eurobank's 
business is connected with (franc) transactions between French compan­
ies/individuals, According to one report Eurobank handles transactions 
for the French Communist Party,
TABLE 5*9 shows the development of Eurobank's operations from
1973-1976. During this period total assets grew by 27 percent. At 
the end of 1976, Eurobank's total assets amounted to F.fr, 14,143.3 
million (approximately £1,724,8 million). This sum is a little larger 
than MNB's total assets. At the end of 1976, balances with banks (in­
cluding other organisations involved in banking operations) comprised 
76 percent of Eurobank's total assets. Balances of banks (including 
other organisations involved in banking operations) comprised 91 per­
cent of Eurobank's total liabilities. At the end of 1976, Eurobank's 
capital amounted to F.fr, 25O million (about £30.5 million) and net
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profit F.fr. 38 ,9 million (about E4.7 million). It is obvious from 
TABLE 5*9 that Eurobank's principal operation is the attraction of 
financial resources from banks (and related organisations) and the 
transfer of most of these funds to banks (and related organisations). 
In this respect Eurobank and MWB have much in common,
TABLE 5,9
DEVELOPMENT OF EUROBANK’S 
OPERATIONS, 1973-1976 
(in millions of F.fr.)
i m 1974 l£7i 1926
Total assets 11,121.4 12,433.8 13,613.7 14,143.3
Balances with banks and 
other organisations in­
volved in banking oper­
ations (assets) 8,824.0 9,595.4 11,045.6 10,698.5
Balances of banks and 
other organisations 
involved in banking 
operations (liabilities) 10,105.6 11,320.5 12,475.4 12,880,6
Capital 150.0 200.0 250,0 250.0
Net profit 28,6 27.0 40.2 38.9
Sources: Eurobank, Annual Reports, 1973-1976.
Like their counterparts in London, Eurobank’s directors often 
propose (to the bank's shareholders or supervisory-council members) 
that funds in the reserve account be used to increase the bank’s share 
capital. For example, on 14 May 1975» Eurobank's directors suggested 
to shareholders that the bank’s (paid-up) share capital should be in­
creased from F.fr, 200 million to F.fr. 250 million. It was proposed 
that one-half of the new share capital (i.e., F.fr. 25 million) should 
come from the bank's reserves while the other half should be purchased 
(on a cash basis) by Eurobank’s shareholders.
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Bank Russo-Iran Ltd.
Bank Russo-Iran was first set up in Teheran in 1923 as the Russian- 
Iranian Banking Office of the Russian-Asiatic Company. In 1932, the 
Russian-Iranian Banking Office was transformed into the Bank Russo- 
Iran . According to one source Vneshtorgbank owns 84 percent of the 
share capital in Bank Russo-Iran and Gosbank owns 16 percent,
Bank Russo-Iran is primarily concerned with financing trade be­
tween Iran and CMEA countries. The bank is not regarded as one of the 
most active SFBBs in Eurocurrency markets. However, on at least two 
occasions Bank Russo-Iran has participated in the granting of Eurocur­
rency loans (see APPENDIX C),
Bank Russo-Iran's total assets increased from 5.4 billion rials 
in 1972, to 7.7 billion (about L59.3 million) in 1975» a.n increase of 
43 percent. In the early part of 1975» the bank's share capital stood at 
600 million rials (about E4.6 million), (The share capital was supposedly 
increased to 1.25 billion rials about $9.6 millionj/ in June 1975.^^*) 
Bank Russo-Iran's profit amounted to 69 million rials (about $531»000) 
in 1972
Wozchod Handelsbank AG
Wozchod Handelsbank was established in Zurich in July I966. The bank's 
initial share capital amounted to 8w.fr. 10 million. In I966, Gosbank 
owned 55 percent of the share capital in Wozchod Handelsbank, Vnesh­
torgbank owned 40 percent, and Soviet state savings banks owned the 
remaining 5 percent.?^ According to one report a few Swiss bankers 
tried to discourage Soviet officials from establishing Wozchod Handels­
bank but the Soviets 'were not to be discouraged'.^^
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In 1972, Wozchod Handelsbank's board of directors comprised three 
Swiss nationals and two Soviet citizens, A Soviet citizen functioned 
as president of the board while one Swiss national and one Soviet cit­
izen functioned as vice-presidents. During 1972, the board of manage­
ment comprised two Swiss nationals and two Soviet citizens. Each mem­
ber of the board of management was placed in charge of a particular 
department within the bank (e.g., foreign trade, foreign exchange, 
economics, etc.),
Wozchod*s total assets increased from Sw.fr. 394,5 million at 
the end of 1972, to Sw.fr, 461,1 million (about $51.2 million) at the 
end of 1973; a.n increase of 17 percent. At the end of 1972, Wozchod's 
balances with banks amounted to 8w.fr. 255.0 million (or 65 percent 
of total assets). At the same time the balances of banks amounted to 
Sw.fr. 322.8 million (or 82 percent of total liabilities), Wozchod*s 
share capital stood at Sw.fr, 40 million (about $4.4 million) in 1972, 
and net profit amounted to Sw.fr. 2.0 million (about $222,000). This 
researcher has been unable to obtain any data from Wozchod's Annual 
Reports for the period 1974-1976. So, in order to get an idea of 
Wozchod's size at the end of 1976 it is necessary to make some very 
rough estimates on the basis of available data. If Wozchod's total 
assets increased by I5 percent each year during the period 1974-1976, 
then the bank's total assets would amount to Sw.fr. 701.3 million (about 
BI75.3 million). In the event Wozchod's total assets increased by 
20 percent each year during the period 1974-1976, then the bank's total 
assets would amount to Sw.fr. 796.8 million (about $199.2 million)
Since Wozchod Handelsbank operates within a community where bank­
ing secrecy prevails,few reports on the bank's activities are published. 
So, there is little left to say about Wozchod Handelsbank. We know 
from APPENDIX C that Wozchod occasionally participates with other SFBBs
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in the granting of Eurocurrency loans. In addition, since Wozchod 
supposedly sells more gold than any other SPBB there is good reason 
to believe that security measures are more strict in Wozchod than in 
other SFBBs. And finally, we can assume that Wozchod Handelsbank follows 
the practice of providing 'numbered accounts' for depositors,
Ost-West Handelsbank AG
Ost-West Handelsbank was established in Frankfurt on 11 November 1971.
The initial share capital of the bank totalled DM 20 million. In 1973» 
Ost-West Handelsbank's share capital was increased to DM $0 million.
At the end of 1973» Gosbank owned 52 percent of the share capital in 
Ost-West Handelsbank, Vneshtorgbank owned 42 percent, and three Soviet 
FTOs— Promsyrioimport, Eksportles and Tekhmashimport— owned two per­
cent each. However, by the end of 1976 the situation was much differ­
ent. At that time Gosbank owned 15 percent of the share capital in 
Ost-West Handelsbank, Vneshtorgbank owned 13 percent, the Soviet state 
savings banks owned 9 percent and seven Soviet FTOs owned 9 percent 
each.
TABLE 5.10 shows the development of Ost-West Handelsbank from 
1974-1976, During this period the bank's total assets increased from 
DM 1,346.7 million to DM 1,781,9 million (about $451.1 million); an 
increase of 32 percent. (At the end of 1976, MNB's total assets were 
almost three and one-half times larger than Ost-West Handelsbank's 
total assets.) At the end of 1976, balances with banks comprised 63 per­
cent of Ost-West Handelsbank's total assets. At the same time, balances 
of banks comprised 80 percent of Ost-West Handelsbank's total liabil­
ities, At the end of 1976, the bank's share capital amounted to DM 60 
million (about $15.2 million) while net profit totalled DM 6.9 million
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(about $1.7 million).
TABLE 5.10
DEVELOPMENT OF OST-WEST HANDELSBANK,
1974-1976
(in millions of DM)
1224 i m 1976
Total assets 1,346.7 1,529.7 1,781.9
Balances with banks (assets) 837.8 981.1 1,114.8
Balances of banks (liabil­ 1,076.2 1,211.6 1,417.4
ities)
Capital 50.0 60.0 60,0
Net profit 6.0 6.5 6.9
Sources: Ost-West Handelsbank, Annual Reports. 1974-1976.
In 1976, three German nationals and tliree Soviet citizens served 
on Ost-West Handelsbank's board of directors. The positions of chair­
man and vice-chairman were occupied by Soviet citizens based in the 
USSR, Only one Soviet director was based in Germany. In 1976, Ost- 
West Handelsbank's board of management comprised two German nationals 
and two Soviet citizens. The Soviet members of the board of management 
function as chairman and vice-chairman. Both reside in Germany.
Like MNB, Ost-West Handelsbank owns share capital in SFBBs. At 
the end of 1976, Ost-West Handelsbank owned 7 percent of the share 
capital in Banque Unie Est-Ouest, 5.75 percent of the share capital in 
MNB and 3.85 percent of the share capital in Wozchod Handelsbank, Ost- 
West Handelsbank also owns 30 percent of the share capital in a Soviet 
insurance company (Schwarzmeer und Ostsee Versicherungs) and 2 percent 
of the share capital in a Soviet foreign-based trading company (Sobren 
Ghemiehandel).
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Donau Handelsbank AG
Donau Handelsbank was established in Vienna in March 1974. The bank's 
initial share capital totalled A,sh. 100 million. In 1974, Gosbank 
owned 60 percent of the share capital in Donau Handelsbank, and Vnesh­
torgbank owned the remaining 40 percent,®^ From 1974-1976, Donau Handels­
bank* s total assets increased from A.sh. 2,720.3 million to A.sh, 3 ,605.0 
million (about $129.3 million); an increase of 33 percent. At the end 
of 1976, the bank's net profit amounted to A.sh, 2,7 million (about 
$96,800) while capital still totalled A.sh, 100 million (about $3.6 mil­
lion), According to one source Donau Handelsbank deposited $1 million 
in the Allgemeine Wirtschaftsbank just before that bank collapsed. As 
a result, Gosbank recalled Donau*s Soviet manager,®^
Banque Unie Est-Ouest SA
Banque Unie was established in Luxemburg on 12 June 1974. The bank's 
initial share capital totalled L.fr. 375 million. Banque Unie's share­
holders include Gosbank, Vneshtorgbank, MNB, Eurobank, Ost-West Handels-
82bank, Bank Russo-Iran and Wozchod Handelsbank.
TABLE 5.11 shows the development of Banque Unie from 1975"1976. 
During this period the bank's total assets increased from L.fr. 18,803.3 
million to L.fr. 24,673.5 million (about $407.2 million); a 3I percent 
increase. At the end of 1976, balances with banks (and related organ­
isations) amounted to 54 percent of total assets. At the same time 
balances of banks (and related organisations) amounted to 94 percent 
of total liabilities. Share capital totalled L.fr, 5OO million (about 
$8.3 million) in 1976, and net profit amounted to L.fr. 68.5 million 
(about $1.1 million). Banque Unie is currently one of the most active
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SFBBs in the Eurocurrency market (see APPENDIX O),
TABLE 5.11
DEVELOPMENT OF BANQUE UNIE EST- 
OUEST, 1975-1976 
(in millions of L.fr.)
1275 12.7i
Total assets 18,803.3 24,673.5
Balances with banks and other 
organisations involved in 
banking operations (assets) 9,265.8 13,428.4
Balances of banks and other 
organisations involved in 
banking operations (liabilities) 17,787.6 23,205.6
Capital 375.0 500.0
Net profit 15.9 68.5
Sources* Banque Unie Est-Ouest, Annual Reports, 1974/1975-1975/1976
Banque Unie's board of directors comprises four Soviet citizens.
Two members are based in the USSR. A local national is in charge of 
the bank's board of management. The remaining members of the board 
of management are predominantly local nationals.
NOTES
Arbitrage is the practice of switching (short-term) funds from 
one market (or form of investment) to another in order to obtain the 
highest rate of return. Since the monetary authorities in the United 
States often kept interest rates below those in the U.K. and Western 
Europe, American investors were encouraged to deposit their funds abroad.
2
Indeed, even Moscow has become a quasi-part of the Eurocurrency 
market as Vneshtorgbank is fairly active in the borrowing and lending 
of Eurocurrencies,
'I
^Remember that a loan is a sum of money lent by an institution 
(or individual) to another institution (or individual) while credit 
enables the borrower to use or possess commodities without immediate 
payment. However, there is one exception. As we learned, buyer's cred­
its enable the importer to make immediate payment for goods/services.
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^Morgan Guaranty Trust Company, World Financial Markets. Sept­
ember 1976, p. 13.
Paul Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System* Practice and Theory of 
International Interest Rates, 4th ed^iLondon* MacMillan, I970), p. 30.
^aul Einzig, The Euro-Dollar System* Practice and Theory of 
International Interest Rates. 3rd ed. (London* MacMillan, 1964), p, 71.
Ibid.
®See L. Glukharev, 'The Euro-Dollar Market and Inter-Imperialist 
Contradictions', International Affairs (Moscow), No, 9 (September 1972),
pp. 50-57.
^K. J, H, Robbie, 'Socialist Banks and the Origins of the Euro­
currency Markets', Moscow Narodny Bank, Quarterly Review (Winter
1975-1976), p. 29.
^^Wholesale Eurocurrency deposits are made by banks which are 
unable to utilise such funds for more profitable purposes (e.g., the 
financing of trade). Banks that accept wholesale Eurocurrency funds 
must find final borrowers (e.g., trading companies) or they too will 
be forced to make wholesale deposits,
^^Robbie, 'Socialist Banks , . .', p. 30. 
l^Ibid.
^^Ibid.. p. 31.
14It is recognised that Vneshtorgbank was financing trade via 
Western-owned banks long before the early 19?0s. Indeed, for quite 
some time Western exporters have obtained Eurocurrency payments by 
discounting bills of exchange and promissory notes guaranteed by Vnesh­
torgbank, Such payments are sometimes called 'indirect loans' to the 
USSR, However, at this point we are discussing direct loans (i.e., 
the transfer of funds from Western-owned banks to the USSR),
15Of course, the USSR also has access to Eurocurrency markets 
via banks in individual GMEA countries. However, it is unnecessary 
to cover this topic in any detail as such banks, in all likelihood, 
have never carried out any meaningful operations in Eurocurrency mar­
kets on behalf of the USSR.
^^The Times, 7 November 1974, p. 19.
17LIBOR represents the London interbank offered rate for six- 
month Eurocurrency deposits. The reader should keep in mind that Euro­
currency loans normally carry fluctuating rates. For example, a five- 
year Eurocurrency loan might carry rates according to the following 
scheme* for the first two years, 1 percent over LIBOR; for the next 
two years, 1 1/4 percent over LIBOR; and for the remaining year, 1 1/2 
percent over LIBOR.
^^Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 5 February 1975, p. 13.
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1^East-West (Fortnightly Bulletin), 24 April 1975, pp. 6 and 9.
It is interesting to note that an executive in one of the banks in 
the consortium was also chairman of Les Grandes Hotels Associes— the 
French company which won a $l80-million contract to build hotels in 
Moscow and Leningrad,
^Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 7 January 1976, p. 15.
^^Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 28 July 1976, p. 13.
^^Alec Nove, 'East-West Trade* Problems, Prospects, Issues',
The Washington Papers. Vol. VI, No. 53 (Beverly Hills and London* Sage 
Publications, 1978), p. 21.
^% e  Times. 15 October 1975, p. 25.
^^East-West (Fortnightly Bulletin), 25 June 1976, p. 6.
^^Glen Alden Smith, Soviet Foreign Trade (New York* Praeger,
1973), p.151.
^^Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin. 22 March 1978, p. 2,
"^^ Financial Times. 30 October 1975, P. 24; Moscow Narodny Bank, 
Press Bulletin, 15 October 1975, P. 13; and Moscow Narodny Bank, Press 
Bulletin, 5 November 1975, PP. 15-16.
280. S, Bogdanov and A, A. Postal', 'Razvitie ekonomicheskikh 
svyazei mezhdu sotsialisticheskimi i promyshlenno razvitymi kapital- 
isticheskimi stranami*, Den'gi 1 kredit. No. 11, 1974, pp. 66-67.
29
Personal conversations with members of SFBBs,
^^Der Spiegel, No. 47, 1971, p. 52.
^^Personal conversations with members of SFBBs.
32
Banque Commerciale pour 1' Europe du Nord (Eurobank), Report 
of the Directors. 23 May 1973.
33•"^ According to French banking norms the president of all foreign 
banks operating in France must be a local national.
34
Personal conversations with members of Eurobank.
35But it should be pointed out that local nationals are no guar­
antee that SFBBs will operate efficiently* Indeed, the actions of one 
Western manager of a SFBB cost the USSR a few million dollars. This 
case will be covered a little later.
^^Until the late 1960s or early 1970s a Soviet citizen functioned 
as head of MNB's economics department. However, at this time a British 
economist occupies the position,
37Moscow Narodny Bank, Fiftieth Anniversary Year, October 1919- 
October I969 (Stevenage Hertsl The Bay Tree Press), p. 2.
3^Ibld.. p. 4.
344
^^ Ibids, p. 5 »
40The reader should not attach too much significance to small 
annual increases in MNB's total assets. Since a high proportion of 
MNB's financial transactions are carried out in foreign currencies 
a decrease in the value of the pound would tend to inflate the balance- 
sheet total when the bank's foreign currency accounts are converted 
into sterling at the end of the year,
41Moscow Narodny Bank, Fiftieth Anniversary Year, . , ,, p. 12.
42Material obtained from Companies Registration Office in London,
43
International Herald Tribune. 26 September 1972, p. 7, quoting 
MNB's Quarterly Review.
^International Herald Tribune, 26 September 1972, p. 7.
^^Wall Street Journal, 26 September 1972, p. 24.
^^For background material on the Creditanstalt case see MNB's Press 
Bulletin. 9 February 1977, pp. 17-20; and The Times. 26 January 1976, 
p. 17.
47Moscow Narodny Bank, 1972 Annual Report, p. 9.
4^Ibid.
49Moscow Narodny Bank, 1973 Annual Report, p. 8.
-^ A^run Senkuttuvan, 'A Change of Emphasis for Moscow’, Fareastern 
Economic Review. Vol. 91, No. 5 (30 January 1976), p. 51.
^^Ibld.
^^Mosoow Narodny Bank, 1975 Annual Report, p. 7.
^^Andrew Davenport and Arun Senkuttuvan, 'Moscow: Retreat from
Mosbert', Fareastern Economic Review, Vol. 91, No. 4 (23 January 1976), 
p. 56.
^^See Herbert E. Meyer, 'This Communist Internationale has a 
Capitalist Accent', Fortune. February 1977, p. 142, Meyer claims that 
MNB's losses could exceed $60 million. This figure is undoubtedly too 
large. Most of MNB's loans to Mosbert should be covered after the 
sale of Mosbert's property,
^^Philip Bowring, 'Slamming the Door on Mosbert', Fareastern 
Economic Review. Vol. 9I, No. 7 (13 February 1976), p. IO8.
•^^Observer. 6 August 1978, p. 5*
57It might be interesting to note that Tec Poh Kong claims that 
his Soviet boss urged him to 'lend as much as possible as far as pos­
sible* ; see Observer, 6 August 1978, p. 5.
^^Moscow Narodny Bank, 1976 Annual Report, p. 11.
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^^Ibid.. p. 4.
^^The Times. 19 August 1977, P# 1.
^^The Times. 20 August 1977, p. 3.
63lbid.
^The Sunday Times. 2 October 1977, p. 72,
^■^Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin. 23 November 1977, p. 1.
^^Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 5 November 1975, P* 16.
67
Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, 15 February 1978, p. 1.
^^0. Kuschpeta, The Banking and Credit System of the USSR (Leiden 
and Boston* Martinus Nijhoff, 1978), p. 69.
^^Personal conversations with members of Eurobank.
T^Woscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin. 24 May 1978, p. 13.
T^EUromoney. January 1976, p. 14.
Banque Commerciale pour 1' Europe du Nord (Eurobank), Report 
of the Directors. 14 May 1975.
73Peter M. Mattson, 'Soviet-Owned Banks in Foreign Countries, An 
Outline', Osteuropa Wirtschaft. No, 1 (January 1976), p. 45.
"^ P^aul Gekker, 'The Soviet Bank for Foreign Trade and Soviet 
Banks Abroad* A Note', Economics of Planning, Vol. 7, No. 2 (I967),
p. 189,
*^ -^ Mattson, 'Soviet-Owned Banks . . , p. 45,
^^Kuschpeta, The Banking and Credit System . , ., p. 69.
7?The Times. 29 July I966, p. I7.
78The Times, 2 April I966, p. 7.
"^^Ost-West Handelsbank, 1976 Annual Report, p. 14.
^^Moscow Narodny Bank, Press Bulletin, I3 February 1974, p, 10,
quoting Reuter East-West Trade News. 4 February 1974.
^^Meyer, 'This Communist Internationale . . .', p. 142.
82Banque Unie Est-Ouest, 1975/1976 Annual Report, p. 4,
The United States may have no desire to copy Soviet policy struct­
ure or goals in the oceans. It is important that as a Nation, however, 
we are cognizant of the progress made in ocean capability by the Soviet 
Union, and, where appropriate, benefit by the lessons it may provide.
— National Ocean Policy Study Staff
CHAPTER VI 
SOVIET MARITIME OPERATIONS
Development of the Soviet Merchant 
Fleet After World War II
World War II severely crippled the Soviet merchant fleet (SMF), Almost
half of the USSR's ships were lost during the war and most of the re-
1
maining vessels needed repairs. Toward the end of the war the USSR 
received a few merchant-type ships through the Lend-Lease agreement.
In addition, the USSR collected some ships from the Axis nations as 
reparations. But on the whole the USSR emerged from World War II as 
a major world power without a developed merchant fleet.
Immediately after the war there was no reason for the USSR to 
start developing its merchant fleet on a massive scale. At that time 
the Soviet Union was primarily concerned with improving its commercial 
relations with Eastern Europe. Railways and roads linking the USSR 
with Eastern Europe provided the basis for commodity transport between 
the two regions. In the early 1950s, almost all Soviet trade with non- 
GMEA members was directed toward neighbouring countries in Asia and the 
Middle East. However, by the early 1960s, Soviet foreign traxie'was 
being conducted on a worldwide basis. This expansion of Soviet trade
346
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exposed the shortcomings of the SMF. In 1959» 55 percent of the USSR's
seaborne foreign trade was transported in Soviet ships. By I96I, this
2
figure had fallen to 37 percent. The failure of the SMF to keep in
step with the country's external commercial operations forced the USSR
3
to charter more foreign ships. Such a policy required additional hard 
currency expenditures. However, it also placed the country in a pre­
carious political position. For example, the growing level of Soviet 
trade with Cuba following the advent of the Castro regime in I96O in­
creased the USSR's demand for shipping services. Since the Soviet 
Union was initially unable to meet that demand with its own merchant 
vessels it was forced to charter a number of foreign ships (especially 
tankers). As a result, the USSR was placed at the mercy of Western 
shipowners. The restrictive measures initiated by the United States 
against ships that transported cargo to Cuba (e.g., such ships were 
not permitted to use American port facilities) and the boycott organ­
ised by Western petroleum companies against foreign tankers which car­
ried Soviet oil to Cuba during the early 1960s, made Soviet chartering 
both difficult and expensive. These facts helped to bring about a 
swift change in Soviet maritime policy.
The accelerated development of the SMF began in the early 1960s.
In i960, the SMF held the thirteenth position in the world in both 
gross registered tonnage (grt)^ and deadweight tonnage (dwt)^. By 
1968, the USSR held the sixth position in both categories (see TABLE 6,1), 
In order to bring about the rapid development of its merchant fleet 
the USSR purchased a large number of foreign ships. During the period 
1956-1970, approximately 40 percent of the USSR's merchant ships were 
constructed in Soviet yards, about 58 percent were built in other social­
ist countries (especially Poland and East Germany) and the remaining 
10 percent came primarily from Western Europe and Japan,^
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The growth of Soviet maritime operations was especially impres­
sive during the Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965). In 1958» the SMF carried 
only 7 percent of the country's total (i.e., both foreign and domestic) 
cargo turnover. By I965, this figure had risen to 14 percent. The 
operations of the SMF increased from 57.4 billion ton-miles in 1958, 
to 209.9 billion in I965, During I965, the USSR had over 8OO ships 
which were suitable for long-distance transport, compared with approx­
imately 250 in 1958. By the mid-1960s, almost 80 percent of Soviet 
merchant vessels had been constructed during the previous ten-year
period which meant that the USSR had one of the youngest merchant fleets 
7in the world.
During the period I96O-I969, the SMF grew from 2,771,000 grt to
9 ,354,000 grt; an increase of 238 percent. Since I969, the growth of the 
SMF has been steady albeit unimpressive. The rapid expansion of the 
Greek and Panamanian merchant fleets in the first half of the 1970s 
was responsible for dropping the USSR from sixth place (in mid-1970) 
to eighth place (in mid-1975) In the world merchant fleet (in terms of 
grt). When compared with the recent rate of growth of the world mer­
chant fleet, the growth of the SMF falls below the world average. From 
mid-1970 to mid-1975, the SMF grew from 9,646,000 grt to 12,263,000 grt; 
an increase of 27 percent. During the same period the world merchant 
fleet grew from 214,790,000 grt to 325,028,000 grt; an increase of 
51 percent. In mid-1975, the SMF comprised about 4 percent (of the 
grt) of the world merchant fleet.
The SMF has become an important part of the Soviet economy. The 
SMF currently handles well over half of the USSR's total seaborne for­
eign trade.^ Moreover, the SMF can now transport virtually all cargo 
which is connected with the USSR's economic and military aid programmes. 
The foreign currency earnings of the SMF cover the USSR's obligations
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connected with the chartering of foreign merchant vessels. Furthermore, 
such earnings are sometimes large enough to provide other sectors of 
the Soviet economy with foreign currency resources,^
In mid-1975, dry-cargo ships comprised 70 percent (of the grt) 
of the SMF. A high proportion (i.e., 86 percent of the grt) of the 
USSR's dry-cargo vessels falls within the 'general-cargo* classifica­
tion (see TABLE 6.2), General-cargo ships are well suited for trans­
porting most types of civilian and military cargo. However, such ships 
are usually required to remain in port much longer than specialised 
vessels as the cargo is often loaded/unloaded piece-by-piece. Moreover, 
as a result of their unspecialised nature, general-cargo ships are 
often required to transport less profitable cargo,
Soviet merchant vessels are generally smaller than vessels in 
the world merchant fleet. In mid-1975, the average Soviet dry-cargo 
ship was about 5,700 dwt and the average Soviet tanker approximately 
11,200 dwt. At the same time the average dry-cargo ship in the world 
merchant fleet was about 9,500 dwt and the average tanker 36,300 dwt. 
However, small vessels are ideally suited for transporting cargo to 
and from Soviet ports. At the present time few Soviet harbours are 
deep enough to handle dry-cargo ships larger than 23,000 dwt or tank­
ers above 50,000 dwt. At the end of 1974, the USSR had only four mer­
chant ships larger than 50,000 dwt— one tanker, two combination oil/dry- 
bulk carriers and one dry-bulk c a r r i e r . A l l  four of these vessels 
are currently involved in cross-trade operations (i,e,, the ships are 
used to transport cargo to and from countries other than the USSR),
They will presumably start operating in Soviet ports when dredging 
operations have been completed in the late 1970s,
TABLE 6.3 shows selected tanker fleets. In mid-1975, Soviet 
oil tankers comprised 2,5 percent (of the grt) of the world oil-tanker
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fleet. At the same time Soviet oil tankers made up 30 percent (of the
grt) of the SMF, The importance of Soviet oil tankers is quite obvi-
ous since, according to William Carr, petroleum accounts for almost
half (by weight) of total Soviet seaborne trade,
During the tanker boom which preceded the Arab petroleum embargo
of 1973» Soviet planners were considering the possibility of acquiring
a supertanker fleet. Since that time a few tankers in the 150,000
12deadweight"ton range have been added to the SMF.' " In the mid-1970s 
Soviet officials were thinking of adding a 330,000 deadweight-ton oil 
tanker to the SMF. Such a tanker would most likely be used for cross- 
trade operations as it would be much too large for most Soviet ports.
The 1976-1980 Five-Year Plan has called for a marked growth of the 
Soviet tanker fleet. Some of the planned tankers will fall within 
the 100,000-150,000 deadweight-ton range,However, the present world­
wide surplus of oil tankers could induce Soviet officials to modify 
their plans. The acquisition of combination oil/dry-bulk carriers (as 
opposed to tankers) would give the SMF more flexibility in meeting the 
uncertainties of the world shipping market.
In 1977, the GIA predicted that Soviet petroleum production will
id
start declining by the late 1970s or early 1980s while Soviet con­
sumption of petroleum is expected to remadn constant or increase. If 
the CIA prediction is true, the composition of the USSR's tanker fleet 
could change during the next decade. At this time, small Soviet tank­
ers play a key role in transporting Soviet petroleum to LDGs, (Many 
ports in LDGs are too shallow for supertankers.) However, since pet­
roleum represents an important hard currency earner, Soviet officials 
could eventually decide to decrease oil exports to LDGs (and selected 
members of GMEA^5^ in order to increase petroleum sales to IMTEs, (Such 
a move would almost be inevitable if the USSR runs into serious payment
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difficulties with IMTEs,) Since it is generally accepted that super­
tankers can deliver large amounts of petroleum to IMTEs more efficient­
ly than small tankers, a marked increase in Soviet petroleum deliver­
ies to IMTEs could lead to a sharp rise in the number of Soviet super­
tankers,^^
In the early 19?0s the USSR started to break away from its policy 
of building traditional dry-cargo vessels and began constructing/pur­
chasing semi-containerships and other specialised merchant vessels, 
Semi-containerships are capable of transporting both loose cargo and 
containerised freight. On such ships the loose cargo is normally placed 
within the hull and the containers are placed on the deck. Some general 
purpose dry-cargo ships can be transformed into semi-containerships by 
increasing the amount of deck space and adding devices for securing the 
containers. In 1972, the SMF obtained three general purpose semi-con­
tainerships, In 1975, 28 such ships were added to the SMF,^^
Semi-containerships are well-suited for Soviet shipping opera­
tions in foreign waters and could prove to be an important part of the 
SMF even if the USSR does not significantly increase its own container 
trade. For example, the Soviet Union could send a semi-containership 
to an LDG loaded (below the deck) with various types of loose cargo. 
While the vessel is en route it might be ordered to pick up any avail­
able containers in IMTEs, As a result, the semi-containership not only 
delivers Soviet cargo to the LDG but also earns hard currency by trans­
porting containerised cargo between IMTEs,
18In mid-1975, the USSR had eleven cellular containerships with 
a combined capacity of 69,000 dwt. The average Soviet cellular con- 
tainership amounted to approximately 6,300 dwt. At the same time the 
United States had IO3 such vessels with a combined capacity of 1,628,000 
dwt. In mid-1975, the average American cellular containership totalled
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about 15,800 dut. The largest Soviet containership at the end of 1974 
was capable of transporting 358 (twenty-foot) containers and travelling 
at a speed of seventeen knots per hour. During 1975, the USSR was 
planning to acquire some East German containerships in the 13,000 dead­
weight-ton range. These vessels can carry 774 (twenty-foot) contain­
ers and travel at speeds exceeding twenty knots per hour. But even 
the East German containerships are considered small by world standards. 
Some cellular containerships in the world merchant fleet amount to
49,000 dwt and have space for almost 3,000 containers. A few of these 
large Western containerships can travel at speeds exceeding thirty
19knots per hour.
The recent agreement between Japan and the USSR regarding the 
transport of containers to such areas as Southeast Asia, Indonesia, 
Australia and New Zealand indicates the Soviet Union could soon become 
a key participant in world container transport, Japanese exports to 
Western Europe and the United Kingdom greatly exceed imports from these 
regions. Since a high proportion of Japanese exports are shipped in 
containers a number of empty containers were ultimately being sent 
back to Japan, One of the large Japanese freight forwarders saw the 
possibility of securing additional outward bound freight from Western 
Europe and the U.K. (to Southeast Asia, Indonesia, Australia etc.) 
by offering importers in the Pacific region attractive rates for trans­
porting cargo in these containers. The Soviet Union joined the Japan­
ese in this scheme by offering attractive rates for transporting the
containers from ports on the west coast of the USSR to Vladivostok via
20
the Trans-Siberian Railway, The SMF came into the picture by partici­
pating in the transport of the containers from Vladivostok to Japan 
and other countries in the Pacific region.
It is worth mentioning that a New Zealand freight forwarder.
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G. H, Williams, daims there are at least four factors which are prov­
ing (or could prove) to be obstacles to the development of the Japanese- 
Soviet container-transport scheme in New Zealand* time, loyalty, pres­
sure from Western shipping companies and governmental intervention. In 
order to use the Trans-Siberian Railway for the transport of cargo 
from Western Europe to the Far East, commodities are first delivered 
to either Berlin or some Soviet city where they are consolidated before 
being shipped across Siberia. The commodities are then transported 
from Vladivostok to Japan, In Japan the goods are deconsolidated and 
shipped to their various destinations. In the end, some New Zealand
importers must allow up to three months for transport time, Gonfer- 
21ence-line vessels (from West European ports) reach New Zealand in 
approximately four weeks and the movements (sailings) of the ships 
are known so importers can plan production and sales more effectively. 
Regarding loyalty, Williams points out that many New Zealand companies 
enjoy close relationships with shippers who have served some of these 
companies for over 100 years. Some British and West European shippers can 
even cite occasions when they provided services at a loss. If necessary. 
Western shipping companies could start pressuring certain suppliers to 
use the services of conference vessels. Moreover, conference lines 
could also ask Western governments for protection if their losses are 
too great.
In spite of this rather gloomy situation in New Zealand, the 
USSR seems to be quite active in the transport of containerised cargo 
between Europe and the Far East, Much of this activity involves the 
use of the Trans-Siberian Railway. It should also be pointed out that 
during the Tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) the USSR expects to increase
23
the number of its containerships considerably. Some of these vessels 
are undoubtedly planned for cross-trade operations. Furthermore, a
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container-manufacturing plant will soon be completed in the USSR,
Since the composition of Soviet seaborne exports is unlikely to change 
for some time (i.e., almost all Soviet exports shipped by sea will 
continue to be bulk commodities such as timber, ores and petroleum) 
it is likely that some of the containers produced in the USSR will be 
used for cross-trade operations.
The USSR acquired its first roll-on/roll-off (ro/ro) vessels 
in 1974, Ro/ro vessels were initially constructed to carry wheeled, 
vehicles and cargo in trailers. At this time they are also used to 
transport containers and palletised cargo, Ro/ro ships can be loaded 
and unloaded much faster than general-cargo vessels and full container­
ships, The largest ro/ro ships in the SMF at the end of 1974 stood 
at 6,000 dwt and were capable of reaching speeds up to seventeen knots 
per hour. Some West European ro/ro ships are larger than 20,000 dwt
and are capable of travelling at speeds up to twenty-two knots per
. 24hour.
During the next few years the size and number of ro/ro vessels in 
the SMF should increase significantly. Three types of ro/ro ships—  
the 20,000 deadweight-ton Soviet-built 'Kapitan Smirnov', the 21,000 
deadweight-ton Finnish-built 'Magnitogorsk', and the 17,500 deadweight- 
ton Polish-built 'Skulptor Konenkov'— are currently under construction 
for the SMF, The Kapitan Smirnov is capable of carrying over 1,000 
containers and travelling at speeds up to 25 knots per hour.
The Magnitogorsk can carry 1,100 containers and travel at 22 knots 
per hour. The Skulptor Konenkov has space for 800 containers and can
25travel at 21 knots per hour. All of the aforementioned ro/ro vessels 
are capable of competing with the best ro/ro ships in the world mer­
chant fleet. According to one report the USSR had four ro/ro vessels 
and fourteen full containerships in 1977. It is estimated that by
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1980 the SMF will have nearly forty such ships.
One of the most recent acquisitions of the SMF is the barge car­
rier or LASH (lighter aboard ship). Like the full containership and 
ro/ro, the barge ca,rrier spends little time in port. Such carriers 
transport shallow-draft barges which are loaded with all types of car­
go. The barges are dropped off in various harbours and towed by tug­
boats to inland docks or shallow coastal ports. Barge carriers would 
be especially useful if the USSR is supplying a country with economic 
and military aid during a period of \ra.r (e.g., a Soviet barge carrier 
could deliver supplies without entering a dangerous foreign port.) The 
USSR ordered its first barge carriers from Poland and Finland in 1975. 
During the period 1978-1979, the USSR will receive two barge carriers 
from Finland, Each vessel will be able to transport twenty-six 1,300- 
ton barges. In 1979, the SMF will receive Soviet-built barge carriers, 
Data on the development of the SMF between 1 January 1975 and 
1 January 1977 are provided in TABLE 6,4, During this period the SMF 
grew from 14,356,397 grt to 15,311,074 grt; a 7 percent increase. From 
1 January 1975 to 1 January 1977, passenger-ships and passenger-carrying 
freighters increased by 14 percent, tankers grew by 13 percent, and 
dry-cargo ships increased by 3 percent. The reader might wonder why 
the size of the SMF was reduced by 137,320 grt from 1 January 1975 to 
1 January 1976, Almost all (i.e., 127,690 grt or 93 percent) of the 
decrease can be attributed to the loss of a number of steamships (as
opposed to diesel-powered ships) from the SMF.^^ On 1 January 1977,
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diesel-powered vessels comprised 87 percent of the SMF,
During 1976, the USSR completed eighty-five merchant vessels
30
totalling 503,318 grt (see TABLE 6,5). This tonnage represented 
46 percent of the growth of the SMF between 1 January I976 and 1 January 
1977. General-cargo ships over 2,000 grt accounted for 43 percent of
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TABLE 6.4
THE SOVIET MERCHANT FLEET, 1 JANUARY I975. 
1 JANUARY I977& 
(self-propelled ships 100 grt or over)
Type of ship
122.5
Number
1226 1222
Gross registered tonnage 
1975 1976 1977
Passenger-ships 
and passenger- 
carrying 
freighters
198 195 201 559,479 595,092 636,658
Dry-cargo ships 2,175 2,154 2,240 9,146,359 8,910,237 9,431,667
Tankers 452 429 443 3,512,472 3,529,138 3,976,289
Service and 
auxiliary ships
734 754 776 356,037 386,317 4l6,146
Technical ships^ 361 369 391 314,449 304,664 332,705
Other ships 
Total
294
4,21%
318
4^219
342 467.601 
%,393 14,356,397
_493.,629 ,
14,219,077
_ .iiz.609 
15,311,074
Since British and Soviet statistics differ on the size of the 
SMF (British statistics do not include service and auxiliary ships, 
technical ships etc.) the reader should not attempt to compare data 
in TABLE 6.4 with data in TABLES 6,1, 6,2 and 6,3. The reader should 
also he aware of the fact that the USSR includes the fishing fleet in 
its data on the SMF. Data on the Soviet fishing fleet have been ex­
cluded from TABLE 6,4,
^This category includes survey ships, salvage vessels, fire-fighting 
ships, vessels equipped for diving personnel etc.
Sources* Morskoi flot. No. 5, 1977, p. 13; Morskoi flot, No, 5, 
1976, p, 7; and Morskoi flot. No, 11, 1975, p. H.
the tonnage completed by the USSR during 1976; tankers, 26 percent; 
ore and bulk carriers, 25 percent; and general-cargo vessels under
2,000 gi't only accounted for 1 percent.
Recent Soviet foreign trade statistics confirm that foreign ships 
and equipment play a key role in the development of the USSR's maritime 
capabilities. In 1976, the USSR imported 915*1 million-rubles worth 
of ships and maritime equipment and exported only 86,2 million-rubles 
worth of the same commodities. In 1977, Soviet imports of ships and
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and equipment amounted to 918.3 million rubles (about $1,276,4 million) 
while exports stood at 106.5 million rubles (about $148,0 million). 
During the mid-1970s, Finland, the GDR, Poland and Yugoslavia were 
regarded as important suppliers of ships for the USSR.
TABLE 6,5
SHIPS COMPLETED IN THE USSR DURING 
1976, BY PRINCIPAL TYPES
Type Number Gross registered tonnage
General cargo ships 
2,000 grt or over
33 214,495
Oil tankers 5 129,510
Ore and bulk carriers 6 126,235
Combination bulk/oil 
carriers
3 8,097
General cargo ships 
under 2,000 grt
9 5,257
Gontainerships 2,000 grt 
or over
- -
Liquefied gas and chem­
ical carriers
- —
Miscellaneous 22 19,724
Total 85 503.318
Source: Lloyd's Register of Shipping, Annual Summary of Merchant
Ships Completed in the World During 1976. pp, 5"é^ '
On the Organisational Make-Up of the 
Soviet Merchant Fleet
The Ministry of the Merchant Fleet is responsible for formulating and 
controlling Soviet maritime policy. The Main Administration for the 
Operation of the Fleet and Ports is responsible for co-ordinating the
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activities of the SMF, Soviet maritime operations are carried out by 
seventeen shipping companies under the direction of three regional 
administrations (see CHART 6A),
CHART 6A
MINISTRY OF THE MERCHANT FLEET OPERATING STRUCTURE
Main Administration for the Operation of the 
"Fleet and !Ports
Administration for 
the operation of the 
fleet and ports of 
the Northwestern 
Basin (Sevgauflot)
1. Northern Steamship 
Company (Arkhangel'slO
4. Murmansk Steamship 
Company (Murmansk)
7. Baltic Steamship 
Company (Leningrad)
10, Estonian Steamship 
Company (Tallinn)
13, Latvian Steamship 
Company (Riga)
15, Lithuanian Steam­
ship Company (Klaipeda)
Administration for 
the operation of 
the fleet and ports 
of the Southern 
Basin (Yuzhflot)
2, Black Sea Steam­
ship Company (Odessa)
5. Novorossiisk Steam­
ship Company (Novoros­
siisk)
8, Azov Steamship 
Company (Zhdanov)
11, Georgian Steam­
ship Company (Batumi)
l4, Danube Steamship 
Company (Izmail)
16, Caspian Steamship 
Company (Baku)
17, Central Asian Steam­
ship Company (Chardzhou)
Administration for 
the operation of the 
fleet and ports of 
the Far Eastern 
Basin (Pal'flot)
3. Far Eastern Steamship 
Company (Vladivostok)
6, Primorsk Steamship 
Company (Nakhodka)
9, Sakhalin Steamship 
Company (Kholmsk)
12, Kamchatka Steamship 
Company (Petropavlovsk)
Source: William Carr, 'Soviet Shipping Strength and Its Employ­
ment' , in Soviet Oceans Development. U.S. Congress, Committee on Com­
merce and National Ocean Policy Study, 94th Cong.. 2nd sess. (Washing­
ton, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 345.
The largest Soviet shipping companies are located on the Black 
Sea and Baltic Sea, and in the Far East, Each of these companies is 
equipped to transport general and bulk cargo, containerised freight 
and wheeled vehicles to all parts of the world. The largest Soviet 
shipping company specialising in the transport of petroleum and petroleum
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products is the Novorossiisk Steamship Company. Another shipping com­
pany of the same type is the Primorsk Steamship Company, The Georgian 
and Latvian shipping companies operate both dry-cargo vessels and tank­
ers, The Lithuanian, Estonian, Murmansk, Far Eastern and Azov ship­
ping companies specialise in transporting general and bulk cargo. The 
Northern Steamship Company plays a leading role in the transport of 
Soviet timber exports. The Danube Steamship Company is mainly respon­
sible for handling cargo (via the Danube River) destined for ÛMEA coun­
tries, Austria and the FRG, The amount of transit cargo handled by 
the company has increased significantly. By using sea-going vessels 
from other Soviet shipping companies the Danube Steamship Company has 
been able to extend its cargo lines from the Danube River to Mediter­
ranean and Red Sea ports. The Caspian Steamship Company is responsible 
f or transporting cargo between the USSR and Iran. The Central Asian 
Steamship Company handles freight between Afghanistan and the USSR (via 
the Amu Darya River).
Two specialised shipping organisations— Sovfrakht and Sovinflot—  
are also attached to the Ministry of the Merchant Fleet, Sovfrakht: 
charters foreign vessels for transporting Soviet cargo ; hires out 
Soviet merchant vessels to foreign charterers; acts as a broker between 
foreign shipowners and shippers; and utilises hired tonnage, Sovfrakht 
has been carrying out maritime activities for over forty years. It 
has representative offices/companies in a few key world markets and 
maintains close business contacts with over 800 foreign shipowners, 
charterers and brokers,
Sovinflot was established in 1969, and is responsible for arrang­
ing supplies and services for Soviet vessels abroad as well as provid­
ing supplies and services for foreign ships in Soviet ports. It handles 
a considerable share of the business of Soviet vessels operating on
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regular lines as well as containerships involved in cross-trade oper­
ations, Sovinflot operates through a network of representative offices, 
joint-stock companies, foreign agents and stevedore firms in over 120 
countries.
Until recently, the USSR has shown little interest in joining
Western shipping conferences. By operating outside the conferences
the SMF is capable of attracting quite a lot of business by offering
shipping charges which are considerably lower than conference freight
rates. According to one report the USSR undercuts Western freight
33rates by 15-20 percent. But the Japanese Shipowners' Association 
claims that Soviet shipping rates are sometimes 40 percent below con­
ference rates on major Japanese routes to the United States and else- 
34where,^  It might be interesting to note that in the first half of
1978, a Soviet shipping line— Balt-Atlantic— secured a large part of
a contract to transport buses from the FRG to the United States, (Some
of the buses were purchased with federal funds.) According to the
U.S, Federal Maritime Commission, Balt-Atlantic did not seek approval
for its transport charges which were approximately 50 percent lower
35than conference rates.
Tliere have been a number of claims that the low rates charged 
by the SMF are not necessarily an indication that the SMF is capable 
of operating more efficiently than its Western counterparts. But since 
the Soviet economy is almost completely isolated from IMTEs it is ex­
tremely difficult to ascertain whether the SMF is operating on the basis 
of efficiency criteria or merely charging low rates in order to obtain 
as much hard currency as possible. Western reports occasionally men­
tion that the SMF is heavily subsidised, In addition, the Soviet gov­
ernment provides various benefits/services (e.g., insurance) for the 
SMF which most Western shipowners are required to purchase for them-
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selves. However, it is necessary to recognise that the low wages paid 
to Soviet seamen also help to keep shipping rates at low levels, (One 
report claims that an average Soviet seaman receives the equivalent of 
about $30.00 per week while an average Western seaman receives $150.00 )
Much of the SMF's business in the West is connected with bilat­
eral trade. According to recent estimates, Soviet ships carry 97 per­
cent of the (volume of) seaborne cargo transported between the USSR 
and Japan, 84 percent of the (volume of) seaborne cargo shipped between 
the USSR and the U.K., and 75 percent of the (volume of) seaborne car­
go transported between the USSR and the FRG, In addition, the SMF is 
now transporting a fair amount of cargo between third countries. Dur­
ing the first half of 1976, Soviet ships carried about 10 percent of 
all seaborne cargo transported between the west coast of the United 
States and Hong Kong. (Hardly any of this cargo was exported or import­
ed by the USSR,) Furthermore, it is estimated that the USSR handles
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about 10 percent of the cargo shipped between Europe and the Far East,
A high proportion of Soviet seaborne exports consists of bulk 
commodities. On the other hand the USSR imports relatively few bulk 
goods (unless the country is experiencing a serious grain shortage). 
According to S. Luk'yanchenko, Deputy Minister of the SMF, the ratio 
of Soviet seaborne exports to imports (based on volume) is roughly 
five to one,^^ Therefore, after Soviet merchant vessels deliver the 
country's exports to foreign markets and pick up Soviet imports, they 
are still capable of engaging in cross-trade operations while en route 
to the USSR, A few Soviet merchant vessels are even ordered to remain 
in foreign waters throughout the winter months because ready access 
to Soviet ports during this period cannot be guaranteed. Of course, 
such ships are free to compete with Western merchant vessels in the 
world freight market.
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Since the late 1960s, major Western shipping nations have been
aware of the growing amount of cargo handled by the SMF, This growth
will probably continue for at least two reasons. Firstly, the low
freight charges will most likely attract new customers. Secondly,
the size of the SMF is projected to increase from 18,4 million dwt
 ^40 ,
in 1980, to 23 million dwt in I985 (remember that the SMF amounted 
to 16.2 million dwt in mid-1975)* Soviet officials are undoubtedly plan­
ning to use some of this additional tonnage to gain a stronger foothold 
in Western shipping markets.
Up till now Western nations have been reluctant to take measures 
that would seriously restrict the operations of Soviet merchant vessels. 
During the 1960s and early 1970s, various maritime agreements were 
signed between the U,S, and USSR, However, such agreements were only 
connected with the bilateral seaborne trade between the two countries.
(in other words, American and Soviet shippers were guaranteed certain 
portions of the bilateral cargo.) So, the SMF was still free to use 
whatever tactics were necessary to ship cargo from, say, New York to 
London, For almost a decade the U.K. has been trying to reach an 'under­
standing' with Soviet shippers. But such attempts have not been too 
successful. Therefore, the U.K. has appealed to the European Economic 
Community (EEC) for assistance (see CHAPTER VII for details).
The SMF has two distinct roles— economic and political. Accord­
ing to the Minister of the SMF, T. Guzhenko, the establishment of a 
powerful and modern SMF has provided for the needs of the national 
economy in coastal transport; helped to make Soviet foreign trade in­
dependent from the capitalist freight market; liquidated the country's 
negative freight balance; and guaranteed the stability of Soviet for­
eign trade in the face of unforeseen situations like the economic boy-
41cotts against Cuba and the closure of the Suez Canal. Prior to the
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early 1960s the USSR was seemingly content to charter foreign ships
to facilitate its trading operations. The volume of cargo which the
SMF could not handle during the 1950s was not too large hence foreign
currency payments for shipping services did not place a heavy burden
on the USSR's budget. But the increase in Soviet trade and aid was
responsible for changing the USSR's shipping policy.
The Soviet quest for independence from the world freight market
was intensified immediately after the USSR's decision to step up the
development of its merchant fleet. Since the early 1960s the USSR
has attempted to handle virtually all of its seaborne foreign trade.
Whenever the USSR negotiates a foreign trade contract which involves
the transport of commodities by ship, the country attempts to purchase
42its imports f.o.b, and sell its exports c,i,f. The centralised con­
trol of both foreign trade and shipping in the USSR makes flag discrim­
ination relatively easy. For some time the USSR was able to carry out 
its discriminatory shipping policy without provoking Western shippers. 
However, as the SMF developed into a potential threat, Western shippers 
began demanding changes in Soviet maritime policy. Selected Western 
governments are now considering the possibility of curbing the activ­
ities of the SMF in the West, So, within a short period of time Sov­
iet traders could experience more difficulty in negotiating f,o,b, 
terms for their imports and c.i.f, terms for their exports.
The growth of the SMF has seemingly enhanced the political posi­
tion of the USSR, Nowadays the Soviet flag can be seen at various 
times in over 1,200 ports throughout the world. The SMF is now cap­
able of handling virtually all of the USSR's seaborne trade with CMEA 
members and LDGs, Moreover, even IMTEs are now aware of the presence 
of the SMF, But a large merchant fleet could conceivably present prob­
lems for the USSR under some conditions. If relations should temper-
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arily sour between East and West, Soviet merchant vessels would have 
difficulty carrying out worldwide operations because they would not 
be able to obtain supplies and services from ports belonging to adver­
saries of the USSR, The recipients of Soviet economic and military 
aid would not appreciate a marked reduction in the number of Soviet 
merchant ships visiting their ports after becoming accustomed to reg­
ular deliveries for many years. Furthermore, the USSR's modern fleet 
would be underutilised during a period of strained relations and hence 
an economic liability. There would most likely be no attempt to update 
the underutilised fleet so when political conditions improved the USSR 
might have an obsolete merchant fleet. And finally, if war broke out 
between East and West, Soviet merchant vessels in and around Western 
ports would be quickly confiscated.
Most of the cargo transported by the SMF is connected with for­
eign (as opposed to coastal or domestic) t r a d e , A s  a result, the 
USSR's maritime policy is greatly influenced by conditions in the inter­
national freight market.
The Soviet merchant fleet is primarily concerned with foreign trans­
port and its activities are connected with the capitalist market. 
Therefore, a knowledge of the rates and cargoes of the capitalist 
fleet is one of the responsibilities of the officers of the ships 
and the commercial /~e,g,, shipping agents// and operational /  plan- 
ning_7 personnel of the Soviet merchant fleet,
Soviet foreign shipping rates are established by the Bureau of Prices 
of the State Planning Commission (Gosplan) on the basis of rates pre­
vailing in the world cargo market. Shipping charges for cross-trade 
operations are based on free-market freight rates and Soviet liner 
rates are established for each shipping line according to world liner 
rates. Shipping charges on lines which are jointly operated by Soviet 
and foreign companies are determined by agreements between the affil­
iated shipping companies.
According to one estimate, of the ll4 million tons of cargo handled
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by the SMF in international trade during 1974, approximately 90 mil­
lion tons (79 percent) consisted of Soviet exports and imports,45 The 
remainder v/as cross-trade cargo, A sizeable portion of cross-trade 
cargo handled by the SMF consists of commodities which are destined 
for GMEA countries and LDGs (e.g., Canadian flour for Cuba, Iraqi pet­
roleum for Eastern Europe, Cuban military supplies for Angola etc,). 
Payments for such services are often made on a clearing-account basis. 
But as we have learned, the USSR is also earning quite a lot of hard 
currency from the operations of the SMF in the West,
In June 1975» the SMF was handling freight on fifty-eight inter­
national lines (see APPENDIX D), At that time only five of the USSR's 
international cargo lines were affiliated with shipping conferences.
In the latter part of 1976 the Balt-Atlantic line was planning to join 
seven North Atlantic shipping conferences. The Continental North Atlan­
tic Westbound Freight Conference and the Continental North Atlantic 
Eastbound Freight Conference submitted proposals to the U.S, Federal 
Maritime Commission to modify the existing rate agreements in order 
to give Balt-Atlantic membership as a semi-containership operator.
The proposals suggested a two-tier rate system under which Balt-Atlantic 
would be granted a 10 percent rate differential in the first year of 
membership and 6,5 percent in the second year. By the end of the second 
year Balt-Atlantic was expected to bring up the quality of its shipping 
services to conference levels and operate on an equal basis, Balt- 
Atlantic agreed to join the other five shipping conferences— North 
Atlantic Westbound Freight Conference, North Atlantic-United Kingdom 
Freight Conference, North Atlantic-Baltic Freight Conference, Scandin- 
avia-Baltic/North Atlantic Westbound Freight Conference, and North
Atlantic-French Atlantic Freight Conference— without any special interim
46rate arrangements. However, according to evidence which has already
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been mentioned (see p. 363) Balt-Atlantic is apparently not honouring 
all of its conference agreements.
On the Foreign Currency Operations 
' of the Soviet Merchant Fleetly
When operating abroad, Soviet merchant vessels are required to carry
out many of their financial transactions in convertible currencies. A
large portion of the convertible currency expenditures of a Soviet ship
comprises payments for supplies and repairs, and wages for the crew when
the ship is docked in foreign ports. Convertible currency is also used
48to pay for port taxes and pilotage. Letters of credit are used to pro­
vide Soviet merchant vessels with the necessary amounts of convertible 
currency to cover such expenditures. The captain of a Soviet merchant
ship receives letters of credit from his shipping company if the ship
4qdeparts from its port of registration,  ^ If the ship departs from any 
other port the letters of credit are issued by an agent of Sovinflot,
In the event a Soviet merchant vessel requires additional convertible 
currency resources while operating abroad (e.g., the ship might be 
ordered to remain in foreign waters for a longer period than anticipa­
ted) letters of credit are sent by telegram. Of course, convertible 
currency can also be obtained from Westerners who have decided to 
use the services of Soviet merchant vessels (especially passenger-ships), 
When a Soviet merchant ship arrives in a foreign port its cap­
tain presents a letter of credit to an agency providing financial ser­
vices for the SMF, The agency obtains convertible currency from local 
banks on the basis of the letter of credit and gives such currency to 
the captain of the vessel, A receipt for the convertible currency is 
issued by the captain to the agent of Sovinflot, If any convertible 
currency remains after all expenses have been covered, the captain
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normally returns such cash to the agent of Sovinflot, The captain of 
the merchant vessel receives a receipt from the agent for any returned 
sums,
A Soviet merchant vessel must keep a ruble account of its con­
vertible currency operations. The foreign currency earnings and expen­
ditures of a Soviet merchant vessel are calculated into rubles at the 
official rates of exchange (i.e., the rates established by Gosbank) 
prevailing on the day the ship departs from the USSR unless an order 
is received from the shipping company (or other higher Soviet organs) 
to change the existing rates. In the event a Soviet merchant vessel 
is ordered to revalue its foreign currency holdings the captain appoints 
an 'inventory commission* from amongst his crew members to carry out 
this task. The convertible currency operations of Soviet ships are 
recorded in a separate cash ledger. Separate balances are maintained 
for individual currencies (i.e,, foreign currencies are not converted 
into one form of exchange /*~e,g,, dollars// and aggregated).
Members of the crew are paid according to their job descriptions 
and the type of ship on which they serve (e,g., tanker, dry-cargo ship, 
passenger-ship etc,). Most crew members are paid on an hourly basis,
A few members of the crew (e.g,, physicians) are paid fixed sums for 
the duration of the voyage. Convertible currency wages of Soviet crew 
members are determined on the basis of official rates of exchange (e.g., 
if a crew member is paid 75 kopecks per hour, and the official rate 
of exchange is 1 ruble “ $1,40, the crew member receives $1,05 per 
hour on a foreign currency basis). The Soviet authorities do not levy 
a tax on convertible currency earnings of crew members.
When a Soviet merchant ship returns to the USSR after completing 
a foreign voyage the captain is required to submit a foreign currency 
report to his shipping company. The report is a detailed account of
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of the ship's expenditures (including sums which havd been written 
off as 'official necessities', e.g., the wining and dining of Western 
charterers) and earnings during the period abroad. Documents which 
show the ship's foreign currency operations (e.g., receipts from foreign 
companies that have provided goods/services for the Soviet merchant vessel, 
and records of transactions between the ship and the foreign agents of 
Sovinflot) are included with the captain's report.
Measuring the Effect of the SMF on the 
USSR's Balance of Payments
A number of reasons indicate that it is advantageous for a country 
to acquire and maintain a powerful merchant fleet. Maritime transport 
charges comprise a significant portion of the delivered (c.i.f,) prices 
of commodities. In addition, a country's ability to transport its own 
imports can result in enormous foreign currency savings. Furthermore, 
merchant ships are capable of earning quite a lot of convertible cur­
rency from cross-trade operations. So, on the surface it appears that 
a domestic merchant fleet is an important means of improving a country's 
ba.lance-of-payments position.
Now the foreign currency earnings and savings attributed to a 
country's merchant fleet are important performance indicators but they 
do not reflect the fleet’s overall effect on the country's balance of 
payments. The impact on the balance of payments of substituting dom­
estic for foreign merchant vessels cannot be measured solely by the 
foreign currency earnings (and savings) of the domestic fleet since 
this disregards the capital costs (i.e., the costs of purchasing for­
eign merchant vessels) and the necessary foreign currency expenditures 
which are connected with the operation of domestic ships abroad. More­
over, the foreign currency earnings of the merchant fleet which exceed
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foreign currency expenditures do not reflect the overall halance-of- 
payments effect of the fleet since they do not take into account the 
foreign currency losses attributed to the reduction in sales of goods 
and services (in home ports) to foreign ships which have been replaced 
by domestic vessels.
The problems of measuring the overall balance-of-payments effect of 
a nation's merchant fleet were largely solved by R, 0, Goss in I965. Al­
though Goss was concerned with the balance-of-payments effect of West­
ern merchant fleets, his methodology can be applied to the SMF, Accord­
ing to Goss, when measuring the balance-of-payments effect of a country's 
merchant fleet the key question is: 'What is the net extent to which 
the balance of payments differs from what it would have been if the 
investment in ships had not taken p l a c e ' T h e  formula which appears 
below is largely based on material in Goss' article,
E «= I + S -(C + 0 + L)
Where
E represents the effect of a country's merchant fleet on 
the balance of payments;
I represents the foreign currency income of the merchant 
fleet;
S represents the foreign currency savings attributed to the 
merchant fleet;
G represents the capital costs of the merchant vessels that 
were purchased abroad;
0 represents the foreign currency operating expenditures 
(e.g,, supplies and services, port taxes, pilotage etc,) 
of the merchant fleet;
L represents the foreign currency losses attributed to the 
use of a given country's merchant vessels (see lines I-5  
on this page).
Only a few Western analysts have attempted to estimate the bal­
ance-of -payments effect of the SMF. In 1971, Robert E. Athay published 
a book which dealt with this problem. Using Goss' methodology, Athay 
estimated the net effect of the SMF on the USSR's balance of payments 
for the years I96O, and 1964-1966 (see TABLE 6.6), As far as this 
researcher knows, there has been no (published) attempt to update Athay's
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estimates.
There appears to be at least one reason for the lack of estimates 
on the balance~of-payments effect of the SMF, A Soviet textbook published 
in 1964, contains some rather useful material on the foreign currency
51operations of the SMF, Athay was able to make some of his estimates 
on the basis of material included in this textbook. In the light of 
the marked development of the SMF after I965 (resulting, of course, 
in the increase of Soviet shipping activities in hard currency areas) 
it is reasonable to assume that Soviet officials are now quite wary 
about permitting the same type of material to appear outside the con­
fines of Soviet institutions,
TABLE 6,6
NET EFFECT ON BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN HARD AND 
NON-CONVERTIBLE CURRENCIES OF USING SOVIET 
RATHER THAN FOREIGN SHIPS TO GARRY A 
PORTION OF SOVIET SEABORNE FOREIGN 
TRADE, i960 and 1964-1966 
(in millions of rubles)
Gom-
Year Non-convertible currency Hard Currency bined
net
Gains Losses Balance Gains Losses Balance gain
i960 105.0 124.6 - 19.6 47.2 44.6 2.6 - 17.0
1964 239.8 132,4 107.4 140.8 78.0 62,8 170,2
1965 300,6 206,0 94.6 161.8 86.1 75.7 170,3
1966 328.2 201.5 126.7 192.8 86.6 106,2 232.9
Source: Robert E, Athay, The Economics of Soviet Merchant-Ship­
ping Policy (Chapel Hill, North Carolina: University of North Carolina
Press, 1971), p. 68.
On Measuring the Comparative Advantage 
of the SMF
According to Athay, 'Measuring the absolute gains to the balance of 
payments resulting from investments in merchant shipping does not con-
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stitute a complete test of the effectiveness of that program as a pol-
52
icy of import substitution'. A more meaningful analysis can be car­
ried out by comparing the gains to the balance of payments from ship­
ping relative to those of alternative investment programmes. This 
involves calculating the ruble expenditures necessary for each unit 
of foreign currency saved in substituting domestic shipping services 
for foreign shipping and comparing this ruble-foreign exchange ratio 
with corresponding ratios for various Soviet imports.
On the basis of data for the period 196I-I963» Athay estimated 
that the USSR was required to spend between 1,5 sind 1,6 rubles on its 
home-produced merchant vessels in order to save one dollar, Athay 
then compared his estimated ruble-dollar ratios with the CIA's estim­
ates of ruble-dollar ratios for selected groups of Soviet imports. The 
outcome of Athay's analysis indicated that over two-thirds of the groups
of imports offered greater foreign currency (dollar) savings per ruble
53spent than did merchant shipping. However, these estimates should 
not be taken too seriously as Athay himself was well aware of the fact 
that accurate estimates are extremely difficult to make because 
of the lack of pertinent data from the USSR and the disparity between 
Soviet (domestic) prices and world-market prices. Although Soviet 
planners have access to data which would enable them to make compar­
ative-cost calculations, Philip Hanson concluded in his article on 
the SMF that a fair amount of time would elapse before policy decis­
ions on merchant shipping in the USSR are based on such calculations.
It would be interesting but idle to ask what the 'true' comparative 
advantage of the Soviet Union is in shipping. Economists special­
izing in shipping in the USSR are trying to find out themselves by 
refining estimates of national balance-of-payments returns from in­
vestments in shipping and relating them to similar estimates for 
other investments. But they have a long way to go,54
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The Soviet Fishing Fleet
Russia's fishing fleet rarely ventured beyond the country's coastal 
waters. Soviet fishermen continued this policy for over three decades 
after the October Revolution. In the early 1950s the Soviet fishing 
fleet began penetrating distant fishing regions in the Atlantic and 
Pacific oceans. By the mid-1970s the Soviet Union had become one of 
the world's leading fishing nations (second only to Japan) with the 
largest distant-water fishing fleet.
The Soviet fishing industry is now an important foreign currency 
earner. In 1955» the USSR's fish imports were forty-four times larger 
than exports (see TABLE 6,7). However, in 1976, the USSR exported 
seven times more fish than it imported. Soviet earnings from fish 
exports, minus fish imports, increased from 20 million rubles in 1970» 
to 76.2 million rubles (about $103.6 million) in 1976,
TABLE 6,7
SOVIET EXPORTS AND IMPORTS OF 
FISH, 1955-1976 
(in millions of rubles)
Year Exports Imports Balance
1955 .4 17.4 - 17.0
1957 .5 21.6 - 21.1
1959 6,2 18,7 - 12.5
1961 7.9 6.3 1.6
1963 18,2 15.4 2.8
1965 23.5 12.3 11.2
1967 26,2 13.4 12.8
1969 27.0 9.8 17.2
1970 32.3 12.3 20.0
1971 41.4 10,3 31,1
1972 37.4 9.4 28,0
1973 49.1 6,0 43.1
1974 70.1 13.8 56.3
1975 91.5 14.9 76,6
1976 89.0 12.8 76.2
Source: Official Soviet foreign trade statistics.
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On 1 January 1977» the Soviet fishing fleet included 2,930 ves­
sels (lOO grt or over) totalling 4,559,832 grt (see TABLE 6.8), Diesel- 
powered vessels comprised 95 percent of this total and steamers made 
up the remaining 5 percent. Between 1 January 1975 &nd 1 January 1977, 
the tonnage of the Soviet fishing fleet grew by over 17 percent.
TABLE 6,8
THE SOVIET FISHING FLEET, 1 JANUARY I975- 
1 JANUARY 1977 
(self-propelled ships 100 grt or over)
Year Number Gross registered tonnage
1975
1976
1977
2,865
2,933
2,930
3,882,564
4 ,391,941
4 ,559,832
Sources: Morskoi flot. No, 5. 1977. P. 13; Morskoi flot. No.
1976, n. 7: and Morskoi flot. No. 11, 1975» p. 11.
The Soviet fishing fleet is apparently much larger than the 
figures suggest in TABLE 6,8, In 1976, Milan Kravanja maintained 
that the Soviet fishing fleet comprised over 4,500 high-seas, distant- 
water vessels totalling over 6 million grt.^ "^  This total, according 
to Kravanja, represented over 50 percent of the world's high-seas fishing 
fleet which was estimated at 11-12 million grt, Kravanja's estimate 
most likely included all Soviet fishing vessels (i.e., ships under 
and above 100 grt) which were capable of operating outside Soviet coastal 
waters as well as reserve fishing vessels and various support ships 
which might have been included in Soviet statistics on the SMF under such 
headings as 'service and auxiliary ships' and 'other ships' (see p. 359).
Although the size of the Soviet fishing fleet is impressive (no 
matter which statistics you wish to use), it is the least productive 
of the fleets belonging to the five largest fish-catching nations in
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the world— Japan, the USSR, Spain, Norway and the United States, One 
reason for this low productivity is the fact that over half of the
tonnage of the Soviet fishing fleet consists of support vessels. On
the other hand, support vessels only comprise 14 percent of the Japan-
56
ese fishing fleet. The USSR's distant-water fishing fleet requires 
a large number of support vessels for at least two reasons. Firstly, 
such vessels reduce hard currency payments for supplies and services 
in foreign ports. Secondly, a number of countries are still reluctant 
to permit Soviet fishing vessels to use their port facilities even
though the USSR might be willing to pay hard currency for supplies and
services.
As a result of the lack of port services and Soviet fish-processing 
facilities abroad, the Soviet fish industry was induced to develop 
efficient methods of supplying its fishing vessels and processing its 
catches on the high seas. After studying the Japanese method of supply­
ing fishing vessels and processing marine catches on the high seas, the 
USSR decided to adopt a similar policy. The scheme involves the crea­
tion of large fishing flotillas which are supported by 'factory mother­
ships' , These mother-ships are capable of carrying thousands of tons 
of supplies and equipment. They also have facilities for cleaning 
and processing marine catches. The fishing flotillas are one solution 
to the problem of great distances between the USSR and Soviet fishing 
regions.
In 1969, the USSR launched one of the largest factory mother­
ships in the world— the 'Vostok', This mother-ship totals 43,000 dwt 
and has the characteristics of five different types of vessels* a 
dry-cargo ship with a storage capacity of over 13,000 tons; a fish- 
factory ship which is capable of processing many tons of marine life 
each day; a passenger-ship capable of transporting hundreds of people;
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57a tanker; and a refrigerator ship. The Vostok is able to remain
in tropical waters for up to four months without replenishment. The 
factory mother-ship carries fourteen Nadezhda-type fishing boats total­
ling about 60 dwt each. A helicopter from the Vostok is used to supply 
the Nadezhda fishing boats whilst they are operating away from the 
mother-ship.
The Ministry of the Fish Industry's information centre on 
Rozhdestvensky Boulevard in Moscow is responsible for knowing the loca­
tion of Soviet fishing vessels as well as the size of their catches.
The centre receives information from all regions of the world and in 
many respects functions as a sophisticated naval intelligence unit,
A section of the information centre was described as follows*
Behind the control panels of computers is a huge operational map 
of the fishing fleet of the USSR's Ministry of the Fish Industry,
It does not have the usual colours— yellow, green and brown— which 
show deserts, forests and mountains. The map is a very deep blue 
of the seas and oceans. On this map even continents appear as 
small islands.
The director flipped the switch. Squares, figures and routes 
of ships became illuminated. In the right corner, columns of num­
bers were lit. Today on the high seas there are 1,929 ships; 1,420 
of them are fishing, IO3 are en route and 149 are in ports , . .58
The political significance of the Soviet fishing fleet should 
not be underestimated. In some LDGs, a Soviet fishing vessel is re­
garded as an important means of supplying marine protein to local mar­
kets, Such dependence is obviously desirable for the USSR, The stra­
tegic significance of the Soviet fishing fleet should also be mentioned. 
Like their counterparts in the SMF, officers in the Soviet fishing 
fleet are reserve members of the Soviet navy. In addition to report­
ing their daily position at sea, officers of Soviet fishing vessels 
are required to send all information of military interest to Moscow, 
According to Michael MccGwire, 'Fishing fleets working in the more 
strategic areas are likely to include one or two ships which are spec­
ially fitted for intelligence work'
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During the Portuguese sardine fishermen's strike in 1974, the 
Soviet fishing fleet functioned as an instrument of Soviet foreign 
policy. But the actions of the fleet were somewhat unexpected. By 
agreeing with Portuguese authorities to supply sardines to Portugal’s 
canneries the Soviet fishing fleet acted as a strike breaker. In the 
words of Carl Jacobsen, 'Ideological criteria and proletarian solidar­
ity concepts clearly played second fiddle to the pragmatic desire to 
foster good relations with Portugal's new radical (but as yet far from 
Marxist) regime'.
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CHAPTER VII 
RESTRAINTS ON SOVIET GOMMERGIAIj-FINANGIAL 
OPERATIONS IN MARKET-TYPE ECONOMIES
Up till now Soviet commercial-financial operations in MTEs have been 
controlled, for the most part, by local laws and norms which govern 
the activities of all participants in Western markets. The rapid growth 
of the USSR's operations in MTEs is a good indication that government 
and business leaders in the West axe not averse to a rather significant 
level of Soviet commercial-financial activity in their respective com­
munities, In the event Soviet leaders decide to maintain or intensify 
the USSR's foothold in MTEs, Soviet traders and bankers must conduct 
their operations according to the guidelines established by proponents 
of the market mechanism.
On the Laws Governing the Establishment and 
Operations of Soviet Trading Companies 
and Banks in MTEs
At this time there are very few laws (if any) which specifically per­
tain to the establishment of Soviet foreign-based trading companies 
and banks (SFTCs and SFBBs), According to W. H, Balekjian, Soviet 
applications for the establishment of SFTCs and SFBBs are most likely 
given the same degree of consideration throughout the EEC as applica­
tions from all other foreign (i.e., non-EEC) business interests,^ The 
same conditions appear to prevail in the United States, According to 
government and private sources, there are no American laws which specif-
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ically deal with the establishment of SFTCs and SFBBs,^
The absence of laws on the establishment of SFTCs and SFBBs should 
not give one the impression that the USSR is free to set up any type 
of company whenever and wherever Soviet officials deem appropriate. 
Generally speaking, the establishment of an SFTG or SFBB involves three 
steps. Firstly, the USSR informs the appropriate national governmental 
organs of its intention to set up an SFTG or SFBB, (in the United 
States these governmental organs include the Department of Commerce 
and the Department of State.) As a rule, the USSR follows the inter­
national practice of informing such organs via a formal (written) re­
quest. National governmental organs can reject Soviet requests for 
the establishment of SFTCs and SFBBs for any number of reasons. An 
SFTG or SFBB which might disrupt economic conditions in a given locality 
(e.g., a Soviet company that could put a local firm out of business) 
or present a threat to national security would most likely be rejected 
by most governmental organs, (For example, according to an American 
lawyer, 'the USSR would certainly not be able to establish a missile- 
manufacturing corporation in the United States'.^) In addition, the 
USSR would obviously not be permitted to set up an SFTG or SFBB in a 
given MTE if such a move conflicts with national economic/financial 
policies. We should note that the USSR has yet to establish a bank 
on Wall Street (or anywhere in the United States), (in all likelihood 
the USSR has made moves in this direction over the past two decades.) 
However, it is unlikely that the USSR will be permitted to set up a 
bank in the United States until American governmental officials adopt 
a more liberal policy of financial co-operation with the Soviet Union,
Now on to the second step* Soviet officials must gain the approval 
of local governmental officials before setting up an SFTG or SFBB, Since 
local laws that govern the establishment of joint-stock companies some-
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times differ markedly it is reasonable to assume that the USSR might 
experience more difficulty setting up a company in one locality than 
another. Moreover, we should bear in mind that some local officials 
are less willing to accept the presence of Soviet companies in their 
communities (for ideological reasons) than officials in other local­
ities, Thirdly, the USSR must gain the support of the local business 
community and consumers. Needless to say, without the support of both 
groups a Soviet company would not stand a chance of operating as a 
profit-making organisation.
At the present time there are few laws (if any) which specifically 
pertain to the operations of SFTGs and SFBBs, As we learned, SFTCs 
and SFBBs are expected to function like their Western counterparts.
SFTGs and SFBBs submit their annual reports and balance sheets (when 
required) to local and national governmental officials. In almost 
all cases, SFTCs and SFBBs fall under the same tax schedules as their 
local counterparts. Some countries place heavy restrictions on the 
exportation of funds (dividends) from foreign (including Soviet) com­
panies while other nations do not. Unless there are marked changes 
in the operations of SFTGs and SFBBs it is reasonable to assume that 
very few laws will be passed to discriminate against such organisations.
Soviet Commercial Organisations Established 
on the Basis of Intergovernmental 
Agreements
We discussed a number of organisations in CHAPTER II which were set 
up on the basis of intergovernmental agreements (e.g., Soviet trade 
representations, joint commercial commissions, purchasing commissions 
and at least one joint-stock company— the U.S.-USSR Trade and Economic 
Council), Many of these organisations were not established to buy
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and sell commodities. However, they are able to promote Soviet trade 
by facilitating the operations of Soviet FTOs, SFTGs and SFBBs. Vir­
tually all intergovernmental agreements concerning the establishment 
of Soviet (and mixed) commercial organisations abroad contain opera­
tional guidelines and staffing instructions for these organisations. 
The organisations are set up on a permanent or temporary basis. In 
the latter case the intergovernmental agreements cite the period of 
time within which the organisations can operate.
Procedures for Assigning Soviet Personnel 
to Gommercial/Finanoiai Posts In 
the West
Almost all Western governments have restrictions (sometimes referred 
to as 'personnel ceilings') on the number of Soviet citizens who can 
be permanently assigned to commercial and financial positions. In the 
middle part of 1977 there were 120 Soviet citizens assigned to such 
positions in the United States under the prevailing personnel ceiling,^ 
Of course, personnel ceilings can be increased or decreased to fit a 
particular situation.
The procedure for assigning a Soviet citizen to a commercial or 
financial post is rather simple (although it often takes a long time) 
and differs little from country to country. A Soviet citizen must 
obtain a visa before taking up a post in an SFTC or SFBB, If the appli­
cant is not classified as a persona non grata the visa is usually grant­
ed, The Soviet applicant is also required to convince Western govern­
ment officials that he is fully qualified for a certain position. If 
a Soviet banker (or bank employee) is applying for a position within 
an SFBB he will probably experience no difficulty in obtaining permis­
sion (usually in the form of a work permit) to function in such a capac-
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ity (once he has obtained a visa).
Members of Soviet foreign trade missions normally gain permis­
sion to operate in MTEs without too much trouble, (Remember that Sov­
iet trade missions only remain in MTEs for about one or two weeks.)
The visa applications for members of Soviet trade missions are usually 
processed in about one month. The local host of a Soviet trade mission 
is often responsible for providing the appropriate Western governmental 
organs with a detailed account of the mission's itinerary.
On the Laws Governing the Activities of Soviet 
Personnel Assigned to SFTGs, SFBBs and Other 
Soviet Organisations in MTEs
In most oases, Soviet citizens assigned to foreign-based commercial- 
financial organisations are governed by the same laws which regulate 
the activities of local nationals. However, there are at least two 
exceptions. Firstly, official Soviet trade representations are usually 
set up as integral parts of Soviet Embassies, As a result, the heads 
of the trade representations (i.e., the trade representatives) and their 
deputies normally enjoy all of the privileges and immunities which are 
enjoyed by diplomatic staff members of Soviet Eraba-ssies, Other members 
of Soviet trade representations usually enjoy all of the privileges 
and immunities which are enjoyed by corresponding personnel in Soviet 
Embassies, Secondly, most MTEs place heavy travel restrictions on 
Soviet citizens who are permanently or temporarily assigned to all 
forms of commercial-financial organisations. In many cases, Soviet 
nationals working in the West are not permitted to travel more than 
fifty miles from their places of employment without special permission. 
In addition, most Western nations maintain a list of areas which are 
classified as 'off-limits' for Soviet citizens.
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It is interesting to note that some Western governments have
offered to ease travel restrictions on Soviet citizens living abroad
in return for reciprocal action by the Soviet government. According
to the U.S. State Department;
The United States Government has long believed that Soviet restrict­
ions on foreign travel within the USSR inhibit direct contacts 
between Soviet citizens and foreigners which could promote inter­
national understanding. A system of areas closed to travel by 
Soviet citizens in this country was set up in 1955 after several 
vain attempts to induce the Soviet Government to drop its travel 
restrictions on foreigners in force since 1941. Our position has 
always been that we will abolish our own travel restrictions on 
Soviet citizens if the Soviet Government will reciprocate, or that 
we will respond in kind to any reduction or abolishment of Soviet 
travel restrictions on Americans,5
Needless to say, the Soviets have been slow to respond to similar pro­
posals from a wide range of Western countries. In the light of this 
fact it seems highly likely that stringent travel restrictions will 
remain in force for quite some time on Soviet citizens working in the 
West,
Most Western governments are prepared to deal expeditiously with 
Soviet citizens involved in espionage. Within the last two decades 
only a few members of SFTGs have been expelled (or arrested) for such 
activity. As far as this researcher knows, no Soviet citizens working 
in SFBBs have been expelled (or arrested) for spying. This is a good 
indication that the USSR has been reluctant to assign personnel to these 
companies and banks for the purpose of carrying out espionage. The 
reason for this policy is quite clear; any serious violation of a 
host country's laws by a member of an SFTC or SFBB could seriously 
affect the USSR's commercial-financial relations with that country.^  
Moreover, a single incident of such nature could culminate in far greater 
problems for the USSR if other countries become suspicious of Soviet 
personnel in SFTGs and SFBBs throughout the West. But we should note that 
Soviet officials do not appear reluctant to assign spies to other types
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of commercial organisations. Since the early 19?0s a number of MTEs 
have expelled Soviet intelligence agents who were assigned to various 
Soviet organisations in the West, One of the most notable cases took 
place in September 19?1 when the British government expelled 105 Sov­
iet citizens out of a total working force of approximately 550 Soviets
7
assigned to various organisations in the U.K. Many of the expelled
agents were members of the Soviet trade representation in London. The
Soviet defector responsible for exposing the spy ring was himself a
KGB (secret police) officer disguised as a member of the Soviet trade 
8
representation.
Now at that time it might have been reasonable to assume that 
Anglo-Soviet trade would decrease sharply following the expulsion of 
a large number of Soviet citizens who were employed in official Soviet 
organisations in the U.K. (e.g., the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet 
trade representation). But this did not happen. In 1970» Soviet ex­
ports to the U.K. (in current prices) amounted to 418.2 million rubles 
(imports from the U.K. stood at 223.2 million rubles). During 1971» 
Soviet exports to the U.K. (in current prices) fell slightly to 4o6,8 
million rubles (imports from the U.K. amounted to 200,0 million rubles). 
Tile decrease was a little more pronounced in the following year when 
Soviet exports to the U.K. (in current prices) amounted to 371.1 mil­
lion rubles (imports from the U.K. stood at 186.7 million rubles). How­
ever, by the end of 1973» Soviet exports to the U.K. (in current prices) 
increased markedly to 540,6 million rubles (imports from the U.K. de­
clined slightly to 174.6 million rubles). These data indicate that 
Anglo-Soviet trade was not seriously affected by the mass exodus of 
personnel from the Soviet Embassy and trade representation.
In addition to reducing the number of Soviet employees in the 
United Kingdom from 55O to 44j, the British government took other
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measures which probably decreased the USSR's desire to continue wide­
spread espionage in the U.K. Following the deportation order the Brit­
ish government informed the USSR that the number of Soviet citizens 
assigned to the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet trade representation and 
all other Soviet organisations in the U.K. could not rise above the 
number of Soviet nationals serving in such organisations after the 
departure of the intelligence agents (i.e., after September or October 
1971, the maximum number of Soviet citizens who could serve in Soviet 
organisations in the U.K. stood at roughly 445). (Of course, this 
ceiling could be increased after a certain amount of time.) The Brit­
ish government also informed the USSR that each time a Soviet official
was expelled from the U.K. for spying the authorised number of Soviet
9
employees in that category would be reduced by one.
Restraints on the Operations of the Soviet 
Merchant Fleet in the West
Until the late 1960s, shippers in MTEs did not appear to be overly 
concerned with the level of Soviet participation in Western freight 
markets. Before that time it was widely known that the SMF was under­
cutting Western rates but conditions in world freight markets were so 
favourable that Western shippers had little reason to attack the USSR, 
It should also be pointed out that Soviet shippers can quite easily 
argue that they were forced to charge lower rates during the 1960s 
because Soviet shipping services were inferior to those offered by 
Western shippers. But times have changed. The Soviet merchant fleet 
is no longer considered grossly inferior to its Western counterparts. 
Moreover, the level of competition in Western freight markets has grown 
considerably. This is largely the result of the marked growth of the 
world merchant fleet from 1970 to 1975 the face of adverse condi-
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tions for world trade (e.g., recessions, protectionism etc.). Since 
Western shippers are now forced to bargain hard for a sizeable portion 
of their business they are becoming increasingly critical of Soviet 
maritime tactics.
In 1968, the British and Soviet governments signed a navigation 
treaty in an attempt to establish a happy medium between British and 
Soviet shippers. The two governments agreed that 'free and fair com­
petition' should prevail in the transport of commodities between the 
U.K. and the USSR.^^ The treaty did not specify the amount of bilat­
eral seaborne trade which should be transported in British and Soviet 
ships. However, the treaty set up an Anglo-Soviet shipping commission 
which is responsible for discussing maritime relations between the 
two countries. The commission meets at least once a year in either 
London or Moscow. British shipping interests are permitted to parti­
cipate in these meetings. Up till now such meetings (and the treaty) 
have done little to improve relations between British and Soviet ship­
pers.
In 1972, a maritime agreement was signed between the United States 
and the USSR. The agreement specified that American and Soviet ship­
pers were entitled to transport equal shares of the bilateral seaborne
11
trade between the two countries, (About two-thirds of this cargo was ear­
marked for Soviet and U.S. shippers and the rest for third-country shippers.) 
However, it appears as though the USSR has forgotten about some of its 
obligations under the agreement. In August 1976, the U.S. State Depart­
ment claimed that the USSR had violated the section of the maritime
agreement concerning the amount of cargo which could be transported
12in American and Soviet vessels.
In the opinion of many Western shippers the SMF is presently 
conducting a policy of unfair competition. These shippers argue that
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the SMF is able to reduce its rates to the point where there is no 
way of meeting the Soviet challenge without government action. As a 
result, a few Western governments are now considering ways to curb Sov­
iet penetration into the world freight market, (it should be pointed 
out that many IMTEs have maritime laws that can be used to protect 
their shippers.) Moreover, shippers and government leaders in indiv­
idual BEG nations are now calling for concerted action against the SMF 
(as well as other socialist fleets). In May 1978, the European Com­
munities Commission made the following proposals after considering 
arguments from individual meraber-states of the EEC;
(1) . , . member states and the Community should define the ob­
jectives to be pursued in relation to cargo liner shipping by state- 
trading countries;
(2) , . , member states should set up monitoring procedures en­
abling them to follow the activities of the liner operators of 
state-trading countries using Community ports;
(3) • • • member states and the Commission should regularly ex­
amine developments in this area through approved consultative pro­
cedures; /™and__7
(4) . . . the Council ^i.e., the Council of Ministers of the 
EEG__7» in certain circumstances and on a proposal from the Commis­
sion, should take powers to place quantitative restrictions on car­
go carried to and from Community ports in state-trading country 
vessels. These restrictions could be applied generally, by cer­
tain member states only, or in a specific area or trading range,^
The U,K, probably took the strongest stand against the tactics 
of the SMF. The British government’s recent proposals to the EEC cal­
led for each member-state to adopt laws on shipping which are similar 
to those prevailing in the U.K. Such laws would enable individual 
member-states of the EEC to* (l) levy a tax on every Soviet ship 
entering their ports; (2) fix minimum rates at which Soviet ships 
can pick up cargo in their ports; (3) set up a quota system which 
would direct Soviet ships to less popular ports; and (4) draw up con­
tract clauses for the amount of bilateral seaborne trade that should
14
be transported in their own merchant vessels.
In the light of its strong stand against the current activities
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of the SMF, the British government must have been quite disappointed 
in the outcome of the meeting between transport ministers of the EEC.
On 13 June 1978, the transport ministers failed to agree on counter­
measures against the SMF, However, they did agree on a scheme to mon­
itor the operations of GMEA merchant vessels. Under this scheme the 
EEG will maintain records of the cargoes carried by such ships as well
15
as the rates charged for transport services. It appears as though 
the USSR will now be forced to take the warnings of Western governments 
more seriously. If not, future meetings which deal with the so-called 
unfair practices of the SMF could well result in a marked diminution 
of Soviet activities in world freight markets.
On Future Soviet Participation in International 
Economic Organisations
The steady growth of Soviet commercial-financial operations in the 
West coupled with the fact that a few GMEA nations (i.e., Hungary, 
Poland and Rumania) are currently members of some Western-dominated 
international economic organisations has prompted a number of Western 
analysts to study the problems connected with Soviet membership in 
these organisations,^^ At this point it is necessary to mention that 
the West seems to be taking a more favourable attitude toward improv­
ing economic relations with the USSR (in spite of minor problems like 
the SMF), and the Soviet Union, in its turn, seems to be slowly recog­
nising the importance of more profound commercial-financial relations 
with MTEs, In the event these trends continue, the USSR could start 
participating in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OEGD), 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), (The reader should note that 
the IBRD is often referred to as the World Bank.)
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On the Prospects for Soviet 
Participation in GATT
For many years the USSR has criticised the West (especially IMTEs) 
for imposing high tariffs on Soviet exports. Of course, the USSR could 
eliminate some of these tariffs by participating in GATT. Article I 
of GATT states* 'any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity grant­
ed by any contracting party to any product originating in or destined 
for any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to the like product originating in or destined for the territories of 
all other contracting parties'. But instead of participating in GATT, 
the USSR has attempted to gain most-favoured-nation status through 
bilateral agreements with MTEs.
The USSR's reluctance to participate in GATT partially stems 
from the fact that Soviet officials would be required to make a number 
of concessions which could undermine Soviet foreign economic policy 
as it exists today. For example, contracting parties are expected to 
follow anti-dumping guidelines which are included in Article VI of 
GATT, Moreover, under Article XVi 'The GONTRAGTING PARTIES shall 
seek co-operation with the International Monetary Fund to the end that 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES and the Fund may pursue a co-ordinated policy 
with regard to exchange questions within the jurisdiction of the Fund*. 
(Of course. Article XV contains special provisions for contracting 
parties that are not members of the IMF.) According to Article XVI, 
Section A:
If any contracting party grants or maintains any subsidy, includ­
ing any form of income or price support, which operates directly 
or indirectly to increase exports of any product from, or to re­
duce imports of any product into, its territory, it shall notify 
the CONTRACTING PARTIES in writing of the extent and nature of the 
subsidization, of the estimated effect of the subsidization on the 
quantity of the affected product or products imported into or ex­
ported from its territory and of the circumstances making the sub­
sidization necessary.
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It is quite obvious that Articles VI, XV and XVI would conflict 
with present-day Soviet foreign economic policy. But since Hungary, 
Poland and Rumania are participants in GATT it is conceivable that 
at some future date the USSR might decide that the advantages of be­
coming a contracting party outweigh the disadvantages. In addition, 
the current members of GATT could decide, within a reasonable amount 
of time, to ease the conditions for Soviet membership in oider to pro­
mote greater international economic rapport.
On the Prospects for Soviet Membership 
in the OEGD
Unless Soviet attitudes change markedly, it is unlikely that the USSR 
will seek membership in the OEGD for at least four reasons. Firstly, 
most of the members of the OEGD are IMTEs. (At this time there are no 
socialist members in the OEGD although Yugoslavia enjoys ’special status' 
in the organisation,) Secondly, the primary aims of the OEGD include 
the promotion of economic growth, high employment and financial sta­
bility in member-countries, (in other words, the USSR would have to 
openly agree to help promote favourable economic conditions in IMTEs.) 
Thirdly, OECD members are required to promote the expansion of world 
multilateral trade. As a result, the USSR would have to operate in 
conjunction with international organs of the world (capitalist) mone­
tary system (e.g., the IMF), And finally, the OECD is responsible 
for publishing data on the economic systems of member-countries. Before 
joining the OEGD, the USSR would probably be required to divulge econ­
omic data which do not appear in official Soviet statistics.
On the Prospects for Soviet Membership 
in the IMF and the IBRD
The USSR would benefit from membership in the IMF and IBRD for at least
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two reasons. Firstly, the USSR would have access to hard currency 
resources in both organisations. Secondly, it would probably be easier 
for the USSR to obtain credits and loans from banks in individual IMTEs 
if Soviet officials decide to join the IMF and IBRD.
Adam Zwass has pointed out that although the USSR participated 
in discussions on the establishment of a post-war international mone­
tary system, Soviet officials decided against joining the IMF and the
IBRD in the mid-1940s because of the strong American presence in both
17of these organisations. However, much has happened during the 
past thirty years. Firstly, American influence in both organisations 
has decreased significantly. (For example, the EEG now has more voting 
power in the IMF than the U.S.) Secondly, the instability of the inter­
national monetary system coupled with the marked depreciation of the 
dollar has brightened the prospects for Soviet participation in the 
establishment of a new world monetary system via existing international 
economic organisations,^^ At this point it should be mentioned that 
Rumania has been a member of both the IMF and IBRD for some time. In 
the light of this fact there is now little reason for socialist countries 
to argue that all of their goals are necessarily incompatible with the 
objectives of the IMF and IBRD,
Under Article VIII, Section 5 of the IMF's Articles of Agreement, 
member-countries are required to supply the IMF with national economic 
data. For example, members are required to provide data on their 'Inter­
national balance of payments, including (l) trade in goods and ser­
vices, (2) gold transactions, (3) known capital transactions, and
(4) other items'. This would obviously be a stumbling-block to Sov­
iet participation in the IMF, However, Article VIII, Section 5 also 
states that 'In requesting information the Fund shall take into con­
sideration the varying ability of members to furnish the data requested*.
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Another stumbling-block to Soviet membership in the IMF is the 
fact that the USSR does not have a convertible currency. It is widely 
known that the IMF was established to promote multilateral trade via 
a multilateral system of payments. Article I of the IMF's Articles 
of Agreement states that one of the purposes of the IMF is* 'To assist 
in the establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect 
of current transactions between members and in the elimination of for­
eign exchange restrictions which hamper the growth of world trade'.
This would indicate that convertibility is a pre-condition for member­
ship, However, under Article XIV, a country without a convertible 
currency is entitled to join the IMF if such a country shows a willing­
ness to establish a convertible currency 'as soon as conditions permit'. 
Since all members of the IBRD must join the IMF, there is little reason 
to discuss the problems connected with Soviet membership in this bank.
On the Prospects for Ruble Convertibility
The increasing level of Soviet commercial-financial dealings in world 
markets could someday induce Soviet leaders to establish a ruble with 
at least a limited degree of convertibility. Such a move could pro­
mote the growth of Soviet foreign trade. Moreover, it could give the 
USSR a key policy-making role in the international monetary system,
A convertible currency is generally considered to be a form of 
exchange that can be (freely) converted into other currencies and com­
modities (i.e., goods and services). Convertible currencies are de­
sirable because they facilitate multilateral transactions. In addition, 
a country whose currency is used as an international reserve currency
is in a position to cover some of its foreign debts by exporting its 
19paper money. However, convertible currencies can also create problems.
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For example, under a floating-rate system, exchange rates can fluctu­
ate markedly as a result of speculative activity*
By maintaining a convertible currency a given country's price 
system tends to be based on world market prices. For example, if com­
modity prices in a country are significantly higher than world mar­
ket prices for the same goods (or substitutes) it is reasonable to 
assume that large amounts of currency will be exported from this coun­
try in order to purchase goods at more favourable prices. Such action 
would normally induce local sellers in the aforementioned country to 
adjust their prices (along the lines of world market prices) to curb 
the outward flow of funds, (if this is not possible such sellers would 
probably go out of business and seek a more profitable livelihood.)
On the other hand, if commodities in a given country are considerably 
cheaper than the same commodities (or substitutes) in world markets 
the rising inflow of funds from abroad should induce sellers (of the 
inexpensive commodities) to increase prices. Of course, such a system 
does not exist in the USSR. Since Soviet buyers are not entitled to 
export their rubles simply to take advantage of cheaper commodity prices, 
and Soviet producers/sellers are not permitted to alter their prices 
according to (domestic and international) demand, the Soviet price 
system does not necessarily reflect conditions in world markets. In 
the event Soviet officials wish to maintain their centrally-determined 
price system it would be reasonable to assume that the power to carry 
out foreign exchange transactions would remain entirely in the hands 
of Soviet planners.
For the purpose of this discussion we will consider three types 
of rubles* (l) the transferable (GMEA) ruble, (z) a hypothetical 
(Soviet) ruble that can be converted into other currencies but not 
into goods and services, and (3) a hypothetical (Soviet) ruble that
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can be exchanged for both commodities and other currencies (i.e., a
convertible ruble). As we learned, the IBEG was set up in I963 to
promote a multilateral clearing system within GMEA. The basic unit
of account in the IBEG is the transferable ruble (or T-ruble). In
some respects the operations of the IBEG are similar to those of the
BIS, T-ruble balances in the IBEG are created via the export of goods
20and services of countries utilising the bank's services. For example, 
let's assume that during a particular year the USSR exports 2 billion 
T-rubles worth of commodities to a given country (operating within 
GMEA's clearing system) and imports 1,8 billion T-rubles worth of com­
modities from that country. The balance (i.e., 200 million T-rubles) 
could be used by the USSR to cover (T-ruble) debts with other countries 
or the balance could be placed at the disposal of the IBEG, In the 
latter case the sum could be lent to a country requiring T-rubles to 
cover its trade deficit. (Some T-ruble funds are placed in the IIB 
in order to promote industrial development within GMEA.) It is impor­
tant to note that at this time T-ruble balances cannot be exchanged 
for convertible currency.
Despite the fact that capitalist countries are entitled to join
the IBEG or participate in CMEA's T-ruble clearing system without join- 
21
ing the bank, H. G, Trend maintains that no non-socialist country
22
has joined the IBEG or participated in the bank's settlement system.
The reluctance of Western nations to conduct business with the IBEG 
prior to 1977 is quite understandable since preliminary balancing of
23
settlements was obligatory until the latter half of 1976, (in other
words, if the U.S. had agreed to export 100 million T-rubles worth of 
goods to the USSR in 1975» the U.S. would have eventually been required 
to import 100 million T-rubles worth of goods from the USSR.) Soon 
after the IBEG's announcement that preliminary balancing of settlements
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was no longer necessary, Western analysts began predicting that a Euro-
24
ruble market would soon be established. According to one report,
'it ^ i .e., the IBEG's decision to permit unbalanced T-ruble transac-, 
tions_7 could well lead to /~the_7 creation of a Eurorouble market 
in which Western companies exporting goods , , , Gomecon coun­
tries would sell transferable roubles to companies wishing to buy goods
2 S
from Gomecon countries'. Needless to say, SFBBs (and even the IBEG)
26
were besieged with calls about the new Euroruble market. The sit­
uation was finally straightened out in the early part of 1977. However,
it is quite obvious from the IBEG's Economic Bulletin that GMEA offic­
ials did not take the Western reports very lightly*
, , , , some of the press agencies of Western countries were 
inexact in their statement^s_y and commented without founda­
tion on the character of the adopted alterations, misinterpre­
ting them as the creation of a Eurorouble, introduction of the 
convertibility of the transferable rouble, the possibility of 
establishing a secondary market of this currency, etc. These 27
statements are unrelated to the reality of the situation . . . .
The blame for the problems connected with the IBEG's announcement 
in the latter half of 1976 should not be borne solely by Western analysts. 
True, these analysts were overly optimistic, but it is only fair to point 
out that the IBEG made the initial announcement without elaborating on 
the change. So, Western analysts foresaw the possibility of a lot of 
East-West trade being financed via (non-convertible) T-rubles, Since 
preliminary balancing of settlements was no longer obligatory, it was 
only natural to assume that some Western companies would have large 
amounts of T-rubles which they would be willing to sell to the highest 
bidder. However, many Western analysts failed to realise that changes 
in the T-ruble's world standing would have to come about before Western 
companies would be willing to accept large amounts of T-rubles as pay­
ment for goods and services. Indeed, Jozef Van Brabant has mentioned 
that if T-rubles are widely used for the financing of East-West trade.
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a Euroruble market could be established that would rival the Eurodollar
market. But Van Brabant was also quick to point out that before the
West starts accepting the T-ruble as an important means of financing
East-West trade, GMEA nations will have to guarantee the T-ruble's
28
(commodity or currency) convertibility. Although there is little 
indication that GMEA (as a whole) favours the emergence of a convert­
ible T-ruble, Imre Vincze, Hungarian Deputy Minister of Finance, 
has claimed that GMEA nations are currently planning to establish a
T-ruble which can be converted into Western currencies. Such a ruble
29
could be in use by 1990.
In 1973» Peter Wiles suggested a type of ruble which would have 
'financial convertibility' (i.e., it could be converted into other 
currencies) but could not be used to purchase commodities ('goods incon­
vertibility'),^^ Such a ruble would offer the USSR financial flexibil­
ity without undermining the rigid Soviet price system. Since a number 
of Western currencies have depreciated markedly since the early 1970s, 
while the ruble's (official) rate of exchange has appreciated, Western 
investors could find that under these conditions it would be highly 
desirable to sell their (fully) convertible currencies for rubles (and 
collect a small profit when they finally cash their rubles for dollars, 
pounds etc.) instead of engaging in day-to-day foreign exchange opera­
tions, The USSR could use Western currencies which are obtained via 
the sale of rubles for a wide range of purposes (e.g., the payment of 
foreign debts, foreign exchange operations etc.). In the event the 
financially-convertible ruble becomes an accepted hedge against infla­
tion, the ruble could become another world reserve currency.
It is appropriate to close this section by briefly discussing 
the prospects for the establishment of a ruble which can be exchanged 
for both commodities and currencies. Through harsh foreign exchange
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restrictions the USSR might be able to maintain a reasonable amount 
of control over the country's currency exports and imports. But it 
is certain that the USSR’s centrally-determined price system would con­
stantly be under pressure. If Soviet prices are set markedly higher 
than prices prevailing in world markets, Soviet citizens would find 
ways of exporting rubles in order to make purcliases abroad. In addition, 
a fair amount of Soviet currency might be exported from the USSR (by 
private citizens) to purchase goods which are not available in the 
Soviet Union. Moreover, spontaneous purchases of Soviet goods by 
Westerners could create shortages in the USSR, Furthermore, under 
a system of floating exchange rates the convertible ruble could be 
quite easily used for speculative purposes. Unlike the situation today, 
Soviet financial institutions could well be forced to buy up rubles 
or the market would soon become glutted and the value of the Soviet 
currency would depreciate. Of course, the problems arising from the 
convertible ruble would not necessarily be the result of unauthorised 
trading. Indeed, the value of the ruble could fall as a result of poor 
economic development/planning in the Soviet economy (i.e., a decline 
in Soviet economic performance could lead to trade deficits which in 
turn might add vast sums of rubles to world financial markets). In 
the light of these facts it seems rather doubtful that we will see 
a (fully) convertible ruble for quite some time.^^
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CONCLUSIONS
The importance of Soviet commercial-financial dealings with the West 
has grown considerably since the mid-1960s. This phenomenon is largely 
the result of the growing emphasis which Soviet analysts now place on 
the economic (as opposed to military) achievements of the USSR. In 
the words of one Soviet author* 'Historically, socialism is called 
upon to transform the world primarily through its j^i.e,, socialism's^ 
successes in economics, science, technology, the development of cul­
ture and the raising of the living standards of the entire population* 
(see V, M. Kudrov, 'Nekotorye voprosy ekonomicheskogo sorevnovaniya 
SSSR i SShA', SShA ekonomika politika ideologiya. No. 9, 1975, P* 16). 
During the 1950s and 1960s, few Soviet analysts stressed the importance 
of boosting the volume of Soviet industrial output and the efficiency 
of Soviet industrial processes via the technology of IMTEs, At this 
time Western technology is recognised by many Soviet scholars as an 
important means of developing the Soviet economy. The Soviet quest 
for economic rationality has softened the USSR's attitude toward the 
presence of Western businessmen and technicians in the Soviet Union. 
Some of these Westerners are working on joint industrial projects which 
will be in operation during the twenty-first century*
The desire of Soviet leaders to improve economic relations be­
tween the USSR and MTEs is also manifested in the number of Soviet 
organisations which have been established in the West during the 197Cs. 
Many of these organisations were set up to promote Soviet trade with 
MTEs through governmental channels. Other organisations were estab-
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lished to deal directly with both companies and individual consumers 
in the West, The marked expansion of the USSR's international network 
of trading companies and banks clearly indicates that Soviet officials 
have recognised the importance of more direct contact with Western mar­
kets*
Although the increase in Soviet commercial-financial dealings 
with the West has led to a number of encouraging developments, it has 
also brought about some problems which could eventually hamper the 
growth of Soviet trade with IMTEs, During the 1950s and 1960s, Soviet 
trade with IMTEs was more or less balanced. But after 1970, the USSR 
has recorded some rather large hard-currency trade deficits* At this 
time Soviet trade-related debts to IMTEs amount to well over $10 bil­
lion. It is also important to note that Soviet payments for debt ser­
vicing might have amounted to $3 billion in 1977, and could go as high 
as almost $4 billion during 1978 (see The Times, 12 April 1977, p, 4),
If these estimates are accurate the USSR's (hard currency) debt-service 
ratio now stands at about 25 percent, and could increase to over JO per­
cent by the end of 1978 if Soviet exports to hard currency areas do not 
increase significantly. Now it is difficult to believe that the Western 
world is presently concerned that the USSR will be unable to meet all 
of its financial obligations. After all, we are dealing with the second 
largest economy in the world (the USSR's 1976 GNP was estimated at 
$897.3 billion,* see GIA, National Basic Intelligence Factbook, July 
1977, p. 203). Soviet gold reserves are undoubtedly large enough to 
cover a sizeable portion of the USSR's debts. Moreover, Soviet foreign 
indebtedness does not appear so large when compared with the debts of 
selected LDGs (see Financial Times, I7 June 1977» p. 4). Furthermore, 
Western creditors are well aware of the USSR's impeccable financial 
record with IMTEs, So why are IMTEs concerned about the USSR's indebt-
40?
edness? The reason is quite clean Soviet officials are still unwil­
ling to provide necessary data for Western creditors in the face of 
rising Soviet debts. If the USSR's financial position is so sound 
why should there be any reluctance to cite a few pertinent facts?
The problem of reciprocity has become more important in the light 
of the expansion of Soviet commercial-financial operations in the West, 
During the past decade the SMF aud SFTGs and SFBBs have been free to 
take advantage of opportunities in Western markets. However, at this 
time the Soviet economy is still closed to Western entrepreneurs. True, 
there has been a marked increase in the number of Western representa­
tive offices in the USSR. But this can hardly be considered an impor­
tant development as such offices are not permitted to engage in commer­
cial activity. Even Western companies that participate in compensa­
tory projects in the USSR are seldom permitted to function in a decision­
making capacity. So, at some point the USSR could find that Western 
nations are reluctant to permit the free growth of the Soviet foreign- 
based business community without evidence that the Soviet economy is 
becoming more accessible to Western traders.
Three years ago this researcher argued against more Western govern­
ment participation in trade with the USSR. But times have changed and 
so has this researcher. It is now recognised that Western governments 
can play an important role in improving the conditions for private 
operators in the sphere of East-West trade (note that I only mentioned 
East-West trade). Selected government departments in IMTEs now have 
quite a lot of access to their Soviet counterparts. IVhen serious prob­
lems arise between private and state traders, Western governments should 
be quick to discuss such problems with appropriate Soviet organs, (For 
example, if the SMF is accused of undercutting the rates of American 
shippers the U.S. Department of Commerce should demand an explanation
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for this policy from the Soviet Ministry of the Merchant Fleet.) If 
the response from a particular Soviet ministry is unsatisfactory the 
appropriate Westem-govemment department should immediately take action 
to safeguard the interests of private traders. (For example, legislation 
could be passed that would help American shippers compete with the SMF,)
Many Western entrepreneurs have found it difficult to deal with 
or compete against Soviet traders because of a lack of information. 
Therefore, information and advisory offices for East-West trade should 
be set up in appropriate Western government departments to compile and 
distribute data as well as provide consultative services for private 
traders. Much of the information which is made available to Western 
companies could come from government organs which are set up to research 
problems that are connected with East-West trade (e,g,, the Bureau of 
East-West Trade in the United States), Other information could come 
from discussions between Western government leaders and Soviet officials. 
Since Soviet officials are probably more inclined to discuss sensitive 
issues with government representatives than private businessmen, it 
is likely that government-sponsored information and advisory offices 
would even be able to assist commercial intelligence departments in 
the largest private firms.
In the final analysis, most of the burden of dealing with Soviet 
traders should fall on the shoulders of Western entrepreneurs. Given 
an adequate supply of information from government sources, Western trad­
ers should be able to deal sagaciously with Soviet organisations. If 
selected groups of Soviet and Western traders cannot resolve their dif­
ferences, Western governments should be called upon to deal with these 
problems as soon as possible. Such a policy encourages the use of the 
market mechanism whilst it protects the interests of efficient Western 
traders in the face of competition from centrally planned economies.
The call for more Western government participation in East-West
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trade matters was not made in the hope of solving the real problems 
which now hinder the development of Soviet economic relations with 
MTEs, There is no doubt that some Western governments are now in a 
position to put a lot of pressure on Soviet leaders for the purpose 
of gaining information which would help Western businessmen make econ­
omic decisions. But one could well ask if this tactic is really nec­
essary. There are a number of obvious problems in the Soviet economy. 
The GIA has made a controversial projection that Soviet petroleum pro­
duction will start declining by the early 1980s in spite of the fact 
that the USSR has vast oil reserves. If this is true the USSR could 
experience some serious problems. It is hard to believe that Western 
companies would not be in a position to assist the USSR if such dif­
ficulties arise. Of course, the petroleum sector is but one part of 
the Soviet economy that might benefit from Western technology. Large- 
scale Western participation in other sectors of the Soviet economy 
could well make the USSR a better place to live. Moreover, any increase 
in Western operations in the Soviet economy is bound to create more 
Soviet commercial activity in the West, Such developments could re­
duce tensions between the USSR and MTEs, However, as long as Soviet 
leaders insist on isolating the Soviet economy from the West a major 
impediment to the development of East-West relations will exist,
Soviet leaders maintain that their current policies will someday 
give rise to an economy which is far superior to any market-type econ­
omic system. This possibility cannot be ruled out. But if economic 
conditions in the USSR do not improve vis-à-vis the West, Soviet lead­
ers will find that it is increasingly difficult to convince the Soviet 
citizenry that someday is worth waiting for.
APPENDIX A
SOVIET SHARE OF WORLD EXPORTS TO SELECTED 
COUNTRIES AND GROUPS OF COUNTRIES
1970-1975
(in millions of U.S. dollars)
Commodity classification 
and countries
1970 1972 1973 1974 1975
I, Food, beverages and 
tobacco
World exports to the U.S. 5,780 7,110 8,920 10,060 9,130
Soviet exports to the U.S. 6 2 1 1 1
Soviet share % 0.1 negl. negl. negl. negl.
World exports to Canada 1.030 1,340 1,640 2,150 2,230
Soviet exports to Canada -* « - 1
Soviet share % - - — negl. -
American exports to Canada 560 660 810 970 1,060
American share % 54.4 49.3 49.4 45.1 47.5
World exports to Japan 2,110 3,040 5,590 7,030 7,330
Soviet exports to Japan 7 6 14 32 29
Soviet share % 0.3 0 .2 0.3 0.5 0.4
American exports to Japan 730 810 1,930 2,260 2,140
American share % 34.6 26.6 34.5 32.1 29.2
World exports to the EEG^ 17,230 23,380 31,730 35,360 40,300
Soviet exports to the EEC 62 63 64 74 89
Soviet share % 0,4 0.3 0.2 0 .2 0 .2
American exports to the EEC 1,480 1,800 2,950 3,370 3,950
American share % 8.6 7.7 9.3 9.5 9.8
World exports to the EFTA^ 2,080 2,750 3,800 4,520 4,680
Soviet exports to the EFTA 16 13 17 33 20
Soviet share % 0 .8 0.5 0.4 0.7 0.4
American exports to the EFTA 225 250 350 46o 510
American share % 10.8 9.1 9.2 10.2 10.9
World exports to LDGs^ 7,360 9,310 14,150 21,650 23,560
Soviet exports to LDCs 190 160 380 780 510
Soviet share % 2.6 1.7 2.7 3.6 2.2
American exports to LDCs 1,770 2,170 4,010 5,900 6,140
American share % 24.0 23.3 28.3 27.3 26,1
World exports to GPEs^ 4,140 5,250 7,910 9,190 12,080
Soviet exports to CPEs 520 340 500 600 550
Soviet share % 12.6 6.5 6.3 6.5 4.6
American exports to CPEs 76 530 1,590 970 1,580
American share % 1.8 10.1 20.1 10,6 13.1
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Commodity classification 
and countries
1970 1972 1973 1974 1975
II, Raw materials (excluding 
fuels, oils and fats)
World exports to the U.S. 3,450 4,290 5,150 6,500 5,750
Soviet exports to the U.S. 16 14 12 20 38
Soviet share % 0 .5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7
World exports to Canada 750 790 960 1,320 1,250
Soviet exports to Canada 3 3 2 5 2
Soviet share 0.4 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2
American exports to Canada 550 580 710 960 960
American share % 73.3 73.4 74.0 72.7 76.8
World exports to Japan 5,020 5,770 9,880 10,870 8,330
Soviet exports to Japan 200 295 510 730 560
Soviet share % 4.0 5.1 5.2 6.7 6.7
American exports to Japan 1,340 1,400 2,550 2,770 2,360
American share % 26.7 24.3 25.8 25.5 28.3
World exports to the EEC 13,080 14,930 22,430 29,820 25,800
Soviet exports to the EEC 320 415 680 1,010
3.4
960
Soviet share % 2.4 2.8 3.0 3.7
American exports to the EEC 1,510 1,660 2,660 3,680 3,150
American share % 11.5 11.1 11.9 12.3 12,2
World exports to the EFTA 1,670 1,920 2,690 3,740 3,500
Soviet exports to the EFTA 95 87 160 270 345
Soviet share % 5.7 4.5 5.9 7.2 9.9
American exports to the EFTA 135 135 205 340 280
American share % 8.1 7.0 7.6 9.1 8.0
World exports to LDCs 3,790 4,630 7,010 10,190 9,480
Soviet exports to LDCs 140 190 205 400 355
Soviet share % 3.7 4.1 2.9 3.9 3.7
American exports to LDCs 1,080 1,140 1.790 2,970 2,720
American share % 28.5 24.6 25.5 29.1 28.7
World exports to CPEs 3,550 3,950 5,790 6,960 7,330
Soviet exports to CPEs 1,210
34.1
1,320 1,630 1,690 2,450
Soviet share % 33.4 28.2 24.3 33.4
American exports to CPEs 105 170 425 540 295
American share % 3.0 4 .3 7.3 7.8 4.0
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Commodity classification 
and countries
1970 1972 1973 1974 1975
III. Mineral fuels and 
related materials
World exports to the U.S. 3,360 5,730 9,730 27,090 27,670
Soviet exports to the U.S. - — 50 7 46
Soviet share % — - 0.5 negl. 0.2
World exports to Canada 770 1,160 1,560 3,640 3,830
Soviet exports to Canada - - 11 16
Soviet share % - - - 0.3 0.4
American exports to Canada 270 355 360 530 870
American share % 35.1 30.6 23.1 14.6 22.7
World exports to Japan 3,420 5,640 7,720 24,380 24,090
Soviet exports to Japan 68 58 105 190 245
Soviet share % 2.0 1.0 1.4 0.8 1.0
American exports to Japan 520 440 500 1,450 1,570
American share % 15.2 7.8 6.4 5.9 6.5
World exports to the EEC 10,830 16,600 23,720 60,960 55,750
Soviet exports to the EEC 335 465 1,070 1,990 2,500
Soviet share % 3.1 2 .8 4 .5 3.3 4 .5
American exports to the EEC 355 375 365 720 960
American share % 3.3 2.3 1.5 1.2 1.7
World exports to the EFTA 1,770 1,430 3.390 7.590 7,940
Soviet exports to the EFTA 275 400 580 1,420 1,620
Soviet share % 15.5 16.5 17.1 18.7 20.4
American exports to the EF’TA 36 33 35 53 99
American share % 2.0 1.4 1.0 0.7 1.2
World exports to LDCs 4,710 6,380 9,870 28,090 29,140
Soviet exports to LDCs 150 210 250 660 830
Soviet share % 3.2 3.3 2.5 2.3 2.8
American exports to LDCs 290 265 315 520 720
American share % 6.2 4.2 3.2 1.9 2.5
World exports to CPEs 1,750 2,450 3,320 4,210 7,660
Soviet exports to CPEs 1,090 1,460 1,840 2,090 4,430
Soviet share % 62.3 59.6 55.4 49,6 57.8
American exports to CPEs 30 2 6 8 23
American share % 1.7 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.5
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Commodity classification 
and countries
1970 1972 1973 1974 1975
XV, Chemicals
World exports to the U.S. 1,250 1,840 2,330 4,100 3,570
Soviet exports to the U.S. 1 1 2 30 44
Soviet share % negl. negl. negl. 0.7 1.2
World exports to Canada 710 900 1,120 1,680 1,650
Soviet exports to Canada - - 4 4 6
Soviet share % «• *» 0.4 0.2 0.4
American exports to Canada 550 690 840 1,210 1,220
American share % 77.5 76.7 75.0 72.0 73.9
World exports to Japan 810 910 1,660 2,260 1,680
Soviet exports to Japan 5 7 14 23 12
Soviet share % 0.6 0,8 0.8 1.0 0.7
American exports to Japan 320 315 630 770 590
American share % 39.5 34.6 38.0 34.1 35.1
World exports to the EEC 7,810 10,660 15,150 23,670 21,640
Soviet exports to the EEC 34 34 49 155 175
Soviet share % 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.7 0.8
American exports to the EEC 1,200 1,200 1,560 2,210 2,230
American share % 15.4 11.3 10.3 9.3 10.3
World exports to the EFTA 2,130 2,720 3,740 5,640 5,210
Soviet exports to the EFTA 16 13 20 48 49
Soviet share % 0.8 0.5 0 .5 0.9 0.9
American exports to the El^’TA 155 150 230 290 285
American share % 7.3 5.5 6.1 5.1 5 .5
World exports to LDCs 5,190 6,750 9,380 15,790 16,370
Soviet exports to LDCs 49 61 79 180 200
Soviet share % 0.9 0.9 0,8 1.1 1.2
American exports to LDCs 1,280 1,460 2,020 3,600 3,740
American share % 24.7 21.6 21.5 22.8 22.8
World exports to CPEs 2,040 2,830 3,580 5,430 6,380
Soviet exports to CPEs 180 220 250 275 340
Soviet share % 8.8 7.8 7.0 5.1 5 .3
American exports to CPEs 37 38 38 64 89
American share % 1.8 1.3 1.1 1.2 1.4
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Commodity classification 
and countries
1970 1972 1973 1974 1975
V. Machinery and transport 
equipment
World exports to the U.S. 11,610 17,750 21,820 24,990 24,290
Soviet exports to the U.S. - - 2 6
Soviet share % - — negl. negl.
World exports to Canada 5,840 8,770 10,520 13,190 14,780
Soviet exports to Canada - - 1 4 10
Soviet share % - negl. negl. 0.1
American exports to Canada 4,870 7,110 8,730 10,940 12,360
American share % 83.4 81.1 83.0 82.9 83.6
World exports to Japan 1,820 2,090 2,750 3,780 3,150
Soviet exports to Japan 3 6 6 6 4
Soviet share % 0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
American exports to Japan 1,150 1,250 1,490 2,120 1,700
American share % 63.2 59.8 54.2 56.1 54.0
World exports to the EEC 25,030 35,070 47,330 54,210 61,280
Soviet exports to the EEC 48 55 90 105 150
Soviet share % 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
American exports to the EEC 4,080 4,310 5,770 7,180 7,660
American share % 16.3 12.3 12,2 13.2 12.5
World exports to the EFTA 7,750 10,760 14,130 17,120 18,800
Soviet exports to the EFTA 27 36 79 90 170
Soviet share % 0.3 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.9
American exports to the EFTA 710 760 870 1,350 1,430
American share % 9.2 7.1 6.2 7.9 7.6
World exports to LDCs 19,450 26,510 35,140 50,760 70,410
Soviet exports to LDCs 900 1,020 1,240 1,220 1,520
Soviet share % 4.6 3.8 3.5 2.4 2.2
American exports to LDCs 4,940 5,940 7,720 11,760 16,580
American share % 25.4 22,4 22.0 23.2 23.5
World exports to CPEs 10,130 14,360 19,190 23,350 30,890
Soviet exports to CPEs 1,730 2,460 3,200 3,750 4,310
Soviet share % 17.1 17.1 16.7 16.1 14.0
American exports to CPEs 69 105 340 530 890
American share % 0.7 0.7 1,8 2.3 2.9
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Commodity classification 
and countries
1970 1972 1973 1974 1975
VI, Other manufactured 
commodities
World exports to the U.S. 13,280 17,590 20,690 26,320 22,750
Soviet exports to the U.S. 31 48 110 175 54
Soviet share % 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.2
World exports to Canada 2,960 4,250 5,220 7,470 7,070
Soviet exports to Canada 4 8 12 8 6
Soviet share % 0,1 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
American exports to Canada 1,710 2,300 2,940 4,340 4,320
American share % 57.8 54,1 56.3 58.1 61,1
World exports to Japan 2,240 2,810 6,220 6,790 4,870
Soviet exports to Japan 97 53 195 215 72
Soviet share % 4,3 1.9 3.1 3.2 1.5
American exports to Japan 485 660 1,010 1,100 920
American share % 21.7 23.5 16.2 16,2 18.9
World exports to the EEC 34,260 44,920 62,360 79,420 77,920
Soviet exports to the EEC 245 290 420 530 520
Soviet share % 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.7
American exports to the ESC 2,200 2,040 2,730 3,830 3,740
American share % 6.4 4.5 4.4 4.8 4.8
World exports to the EFTA 8,300 10,690 14,940 19,390 19,310
Soviet exports to the EFTA 71 65 130 155 125
Soviet share % 0.9 0.6 0.9 0,8 0.6
American exports to the EFTA 350 365 495 700 690
American share % 4.2 3.4 3.3 3.6 3.6
World exports to LDCs 15,260 18,400 25,690 40,290 44,370
Soviet exports to LDCs 265 305 330 510 430
Soviet share % 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.3 1.0
American exports to LDCs 2,280 2,190 3,100 5,080 5,540
American share % 14.9 11.9 12.1 12.6 12.5
World exports to CPEs 8,660 11,410 14,830 19,460 24,020
Soviet exports to CPEs 1,700 2,090 2,300 2,360 3,560
Soviet share % 19.6 18.3 15.5 12.1 14.8
American exports to CPEs 35 39 80 120 200
American share % 0.4 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.8
^The European Economic Community (EEC) includes the following 
countries I Belgium, Denmark, France, the PRG, Italy, Luxemburg, the 
Netherlands, the Republic of Ireland, and the U.K.
^The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) includes the follow­
ing countries* Austria, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, 
and Switzerland,
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°Less-developed countries (LDCs),
C^entrally planned economies (CPEs) include members of the Coun­
cil for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) and China,
Source* United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
Statistical Yearbook 1976 (New York, 1977), pp. 434-462,
APPENDIX B
SOVIET TRADING COMPANIES AND BANKS 
OPERATING IN THE WEST
Companies by country Year of estab­
lishment or 
year operations 
commenced
Share capital 
owned by the 
USSR {% )
Australia
Fresco Australia Line 
Opal Maritime Agency Ltd,
Austria
Asotra
Donau Handelsbank AG 
Garant Versicherungs AG 
Interprom Handelsgesell- 
schaft mbH
Belgium
Belgium-Soviet Trade 
Company (Belso)
NV East-West Agencies 
NV Elorg Belgie 
NV Ferchimex 
Nafta-B 
Russalmaz NV 
Scaldia-Volga
Transworld Marine Agency (TWM) 
Cameroon
1976
1974
1976
1974
1958
1978
1966
1973
1974 
1972
1967 
1972
19&f-
1970
85
NA
52
100
100
60
75
NA
80 (approx.)
60
90
80
66 (approx.) 
75
Keteko
Canada
Belarus Equipment Ltd,
Emec Trading Ltd.
Morflot Freight Liners Ltd, 
Socan Aircraft Ltd,
Stan Canada Machinery Ltd.
Ethiopia
Ethiopian-Soviet Trading 
Company Ltd. (Ethso)
Federal Republic of Germany
Neotype Techmaschexport GmbH
1973
1972
1973 
1975 
1975 
1972
1967
1973
NA
100
100
95
67
100
72
75
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Companies by country Year of estab­
lishment or 
year operations 
commenced
Share capital 
owned by the 
USSR W
Federal Republic of Germany (cent.)
Ost-West Handelsbank AG 1971
Plodimex Aussenhandels GmbH 1974
Russalmaz AG 1975
Russische Holz GmbH (Russholz) 1974
Sobren Ghemiehandel GmbH 1974
Schwarzmeer und Ostsee Trans- 
portversicherungs AG (Sovag) 1927
liberseeschiffahrtsagentur 
Transnautic GmbH 1974
Wesotra Spedition und
Transport GmbH 1976
Finland
Finn-Elorg 
Koneisto AB 
Konela
Saimaa Lines Ltd, 
Suomen Petrooli 
Teboil Oy
France
1974 
1964 
1947 
early 1970s 
1946 
1934
Actif-Avto 1966
Banque Commerciale pour 1*
Europe du Nord SA (Eurobank) 1925
Fransoy 1976
Groupement d' Intérêt Economique 
pour le Développement des Echanges 
Commerciaux entre 1' URSS et la 
France (Gisofra) 1971
Promolease 1974
Rusbois 1969
Société d' Agences Maritimes 
Franco-Sovietique SA (Sagmar) 1974
Slava SA 1972
Sogo and Company SA I968
Stankofrance 1971
Iran
Bank Russo-Iran 1923
Iraq
Rafidian Fisheries Ltd. 1974
100 
51 ^
90 (approx.) 
NA
51 
100
50 (approx.)
52
NA
NA
75
NA
NA
NA
70
100
50
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
NA
100
49
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Companies by country Year of estab­
lishment or 
year operations 
commenced
Share capital 
owned by the 
USSR W
Italy
Dolphin Agenzia Maritima 
Stanitaliana SpA 
Sovitalmare 
Sovitpesca SpA 
Teonicon SpA
Japan
Nisotra
United Orient Shipping Agency 
The Lebanon
Moscow Narodny Bank (Beirut 
branch)
Luxemburg
Banque Unie Est-Ouest SA
Mozambique
Soviet-Mozambique 
Fishing Company
The Netherlands
East-V/est Agencies 
Elorg BV
Transworld Marine Agency NV 
Nigeria
West African Automobile and 
Technical Engineering Company 
(WAATEGO)
Norway
Koneisto Norge AS 
Konela Norge Bil
The Philippines
Fil-Sov Shipping Company
1976
1971
1976
1976
1977
1977
1969
1963
1974
1977
1969
1972
1972
I9&+
1967
NA
1974
NA
84
NA
NA
50
50
50
100
50
NA
65
NA
NA
NA
NA
40
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Companies by country Year of estab- Share capital
lishment or owned by the
year operations USSR
commenced
Singapore
Marine Industries of 
Singapore-Soviet Com­
pany Pte Ltd, (Marissco) 1975 NA
Moscow Narodny Bank
(Singapore branch) 1971
Singapore-Soviet Shipping
Company (Sosiac) 1967 NA
Spain
Intramar SA 1976 NA
Pesquerias Espanolas Soviet-
icas Conjuntas SA (Pesconsa) 1975 NA
Sovhispan 1971 50
Sweden
Alco 1975/1976 49
Matreco Handels AB NA 97 (approx,)
Scansov AB 1976 60
Switzerland
Woachod Handelsbank AG I966 100
The United Kingdom
Anglo-Soviet Shipping Com­
pany Ltd, 1923 100
Anglo-Soviet Shipping Com­
pany (Humber) Ltd, mid-1970s
Black Sea and Baltic
General Insurance Company Ltd, I925 100
Charter Travel Company
Ltd, (CTC Lines) mid-1970s 100
East-West Leasing Company 1973 50
Moscow Narodny Bank Ltd, 1919 100
Nafta-GB Ltd, late 1950s 100
Sadko Marine Supplies Ltd, mid-1970s 100
Sovfracht (London) Ltd, mid-1970s 100
Technical and Optical
Equipment Ltd. 1968 100
United Machinery Organisation
Plant Ltd, (UMO) I969 100
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Companies by country Year of estab­
lishment or 
year operations 
commenced
Share capital 
owned by the 
USSR (%)
The United States
Amtorg Trading Corporation 1924 100
Belarus Machinery of USA Inc. 1976 100
Morflot American Shipping
Inc. (Moram) 1976 100
U.S.-USSR Marine Resources
Company Inc. 1976 50
Sovfracht (USA) Inc. 1976 100
Sources* CIA, Soviet Commercial Operations in the West. Septem­
ber 1977; and selected press reports.
APPENDIX G
SELECTED EUROCURRENCY LOANS GRANTED BY 
INTERNATIONAL BANKING CONSORTIA COM­
PRISED OF WESTERN BANKS, SOVIET 
FOREIGN TRADE BANKS, AND THE 
IBEC AND IIB, JANUARY I975- 
AUGUST 1978
Date loan 
was announ­
ced
Soviet/CMEA banks 
participating in 
consortium loan
Total amount 
of loan®*
Terms Recipient
January 1975 Moscow Narodny 
Bank (MNB)
February 1975 MNB
February 1975 
February 1975
February 1975
March 1975 
April 1975
April 1975 
April 1975
April 1975
July 1975 
July 1975
MNB (Beirut 
branch) and 
Eurobank
Eurobank, Banque 
Unie and Wpzchod 
Handelsbank
Eurobank and Ost- 
West Handelsbank
Eurobank
MNB, Eurobank, 
Banque Unie, Ost- 
West Handelsbank 
and Donau Handels- 
bank
Eurobank
Eurobank
Eurobank
Eurobank
Banque Unie
$10 million
$100 million 
$40 million
five-year 
floating- 
rate loan
five years
medium-term
loan
Finland
Vneshtorg­
bank
Middle
East
Airlines
$100 million five years Hungary
$100 million nine years Egypt
DM 80 million five years Spain
$l40 million medium-term Brazil
loan
$140 million 
$150 million
$150 million
$250 million 
$100 million
ten years Malaysia
seven
years
seven
years
Frigg Gas 
Field De­
velopments
Frigg Gas 
Field 
Transpor­
tation
medium-term Vneshtorg- 
loan bank
five years Mexico
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Date loan 
was announ­
ced
Soviet/CMEA banks 
participating in 
consortium loan
Total amount 
of loan&
Terms Recipient
August 1975 MNB
September 1975 MNB, Ost-West 
Handelsbank, Bank 
Russo-Iran, Banque 
Unie, Eurobank and 
the IBEC
September 1975 Eurobank 
September 1975
October 1975 
October 1975 
October 1975
October 1975 
October 1975
October 1975
November 1975 
November 1975 
November 1975
Eurobank and 
Banque Unie
Banque Unie
Eurobank
Eurobank and 
the IBEC
Wozchod
Handelsbank
MNB (Beirut 
branch), Eurobank 
and Wozchod 
Handelsbank
Eurobank and 
Vneshtorgbank
Vneshtorgbank
Eurobank
Eurobank
November 1975 Eurobank and 
Banque Unie
November 1975 Eurobank
January 1976 Eurobank and 
Banque Unie
$10 million medium-term Iran
floating- 
rate loan
DM 250 million five years Cuba
$50 million 
$50 million
eight years Poland 
five years Poland
$50 million five years Brazil
DM 300 million five years Cuba
$25 million
$28 million 
$500 million
$150 million
$50 million 
$10 million 
$150 million
five years African 
Develop­
ment Bank
NA
NA
Brazil
Iraq
medium-term Turkey 
loan
five years Argentina
five years Spain
medium-term Peru 
loan
$200 million five years Greece
$160 million medium-term Brazil
loan
$150 million six years Hungary
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Date loan 
was announ­
ced
Soviet/CHEA banks 
participating in 
consortium loan
Total amount 
of loan&
Terms Recipient
J anuary 1976 Eurobank DM 100 million five years Vietnam
at 1 3/4 
percent over 
LIBOR
January 1976 MNB, Eurobank, $350 million
Donau Handelsbank,
Bank Russo-Iran,
Banque Unie and 
Ost-West Handelsbank
NA IIB
January 1976 MNB
January 1976 Eurobank
January 1976 Eurobank
February 1976 Eurobank and 
the IBEC
$400 million
$20 million 
DM 20 million
five years Vneshtorg­
bank
five years Senegal 
medium-term Republic
loan of Gabon
DM 100 million five years Vietnam
February 1976 Eurobank, Banque $40 million 
Unie and the IBEC
April 1976 Eurobank $120 million
April 1976 Wozchod Handelsbank $50 million 
and the IBEC
June 1976
June 1976 
July 1976 
July 1976
July 1976
Eurobank
Eurobank
Vneshtorgbank
Eurobank and the 
IBEC
Eurobank
$40 million
$30 million 
$600 million 
DM 200 million
six-year 
floating- 
rate loan
medium-term
loan
six-year 
floating- 
rate loan
long-term
loan
NA
six years
floating- 
rate loan
$500 million seven years
Bank Polska 
Kasa Opieka 
SA
Brazil
Iran
African 
Develop­
ment Bank
Poland
IIB
Cuba
Electri­
cité de 
France
September 1976 Eurobank $50 million NA Algeria
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Date loan 
was announ­
ced
Soviet/CMEA banks 
participating in 
consortium loan
Total amount 
of loan&
Terms Recipient
September 1976 Wozchod Handelsbank $13.5 million seven-year 
floating- 
rate loan
Polestar 
Naviga­
tion SA
September 1976 Eurobank $60 million medium-term
loan
Groupement 
de 1' Indus­
trie Sidér­
urgique
October 1976 Eurobank $25 million five years Spain
January 1977 Vneshtorgbank 
and the IBEC
DM 150 million five years Cuba
August 1977 Eurobank $20 million NA Yugoslavia
November 1977 Eurobank $30 million NA Algeria
November 1977 Eurobank $35 million NA Yugoslavia
December 1977 MNB $600 million seven years IIB
January 1978 Eurobank DM 100 million medium-term
loan
Tradinvest 
Bank and 
Trust Com­
pany of 
Nassau Ltd.
February 1978 Eurobank $500 million eight years France
March 1978 MNB $105 million medium-term
loan
Yugoslavia
March 1978 MNB $50 million medium-term
loan
Yugoslavia
March 1978 MNB $400 million seven years 
at 3/4 per­
cent over 
LIBOR
Vneshtorg­
bank
April 1978 Eurobank $27.1 million short-term
loan
Fundacion 
Institute 
Municipal 
de Energia 
de Maracaibi
April 1978 Eurobank $100 million seven years Gaz de
France
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Date loan 
was announ­
ced
Soviet/CMEA banks 
participating in 
consortium loan
Total amount 
of loan®*
Terms Recipient
April 1978 Banque Unie $200 million medium-term
loan
Italy
May 1978 Eurobank $65 million medium-term
loan
Greusot-
Loire
(France)
June 1978 Banque Unie and 
Wozchod Handelsbank
$300 million medium-term
loan
Hungary
June 1978 Banque Unie DM 400 million eight years Denmark
July 1978 Eurobank $218 million NA Algeria
July 1978 Eurobank DM 100 million NA Brazil
July 1978 Eurobank $150 million medium-term
loan
Lebanon
August 1978 Eurobank $150 million seven years Portugal
August 1978 Eurobank $65 million medium-term
loan
Finsider 
SpA (ital}
August 1978 Eurobank $150 million medium-term
loan
Tunisia
August 1978 Eurobank $120 million medium-term
loan
Brazil
August 1978 Banque Unie 
and Eurobank
$700 million NA Mexico
August 1978 Eurobank $25 million medium-term
loan
Algeria
August 1978 Eurobank $60 million medium-term
loan
Algeria
It is important to keep in mind that each sum represents the 
total amount of the consortium loan and not the sum granted by social­
ist banks.
Sources* Selected Press Bulletins from Moscow Narodny Bank.
APPENDIX D
INTERNATIONAL CARGO LINES OF THE USSR, 30 JUNE 1975
Lines Operated. Unilaterally by Soviet 
Shinning Companies
Route
Soviet Baltic/Western Europe-Eastern Canada/Great 
Lakes^
Soviet Baltic/Western Europe-U.S. East Coast 
(Balt-Atlantic)^
Soviet Baltic/Western Europe-Australia®
Soviet Baltic/Western Europe-New Zealand^
Soviet Baltic/Western Europe-Venezuela and West 
Coast of South America (Balt-Pacific)®'
Soviet Baltic/Western Europe-Central America.
West Indies and U.S. and Mexican Gulf (WIGAS)
Soviet Baltic/Finland-Netherlands/Belgium 
(Balt-Scan)^
Soviet Baltic-West Germany/East Coast United 
Kingdom (London)
Soviet Baltic-West Germany/Netherlands 
Soviet Baltic-Cuba 
Soviet Baltic-Belgium
Soviet Baltic-East Coast United Kingdom (Hull)- 
B eIgium-F inland
Soviet Baltic-Sweden-Italy-UAR-Western Europe^ 
Soviet Baltic/Western Europe-Portugal/Spain 
Soviet Baltic/Western Europe-Eastern Mediterranean 
Soviet Baltic-East Coast Sweden
Soviet Baltic-Denmark-Norway-Eastern Mediterranean 
Soviet Baltic-Norway and Denmark 
Soviet Baltic/Finland/Norway-Netherlands/Belgium 
Soviet Baltic-West Germany
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Company
Murmansk
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic
Baltic/Latvian
Estonian
Estonian
Estonian
Estonian
Estonian
Lithuanian
a
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Company 
Latvian 
Danube 
Danube 
Danube 
Danube 
Black Sea 
Black Sea 
Black Sea 
Black Sea 
Black Sea 
Black Sea
Black Sea
Azov
Azov
Azov
Caspian
Par East
Far East 
Far East 
Far East
Far East
Far East
Far East
Route
Soviet Baltic-East Coast United Kingdom (London/Tilbury)
Soviet Danube-Near East (Lebanon, Syria, UAR and Cyprus)
Soviet Danube-Turkey
Soviet Danube-North Africa
Soviet Danube-Greece
Soviet Black Sea-Persian Gulf (Iraq)
Soviet Black Sea-Syria 
Soviet Black Sea-Vietnam 
Soviet Black Sea-Cuba
Western Europe/Soviet Black Sea-Southeast Asia ^
Soviet Black Sea/Mediterranean Europe-Eastern Canada/
Great Lakes^
Soviet Black Sea-East Africa/Red Sea 
Soviet Black Sea-Turkey/Greece 
Soviet Black Sea-Italy 
Soviet Black Sea-Near East
Iran (Caspian)-Baltic-North Sea (via Volga-Baltic 
Waterway)^
Southeast Asia-Western Canada and the United States
Soviet Far East/Japan-Western Canada and the United States®* 
Soviet Far East/Japan-Western Canada and the United States®* 
Soviet Far East/Japan-Southeast Asia/lndia^
Soviet Far East-Hong Kong-Japan®
Soviet Far East/Japan^
Soviet Far East/Philippines^
Lines Operated Jointly by Soviet and 
Foreign Shipping Companies
Soviet company 
Baltic
Route
Soviet Baltic-East Coast United 
Kingdom (London)
Nationality of 
foreign partner
British
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Soviet company 
Baltic
Estonian
Estonian
Latvian
Latvian 
Latvian 
Latvian 
Latvian 
Black Sea 
Black Sea 
Black Sea 
Black Sea 
Azov 
Far East
Route
Soviet Baltic/Western Europe- 
East Coast of South America 
(Balt-Amerioa)G
Soviet Baltic-West Germany
Baltic/Western Europe-West 
Africa^
Soviet Baltic-West Coast 
United Kingdom
Soviet Baltic-East Germany
Soviet Baltic-France (Atlantic)
Soviet Baltic-Netherlands
Soviet Baltic-Belgium
Soviet Black Sea-Bulgaria
Soviet Black Sea-UAR
Soviet Black Sea-India/Sri Lanka
Soviet Black Sea-Southern France
Soviet Black Sea-Algeria
Soviet Far East-Japan
Nationality of 
foreign partner
Polish and 
East German
West German
Polish and 
East German
British
East German
French
Dutch
Belgian
Bulgarian
Egyptian
Indian
French
French
Japanese
An independent line primarily involved in cross-trade operations,
^In June 1975» Balt-Atlantic was an independent line primarily 
involved in cross-trade operations. However, at the end of 1976, Balt- 
Atlantic was planning to join seven North Atlantic shipping conferences,
^A conference line primarily involved in cross-trade operations.
Source: William Carr, ‘Soviet Shipping Strength and Its Employ­
ment’ , in Soviet Oceans Development, compiled by the U.S. Congress, 
Committee on Commerce and National Ocean Policy Study, 94th Gong.,
2nd sess. (Washington, D.G.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976),
pp. 338-341.
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